The Emergence of the Classical Style in Greek Sculpture

RICHARD NEER
The Emergence of the Classical Style in Greek Sculpture
The Emergence of the Classical Style in Greek Sculpture

RICHARD NEER

The University of Chicago Press  CHICAGO AND LONDON
FOR
Theodore Frederick Douglass Neer

He makes a July's day short as December,
And with his varying childness cures in me
Thoughts that would thick my blood.
Even if in the last resort I have no absolute knowledge of this stone, and even if my knowledge regarding it takes me step by step along an infinite road and cannot ever be complete, the fact remains that the perceived stone is there, that I recognize it, that I have named it and that we agree on a certain number of statements about it.

*Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962: 330)*

I will describe this experience in order, if possible, to make you recall the same or similar experiences, so that we may have a common ground for our investigation. I believe the best way of describing it is to say that when I have it *I wonder at the existence of the world.*

*Ludwig Wittgenstein (1993: 41)*
CONTENTS

List of Illustrations xi
Preface xv

Introduction: An Apology for Style 1

1 WONDERS TAKEN FOR SIGNS 20
2 THE SPEED OF LIGHT 70
3 DIAPHANOUS FIGURES 104
4 MYTHS OF THE INNER 142
5 SPACE AND POLITICS 182

Coda: The Benefits of Hindsight 215

List of Abbreviations 216
Notes 217
Bibliography 239
General Index 255
Index Locorum 261

Color gallery follows page 112
ILLUSTRATIONS

Figures

1. The Anavysos road, facing north  21
2. Map of Attica  22
3. Kouros of Aristodikos: front view  23
4. Kouros of Aristodikos: side view  23
5. Votive kouros from Sounion  24
6. Kouros, probably from Phoinikia in Attica (the New York kouros)  25
7. The New York kouros: side view  25
8. Kouros, probably from Phoinikia in Attica (the “Anavysos” kouros)  26
9. “Anavysos” kouros: side view  26
10. Kouros, probably from Phoinikia in Attica (the Munich kouros)  27
11. Grave stele from Phoinikia in Attica: Diskobolos (discus thrower)  29
12. Grave stele probably from the vicinity of Mount Olympos in Attica: youth and girl, with sphinx above (the Brother-and-Sister stele)  29
13. Grave stele from Barbaliaki in Attica: mother with child  29
14. Unfinished kouros, abandoned during transport from a quarry on Naxos  33
15. Offering of Khares, from Didyma  34
16. Kore dedicated by Kheramyes, from the Heraion on Samos: front view  35
17. Kore dedicated by Kheramyes, from the Heraion on Samos: side view  35
18. Column drum relief from the temple of Apollo at Didyma: female votary  36
19. Kore dedicated by Nikandre of Naxos to Artemis of Delos: probably a representation of Artemis  36
20. Apollo from Piraeus  37
21. New York kouros: wrist  37
22. “Anavysos” kouros: wrist  37
23. Barbara Hepworth, Single Form (Antiphon)  38
24. Metope from the Heraion at Fuce del Sele: Tityos abducting Leto  38
25. Siphnian treasury at Delphi, north frieze, detail: battle of gods and giants  41
26. Nike from Delos, likely work of Arkhermos of Chios  42
27. “Anavysos” kouros: face  43
28. Female head from Chios  43
29. Attic red-figure pelike by the Eucharides Painter: sphinx and Thebans  45
30. Attic red-figure cup by the Kiss Painter: man admiring a statue  50
31. Kouros from the Athenian Akropolis (the Kritian boy): front view  51
32. Kritian boy: profile view  51
33. Attic red-figure cup by the Brygos Painter: man and boy  52
34. Kore of Phraskkleia, from Merenda in Attica  54
35. The road at Merenda  54
36. Modern reconstruction of the Geneleos dedication in the Heraion on Samos, with casts of extant remains  55
37. Diadoumenos from Delos  73
38 Tyrannicide group: Harmodios and Aristogeiton 79
39 Reconstruction of the Tyrannicides group of Kritios and Nesiotes 80
40 Gorgon from Paros 84
41 West pediment of the temple of Artemis at Corfu: Medousa, Chrysaor, Pegasos, flanked by panthers; in angles, Gigantomachy 85
42 Zeus from the sea off Cape Artemision, of Attic manufacture: side view 86
43 Statuette of Zeus 87
44 Statuette of Zeus from Ugento in southeast Italy 87
45 “Lancelotti” diskobolos: three-quarter view 89
46 “Lancelotti” diskobolos 89
47 Reconstruction of the pediment from Temple C at Selinous: Gorgon 92
48 Reconstruction drawing of the west pediment of the temple of Zeus at Olympia: Centauromachy 93
49 Reconstruction drawing of the east pediment of the temple of Zeus at Olympia: Zeus, Pelops, Oinomaos 93
50 Reconstruction drawing of the pediments of the Hekatompedon on the Athenian Akropolis 95
51 Reconstruction drawing of the west pediment of the temple of Aphaia on Aegina: assault on Troy 95
52 Reconstruction drawing of the east pediment of the temple of Aphaia on Aegina: assault on Troy 95
53 Pediment from Temple A at Pyrgi: Seven against Thebes 95
54 Reconstruction drawing of the east pediment of the “Alkmeonid” temple of Apollo at Delphi 96
55 Corner figure from the east pediment of the temple of Aphaia on Aegina 97
56 Reconstruction drawing of the west pediment of the Old Temple of Athena on the Athenian Akropolis: Athena killing a giant 97
57 Reconstruction drawing of the east pediment of the Parthenon 98
58 Reconstruction drawing of the west pediment of the Parthenon 98
59 Attic red-figure hydria by the Pronomos Painter: contest of Athena and Poseidon (detail) showing Zeus’s thunderbolt, olive tree, Poseidon 99
60 Athena Parthenos, from Athens (the “Varvakeion Athena”) 100
61 Calf bearer from the Athenian Akropolis: detail of upper body 115
62 Calf bearer from the Athenian Akropolis: detail of garment 116
63 Kore from the Athenian Akropolis (Pomegranate kore): side view 118
64 Reclining male ([. . .] arches) from the Geneleos dedication in the Heraion on Samos 119
65 Kore from the Athenian Akropolis (Peplos kore): Artemis? 120
66 Plaster cast of the Peplos kore 120
67 Oil flask in form of a female with bird, from Thebes 121
68 Kore from the Athenian Akropolis 122
69 Kore from Eleusis 123
70 Ludovisi “throne” and adytos of temple of Aphrodite at Epizephyrian Locri 125
71 Locrian pinax (type 5/2): woman with ritual textile 126
72 Ludovisi “throne,” front (detail): Aphrodite 127
73 Aphrodite (“Hera Borghese” 129
74 Goddess (Aphrodite?) from Sicily or Magna Grecia 130
75 Aphrodite (Brazzà type) 131
76 Relief from Eleusis ("The Great Eleusinian Relief"): Demeter, Ploutos (?), and kore 132
77 Great Eleusinian Relief (detail) 133
78 Figures L and M from the east pediment of the Parthenon: Aphrodite and Dione 134
79 Nike in flight from the Athenian Akropolis 135
80 Nike akroterion originally from Magna Grecia, found in the Gardens of Sallust in Rome 136
81 Detail of the Nike in figure 80 136
82 Winged caryatid mirror handle (Nike or Athena?), probably Tarentine 137
83 Nike from Paros 138
84 Nike akroterion (corner) from the Athenian agora 139
85 Nike akroterion (center) from the Athenian agora 139
86 Nike, probably an akroterion 141
87 Metope 11 from the temple of Zeus at Olympia: Herakles and Cerberus 143
88 Metope 11 from the temple of Zeus at Olympia, detail: Herakles’ torso 143
89 Charioteer (?) from Motya (Mozia): detail of torso 144
90 Draped kouros from Rhaide stos 144
91 Torso of a kouros from Sounion (back) 145
92 Statuette of Apollo, dedicated by Mantiklos, from Boeotia 145
93 Colossal kouros dedicated by Iskhys in the Heraion on Samos 146
94 Warrior A from the sea off Riace Marina: face 148
95 Warrior B from the sea off Riace Marina 149
96 Warrior A from the sea off Riace Marina: detail of right arm 150
97 Roman version of the Doryphoros of Polykleitos 152
98 Attic red-figure amphora by the Dikaios Painter: courtship 153
99 Kouros (?) head from the Athenian Akropolis (the Blond boy) 158
100 Temple of Zeus at Olympia, west pediment: Lapith woman (B) 158
101 Grave relief from Taranto: visit to the tomb 158
102 Parthenon, north frieze figure 4: youth 163
103 “Mourning Penelope,” from Persepolis 165
104 “Mourning Penelope,” Roman version of a Greek original 166
105 Relief from Melos showing Odysseus and Penelope 166
106 Attic red-figure skyphos from Chiusi: Penelope and Telemakhos 166
107 Attic grave relief: woman with veil 167
108 Attic red-figure amphoriskos, by the Heimarmene Painter: Helen on the lap of Aphrodite (detail) 167
109 Dying Niobid, likely part of a pedimental group 169
110 Prokne and Itys by Alkamenes 170
111 Prokne and Itys by Alkamenes, detail: Itys 111
112 East pediment of the temple of Zeus at Olympia: figure F (Sterope or Hippodameia) 173
113 Neo-Attic relief: Medea and the daughters of Pelias 174
114 Parthenon, Metope South 19 (detail): woman spinning 175
115 Parthenon, Metope South 19 (detail): woman spinning 175
116 Attic red-figure kylix: wool working 175
117 Grave stele of Ampharete, from the Athenian Kerameikos 177
118 Stele of Aristion, signed by Aristokles, from Velanideza in Attica 187
119 Stele of Eupheros from the Athenian Kerameikos 189
120 Grave stele of Agakles: bronze statue of a pankratiast (Agakles?) 190
121 Attic red-figure cup by the Foundry Painter (detail): statue in a foundry 190
122 Grave stele: woman with loutrophoros 191
123 Aphrodite from the Borghese collection 192
124 Stele from the borderlands of Athens and Megara: man with pilos 195
125 Grave stele: warrior with bronze pilos 196
126 Parthenon, Metope South 27: Greek or Lapith fighting Centaur 197
127 Stele of a woman, from the Kerameikos of Athens 199
128 Stele of Pausimakhe, from Charvati in Attica 199
129 Stele of Mika and Dion, from the Kerameikos of Athens 199
130 The “Cat” or “Salamis” stele, from Salamis (detail): drapery 200
131 Parian grave stele: youth, dog, boy 201
132 Parian grave stele: girl with doves 202
133 Parian grave stele: girl with dove 203
134 Parthenon, east frieze: Apollo 204
135 Temple of Zeus at Olympia, west pediment (detail): Apollo 205
136 Grave stele from near Dipylon Gate, Athens: dexiosis 206
137 Grave stele, from Salamis (the Actor’s stele): actor with mask 207
138 Apulian red-figure krater by the Tarporley Painter: Athena with the head of Medousa 208
139 Hydria monument with base, from Vari, front view: dexiosis 209
140 Hydria monument from Vari, detail of right face of base: actor in female costume 210
141 Stele of Painaitios of Hamaxanteia, from Athens: five vessels, two with decoration 212
142 Attic Grave relief 213

Color plates following page 112

PLATE 1 Zeus from the sea off Cape Artemision
PLATE 2 Kore from the Athenian Akropolis (Pomegranate kore)
PLATE 3 Ludovisi “throne,” front: birth of Aphrodite
PLATE 4 Ludovisi “throne,” left flank: flute girl
PLATE 5 Ludovisi “throne,” right flank: matron burning incense
PLATE 6 Nike of Paionios, from Olympia
PLATE 7 Charioteer (?) from Motya (Moza)
PLATE 8 Warrior A from the sea off Riace Marina
PLATE 9 Stele of Khairedemos and Lykeas, from Salamis
PLATE 10 Attic grave relief from Salamis (“the Cat stele,” “the Salamis stele”): youth releasing a dove, with boy and house cat
This book was written in Chicago and Rome during the years 2002–2005. Difficulties in obtaining photographs (some insurmountable) delayed publication; the bibliography is reasonably up to date through early 2006 but later additions have been unsystematic.

I thank the American Academy in Rome for supporting my research in 2003–2004 with an Andrew Heiskell Post-Doctoral Rome Prize Fellowship, and the University of Chicago for permitting me to accept that award and for providing funds to defray production costs. Audiences in Ann Arbor, Berkeley, Cambridge (Massachusetts), Chicago, Dallas, New York, Oxford, and Sounion offered encouragement and criticism, debate and engagement, for which I am very grateful. My friend Jaš Elsner read an early draft with the greatest care, generosity, and toughness— one of the nicest things anyone has ever done for me, and I hope the effort was not wasted! But he was not alone: Jim Porter and Mary Beard also read earlier drafts, as did an anonymous reader for the Press; I thank them all for their perspicacity and care. My gratitude to Leslie Kurke and Andrew Stewart is permanent: they will always be my “readers in the text.” At Chicago, Joel Snyder is the truest sounding board I know, while Verity Platt has been a constant source of inspiration. I have learned more than I can say from Clifford Ando, Shadi Bartsch, Chris Faraone, Tom Gunning, Dan Morgan, and Katherine Taylor. But I would especially like to thank my coeditors at Critical Inquiry, who over the years have taught me patiently and expertly in the best seminar on earth: Lauren Berlant, Bill Brown, Dipesh Chakrabarty, Arnold Davidson, Elizabeth Helsinger, Françoise Meltzer, W. J. T. Mitchell, and again Joel Snyder. Out in the wide world I particularly thank Richard Brilliant, David Eskerdjian, Françoise Frontisi-Ducroux, Milette Gaifman, Adam Herring, Mario Iozzo, Tally Kampen, Michael Koortbojian, Barbara Kowalzig, Merle Langdon, François Lissarrague, Elizabeth Marlowe, Chris Ratté, Alan Shapiro, Deborah Tarn Steiner, Natalia Vogeikoff-Brogan, Robert Wallace, Irene Winter, and (last but not least) Froma Zeitlin. Susan Bielstein at the University of Chicago Press is the most supportive and patient of editors. I am grateful as well to my students, Ann Patnaude, Angele Rosenberg-Dimitracopoulou, Nicola Cronin, Kenny Yu, Oksana Paluch, Kristine Hess, and Eric Driscoll. Lastly, I thank Teddy and Erika, lights of my eyes.


Greek texts have been provided in the endnotes for epigraphical materials only, which may be inconvenient of access. All translations of the latter are my own unless otherwise noted.
INTRODUCTION:
AN APOLOGY FOR STYLE

This book tries to account for certain effects of sculpture. It is also an account of those effects and, in a way, of the peculiar conditions of accountability in the history of art. More specifically, it is about a particular style of sculpture and that style’s historical emergence. The style itself is often called “High Classical” (as opposed to “Early” and “Late” Classical). It came into being in Greece shortly before the middle of the fifth century BCE, and flourished in the final decades of that century. It is generally regarded as a watershed in the history of Greek art and, for that matter, the art of the West generally. Characteristic features include the naturalistic depiction of space, anatomy, and movement and the dramatic presentation of character.

Such dry descriptors, however, do not capture the effects I have in mind. Here are some examples: being arrested by a statue, being attracted, being excited, being fascinated, impressed, frustrated, repelled, irritated, intimidated, enthralled, dumbstruck. The wager of this book is that such instances of compulsory attention can be legitimate, even important data in a historiographic project. For the effect of a given work of sculpture—its solicitation and retention of a beholder’s attention, its specific modes of appeal, gratification, frustration—is not an incidental or trivial fact about it. On the contrary, a statue’s effect is arguably the most important, the essential thing (I shall return to this point below). Yet such effects do not admit of quantification or, for that matter, any of the other ways of demonstrating seriousness outside of humanistic scholarship. How, then, can we talk about them? This dilemma is commonplace in the discipline of art history. But it is especially pressing when dealing with archaeological materials, insofar as archaeology as a discipline aspires to the status of social science while dealing with often intractable evidence. Hence the need for an accounting.

Two centuries of academic scholarship have bequeathed a supple and nuanced vocabulary for discussing Greek sculpture; few disciplines have been so blessed with keen eyed and methodical taxonomers as Classical archaeology.¹ But this legacy, for all its splendor, can also be an impediment, insofar as it predetermines the kinds of question one can ask of Classical art. Almost invariably, our inherited terminology tends to cast the High Classical style in terms of mimēsis, or imitation. In both the scholarly and popular literature, Classical sculpture seems always to be the imitation or materialization of an idealized content, be it Nature (in which case, the Classical is said to be accurate or scientific) or some concept or ideology (so the Classical becomes perfect, idealistic).² Thus Classical sculpture seems always to be the overcoming of an antithesis of form and content, and the history of Greek art to be the perfect adequation of the two. Such, indeed, was Hegel’s influential definition of the Classical as a “presentation and unveiling,” Darstellung und Enthüllen, of truth—a formulation that, as we shall see, remains in scholarship’s deep background to this day.³

But such formulations have lost some of their power. Our Greeks are no longer perfect, and “imitation” is no longer the self-evident ambition of every competent artist. These points are banal; few, if any, serious scholars would maintain otherwise.
But if that is the case, then what happens to a history of sculpture founded on those very premises? We need to make the Classical strange again, uncanny; we need to restore its wonder.

The present study, accordingly, seeks a new critical vocabulary, a new way of conceiving “presentation and unveiling.” It does so by means of two stratagems. The first is a shift in emphasis away from the relation of image to model and toward the relation of image to beholder. The second involves a turn to contemporary (pre-Classical and Classical) Greek texts for terms of description. The very name for “statue” in Archaic Greek, *agalma* or “pleasing thing,” tells us much of ancient priorities: the final cause, not the first, is what mattered in Greece. More generally, early authors praise works of craft in remarkably consistent terms. These terms of praise suggest the goals and ambitions—the “brief”—of Greek sculptors. Most of the book consists of analyses of individual artworks based on these historically specific terms of praise.

These topics may seem rather old-fashioned or recondite, even to a specialist readership. A book-length treatment stands in need of justification. Simply to assert that the sculptures themselves compel such an accounting may seem to beg the question. Why write about the Classical, and why about a style?

One response is that a reevaluation of the High Classical style can help to clarify some basic concepts of both archaeology and the history of art. For the Classical holds a special place in both disciplines: it functions as a high point, an apogee, a constant point of reference. From Pliny through Winckelmann to the present day, it has been normal to write the history of Greek art as a steady march toward the attainment of this style—the so-called Greek Miracle. The philosopher Bernard Williams named this model “progressivism.” Although it produces a satisfying narrative, it is not very plausible. It is simply anachronistic to claim that the early Greeks were, for generations, working toward a sculptural style of which they had no prior knowledge. Yet progressivism is deeply ingrained in both art history and archaeology. As we shall see, it is a premise in the chronological framework of both disciplines. This book, conversely, is an experiment: an attempt to see what happens if we suspend our faith in the march of progress and return to the works themselves. Like all experiments, this one risks failure. But the reward might be a new way of seeing.

**Cases**

This book does not aspire to be comprehensive or to explain everything about Classical sculpture. It is not a survey. Certain classes of material, notably terracottas and small bronzes, get short shrift; big names like Polykleitos, and big masterpieces like the Doryphoros or the Parthenon Frieze, do not have their accustomed centrality. No doubt it will possible to adduce counter-examples to some of the claims put forward. But a somewhat unsystematic approach seemed appropriate to the argument, which is deliberately open-ended. It aims to be generative, not conclusive.

To that end this book proposes a new grammar—or, more precisely, excavates an old one—for engaging Classical sculpture. Any such grammar will have pertinence only in its use: in particular cases, with reference to particular works. Accordingly, the argument emerges from close readings of individual statues and reliefs. There are no catalogs, lists, or statistical charts. Whatever benefits it may confer, the apparatus of the social sciences is inevitably reductive when it comes to complex artifacts of the sort under discussion. Quantification and taxonomy obscure the specificity of the encounter with statues. But that specificity is of the essential.
Taking inspiration from the great literary historian Erich Auerbach, I have greater faith in this specificity than in the abstract and schematic claims of social history and contextualism. This book, accordingly, expresses what Auerbach called “a transfer of confidence.”

The great exterior turning points and blows of fate are granted less importance; they are credited with less power of yielding decisive information concerning the subject; on the other hand there is confidence that in any random fragment plucked from the course of a life at any time the totality of its fate is contained and can be portrayed.\(^\text{10}\)

Auerbach’s wager is that close reading is a way of writing history. As he said elsewhere, “I see the possibility of success and profit in a method which consists in letting myself be guided by a few motifs which I have worked out gradually and without a specific purpose, and in trying them out on a series of texts which have become familiar and vital to me … for I am convinced that these basic motifs in the history of the representation of reality—provided I have seen them correctly—must be demonstrable in any random realistic text.”\(^\text{11}\)

To be sure, it is no longer possible to share Auerbach’s confidence in “totality” (even when he wrote, it was whistling in the dark). But that only makes the method more compelling. The history of Greek art exists nowhere but in particular cases, and particular cases warrant close attention if they are of any significance. The reward is real historical knowledge. As we shall see, working from cases even has the potential to tell us about politics, because it can reveal what was at stake on the ground in “the great exterior turning points and blows of fate.”

**Synopsis**

The argument proceeds in six stages. The introduction addresses theory and method. It has three parts: first, an apology for the role of style in archaeology, and a corresponding denial of firm distinctions between art-historical and archaeological method; second, a discussion of the role of “the beholder” and “viewing experience” in recent studies of Greek art; third, a sympathetic critique of the French scholar Jean-Pierre Vernant’s influential argument that the early Greeks lacked a functioning concept of the image, but instead understood figural representations as substitutes, signs, or stand-ins for an absent referent. The aim, in each case, is to demonstrate the evidentiary importance of features and experiences that are often dismissed as merely “aesthetic.” By extension, the aim is to defend the idea of a truly historical art criticism.

Chapter 1 lays out a vocabulary for discussing Greek sculpture. It begins by describing the sculptures that, circa 500 BCE, punctuated a stretch of road in southeastern Attica. Using this road as a unifying thread, the chapter proposes five ways in which Vernant’s arguments might bear upon the production and beholding of sculpture: Carving, Sameness, Joining, Embodiment, and Wonder. In each case, the basic claim is that Archaic figural statuary took the play of presence and absence so aptly described by Vernant as a guiding theme. What the statue showed, its depictive content, related metaphorically to its function as a sign or marker of the invisible or nonpresent. Chapter 1 tracks this theme in Greek sculpture from the excavation of a stone block in the quarry, through the beholding of a statue in a
sanctuary or graveyard. The result is a conceptual framework, however schematic, for the discussion that follows.

The remainder of the book is about the Classical style itself. Modern scholars typically discern four broad tendencies in the emergence of this style. There is a change of pose, from relatively static and closed to relatively open and active. There is a change in the rendering of anatomy, from a relatively superficial marking or incising of bones and muscles to the evocation of subdermal structures, and from loose to tight fit between the anatomical features represented and those extant in a normal human body. There is a change in psychology, from smiling exteriority to the suggestion of inner life or ethos. Lastly, there is, in relief sculpture, a change in the rendering of space, from adherence to the relief plane to three-dimensionality. Taken together, these changes may fairly be said to comprise the “Greek revolution,” and they have provided the basis for extravagant claims about “the discovery of the mind,” die Entdeckung des Geistes, from Hegel to the present day.

Chapters 2–5 discuss these elements in turn. In each case, it emerges that the new style does not represent a radical break or rupture with Archaic past so much as an ongoing adjustment of emphasis. The novelty of the Classical does not consist in any epistemic or conceptual shift, nor in any sudden advent of empirical knowledge. It consists, rather, in a gradual reconfiguration of the relation of image to beholder. What matters is less the way an image connects (or fails to do so) with the world it represents than the way it connects (or fails to do so) with the audience it addresses. Classical statues engage their audiences, interact with them, in a new way, but they do so on the basis of old assumptions about the nature, the power, and the function of images.

Specifically, chapter 2 is about pose, medium, and wonder. It argues that the new, active poses of the early Classical are best understood as attempts to induce thauma, “wonder,” in beholders. Thauma is the last of the keywords organizing chapter 1: here it makes its usefulness shown. In Greek as in English, one wonders at wonders; and literary texts from Homer on suggest that the quintessential wonder is a spectacle of brilliant radiance, flashing speed, and radical “otherness.” Uniting these qualities is a basic effect of twofoldness or doubleness in viewing: the statue should seem simultaneously alien and familiar, far and close, inert and alive, absent and present. The Classical style consists in part of new poses that dramatically engage the beholder: they throw things at us, rush toward us, overwhelm us with sheer scale and glitter. The language of wonder is appropriate to such works. The bulk of the chapter consists of a series of close readings of fifth-century sculptures, including the Tyrannicide group, the Zeus of Artemision, the Diskobolos of Myron, and several important pedimental groups.

Seen in these terms, the history of fifth-century sculpture ceases to be one of progress toward naturalism, empirical accuracy, or truth. Instead, it becomes the story of an ongoing effort to meet the essential brief of the Greek artisan: to produce a thauma idesthai, “a wonder to behold.” The culmination of this story is not perfection and harmony—not Atticism in any of its various guises—but an amplified and expanded rhetoric: an aesthetics of overwhelming size and dazzling radiance, of statues that strike the eye by shining even as they charge or throw or rush at the beholder, loom overhead, or glitter out of the darkness. Classical statues are not more realistic or more perfect than their Archaic predecessors, but more wonderful.

Where chapter 2 is about the various ways in which statues address or ignore their surroundings, chapter 3 is about the ways in which they evoke their own in-
teriors. Specifically, it is about the use of drapery to suggest a body beneath the visible surface. It begins by exploring what might be called “surface-effect” in statuary: the perception that sculpted drapery conceals something beneath its surface. In Greek terms, sculpted drapery elicits a paralogismos, or false inference: seeing a sculpted garment, we tend automatically to imagine that it covers a body, even as we know that it does not. For Aristotle, such curious effects instance to thaumaston, “the wonderful.” More often, the Greek imagination deals with this strange effect by imagining statues to be containers of hidden and magical forces. From the Trojan Horse to the terracotta silens of Plato’s Symposium, an image is a vessel, either deceptive or revelatory. The ideal image is one in which the inner content “shows through,” diaphainei, to outer form. From the sixth through the fifth centuries, in a broad array of works, Greek sculptors trade upon the almost irresistible impulse to see drapery as a veil or a cover, in order to stage what Vernant calls “appearance-as-disappearance.” Because it is the feminine body that is most often clothed, such stagings are conveniently assimilated to gendered notions of fecundity and void: the female body is understood as a veiled container. The centerpiece of the chapter is an extended reading of an early Classical relief from a Greek colony in Calabria, known today as the Ludovisi “throne.” This Π-shaped slab shows the birth of Aphrodite; the goddess wears transparent garments and is set between a nude courtesan and a heavily muffled matron, such that her sudden appearance from the sea is associated with a textile that simultaneously veils and reveals. It evokes a body by hiding it: an apt metaphor for the basic function of a Greek statue as such.

Chapter 4 moves from the relation of clothing to bodies to that of skin to muscles, and of bodies to souls. When a statue is diaphanous, everything can become visible; and the interior is constituted as that which is revealable. Male nudes are crucial to this conception of sculptural depth. The chapter begins with a study of male figures, particularly the so-called Motya Charioteer and the Riace bronzes. While Classical anatomy is often taken as a triumph of realism, in fact the situation is more complex. New modes of realism bring with them new modes of infelicity. Classical sculptors routinely distort the body, twisting limbs into impossible positions, wrenching joints out of sockets, or altering proportions for dramatic effect. Such distortions are incomprehensible as realism but do provide opportunities to evoke hypodermal structures. What matters is that the surface suggest something veiled or hidden. Like clothing, skin provides an opportunity to stage surface-effect.

But bones and sinews are only the beginning. Famously, Classical sculpture evokes another mode of interiority: inner ēthos or “character.” Hegel called the emergence of ēthos in Greek statuary die Blitz der Individualität, “the lightning bolt of individuality,” and he considered it a world-historical event. Nineteenth-century idealism may seem remote from contemporary archaeology, but to this day a best-selling textbook presents early Classical statuary in Hegelian terms as the locus of Europe’s discovery of “Consciousness and Conscience.” Early Classical sculptors typically evoke ēthos by representing figures that are self-absorbed, ecstatic, asleep, or dying. The new psychology may also be seen as another step in the ongoing elaboration of a familiar metaphor: the ēthos is a void, a lack, made good in the moment of viewing. On offer here is a more complete, more effective, “presentification” of the absent. Narrative plays a crucial role in such evocation, for it enables beholders to specify the psychological states in question. Indeed, in chapter 4 ēthos represents the narrativization of surface-effect. The chapter concludes with an extended account of Alkamenes’ great Prokne and Ityx group from the Athenian Akropolis: a
neglected work that matches Sophoklean tragedy in the intensity, and the complexity, of its ethical engagement of the beholder. With this statue, the beholder’s share in the revelation of interiority is thematized expressly.

The final chapter addresses the rendering of pictorial space on Athenian grave stelai produced during and immediately after the Peloponnesian War. Here, for the first time, it is possible to deal with a fairly large set of monuments in well-defined historical circumstances. These Classical gravestones are a crucial site of what Gombrich called “the conquest of space”: they discard the rigid planarity of their Archaic predecessors and engage the beholder in a new way, suggesting a replete, three-dimensional environment in which entities move or lie at rest. The chapter argues that this change carried a political charge: indeed, that politics was, in this case, the engine of stylistic change. In a nutshell, Athenian tradition made an ideological distinction between freestanding and relief in tomb sculpture. When tomb sculpture reappeared in the late fifth century after a hiatus of some seventy years, freestanding statuary seems not to have been an option. Instead, some sculptors used the traditionally civic-minded medium of relief to evoke the relatively elitist medium of sculpture in the round. The result was a new rendering of space in relief sculpture. But this “conquest of space” may be understood as an essentially conservative attempt to pursue statuary by other means. Style was, in this sense, the very stuff of politics.

The book concludes there, at the close of the fifth century BCE, the end of an era in sculpture and politics both. A new generation of sculptors came up in the early fourth century, and they inhabited a political environment very different from that of their predecessors, one in which power and patronage were concentrating in individuals and dynasts. They lie beyond the scope of this discussion.

In sum, then, this book is about the elaboration of a particular way of making and beholding statues over a period of nearly two centuries. The Classical style amplifies and elaborates traditional structures of beholding: it is, in this sense, a hyperbolic version of the old Archaic style. Just so, it psychologizes and narrativizes inherited visual metaphors: surface-effect, for instance, comes to signify character, ēthos, within a depicted narrative. An older mode of engaged beholding gives way, thereby, to something closer to theatrical spectatorship. With that shift, at once a discovery and a forgetting, a new concept of the image emerges. These developments, finally, did not occur in a vacuum but were, on the contrary, integral to the political and social lives of the Greek cities.

Apology I: The Priority of Style

Such arguments may sound “formalist,” hence untimely. Recent polemics have opposed Classical art history to Classical archaeology, to the detriment of the former. “Classical art history,” opines one authority, “is archaeology or it is nothing.” On this view, it is no use talking about particular works, because broad social trends are all that really matter. Such trends are the proper business of archaeology, and studying them provides evidence for important things like cultural history, politics, or social structure. Art history, on the other hand, is branded the aestheticist study of unique works, hence a kind of mandarinism. But this dichotomy of style versus substance is at best a half truth. It omits the crucial fact both that both Classical art history and archaeology share a standing commitment to the concept of style.
An apology for style

Archaeology’s commitment to style is everywhere apparent. For instance, excavators routinely use style to place both artifacts and strata into relative sequences. Consider, for instance, how Classical archaeologists produce a ceramic chronology. Susan Rotroff, the great American ceramist, describes the procedure succinctly: “Studying pottery found in layers superimposed over one another, the analyst can track changes in the forms, surface treatment, fabric, and decoration, and thus place vessels in a relative chronological sequence.” This procedure seems both sensible and plausible. But Rotroff’s summary reveals how excavation and connoisseurship go hand in hand. After all, Forms + Surface Treatment + Fabric + Decoration = Style. Moreover, correlating the sequence found in one assemblage with the sequence found in another assemblage inevitably involves a stylistic judgment, be it positive or negative (the artifacts are deemed to be either alike or dissimilar). In other words, judgments about style produce the relative chronology of ancient material culture. There is no clear distinction between empirical research and aesthetic judgment.

It may be objected that stratigraphy, not style, produces relative chronology. But strata are just layers of dirt, without styled artifacts to populate them. Even a sealed context is only significant for chronology on the basis of its perceived similarities and dissimilarities with other contexts. One might say that artifacts—styled artifacts—are what make strata into data, and that the recognition of such artifacts is what distinguishes archaeology from geology. Just so, the scientifically determined fixed points of absolute chronology—radiocarbon dates and the like—provide no escape from the rule of style. Absolute chronology merely provides calendar dates for particular styles, an operation that clearly does not dispense with the concept of style itself.

The lively debate around the eruption of the volcanic island of Thera is exemplary in this regard. There is broad consensus that the eruption occurred before the change from Late Minoan IA to Late Minoan IB, and the controversy concerns the real date of that shift. Radiocarbon and dendrochronological dating puts the eruption near the end of the seventeenth century BCE, but the resulting absolute chronology does not jibe with the chronology previously worked out for Egypt and the Near East. Some people go with the scientific evidence and say that the existing chronology needs to shift; others defend the latter and cast aspersions at the scientific reasoning. There is no need to get into the details of the argument: the simple and obvious point is that both Late Minoan IA and Late Minoan IB are styles. Archaeometry provides a date for the stylistic shift, but in doing so it takes the reality of the style for a premise. Generalizing from this example suggests that, at the level of method, style is the content of absolute chronology. The problem with Thera is not just a glitch in the correlation of Aegean styles to Near Eastern and Egyptian ones. Rather, it is a glitch in the correlation of two ways of reasoning about the past: that of the natural sciences and that of the humanities. There is no way to purify archaeology of the latter, because absolute chronology just is a chronology of styles.

Such questions do not even arise, of course, in the burgeoning field of pedestrian surface survey. In surface survey, by definition, there exists basically no stratigraphic context at all. Dates come primarily from the style of the artifacts that surveyors pick up off the ground. Graduate students comb the fields of Greece and the Near East in orderly fashion, segregating pebbles from potsherds, discerning and dating settlement patterns—and doing so largely on the basis of the style of the artifacts they find. In this sense, pedestrian survey is arguably the most aestheticist of archaeological methods.
These issues extend beyond the history of art and into kindred disciplines. An extended example may illustrate the process. A statue from Delos, the dedication of one Nikandre of Naxos to the goddess Artemis, is a benchmark in the history of early Greek sculpture; it has the honor of being the first item in the inventory of the National Archaeological Museum of Athens (fig. 21).¹⁸ Quite apart from its prominence in art history, however, the statue is important to Greek philology. It bears an inscription that, for reasons of orthography, is crucial evidence for the moment at which the Homeric poems were set down in writing.¹⁹ The statue itself is dated to the mid-seventh century largely on the basis of its “Dedalic” style. The key stylistic feature for the dating of Dedalic sculpture is the shape of the face: “primitive,” triangular faces are early; “realistic,” ovoid ones are late. However, the notion that this feature evolves smoothly over the course of the seventh century is a theoretical presupposition, not an empirical observation. As R. J. H. Jenkins put it in his seminal account of the style, “I . . . made the assumption that Dedalic heads of all schools which showed the same stage of stylistic development were contemporaneous.”²⁰

In effect there is no absolute chronology of Dedalic statuary per se. Everything rests on stylistic affinities between the stone sculptures and better dated materials in other media. The chief term of comparison is Protocorinthian and Corinthian pottery: these small vessels sometimes bear “plastic” heads modeled in three dimensions, which may be compared with heads in stone sculpture.²¹ Thus, stylistic analogy in the absence of stratigraphy remains the essential tool of dating the earliest Greek sculpture.

Unfortunately, the absolute chronology of Protocorinthian and Corinthian is not very solid.²² It derives substantially from the foundation dates that Thucydides and other later authors provide for the establishment of Greek settlements in Sicily. Archaeologists correlate the oldest pottery at a given Sicilian site with the date for the site’s foundation as provided by the later sources. This practice has received stinging criticism from A. M. Snodgrass and others: by assuming that the archaeological data will bear out the assertions of literary texts, falsification of the latter becomes impossible.²³ Naturally, using such flimsy dates to provide chronological fixed points for another medium entirely seems a risky endeavor.

But the flimsiness of the absolute chronology is only part of the issue. Equally important is the role of style in relating the flimsy dates to the pottery finds. This role became dramatically apparent when, in the 1950s, a team of French scholars identified Protocorinthian sherds from the site of Selinous in the Palermo museum. According to the traditional dating scheme, such sherds should not have appeared at this site. The result was a fierce debate, and a proposed swing of several decades in the chronology of seventh-century material culture. In the end, however, it was decided that the Palermo sherds were not Protocorinthian after all, and the chronological pendulum swung back to its original position.²⁴ The story shows how connoisseurial judgments, in tandem with theoretical premises about the reliability of Thucydides, provide the foundation for the absolute chronology of the seventh century BCE.

Returning to the case of Nikandre, archaeologists assign a date to the statue on the basis of its position relative to these two systems: the relative chronology of the Dedalic style, and the absolute chronology of Protocorinthian pottery. Then, on the basis of this date, philologists make arguments about Homer. Thus the effects of connoisseurial judgments ripple through the entire discipline of Classical studies.

In this light, the notion that there exists a useful distinction between style-formalism on the one hand, and archaeological or philological historicism on the
other, seems unsustainable. On the contrary, relative chronology is to a very large extent stylistic chronology, and absolute chronology is strictly useless without a theory of style to relate the fixed points to artifacts from other contexts. This statement is not an argument either in favor of, or in opposition to, such a theory; it merely an argument that such a theory exists, despite an academic culture that persistently disavows it.

The point generalizes. Turning to Classical sculpture, there is good reason to believe that the Parthenon was erected between 447 and 432 BCE, and we use this “fixed point” to date works of sculpture that are stylistically similar to Parthenon marbles. Likewise, Athenian document reliefs can sometimes be dated with fair certainty, and their style is important for determining the chronology of Classical Athenian sculpture. In either case, the inference from the type to the comparanda does not proceed of its own accord. It requires a theory of style—a composite of premises and prior inferences—for its justification. Just because the Parthenon sculptures date to 447–432, for instance, does not mean that any stylistically similar piece from elsewhere in the Greek world must also date to the same time. That conclusion requires a theory, viz., that similarity of style is evidence for similarity of date. It is, in effect, a theory of cultural uniformity or “thick coherence.” Before the Second World War it was commonplace for archaeologists to cast this uniformity in terms of “race”; recent work on “ethnic identity” has complicated the picture, thankfully, but without escaping the basic need to theorize a mediating term. In order to use a fixed point to infer the dates of other items in other contexts, it is necessary to deploy a robust concept of style—since style is what connects fixed points, like the white lines that link up the stars in a map of constellations.

But what about written sources? Epigraphy, of course, has its own versions of connoisseurship. Debate continues, for instance, over the utility of letterforms as dating tools, and studies have discerned the hands of individual letter-cutters with an acuity matched only by J. D. Beazley’s work on Attic pottery. For example, the date of an inscription authorizing construction of the temple of Athena Nike at Athens hinges on two points: the chronological significance of a three-bar sigma, and the attribution of an inscription to a particular letter-cutter on the basis of style. Period style (here, letter forms) and personal style (here, the hand of a letter-cutter) combine to provide a date for the inscription and, by extension, for the temple. Absent such arguments, of course, the date of most inscriptions is just a result of archaeological inference, like anything else. One dates epigraphical texts on the basis of the items associated with them by stratigraphy—which is to say, mostly on the basis of the style of the items “associated” with them. The content of an epigraphical text, while by no means unimportant, is logically secondary in these matters, since texts are easy to forge, copy and so on. A good example would be the Oath of the Founders of Cyrene, a fourth-century inscription purporting to repeat a seventh-century original.

As for literary texts, it is important to bear in mind that the overwhelming majority of Classical Greek literature survives in manuscripts dating from Late Antiquity or the Middle Ages. We have no original manuscript of Thucydides or Herodotos, Pindar or Simonides, Sophokles or Plato. What we have are much, much later documents that are judged to be more or less accurate recensions of Classical texts. Literary sources, in other words, are themselves artifacts produced through an arduous labor of paleography and philology—a “connoisseurship of words,” so to speak. Not all paleographic or philological judgments are stylistic. But ever since
Lorenzo Valla unmasked the Donation of Constantine as a forgery on the basis of its post-Antique style, such judgments have been essential to philological method. One need only read through the literature on the authenticity of Plato's epistles, Simonides' epitaphs, or the Anakreontic corpus to see that, as evidence, literary texts (even in up-to-date, well-edited editions, with all the variant readings and interpolations carefully marked) are not different in kind from other sorts of artifacts. In practice, scholars arrange the artifacts in various hierarchies of inference (explaining a destruction layer, for instance, by reference to a passage in Herodotos), but such arrangements necessarily occur after prior judgments of style have provided the artifacts in question. Texts are things, too (this is not a criticism).

Seen in this light, the main categories of Classical archaeology are stylistic, root and branch. Without style there is no “Geometric” and no “Orientalizing,” no “Attic” and no “Corinthian,” no “Middle Helladic” and no “Late Hellenistic,” no “Archaic” and no “Classical.” But there is also no “Greek” and no “Roman,” no “Mycenaean” and no “Minoan,” hence no “ethnic identities,” “cultural contacts,” “incursions,” or “colonies.” It cannot be stated enough: a Greek artifact is a thing that we have identified as Greek, and “ancient Greek civilization” is a name for the vast composite of material things to which this name has been applied. Because these acts of identification and denomination proceed largely from judgments about style, it follows that just about everything that counts as a fact in Classical archaeology depends on style. In this situation, it would be parochial to insist on sharp distinctions between the disciplines. Insofar as art history is, supremely, that discipline which finds meaning in the morphology of artifacts, to just that extent all Classical archaeologists are willy-nilly art historians—and (it bears emphasis) conversely. Questions of style cannot be cordoned off as so much formalist noodling; nor can interest in style justify disregard for (still less destruction of) archaeological context. Archaeologists, no less than art historians, exercise aesthetic judgment to produce facts. Conversely, art historians, no less than archaeologists, are committed to a form of culturalism.

It follows, however, that efforts to curtail stylistic judgment by reference to terms like “historical context” are reckless. The priority of style in Classical archaeology means that such efforts get swept rapidly into a hermeneutic circle. Both contexts and the artifacts they enframe derive from a large but finite archive of evidence. Statues, reliefs, and the like are part of a continuum of data that includes literary texts, inscriptions, buildings, landscapes, and so on: everything that falls under the rubric “material culture.” Scholarship uses style both to recognize these artifacts as such and to replace the raw mass of stuff with an ordered arrangement or syntax. In using one artifact (say, Plutarch’s Life of Perikles) as the “context” to explain another artifact (say, the Parthenon), one asserts a hierarchy of inference. But the context is itself the product of prior judgments—aesthetic judgments—and therefore offers no external check upon such judgments. The distinction between “formalism” and “historicism” breaks down.

But it does not follow that there are no facts or constraints in archaeology and the history of art, that “anything goes.” Rather, it is important to have a sense of what counts as a fact in these disciplines. The facts of ancient Greek art differ importantly from, say, the facts of abstract geometry or the natural sciences. It is a fact that the square on the hypotenuse of a right triangle is equal to the sum of the squares on the other two sides. It is also a fact that a man named Pythagoras developed a theorem in the sixth century BCE. But they are not the same kind of fact. The criteria and the patterns of argumentation that produce them are different in each case. This is
not an especially complicated point. It amounts simply to insisting that we acknowl-
edge our own truth conditions. The hermeneutic circle is vicious only to the extent
that it goes unrecognized.

The suggestion that knowledge of the past, in archaeology at any rate, is knowl-
edge of style, hence aesthetic knowledge, seems to many so monstrous that it must
be disavowed. Something, it seems, has got to give. Either we must surrender the
aesthetic or we must surrender knowledge, and the choice in the modern academy
has clearly been the former. The assertion that “Classical art history is archaeology
or it is nothing,” works to this effect. It posits a distinction between art history and
archaeology, mere aesthetics and empirical knowledge, in order to reduce the for-
mer to “nothing.” To which it seems necessary to respond that perhaps our relation
to the past is not quite one of knowledge, in this definition of the term: knowledge,
so defined, has nothing to do with the matter. Yet maybe it is still knowledge for
all that.

Indeed, it begins to seem as though art history, or “historical criticism,” no longer
quite knows what should count as evidence, or even what evidence should be for.
Its facts derive from a theory of style that goes unrecognized. For all the seeming
shakiness of its foundations, however, the commitment to the potential intelligibil-
ity of sculpture is one that archaeology and art history share. This commitment (this
intelligibility) does not produce a knowledge divorced in advance from other con-
cerns, for instance the ethical. It is, on the contrary, always and inevitably a testing
of the limits of mutual comprehensibility, which is reason enough for the pursuit.37
But these issues bring us to the beholding, the recognition, of style—which is an
issue of criteria in judgment.

Apology II: From Theory to Theōria

Twenty years ago, in a set of introductory remarks to a collection of essays on the
Classical, David Freedberg observed that the contributors made

little attempt . . . to arrive more closely at a means of speaking about the relation-
ship between particular styles . . . and particular kinds of response. There was no
effort to plot the interlocking data that mark the dialectic that arises, but is also
implicit, between specific works and beholder.38

The situation persists today. In his efforts to redress it, Freedberg advocated neuro-
physiology and cognitive science. This book starts from the same point, but takes
a different route: not the biological basis of sculptural effects, but the effects them-

Emphasis on the beholder has been a major feature of Classical art history for
well over a decade.39 It has often seemed to offer a middle way between art-historical
“formalism” and cultural history, moving the field away from aestheticism, and to-
ward anthropology, sociology, archaeology, the history of religion, “visual culture,”
or “agency.” Instead of fussing over pretty things, we talk about what people did
with images, and what they “experienced” when they did it. In short, the beholder
rescues the discipline for social science.40

If only it were that easy. The trouble is that all beholding has “intentionality”; it is
beholding of something. Beholding takes objects. More precisely, it is a meaningful
comportment toward objects. Such being the case, an emphasis on beholding that is
not simultaneously an emphasis on objects risks collapsing into mere subjectivism (and an unhappy subjectivism at that, a subjectivism that does not recognize itself as such). If it is not to be lopsided, emphasis on beholding cannot cash out to mean an emphasis on secondary evidence, such as Classical texts about beholding, at the expense of close examination of objects themselves. Nietzsche was merciless on the notion of spectatorship divorced from firsthand experience, calling it “a fat worm of error.” In this spirit, a turn to beholding must be a return to the objects—a return to the specific and meaningful ways in which objects address, imply, or implicate their beholders. Otherwise it is just an armchair exercise.

But even this talk of “objects” may be misleading, insofar as it suggests a claim to objectivity or science. The problem is, exactly, the status of the object. Beholding takes objects, but some objects entail or manipulate beholders. The conspicuousness of artworks, their implication or entailment of beholders, is not a merely contingent feature of them. On the contrary, it is essential. Insofar as the term “object” obscures this mutual implication, it is misplaced. “Artifact” might better capture the reciprocity of the relationship. But the point is that the beholder cannot be separated from the artifacts, especially given the evidentiary priority of the latter. A turn to the beholder must be a return to artifacts, but to artifacts in their specific modes of conspicuousness: their specific ways of addressing, positing, implicating, seducing, hectoring, intimidating beholders.

Fortunately, the history of art has a robust battery of concepts and terms to deal with these varied modalities. If a return to artifacts amounts to an investigation of modes of conspicuousness, then it is equally a return to the concept of style—to style understood not as the inherent property of an object, or as a subjective projection onto an object, but as the specific way in which artifacts are seen to address themselves to beholders.

Of course, “the beholder” can seem as reductive a construct as any—Greek audiences were no doubt varied and various. Such utility as it possesses will always be a function of the account it gives of actual encounters with artworks. It must affect our own way of seeing. Terms like “visual culture” and “ancient viewing experience” are unhelpful if they do not inform our own accounts of style, that is, our own beholdings. They offer illusory escape from our responsibility to and for artifacts and their arrangement as data.

Indeed, the very idea of an ancient “viewing experience” (or “visual culture”) poses many problems. The scholarly ambition is, standardly, to coordinate a reconstructed ancient “experience” with potential objects of that experience, that is, with statues and pictures and the like. It should be uncontroversial that the middle term in this coordination is the modern, not the ancient, beholder. The ancients, after all, are dead, nonexistent. So we—the scholars, critics, field specialists, museumgoers, tourists, and casual readers in bookstores or online—are the only ones having or imaging the experiences in question. We might as well face up to our duties. To be forthright about what constitutes knowledge in art history and archaeology means: to be responsible to and for what we see. Put differently, to argue for an ancient visual “experience” that was stipulatively unshareable by us, stipulatively unavail- able, would amount to torturing of words. Better to follow Nietzsche and Heidegger in denying that the Greeks even had “experiences” in the first place. In short, any reconstruction of “ancient viewing experience” must, if it is to be heuristic, issue in modern viewing experience. As a regulative concept, therefore, “ancient experience” is hollow, a pseudonym for aesthetic judgment at best, flights of fancy at worst.
So instead of using historical data to provide “experiences” as alibis for our own judgments, we might do better to speak of determinate possibilities and constraints. The art historian Heinrich Wölfflin insisted that “[n]ot everything is possible at every time”; the philosopher Michel Foucault took this axiom as a guiding principle of his own archaeological projects. If we cannot say what happened in the beholding of ancient statues we can at least go some way to specifying what was possible to happen. Which is to say, we can attend to the functioning of historical grammars of concepts, variously ours and theirs, with the possibilities they engender of both function and malfunction, reward and risk.

In arguing for a shift of attention from imitation to use, therefore, I am not especially concerned with “period eyes,” “ritual,” or ancient pilgrimage practices. I am concerned less with the way institutions structure the encounter with images than with the way images structure both institutions and encounters. For that, again, the images themselves must be the best evidence.

The standard objection to such suggestions is that we only see objects through our own modern eyes. Isn’t it exactly to escape our preconceptions that we study things like “ancient viewing experience”? But this objection simplifies a complex situation unacceptably. Whose eyes should we use if not our own? We cannot see through Greek eyes; we are not Greeks, at any rate not ancient ones; we have no eyes but our own, and they are remarkably good to see with. If the goal is to defamiliarize the “objects” to restore their strangeness and their historical distance, then the wager of this book is that to do so it is necessary to test ourselves against them. To some this line may sound like a failure of imagination; I hope it is an acceptance of responsibility.

Another predictable objection to this line of argument is that it is theory driven. I have no wish to evade this charge. But it is worth recalling the origin of the word “theory” in the Greek theōria, “beholding” or “viewing.” Keeping both meanings in play encourages an understanding of theory as something other than an abstract matrix that willful critics impose upon the archaeological record. Instead, it becomes easier to recognize theory as a constitutive engagement with artifacts, essential to the production of facts. At the same time, it makes it easier to acknowledge that, necessarily, ancient beholdings are known only in and through modern beholdings, modern theorizations.

In what follows, facing this situation will mean trying to renounce the language of subjective experience by appealing to standing patterns of agreement in the criteria of judgment. In practice I have tended to test my accounts against those of exemplary critics and historians, chiefly Jean-Pierre Vernant and Rhys Carpenter. More generally, a crucial aspect of this method consists in attending carefully to the everyday words that scholars use for images—in letting the words do their work, following them, remaining committed to them. What does it mean, for instance, uncontroversially to call a Greek artifact a “statue,” or to say that it is “ostentatious,” or “alluring”? There is a lot of fretting over such questions in what follows; a lot of fretting, that is, over getting our descriptions right. I take this method to be more, not less, rigorous than contextualism or cultural studies. When inevitable disagreements arise, at least we will be arguing about the right thing: do we agree in how, in what, we see? It is in the synthesis of a critical vocabulary that much of the real work of art history gets done. For that is where scholars constitute their conceptual grammars, their “styles of reasoning.”
Apology III: The Impossible Sēma

We are told that meaning is use; but how do we know what use really is, or was, in the history of art? In this discipline, a grammatical investigation must be a phenomenological one. The effect of a statue is, as stated earlier, arguably the most important thing about it. At a minimum, it is a criterion of the statue's recognition as a statue in the first place. This assertion, however, will require argument. To that end, we may turn to Jean-Pierre Vernant's work on early Greek statuary.

Over a period spanning three decades, from the 1960s into the 1990s, Vernant put together nothing less than a historical ontology of the concept of the “image.” That is, to use the terms of the present essay, he asked what was at stake, what was entailed, in the seemingly innocent application of the word “image” to certain ancient artifacts. In so doing he interrogated our agreement, or disagreement, in criteria of identification, recognition, denomination, and taxonomization. What are the criteria by which we recognize an ancient image as such, and by which we recognize changes in style in images over time? Although Vernant's account has problems, as we shall see, it is truly exemplary, in the sense that even its vulnerabilities are illuminating. Working through these arguments brings out very rapidly some thorny problems inherent to any historicist account of the image.

Vernant began from the crucial insight that figural representations were grouped with signs in the Archaic period. The verb *graphein*, for instance, could mean writing, drawing, and painting; *grammata* could be both letters and painted figures; *sēmata*, “signs,” could be statues, unworked slabs, bird omens, or symbols. By the fourth century, however, philosophers like Plato and Xenophon could think of figural representation as an autonomous category, distinct from signs. Not only that, but they could theorize figural representation in a new way: as the imitation or *mimēsis* of visible appearance. For Vernant, this change was momentous. He argued that it amounted to the emergence of a new, historically specific class of entity: “the image properly speaking, that is, the image conceived as an imitative artifice reproducing in the form of a counterfeit the external appearance of real things.” The Classical period of Greece witnessed “the birth of images.”

Vernant traced this emergence in a number of studies. In general he argued that early Greek statuary evolved out of “aniconic” figures, mere slabs of stone and planks of wood. Such objects did not represent by means of imitation or resemblance, but through substitution. For Vernant, all of Archaic statuary was an extension and elaboration of this conceit. What we might call a “statue” was, for the Greeks, a “sēmbole plastique”: a substitute or stand-in and not an image. In a word, it was a sēma, a “sign.” Its referent might be a dead person (in the case of funerary art), a divinity (in the case of cult statues), or a sacrificial ritual (in the case of votives). All were, in one way or another, absent, hence invisible: the dead were gone below, the gods were “elsewhere,” the sacrifice was an ephemeral act that slips into the past. But the sign was a constant presence in the here and now. Hence the dual function of Greek sculpture was to mark absence while overcoming it: to mark the alterity of the supernatural while giving it form.

In the context of religious thought, every form of figuration must produce an inevitable tension: the idea is to establish real contact with the world beyond, to actualize it, to make it present, and thereby to participate intimately in the
divine; yet by the same move, it must also emphasize what is inaccessible and mysterious in divinity, its alien quality, its otherness.\textsuperscript{53}

Even in iconic statuary, the \textit{sēma} continued to operate “in the paradoxical manner of a double.”

It inscribes absence, emptiness, at the very heart of that which it makes visible as present. The being it evokes, like a substitute, appears in the form of the stone as that which has gone far away, that which would not deign to be there, that which belongs to an inaccessible “elsewhere.”\textsuperscript{54}

On this view, in short, the Archaic "statue-sign" was an exercise in dialectic: a chiastic interplay of presence in absence, presence \textit{as} absence.\textsuperscript{55} Only in the Classical period—perhaps even as late as the fourth century—did the concept of the “image” emerge.

Vernant’s interventions have been hugely influential. Instead of taking the equation of image and imitation as a theoretical premise, Vernant made it a topic of historical investigation. In so doing, he opened the study of Classical art to new types of questions and new types of answers: the technical definition of a “paradigm shift.” While one might quibble with his philology and the evolutionary history that he proposed, nonetheless this contribution was nothing short of a landmark, and much of the most exciting work in Greek sculpture over the last thirty years has shown his influence. It is striking to note that this scholar, a giant in the field of Greek religion, wound up being one of the most important Classical art historians of his generation as well.

Yet Vernant’s work is not without difficulties. Specifically, he had a tendency to elide a crucial distinction between what he called “the image, properly speaking,” a historically specific category that emerged in the Classical period, and “the notion of figural representation,” a much broader term. This elision had important consequences for his arguments overall. For it rendered unclear the very nature of Archaic art, hence what is new about the Classical image.

Sometimes it sounds as though Vernant is making a fairly straightforward claim to the effect that a new concept of “the image” emerged in the Classical period. Earlier Greeks, accordingly, lacked this concept. Instead, they used the language of signs to talk about figural representations; that is, they classed figural representations along with symbolic operators like bird omens and alphabetic characters. Note that on this view, it need not follow that the Greeks made zero distinction between figural representations and symbols, anymore than the fact that the Greeks classed men and women together as mortals would mean that they equated men with women. Analogy is not identity. At the same, this view implies a distinction between notions or concepts on the one hand, and experiences on the other. Although the early Greeks lacked the concept of a figural representation, still they seem to have had a distinctive kind of experience, which could be conceptualized in different ways at different times. In principle, this experience might be shared by anyone.

Other times, however, Vernant seems to make a much more radical claim. In this version, it is not merely the concept of the image “properly speaking” that turns to have been absent from Archaic Greece. It is the very “notion of figural representation” as such.
The notion of figural representation does not just come from itself. Neither univocal nor permanent, it is what might be called a historical category; a construct elaborated, not without difficulty, through very different routes in different civilizations.

At the pivotal point of the fifth and fourth centuries ... the category of figural representation emerges in its specific features.\(^5\)

When arguing in this vein, Vernant's claim is not just that Archaic Greeks lacked the specifically Classical concept of the image. It is that they lacked any concept of figural representation whatsoever, such that what look to us like statues are in fact "symbolic actualizations" of the divine.\(^6\)

In the first version of the argument, Vernant distinguishes "figural representations" from "images properly speaking," such that the early Greeks could possess the former while lacking the latter. The claim seems simple: early Greeks thought images were a lot like bird omens and letters, later Greeks did not. In the second version, however, he equates "figural representations" with "images properly speaking," such that lacking the latter means lacking the former as well. This second version of the thesis is the more interesting, and also the more problematic, of the two.

In this radical version, Vernant effectively refuses to distinguish between experiences and concepts. The Greek equation of statues and signs was not a mere façon de parler. On the contrary, Vernant's point seems to be that the Greeks did not experience statues either as "figural representations" or as "images, properly speaking"; they experienced them as signs or "presentifications." So the question is: what will count as experiencing something as a "figural representation" or an "image"?

The question concerns criteria, and it holds the key to our understanding not just of Vernant but of the problem he raises: the problem of radical historicism in the history of art. How can we know what people saw, hence what counted as a figural representation (or as an image) in the Greek form of life? What will count as proof in this regard?

Wittgenstein asks a version of this question in the second part of the Philosophical Investigations. He is talking about a famous drawing that can be seen as either a duck or a rabbit. He asks how we can tell which of the two a person has seen, which “experience” the person has had (duck or rabbit?).

What is the criterion of the visual experience?—The criterion? What do you suppose? The representation of “what is seen.”\(^5\)

Wittgenstein's point is that there is no better, more direct description of the experience, no better evidence for “what we do,” than such a public representation. It is tempting to imagine that science could come to the rescue. A neuroscientist might want to prove that I have had a certain experience by hooking me up to electrodes; if certain synapses fire and are measured, then might not that data suffice to prove that I have had the experience? Alas, such a causal, physiological explanation would be of no help, for our descriptions do not invoke physiology. In describing my experience of a picture, for instance, I do not say, “Now the rods and cones in my eye are registering light, and sending electrical impulses into my visual cortex.” That is not the experience I have, electrodes notwithstanding.

Other hidden, inner processes meet a similar objection. The suggestion that early
Greek statues were really signs, not images, implies such a process of interpretation: you see the sign and then interpret it, process it cognitively, to produce a reading.\(^5\) \(^9\) How might this *noēsis* work? Wittgenstein characterizes theories of this sort as proposing an inner “materialization” of the picture, which is then subject to interpretation. But the only evidence to suggest that such an inner interpretation had played a role in the act of seeing would be, again, the “outer” expression or “representation of ‘what is seen.’” Whether one engages in a mysterious inner process of interpretation, or just sees a picture without reading it, makes no difference as far as the expressions go.\(^6\) So the inner process does no work, it is null. The behavior, again, is the criterion of the experience. If the Greeks treated certain entities as pictures, used them as pictures, then regardless of what they called those entities, this behavior will satisfy the criteria for their having had the relevant visual experience.

And what of concepts, as in “the concept of the image”? This question is forensic. Just as “the representation of ‘what is seen’” is the criterion of the experience, so the experience should be the criterion of the concept (of a figural representation). It gains us nothing to say that the Greeks treated certain objects as figural representations, experienced those objects as figural representations, yet did not possess the concept of a figural representation, but only the concept of a sign. For in that case the concept of a figural representation would be, literally, *useless*; there would be no use, no behavior, to which possession or lack thereof might correspond. Like the “inner materialization,” it would be null.

But verbal expressions might not be the only evidence one might use to demonstrate experience. Other forms of behavior might do the trick. One might, for instance, adduce the intentional manufacture of entities that we are inclined to call figural representations. Examples would include tomb statues, grave stelai, and so on. Statues no less than statements are “representation[s] of ‘what is seen,’” not in the Romantic sense that they reveal their makers’ subjective perception of the model, but in the grammatical sense that they reveal the maker’s perception of the statue. After all, it is not a coincidence that the object in figure 5 looks just like a figural representation. That is a criterion of its *being* a figural representation. We know it is a figural representation because it looks like one, which is to say, it counts for us as a Greek “representation of ‘what is seen.’” Here, again, the example of Lascaux Cave is invaluable: we readily recognize the marks on the cave walls as figural representations in the absence of any corroborating evidence whatsoever. The paintings themselves are the best, the only, evidence for what the cave dwellers saw. Just so, kouroi, korai, etcetera, are evidence for what the Greeks saw. The visual facts are primary evidence; although, in the Greek case, we are blessed with a great deal of secondary evidence as well, in the form of literary and epigraphical texts and archaeological data.

A further example may clarify the point. One of the most important achievements of Classical archaeology during the last century was the decipherment of Linear B, the Greek writing system of the Bronze Age.\(^6\) Through a combination of cryptography and guesswork, the British architect Michael Ventris assigned hypothetical sound-values to the signs of this script. But his theory found confirmation only when these signs and their sound-values were juxtaposed with pictures. In 1952, a clay tablet was found at Pylos. It bore pictures of tripods and flagons; after each picture of a tripod there was a series of marks indicating a number, followed by three or four Linear B characters that, according to the scheme Ventris had devised, should stand for *ti-ri-po-de*—in short, “tripod.” The “Tripod Tablet” thus confirmed the sound-values that Ventris had tentatively assigned to the various characters,
and complete decipherment followed swiftly. That is, the decipherment of Linear B was confirmed by interpreting signs (the characters of the script) in terms of figural representations (the tripods). The comprehensibility of the figural representation had analytic priority over the comprehensibility of the writing system, such that the figural representations verified the decipherment of the script (as opposed to the other way around). We assume the figural representations to be comprehensible prior to the script; indeed, the comprehensibility of the figures grounds that of the script.\textsuperscript{62}

In short, Vernant’s thesis produces a conflict between philology, which finds our words (“image”) to be incommensurate with Greek ones (\textit{sēma}), and a mode of perception capable of seeing depictive content in certain pieces of carved stone in the absence of historical data. The lesson of Linear B, however, is that perception has analytic priority: \textit{phenomenology grounds philology}.\textsuperscript{63} This fact is already taken for granted in these disciplines. It poses a problem for the radical version of Vernant’s argument. Like Ventris, Vernant took depictiveness, and the potential comprehensibility of iconic depictions prior to linguistic notations, as a premise. For example, he recognized kouroi and korai as figural representations even though they supposedly come from a time when that concept did not exist. Unlike Ventris, he then proceeded (sometimes) to argue that the Greeks lacked the very concept of a figural representation, and did not experience statues and pictures as such. Something has to give.

It is a perennially astonishing fact that we can recognize very old lumps of carved stone as depictions. The figures themselves provide continuity between our words—our worlds—and theirs. Nothing shows our kinship with the Greeks better than the fact that we have the words like “statue” and “sign” ready-to-hand to name certain of their artifacts and concepts.\textsuperscript{64} Nothing shows our distance from them more clearly than the fact that they identified the two. Our words and the Greeks’ words—the language games—are not fully commensurate when it comes to statues. But for all that, we do see carved lumps of stone as figural representations, effigies, icons, statues. We invoke \textit{our} concept whenever we see \textit{their} stones in this way. Indeed, if we did not do so, then we would have nothing to talk about. We would be in some sense blind to their statues, deaf to their words. As Wittgenstein put it, “The common behavior of mankind is the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language.”\textsuperscript{65} In the present instance, the common behavior is: seeing, responding to, recognizing figural representations as such. The question of whether early Greek statues were images or “presentifications” only arises against the background of this broad agreement in criteria and in judgments.

One benefit of working through Vernant in this way is that it shines light on the question of evidence in the collision of art history, archaeology and philology. In its radical variant, Vernant’s argument tends to render early Greek art occult. We are told not to trust our eyes: what look suspiciously like statues are said to be, in reality, signs. The evidentiary primacy of the visual goes unacknowledged. As though, upon digging up a marble kouros, we needed to check in a book, do a bit of research, before distinguishing it from a fieldstone or a building block; as though it were not \textit{perfectly obvious} that that piece of marble was carved in a particular way to elicit a particular kind of visual experience.\textsuperscript{66} But this position turns out to be unsustainable. The paradoxes of Vernant’s historical ontology of the image bring out the primacy of the historian’s own eye to any account of ancient figural representations, or art, or visual culture, or even to the neoempiricist idea of “ancient viewing experience.”
It is, of course, a cliché of cultural history that we all see things from within our cultural context. But that is not my claim. Instead, my claim is twofold. First, that a historical ontology of images poses particular problems (is particularly interesting) insofar as “the representation of ‘what is seen’” is a criterion of identity for a figural representation as such. Second, that a commitment to the intelligibility of such representations, hence of images, is not something we can easily jettison. Disagreement about what is seen—say, varying “readings” of ancient images, different accounts of the style or the significance of a statue—will, on this account, be indistinguishable from good old fashioned art-historical disputes.

But it would be precipitous to reject Vernant’s arguments entirely. On the contrary, he is more useful than ever. Our distance from the Greeks should not be minimized even if its very ground is a certain nearness or “family resemblance,” that is, a potential comprehensibility exemplified in the recognition of figural representations as such. Vernant may have gone too far in insisting that the early Greeks had no notion of figural representation. But his central insight remains intact: there were entities in Greece that it seems appropriate to call signs, and there were entities that it seems appropriate to call statues, and even if we cannot coherently identify the two, nonetheless the Greeks did just that. My goal is not to minimize the strangeness of the Greeks, nor to deny their historical specificity. It is, however, to insist upon the evidentiary priority of the visual, of the critic’s eye, in the very recognition of that strangeness. That is what Vernant left out.

After Vernant, a Greek statue comes to seem a chimerical sort of thing, a bit like an animal as defined in that famous “Chinese encyclopedia” with which Foucault began *Les mots et les choses*: “animals are divided into (a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) suckling pigs (e) sirens, (f) fabulous . . .” The interesting question, therefore, is not whether “sign” or “image” is really a proper translation of *sēma*. What matters is, as Foucault put it, “the set of other statements in the midst of which [the word] appears, … the domain in which one can use or employ it, … the role or the functions it has to play.” What does a statue do? We cannot know what a statue does without describing its effects on beholders—for a statue does nothing at all but elicit such effects. We cannot know those effects without knowing the expressions to which they give rise—for there is nothing else to know. Hence the method of this book is to study ancient Greek expressions of what it is like to see a work of craft, and to generate new expressions of seeing (new descriptions, or “close readings”) that are guided by those historical expressions. The former without the latter would be philology (à la Vernant); the latter without the former would be belle-lettrism (mooning over statues). Historical expressions provide a field of possibilities within which the new expressions may arise.

These arguments may sound tame, even conservative, but the methodological implications are not. In place of an anthropology or a sociology of Classical art, we need a properly “historical criticism.” What counts as knowledge in this discipline is inseparable from aesthetics, as the very idea of a history of the image is inseparable from our voiced responses to certain carved stones and marked surfaces. Acknowledgment of these conditions ought to be anything but conservative. For the payoff is the possibility of a transformation in our own everyday ways of seeing. Studying Greek statues amounts to an effort to think an impossibility or, more precisely, to ask, with Foucault, “what is it impossible to think?”
Wonders Taken for Signs

The proverb bears witness to them:
“present while absent.”

HERAKLEITOS, FR. 34 DK.
The Anavysos Road

Attica’s central plateau is mostly flat, but as you walk eastward toward the sea the terrain becomes hilly, and the road winds through a series of connected valleys (fig. 1). Near Anavysos, ancient Anaphlystos, rises a pyramidal massif. Smaller than a mountain but larger than a hill, it bears the name Olympos; the epithet Laureotic is often added to distinguish it from the gods’ home in Thessaly (fig. 2). Skirting its slopes on the inland side, a traveler in the early 400s BCE would have passed through fields and orchards, in a region famous for its figs, before encountering a remarkable sight: a naked youth by the roadside (figs. 3–4). Made of pure white marble, with blazing red hair, the youth on sunny days would have gleamed from a distance as you approached. He stood some six feet tall—taller by far than most Athenians—and a base elevated him still further above the passerby. Drawing alongside you could pause to read the inscription on the plinth. It was a single word: Aristodiko, “of Aristodikos.” The statue was the sign, the sēma, of a well-born man, beautiful and good: it marked a grave.

There were lots of “signs” like this one in Archaic Greece, and the encounter on the Anavysos road is representative. Indeed, the making and beholding of these statues—the little roadside dramas of sculptor, image, and beholder—followed a consistent set of themes, which received progressive elaboration over the years to produce the Classical style in sculpture.

First, however, the roadside marker and its circumstances. There is no ancient term for this specific figure type. Modern scholars would call it a kouros, Greek for “young man,” but as a term of art its invention is recent. As Gisela Richter put it, in a

1 * The Anavysos road, facing north. The findspot of the Aristodikos kouros is on the right between the telephone poles. Photo: author.
classic study, “The kouros type . . . runs through archaic Greek sculpture like a chief theme in music.”

The scheme adopted was always the same—a nude youth, generally broad-shouldered and narrow-waisted, standing erect in a frontal pose, one leg, usually the left, advanced, the weight evenly distributed, the arms, at least in the earlier marble statues, hanging by the sides, the hands either clenched or, more rarely, laid flat against the thighs.

Kouroi turn up all over the Greek world, from Asia Minor to Sicily, from the north Aegean to Libya, but they are especially common in the old Ionian territories of the central and eastern Aegean. They are generic, possessing few attributes and stereotyped physiognomies. This lack of specificity seems to have ensured their popularity: kouroi could be used in almost any situation, as cult statues, votives, or grave markers. Attica is unusual in that most of its kouroi stood over tombs: they are mnēmata, memorials for the dead. Even here, however, there is variety. Just down the road from Anavysos, a cluster of sanctuaries at Sounion on the tip of the Attic peninsula has yielded fragments of some fourteen large kouroi, all dating to the first years of the sixth century (figs. 5, 91). Though essentially similar to the Aristodikos monument, these statues were not grave markers but gifts to the gods. Elsewhere in Greece the type is even more adaptable. With the addition of a bow, a kouros

4 * Above, kouros of Aristodikos, side view. Photo: author.
may serve as a statue of the god Apollo; with a beard and cloak, he is Dionysos; and so on. The kouros is “a man for all seasons.” 9 For just this reason, specific contexts of use do not seem especially pertinent to these statues. 10 One kouros is pretty much as good as another, and we should not imagine a radically different structure of beholding for the type depending on its use in a sanctuary or a graveyard. The best evidence for lumping these two contexts together is the sheer homogeneity of the statues themselves.

If you approached Anavysos from the northwest in the years around 500 BCE, you would have encountered at least four such statues. 11 The earliest, now in New York, dates on style to circa 590 (figs. 6–7); one in Athens and another in Munich both date on style to circa 530–520 (figs. 8–10); the marker of Aristodikos, to about 500–490, again on style. 12 Of these statues, only the last has an absolutely secure provenance: it stood alone on the road to Keratea, about three-quarters of a mile northwest of the present Church of Ayios Panteleimon. 13 The other three kouroi were excavated illegally and smuggled out of Greece; the first around 1910, the latter two in the 1930s. The statue in figures 8–9, known conventionally if inaccurately as the “Anavysos” kouros, was seized by police in Paris; the looters had sawed it in half for ease of transport, and the scars are still visible. Investigations by Greek authorities, in tandem with the testimony of museum personnel (both on and off the record), suggest that all three of these kouroi came originally from the area of Phoinikia to the north of Olympos. 14 In particular, the New York kouros is rumored to have been found with the Anavysos kouros. 15 It is even possible that all three kouroi come from a single plot, since the Munich and Anavysos kouroi turned up at almost the same time—a suspicious coincidence.

Complicating matters is an inscribed block bearing the hexameter couplet,

“Stay and mourn at the marker [sēma] of dead Kroisos
Whom raging Ares destroyed once on a day in the front ranks.” 16

This stone has a complex history. Discovered in 1938, it was presented to the Greek National Museum only in 1954. 17 Its exact provenance remained uncertain until 1974, when Greek archaeologists excavated a large tumulus—2 meters tall, with a diameter of 28 meters—by the roadside in Phoinikia. 18 Although the tomb itself had been plundered, the farmer who owned the land was in possession of a large fragment of stone that joined the inscribed block. He also had a bronze ash urn said to come from the tumulus. On this basis, the epitaph and the tumulus may be associated; the urn presumably held Kroisos’s ashes. His was a cremation burial, a deliberate throwback to the age of heroes at a time when most Athenians were inhumed. Another tumulus stood nearby the first and probably belonged to the same family. 19

The Kroisos epitaph now stands beneath the Anavysos kouroi in the National Museum, and many authors simply identify the statue as “Kroisos.” But there is no join between the statue and the inscribed block, and the connection is hypotheti-
The inscription comes from the middle step of a three-stepped base; the top step, which would have borne the plinth, is lost. According to local residents, the statue and the kouros did not come from the same place. The letterforms of the inscription do seem contemporary, stylistically, to the Anavysos kouros, and the block’s dimensions are appropriate to that statue's size. But the Munich kouros has essentially the same dimensions, provenance, and date as the Anavysos kouros and must, therefore, make an equally plausible candidate. To make matters worse, it is even possible that the base did not support a kouros at all. Absent the top step, we cannot be sure what stood on it. Although the standard identification of the Kroisos base with the Anavysos kouros is plausible, it is at best an educated guess.

Although the combination of illicit and scientific excavation has left a confusing picture, a few points are reasonably secure. First, the relative isolation of these
statues indicates that they come from family plots, as opposed to communal graveyards. Second, it is likely that either the Anavysos or the Munich kouros stood over the grave of Kroisos by the roadside in Phoinikia. Third, it is likely that one of the other sculptures from this vicinity corresponds to the tumulus adjacent to that of Kroisos. Taken together, one can imagine the Anavysos kouroi atop the Kroisos base, and the New York kouros standing nearby. But another possibility is that none of these kouroi matches the Kroisos base; any or all of them could have been found elsewhere in the vicinity.

In addition to the four kouroi, the area around Laureotic Olympos has yielded at least three grave stelai. The first comes from Phoinikia as well (fig. 11). It depicts a discus thrower facing right. Although badly mutilated, the stele seems to date to the third quarter of the sixth century. The second stele, from Anavysos, is one of the finest Archaic gravestones in existence, dating to circa 540–30 BCE (fig. 12). Although
its exact provenance is unknown, it is known to be from the vicinity of Olympos and Anavysos, and may well have been unearthed in the same looting campaign that yielded the kouroi. Known as the “Brother-and-Sister stele,” it is now divided between Berlin and New York—an unfortunate result of black marketeering. A young athlete (identified as such by the oil flask that hangs from his wrist) walks to the right, accompanied by a young girl; an apotropaic sphinx crowns the slab. A fragmentary inscription on the base reads, “To dear dead Me […] his father and dear mother raised this monument […]” The young man’s name is often restored, conjecturally, as “Megakles,” a name traditional to the Alkmeonid clan. The final relief is from Barbaliaki in the hills above Anavysos, on the inland route to Laurion and Sounion (fig. 13). It, too, is sadly fragmentary: what remains is a mother cradling the head of her infant in her robe (the fabric was painted onto the background).

From this scattered and complex evidence, it is clear that a traveler from Phoinikia to Sounion in 500 BCE would have encountered a network of country roads punctuated by marble monuments, culminating in a seaside sanctuary thick with votives. In this regard, the Anavysos road was probably fairly typical of the Archaic Greek countryside. Kouroi and stelai were among the commonest sculptural types of this period, while the graveyard and the shrine were the two chief venues for sculptural display. The Anavysos road thus makes an ideal case study for a consideration of early Greek sculptural practice. It presents a large but not unmanageable number of artworks, all of very high quality, in a representative array of contexts. In this chapter, it will serve as a “home base,” from which we shall make forays to other regions (and other artworks) as the need arises.

There is, of course, a sociology to this scatter of sculpture across the countryside. Made of Naxian stone, in a Naxian style, and very early in date, the Sounion kouroi are anomalous in Attica for having a votive function; indeed, their presence suggests that Sounion may have looked more toward the Cyclades than toward Athens in this period. On the Anavysos road proper, it may be significant that the mortuary kouroi stood in isolated plots, and not in the communal necropolis just west of Anavysos town. These plots may have been associated with particular families. If so, then it is just possible that, as much as they identified graves, these statues identified tracts of land as the property of a particular clan. Land tenure in Attica was generally fragmented, with most wealthy families owning a number of small, noncontiguous estates. Hence it will rarely have been obvious just who owned what territory. In such a situation the need to assert ownership—or, at a minimum, local prestige—will have been pressing. There could be no more forceful assertion of ownership than the raising of a monument over the bones of one’s ancestors. To pause by the roadside in rural Greece and read an epitaph was to be reminded of who owned many of the surrounding fields and pastures, the names of the local gentry. The absence of patronyms from the inscriptions suggests that the dead men had local reputations and did not require much in the way of identification. The name “Kroisos” is not Greek but Lydian, and it has been argued plausibly that the grave precinct at Phoinikia belonged to the Alkmeonidai, a powerful and politically active clan with special ties to Lydia. The radical politician Themistokles grew up in this vicinity—in the township of Phrearrhoi—and must have passed Aristodikos’s grave every time he went into Anavysos town; a land trip to Athens will have taken him by Phoinikia. The man who, more than anyone, put power in the hands of the Athenian commons cannot have failed to see these standing reminders of aristocratic power.
11 * Right, grave stele from Phoinikia in Attica: Diskobolos (discus thrower). Marble. Third quarter of the sixth century BCE. Athens, National Archaeological Museum inv. 4474. Photo: Alison Frantz Photographic Collection, American School of Classical Studies at Athens.


A “territorial” function for sculpture might help to explain an otherwise peculiar aspect of Athenian cultural policy in the late sixth century. At about this time the brother of the ruling tyrant of Athens caused a distinctive form of sculpture to be set up around the Attic countryside. These “herms” were blocks of stone crowned with a carved head of Hermes, god of wayfarers and boundaries. Inscribed with sententious bits of advice like, “Deceive not a friend,” they stood throughout the Attic countryside as markers of the halfway point between the city of Athens and each of the rural townships, or “demes.” Fragments of one have been found; the fragmentary inscription reads, “Midway between Kephale and the town, Brilliant Hermes . . .” The herms established a civic metric or standard by which to organize space in the countryside, and were in this sense an element of the tyrants’ program of political centralization. Running counter to them, like a centripetal force, were the grave monuments of the rural gentry. Instead of organizing space in civic terms, relative to the town, these statues marked territory in terms of family history. Statuary was a way of articulating authority, hence space. The challenge is to see how the actual look of the work accomplished this end.

Synapses

It is useful at this point to return to Jean-Pierre Vernant’s work on Archaic figuration. As detailed in the introduction, Vernant’s central claim was that the job of an early Greek statue was function “in the paradoxical manner of a double”: to mark an absence (variously of a god, a dead person, or a ritual), while yet remaining itself a constant presence in the here and now. Yet, as I hope to have shown, this argument carries no weight if it does not cash out in actual encounters with actual statues. What does the paradoxical manner of a double look like?

The kouros type was Vernant’s paradigm, because it can function variously as a cult image, a votive, and a memorial. In its mortuary inflection, Vernant argues, the statue type makes allusion to the literary conceit of kalos thanatos, or “beautiful death.” It is a commonplace of Archaic poetry—elegy in particular—that to fall in battle and suffer outrage (aikia) at the hands of one’s enemies is miraculously to acquire youth and radiant beauty. For the Archaic body, death in battle is a change for the better: the marks of disfiguration inscribe on it, paradoxically, a new youth and beauty. Even mature men like Hektor and Patroklos become rejuvenated when they die in war, and the horrible mutilations committed upon the former do nothing to dim his radiance. Quite the opposite: as Priam declares, “For a young man all is decorous when he is cut down in battle and torn with the sharp bronze, and lies there dead, and though dead still all that shows about him is beautiful.” At Iliad 22.370, the Greeks admire Hektor’s “bearing and enviable beauty” even as they defile his corpse. Mutilation creates a new moral and physical perfection.

Seen in this light, the kouros instantiates the radiance that a warrior acquires at the moment of his demise. Kroisos, for instance, was “destroyed” by raging Ares: yet here he stands on the roadside, his body whole and perfect. The statue—let us assume, for the moment, that it is the one in Athens—is a device for re-membering what is gone: frozen in time, Kroisos is always in that state of perfect beauty he attained on the battlefield. “In its own way,” writes Vernant, “by the immutability of its material and shape, and by the continuity of its presence, the mnēma [memorial] conveys the paradox of the values of life, youth, and beauty which one can ensure for oneself only by losing them, which become eternal possessions only when one
ceases to be.” The sculpted sign is thus a sort of discursive solipsism: its referent—dead Kroisos in all his glory—resides in the here and now precisely because he is already gone forever. Because Kroisos fell in the foremost ranks, therefore he is bodied forth in the σέμα. The kouros is a machine for the production of presence, conjuring it literally out of its negation.

The principle finds a contemporary exponent in the philosopher Herakleitos. His fragment 34, for instance, serves as the epigraph to this chapter: “The proverb bears witness to them: ‘present while absent [pareontas apeinai].’” Three further dicta expand upon the theme.

Joints [synapsies]: whole and not-whole, connected [and] separate, consonant [and] dissonant, one from all [and] from all.

God [is] day [and] night, winter [and] summer, war [and] peace, satiety [and] hunger.

Immortals [are] mortal, mortals [are] immortal: each lives the death of the other, and dies the life.

Each of these passages enacts the principle of pareontas apeinai, “present while absent.” Herakleitos’s Greek avoids verbs and conjunctions almost entirely, such that each line consists of a series of disconnected units. The sentences are paratactic, stating each word in singularity even as they elicit a stitching-up, a syntax. In the list of “joints” or “synapses,” for instance, the word “and,” kai, does not reappear after the initial pairing of “whole and not-whole.” The remainder of the line consists of a mere string of terms: “connected separate consonant dissonant.” Indeed, really to get the flavor of an early Greek text, which typically would not include spaces between words, one would have to write, connectedseparateconsonantdissonant. Each word grinds against its contrary—or would do so, if the reader did not supply the missing syntactic conjunction. In the act of reading this string becomes formalized as, “connected and separate, consonant and dissonant . . .” Much the same thing occurs after the word “God” in the second fragment. Here again, a string of contraries in juxtaposition calls forth missing words in order to acquire sense: from “Godday-nightwintersummerwarpeacesatietyhunger,” to “God is day and night, winter and summer . . .” The line’s meaning depends on the efficacy of this call: on the reader’s ability both to hear and to make good the lacunae. One could imagine someone reading out, “God is day, night is winter and summer is war,” which is to say that Herakleitos’s line, as often, tests the limits of intelligibility (that is, thematizes the possibility of unintelligibility). Most explicit in this respect is the third fragment, in which the philosopher takes up the interplay of death and life. Immortals are mortal, mortals are immortal, but the verb “to be”—in its jointly copulative and existential function—does not appear. Thus the act of reading recuperates being.

Constructions of this sort are not unusual in Greek and, in ordinary circumstances, would require no special exercise of interpretation. By thematizing it so insistently, however, Herakleitos makes much of this ordinary grammatical operation: he makes the copulae noticeable, relieves them of their superfluity. An ordinary sentence becomes an exercise in ellipsis. In each of these fragments, consequently, the correlation of opposites occurs in and through the reader’s ability to make present the connective tissue between the words. The result is a chain of implied equivalences that simultaneously relies upon and performs the substitution of silence for meaning.
Anne Carson has discerned a similar thematic in Simonides’ poem for the Spartans who died at Thermopylae. It begins:

Of those dead in Thermopylae, glorious is the misfortune, good is the doom, an altar is the grave, for groanings there is memory, the grief is praise. Such a grave-gift as this neither dank decay nor all-annihilating time will darken.

As with Herakleitos’s fragments, here a list of opposites appears without conjunctions or verbs; and, as with Herakleitos’s fragments, the line becomes meaningful through an act of readerly supplementation. Parataxis plays against syntax. The closest thing to a verb in the first sentence is the participle thanontōn—literally, “being dead,” which names the grammatical subject. “To be,” eimi-sum, does not appear. But when the language redeems this absence by supplying the missing verbs, the string of inert words acquires sense. The resulting “synapses” comprise a bright “grave-gift,” entaphion. Once again, a banal fact of Greek sentence structure becomes a way to think about tombs and memorials: about sēmata, “signs,” or “plastic symbols.” Essentially the poem consists of an exchange between words and what lies between words; between words that mark absence, and absolute nothings or silences that acquire the status of ellipses, that is, of absences redeemed in reading. If the poem itself is a sēma or mnēma for the dead, an entaphion, what it signifies essentially is not the dead but this interlacing. And that is a way to think about statues as well.

Aristotle, in the Rhetoric, uses a similar construction to describe what would happen, metaphorically, if one were to describe a bronze statue of a suppliant as actually supplicating. He quotes a literary source—so well known, it seems, that there was no need to mention its name—to say, apsukhon dē empsukhon. The literal meaning is “inanimate, animate,” but, as with Herakleitos and Simonides, a full translation would be, “the inanimate becomes animate.” The language is formulaic, empsukhon being the standard term to describe the uncanny vitality of Hephaistos’s miraculous handiworks. Just so, it is very common to speak of statues as if they were agents, to make them the subject of verbs, as in “The kouros is striding,” or “The kore is offering a gift.” It is almost impossible not to speak of statues in this way—even though to do so is to animate the inanimate. But such language is, as Aristotle shows, figural. Statues do not supplicate, they don’t do much of anything, and to say that they do is a sort of metaphor. Aristotle’s point, however, is that the metaphor works automatically, just as the verb “to become” appears in the phrase apsukhon dē empsukhon, “inanimate animate,” whether we want it there or not.

Herakleitos, Simonides, and Aristotle (or his anonymous source) all enunciate the principle of pareontas apeinai, “present while absent.” They do so, moreover, in passages that concern the manifestation of the divine, the relation of life to death, and the operations of gravestones and statues. Their concerns, in short, are the concerns of Archaic Greek statuary. It might be useful, therefore, to think of sculpture in similar terms, as dramas of syntax and parataxis. I hope to show that the interplay of presence and absence, life and death, stone and flesh, beholder and image, are guiding themes of Greek sculpture in the Archaic and Classical periods. For convenience we may take a cue from Herakleitos and use the term synaptic to describe this odd logic of presence in absence. What follows is an attempt to describe, schematically, its various inflections in Greek sculpture. Moving from the excavation of a stone block in the quarry, through the beholding of a statue in a sanctuary...
or graveyard, it will encompass five categories or rubrics. They are, in Greek and English: Carving, Sameness, Joining, Embodiment, and Wonder. With the exception of the last, not much hangs on the integrity of any particular category: it is the overall arc from production to consumption that matters.

**Carving**

For Hesiod, nothing could be more irrelevant than “matters concerning oak or stone.” But an account of early Greek sculpture must begin in the forest and the quarry, because a statue begins as a block of stone or a felled tree. Greek sculptors make this fact visually conspicuous; it is part of a statue’s content.

Sculptural production in Archaic Greece was a two-stage process. The initial work was performed in the quarry. A block of stone would be extracted and its sides smoothed. Onto these surfaces the sculptor would draw four views of the finished work. A grid, and sometimes a canon of proportions, would ensure that the sides matched one another. Using these two-dimensional drawings as a guide, he would cut straight into the block from each side, roughly defining the figure’s basic contours with a punch. The result of this first stage was a dimly recognizable figure (fig. 14). The sculptor’s main goal was to lighten the object for transport: details, which might easily suffer damage en route, would be left until the stone reached its final destination. The second stage of carving occurred on site in the sanctuary or grave precinct. Here the sculptor would finish the work, transforming it from a vaguely anthropomorphic lump into an agalma, a “pleasing thing.”

This technique accounts for one of the most frequently remarked qualities of early Greek sculpture: its rectilinearity. Looking, for instance, at the New York or Sounion kouroi, it is easy to discern their origins in thick piers of marble (figs. 5–7). The statue has four cardinal viewpoints—front, back, and sides—corresponding to the four planes of the original stone block. Transitions from one side to the other are abrupt: the head, for instance, is virtually a cube of stone, such that in moving from a profile to a facing view one actually rounds a corner. Every manual of Greek sculpture harps on this theme; indeed, the history of Greek sculpture is at times cast as a development from the rectilinear and quadrifacial to the rounded and continuous. It is easy enough to integrate this blocky appearance into a narrative of stylistic, technical, and spiritual progress: to make it a primitivism. Histories of style become tales of the overcoming of quadrifaciality.

Such narratives are anachronistic. The possibility that quadrifaciality might have had value in its own right may be counterintuitive, but it is more legitimate as historiography. Ultimately, all carved statues

---

14 * Unfinished kouros, abandoned during transport from a quarry on Naxos. Marble. Photo: author.
may be described as piers or logs from which the chisel has disengaged a figure. But not all stone statues insist on that fact—make it a source of visual interest—as early Greek ones do.

The effect is by no means unique to kouroi. For example, the magnificent seated figures that lined the Sacred Way at Didyma in Asia Minor are, in their own way, large stone cubes from which the sculptor has made selective extractions (fig. 15). The original block remains as a sort of presence. But the effect is most pronounced in reliefs. Here the Archaic sculptor simply draws his sketch on one plane of the quarried block, instead of four, and proceeds accordingly. There is little deep undercutting in Archaic relief; the figure does not stand free of the slab but is always thoroughly enmeshed in it. The block is a constant, material presence. From a technical point of view, the difference between freestanding and relief is one of degree, not of kind: a relief, one might say, is a statue in which one profile gets all the attention.

Not all Archaic statues were of stone. Much early Greek sculpture was made of wood. Little has survived, but a series of early marble korai—“maidens,” the female equivalents of kouroi—from Samos and Naxos gives a sense of how such works looked (figs. 16–17). Unlike the rectilinear contours of a kouros, the cylindrical shape of these figures is not especially congenial to the crystalline structure of marble: the stone breaks naturally in planes, not arcs. It is, rather, a holdover from an earlier time when such figures were made of wood. As the New York kouros is to a block of stone, so the Samian korai are to the trunks of trees. That they are not, in fact, of wood, is unimportant. Their form makes allusion to wood.

In this as in other respects, the korai resemble Ionic columns, which likewise are stone versions of wooden architectural members; indeed, an early word for statue,
kolossos, has a root meaning of “column.” The allusion becomes explicit at Didyma and Ephesos, where the columns of the great Ionic temples actually incorporate standing maidens around the lowermost drum (fig. 18). Korai of this sort are columnar, hence treelike, in the most literal way possible.

The translation from wood to stone did not entail a great change in the image’s appearance or its connotations. On the contrary, Samian korai give the impression of being wooden statues that just happen to be made of stone. The same cannot be said of all korai: the early figure of Nikandre from Delos—which has a counterpart at Samos itself—distinctly resembles a plank or a slab (fig. 19). But on Samos, at least, a kore is generally cylindrical, “trunky,” by definition. A kouros, by the same token, is “blocky,” by definition. There do exist kouroi of wood and bronze (fig. 20). But just as the rules of genre dictate that a Samian kore is like a tree trunk even
when it is not made of wood, so a kouros is like a stone block even when it is not made of stone. In these works, *medium is metaphorical*. For this reason it is best to follow the English critic Adrian Stokes in understanding carving not as a specific technical process, but as an attitude that sculptors and beholders bring to certain projects. The result is not “truth to materials” in the modernist sense but instead something like “truth to genre” or “truth to type.”

Such examples demonstrate the poverty of functionalism. Scholars committed to the progressivist attitude tend to assume—if only tacitly—that early Greek art looks the way it does because sculptors lacked the means to do things otherwise: primitives are never free. Perhaps technical requirements did indeed force the earliest Greek sculptors to carve blocky, “foursquare” figures. But the constraints of medium did not wholly determine the appearance of a Greek statue. Fairly quickly—by the time of the cylindrical korai, at any rate—blockiness or “quadrifaciality” was a matter of choice, not necessity: a matter, that is, of genre and metaphor, not technology. A kouros or a seated figure does not have a blocky appearance as a direct consequence of its mode of extraction from the stone; cylindrical korai demonstrate that Greek craftsmen were perfectly capable of producing other effects. Rather, a kouros or a seated figure was produced as it was *so that it might have a blocky appearance*. What may have originated as an ancillary effect of technique became a positive value in its own right. Simonides shows this process in action when he says, “It is difficult for a man to become truly noble [agathos], foursquare [tetragōnon] in hands, feet, and mind, crafted without flaw.” The quadrifacial statue is, in these lines, a paradigm. A nobleman is like a kouros, not the other way around.

But Simonides is a symptom, not a cause. What was the value of a blocky appearance in the first place? Innate conservatism should not be underestimated, but it does not get us far. On the other hand, both foursquare “blockiness” and cylindrical “trunkiness” call attention to the fact of extraction. A vanished mantle of stone or bark surrounds these figures like an aura: each foursquare or cylindrical statue invites its beholders to sense the absent block, the absent wood, regardless of the medium actually employed. They thematize the intimate relation between what the chisel has removed and what it left in place. Other features contribute to this effect. From any angle, voids perforate the solid upright mass of a kouros: light shines between the arms and the torso, and between the legs. Just because the statue is so emphatically blocky, so stony-solid, these voids are not inert spaces but perforations, holes, places-from-which-stone-has-been-removed. That such voids were noticed in Antiquity is clear from Diodoros, who states that the legendary sculptor Daidalos instilled wonder, *thauma*, among men for being the first to part a statue’s legs and extend its arms from the body. In effect, he was the first to perforate the block. Post-Classical Greeks imagined an inaugural piercing to be a watershed moment in the history of their sculpture.

As time went on, Archaic sculptors devised increasingly audacious ways of achieving this effect. With greater and greater daring they hol-
allowed out the space between the arm and the torso, creating a sliver of light between the two. On the New York kouros of circa 590, the forearms still cleave to the hip (fig. 21). The sculptor of the Anavysos kouros, by contrast, disengages them entirely: a risky move, as one misplaced blow with hammer and chisel would shatter the slender wrist (fig. 22). The reward is a narrow gap between the inner arm and the pelvis, a gleaming line between matching solids. Such cavities draw attention to chiselwork, which might otherwise be taken for granted. While one might take such passages as displays of technical prowess, the intuition would be incomplete. For the play of mass and void, block and statue, recapitulates the guiding theme of a kouros: pareontas apeinai, present while absent. A statue like the Anavysos kouro stages a dialectic of solid and emptiness. The dead man’s body emerges in and through the removal of stone, and the sculptors dramatize that fact. They make it conspicuous. Technique, again, is a source of metaphor.
It is ironic that, in this respect, Greek statuary has more in common with certain Modernist artworks than with the Academic stereotype of Classical art as closed, self-contained, and unified. The British sculptor Barbara Hepworth, for instance, characteristically pierced and perforated abstract solids of stone or wood in order to set up a relationship between outer aspect and inner structure (fig. 23). In a series of works from the 1950s, produced in the wake of a trip to Greece, she expressly related this device to the practice of Archaic sculptors. Her *Single Form (Antiphon)* of 1953 makes obvious allusion to kouroi, even though it is a bronze derived from a prototype in wood. With its interplay of solid and void, the work stages High Modernism as a renaissance of the pre-Classical. Perforation, here, is what transforms a mere slab into a quasi-anthropomorphic image; as Henry Moore put it, “There is just as much shape to a hole as a lump.” There can, of course, be no question of retrojecting Modernist concerns onto the Archaic past. Quite apart from its role in the history of Modernism, however, *Single Form (Antiphon)* is a brilliant piece of historical criticism. Hepworth was perhaps the first to recognize explicitly the importance of perforation to early Greek sculpture.

Freestanding funerary statues comprise only a small proportion of Archaic sculpture. Yet the principle of *pareontas apeinai* is flexible and adaptable. Moving, for instance, to a different locale and a different genre, one finds a similar exploitation of void space in early architectural reliefs. The metopes from the first Heraion at Foce del Sele near Paestum in southern Italy, dating to circa 550, make a good example (fig. 24). The sculptor has simply drawn a silhouette on the slab and hollowed out the background, leaving figures that cleave to the frontmost plane. In so doing, he trades openly upon an interplay of present solid and absent void. The panel contains nothing but the paired extremes of surface and depth, with minimal transitions between them. Either the flat surface of the slab is present, or it is not. This approach makes the banal fact of “excavation” a source of visual interest.

Like “blockiness” and “trunkiness,” the perforations and trenches of the Archaic style are technically gratuitous but metaphorically vital. The result, with metopes and statues alike, is a glyptic counterpart to the elliptical lines of Herakleitos and Simonides. Just as early Greek poets wove presence and absence into their sentence structure, so masons made it a basic principle of sculptural composition.
Sameness

At least four kouroi stood around the slopes of Mount Olympos. The first nude youth may, for a traveler unused to such statues, have seemed like a unicum; but as one passed the second, and the third, and the fourth, the overall effect must have been of a series. This effect was not accidental. Although no two kouroi are exactly alike, still each individual statue presents itself as the token of a general type. Kouroi are generic in the strict sense of the term: they exemplify a genre. The result is a play of sameness and difference that, as we shall see, is homologous to the other dialectical structures discussed thus far.

The sameness of kouroi is the topic of an important study by Rainer Mack. Mack argues that the sheer repetitiveness of kouroi is their most important feature. Unlike earlier scholars, who have tended to emphasize a statue’s mimetic fidelity (or lack thereof) to real human bodies, Mack stresses the “lateral” or “synagmatic” relation of one statue to another. Gisela Richter’s landmark account arranged kouroi in terms of their anatomical realism: those statues that seemed to her to be more faithful to the facts of human musculature were generally considered to be later in the chronological sequence; those which departed from such facts were generally earlier. Mack, by contrast, insists that a kouros is primarily imitative neither of a real body nor of some Platonic “Ur-kouros,” but of other kouroi. This repetitiveness is a function of the production technology. Grids and proportional systems are no more (or less) than mason’s tools: “the act of producing ‘equivalence’” is “a function of the (rule-governed) mode of production within which that sculptor works.” That said, repetitiveness is an important source of visual interest: the “replication effect” is meaningful. As much as any one kouros represents a youth, Mack argues, it represents another kouros; represents, indeed, the whole kouros class: these statues “signify the equivalence that they instantiate.” From this metonymy—one kouros signifying another and thereby constituting a series—the figure type emerges as an extrapolation. Thus kouroi are not, in any simple sense, tokens of a type: for the type is, in fact, the recursive synthesis of the sequenced tokens. Replication posits an ideal “Ur-kouros” that each statue only seems to replicate, with each statue in the series “misrepresenting itself as the function of an ideal type.”

The result is a constant play between the idealized, purely cognitive type and the actual material statue. Kouroi are generic, but each example is also a particular carved pier of stone. Hence they operate, Mack argues, “at and as the intersection of the series and the fragment, the whole and the part, the class and the individual.” The Anavysos road offers two distinct versions of this play. At Phoinikia, where two or three kouroi probably stood side by side, the traveler would be confronted by a cluster of discrete statues; the similarities between them would make the extrapolation of the type, the “Ur-kouros,” virtually automatic. In such instances the replication effect grounds itself in spatial proximity and temporal simultaneity. Aristodikos, on the other hand, was a singleton. Here the extrapolation of the figure type would occur if and when the beholder related the statue to others he or she had seen before: Aristodikos might, for instance, recall the kouros at Phoinikia. In such cases the replication effect grounds itself in memory—in duration and distance as opposed to simultaneity and proximity. For Mack, the establishment of such spatial and temporal continuity is deeply political: it is, indeed, the materialization of political life as such.
With its foursquare blockiness, its canonical proportions, and its lack of iconographic attributes, the kouros is the most extreme example of this replicatory principle. But a general quality of “sameness” pervades early Greek sculpture. Despite the diversity of local variants, the range of statue types is remarkably restricted. The situation at Laureotic Olympos is not unique: Josef Floren has shown that the entire output of large-scale sculpture in the Archaic period boils down to eleven basic types. A similar situation pertained in Archaic poetry: though the Greek language encompassed many local dialects, the number of poetic genres (epic, lyric, elegaic, iambic) was fairly limited. In this regard the homogeneity of kouroi is only the most extreme example of a general characteristic of early Greek sculpture.

The rule-bound, generic nature of the sculptures implies that any particular example must be seen in light of the general category. The beholder of Aristodikos may confront a solitary statue by the roadside, but she also confronts all the kouroi she has seen before, in a network of memories and precedents. Even somewhat unusual pieces, like the stele from Barbaliaki with a mother and child, read as departures from well-established norms (fig. 13). Recent discoveries have underscored this point. A kore from Samos in the Louvre, inscribed with a dedication to Hera from one Kheramyes, was long believed to represent the goddess herself (fig. 16). In 1984, however, a second kore, nearly identical to the first and with the same inscription, was discovered at the Samian Heraion, along with a base with sockets for two such figures; the number of statues has now grown to four. Thus the particular becomes serial. Walking through the Samian Heraion one would encounter multiple iterations of the same type, each attached to a specific name. A similar situation pertained at Didyma, with numerous blocky figures like the Khares dedication (fig. 15). The Ptoan sanctuary of Apollo in Boiotia contained a veritable forest of kouroi. Sculptors exploited this homogeneity, introducing subtle variations in their works to underscore similarities and differences, and perhaps even relations among patrons. Whether through spatial proximity, recollection, or (most likely) a combination of the two, each individual kouros or kore calls forth the entire class to which it claims to belong.

In practice this dialectic will tend to play itself out as a confrontation between statue and epitaph: between the generic kouros and the specificity of names like “Kroisos” or “Aristodikos.” Like the glyptic articulation of solid and void, this emergence of ideal types from spatial and temporal seriation has a basic affinity with the texts of Herakleitos, Simonides, and Aristotle. Just as, in those passages, presence appears “in the field between the words,” so the meaning of each kouros occurs in the “field” between one statue and another. Meaning emerges from ellipsis, statues from blocks and trunks, and the kouros type itself from the serial presentation of discrete works of craft.

Joining

The qualities of carving and sameness both derive directly from technologies of production: they stand in a causal relation to blocks, trunks, chisels, drawings, grids, canons, and genres. “Joining,” on the other hand, addresses the depictive content of the works themselves. Not how the statues were made, but what they represent. As noted, the term itself comes from Herakleitos and his account of “joints,” or “synapses”; but this category is capacious and I make no historical claims for the specific term itself, although the phenomena themselves are real.
We begin with pose. Most discussions of kouroi note their peculiar timelessness. They are oddly intermediate, neither walking nor standing still. Frozen and immobile, weight distributed with perfect evenness over both legs, a statue like the New York kouros in fact seems somehow outside time. Indeed, it seems almost as if the conventions of the kouros type were designed specifically to convey this sense of what the archaeologist Dieter Metzler called “perpetuity,” die ewiger Dauer. While some scholars have seen the alleged atemporality of the kouros type as expressive of cultural conservatism, the situation is actually more complex. For one thing, kouroi are not unique in their poise. In the area of Laureotic Olympos, for instance, the Diskobolos and Brother-and-Sister stelai clearly depict figures as temporally indeterminate as any kouros (figs. 11–12). The way that many korai tug at their skirts conveys a similar effect: the maiden herself may stand stock-still, but her hem twitches, and the folds of drapery respond: there is movement, of a sort (figs. 67–69).

Going father afield, early Greek sculpture in general avoids agitated poses. Until the end of the sixth century the actors tend to strike static poses regardless of the narrative situation. Even when running, for instance, the torso tends to remain vertical, and both feet stay on the ground. A tangled mêlée of gods and giants on the north frieze of the Siphnian treasury at Delphi, dating to the early 520s, is a good example; compare also the fleeing Tityos from Foce del Sele (fig. 25). Otherwise, representations of motion tend to adhere to the Knielauf or “kneeling run” pose, whereby the figure adopts a pinwheel stance. The so-called Nike of Arkhemos of Chios, found on Delos and dating to the 540s, is a famous example: the Knielauf represents the amazing speed of the flying goddess (fig. 26). This pose, widespread in all media of Greek art throughout the sixth century, achieves an effect analogous to that of a kouros. For although the kneeling run represents speed, and although the pinwheel design is intrinsically dynamic, nonetheless it remains a highly abstract, even diagrammatic, pattern. In statues of youths and goddesses alike, motion interchanges with stasis, hence khronos with aiōn, “time” with “eternity.”

The kouroi on the Anavysos road show how funerary art articulates this particular variant of “synaptic” logic (henceforth I will drop the scare quotes). The
pose of the kouros is but one way in which the memorial seeks simultaneously to overcome and to acknowledge time’s passage. We have already seen, for instance, how each kouros makes allusion to—and in a sense makes present—any and all kouroi that a passerby has seen in the past. The “replication effect” trades on an interplay of presentness and recollection. Likewise part of the statue’s function is to body forth a man who was destroyed sometime in the past. Yet, as Vernant insisted, the premise of any sign is the nonpresence of its referent. Mourning and commemoration are not negations of death but negotiations with it; as much as the statue manufactures a presence, it confirms an absolute absence. The pose of a kouros is not a “mere” formal device, but the means by which the statue expresses its peculiar temporal predicament: that of mourning.

Closely linked to this acknowledgment of time is the statue’s assertion of bodily integrity. In its nudity and its rigidly frontal pose, the kouros displays the body in all its perfection, hiding nothing. Everything conspires to make the body seem a coherent and unified whole. The outrages that disease, age, and war heap upon a man simply vanish. In their place is only seamless perfection: panta kala, “all is fair.” Yet if an early Greek statue may be comprehended at a glance, it is also irreducibly disjunct. We have already seen that most early stone statues have four cardinal viewpoints, corresponding to the four planes of an original stone block. But the display of these statues was not so controlled as to permit only these four angles of beholding: for an ambient viewer, strolling down the Anavysos road or visiting a great sanctuary, the cardinal viewpoints will have been momentary exceptions to a succession of oblique angles. The Sounion kouroi, for instance, are set into their bases at a slight angle, such that a frontal view of each statue is possible only if one stands off to one side (fig. 5). This device by no means diminishes the importance of the frontal view. On the contrary, it dramatizes the importance and desirability of such a sightline, thereby teasing the beholder’s eye and accentuating the statue’s autonomy and aloofness. Most kouroi, however, are not so subtle. They simply ignore the beholder’s difficulties, investing everything in four moments of maximally direct apprehension. They pass over the oblique views, much as Herakleitos and Simonides pass over certain words. Just as the paratactic poems acquire significance in and through the restitution of missing conjunctions, so each complete view depends, for its effect, on the incomplete and unsatisfying ones that precede and follow it.

The play of whole and fragment likewise organizes the articulation of anatomical details. Early Greek sculpture, famously, tends to treat each feature of the body as
a discrete entity: every element is “self-contained within a fully closed contour,” as Rhys Carpenter puts it. Looking, for instance, at the face of the Anavysos kouros, the eyes, the brows, the lips, the nose, the cheeks, even the strands of hair are sharply delineated from one another (fig. 27). The face is an assemblage of separate pieces, like a jigsaw puzzle. There is no intrinsic need for such an approach. Hellenistic sculptors would do just the opposite, creating a style of soft transitions that blur to the point of sfumato (fig. 28). But, as is becoming clear, the Archaic style in sculpture is devoted to just this play between fragments and wholes. To see the face of the kouros as a face is to synthesize a whole from disparate parts. There is nothing unusual in such a process; it is a perfectly ordinary gestalt, as automatic in its way as the syntactical reading of an elliptical line of Greek. What matters is that the sculptors harp upon it, just as Herakleitos and Simonides do.

The monument, however, is more than just a body in stone. It typically includes a text as well; and it is through the texts that one may get a sense of how these statues address their beholders. When confronted in a necropolis or by a roadside, the inscription at the base of a monument invites reading. A sixth-century gravestone from Eretria is particularly insistent:

Greetings, passersby. I lie low in death: come hither and read who of men has been buried here: a stranger from Aegina, Mnésitheus by name; my dear mother Timarete set up this memorial for me, an imperishable stele on the top of the mound which shall say unceasingly forever to passersby: Timarete set it up for her dear son dead.

On the Anavysos road, this formula appears only on the Kroisos base, with its command that passersby “Stay and mourn.” Such apostrophes neatly reverse cause and effect: before the text can order its reader to pause, he or she must already be
doing just that. But they establish from the outset the fiction is that the monument has been waiting for “passersby” to come along, that it is vital not inert, active not passive. The encounter with the monument is, in theory, interactive.

But even as the monument proffers this invitation, it rescinds it. The kouros type is disengaged, aloof from those addressers who actually do stop to read, look, and mourn. Elevated on bases and mounds, kouroi tend to loom over their beholders and to stare off over their heads, especially if one bends to read an accompanying inscription. Museum photographs obscure this feature by showing statues from an artificially elevated vantage point. To be sure, if one stands well back and squints, it can seem as though a kouros is looking at you. But inscriptions on the statues and their bases establish the optimum viewing distance as being sufficiently close to make out the letters. At such proximity, a kouros will stare off overhead, cutting the very ties with the surrounding world that the inscription seems to encourage.

Closely related to this aloofness is the way some monuments work to awe, or even frighten, the beholder. To approach a tomb or a deity can produce fear—one is, after all, in the presence of the supernatural—and the necropolis and the sanctuary are each places where, in Aeschylus’s phrase, “the terrible is good.” In this setting, the encounter with sculpture is intrinsically ambivalent. Some monuments trade upon this aspect and play it against the beckoning or inviting text. On the Anavysos road, for instance, the Brother-and-Sister stele is organized around just this antithesis of attraction and repulsion (fig. 12). On the monument’s lowermost block there is an elegaic couplet. It is just fragmentary enough to be controversial, especially in the matter of names. As noted earlier, one broadly accepted reading goes, “To dear Megakles, on his death, his father and mother raised me up as a memorial [mnēma].” Although this epigram does not actually call out to passersby as some other tombstones do, still its very existence presumes a reader who has paused, approached, and bent to look. It is only in such a reading, moreover, that the stele discharges its commemorative function. For one thing, the text provides specificity. Given the generic and stereotyped format of gravestones, it is not until someone actually reads the inscription that a given monument will cease to be generic and come to commemorate a particular individual. More importantly, as both Jesper Svenbro and Joseph Day have emphasized, early Greek epigrams were read aloud, and a funerary epigram thus triggers a reenactment of the ritual lament for the deceased, endlessly hauling the past back into the present. In this instance, we speak Megakles’ name, we call him our “dear one,” and in so doing we retain him in the here and now. This ongoing circulation of the name is what the Greeks called kleos, “glory,” and it is the prime desideratum of every aristocrat: it was for a short life with enduring kleos that Akhilleus went to Troy.

Crowning the Brother-and-Sister stele is a monstrous sphinx. These creatures appear frequently atop Archaic grave stelai, although they could also function as dedications in their own right. In the mortuary context they are usually understood to be apotropaic: the Sphinx, or “Dog of Hades” as one epigram calls her, guards the tomb. Her frontality is confrontational and, literally, repulsive—it repels with a gaze of fear. More recently, Herbert Hoffmann and others have argued that the Sphinx exemplifies the liminality of the grave marker, its function as a meeting place of living and dead, present and past: the Sphinx is the hybrid marker of a hybrid place. This view, also, has much to recommend it, and indeed it complements the apotropaic argument nicely.

There is thus a marked antithesis between the Sphinx, which is literally repulsive,
and the epigram, which is implicitly attractive. This distinction is, in fact, a basic organizing principle of the monument. The Sphinx, for instance, has her own special connection to poetry. Sophokles describes the Theban Sphinx, adversary of Oedipus, as *poikilōidos*, a *hapax* that Liddell and Scott translate as “of perplexed or juggling song.” For Euripides, her riddles are *mousai*, “musics,” *amousotatai ōidai*, “most un-musical songs,” and a *dysxunetos melos*, “an unsolvable song.” The relation of the Theban Sphinx to the Sphinx of tomb sculpture is uncertain, but Athenian vase-painters clearly conflated the two. They show the Theban Sphinx posing her famous riddles from atop a column or a slab, in clear allusion to funerary and votive sculptures (fig. 29). The connotation is clearly attested in the material record and needs to be taken seriously. On a grave stele, the incomprehensible song of the Sphinx stands in marked contrast to the eminently legible inscription. The lucidity and specificity of the poem, its task of rescuing the name of Megakles from obscurity, has its antithesis in a figure of enigmas and riddles. Just so, where the text is read aloud, the Sphinx’s unmusical music is never redeemed from silence, cannot really be spoken. Her mouth is closed, and in general the silence of images is a commonplace of Greek literature, as in Simonides’ remark that “painting is silent poetry.” In short, where the inscription gives us resonant verse as truth-telling, guaranteeing the commemoration of the dead in and through the legibility of a text, the Sphinx with her “perplexed or juggling song” gives us just the opposite: the silent poetry of an unanswerable enigma. Aristotle says that “it is the form of an enigma to join impossibilities to a description of real things,” and that description seems appropriate to the Sphinx: she is the very form of an enigma, joining real things and impossibilities in three dimensions.

These opposites frame the central shaft. Megakles and his unnamed sister stand within a force field, with positive and negative poles above and below: between clarity and riddle, poetry and nonmusic, attraction and repulsion, low and high, epigram and sphinx. Formally the sculptor presents this structure as a progression of medium: from incised text at the bottom, to shallow relief in the middle, to full sculpture-in-the-round at the top. In this simple triad the inscribed poem is the most “abstract,” the most “symbolic,” element; but it also, when read aloud, acquires the most literal, acoustic presence in the here and now. The Sphinx, by contrast, is the most striking, the most confrontational and the most compellingly plastic; yet her song is silent, implicit. Between the two stand the dead, their low relief assimilating them to the incised words, their iconicity assimilating them to the sculpted Sphinx.

The in-betweenness of the represented figures, shimmering between two and three dimensions, presence and absence, sculpture and writing, silence and poetry, is an instance of synaptic logic in practice. Dead yet remembered, vanished yet tangibly present, Megakles and his sister exemplify this distinctive in-between state, which it is the work of the inscription and the Sphinx to delineate.

A similar dynamic characterizes many Archaic works. Kouroi and korai, for instance, also combine text and image. The statues, however, typically omit the medi-
ating term in favor of a simple juxtaposition of text and sculpture in the round. They are not tripartite but dual. Like the Sphinx, the early Greek statue faces the beholder and stares over his or her head. If the inscription invites the passerby to participate in the dissemination of a name, the distant gaze reasserts the absolute alterity of the dead, the gods, the stone. The kouros is alien from the world of men in the manner of a sphinx, anthropomorphic in the manner of Megakles and his sister. The Aristodikos memorial presents this juxtaposition with singular economy. On the one hand, the nondepictive letters simply state the dead man’s name, setting it in the genitive to indicate his absence: Aristodiko. On the other, the statue bodies forth Aristodikos in a manner both confrontational and alien. Like the lines of Herakleitos, these monuments state an antithesis in order to stage the chiastic interfusion of its terms, not in synthesis or sublation but in a permanent state of twofoldness.

**Embodiment**

Go back now, please, to the roadside by Mount Olympos, and to the encounter with a bright shining stone—a naked youth, sign of Aristodikos (figs. 1, 3–4). The phenomenon I am trying to evoke is *generic*, just as the kouros itself is. It belongs to a genre, a distinctive mode of relation to the world. An epitaph on a stele base from Athens, ca. 540–530, sketches the scenario:

Man, as you stride along the road pondering other things in your mind, stay and mourn, seeing the sign of Thrason.

Such dramas must have played out countless times each day in Greece. On the Anavysos road, imagine the following: walking down a country road in the summer—a hot day, somewhat dusty—sweating a little, and squinting—bees and cicadas and fig trees all around; then something bright in the distance, a pause in the gait, an approach—the eye tracking the thing as you move, the viewpoint ambient, you might look down or away as you step, you might peer as you look up; recognizing at some point a statue—recognition brings it nearer—then full stop at the gravesite, noticing the single carved word, looking up at it from below, seeing the limbs, the sex at about eye level, the eyes staring off overhead, the sparkle of the mica in the marble, the colored hair . . . the hills behind it in the distance. Stop and weep, seeing the sign. Of course, this is a fiction, both in Thrason’s epitaph and in the scenario along the Anavysos road. But something of the sort is entailed, willy-nilly, in anodyne terms like “ostentatious” or “eye-catching” (as in, “The kouros is ostentatious”). The banality of these phrases can be deceptive; they require unpacking. It is not helpful, yet, to call this encounter “aesthetic,” still less to reduce it to a psychological “experience.” Both terms are premature in their application, if only because they work against the generic quality of this narrative and give it an aura of subjective singularity. Better simply to say that the encounter interrupts the gait and readjusts spatial relations by drawing attention away from “other things” and toward a carved thing recognized as a sign. The sculpted kouros differs from the fig trees, cicadas, and other entities by the wayside chiefly in this solicitation of attention. The statue grabs attention and, in so doing, makes a bit of real estate by the roadside into a place, a *topos*.

Elevation on a base and brightness of material both work to this end. Seen at a distance, a kouros in the sunlight will shine like Akhilleus when he enters battle
without armor, a golden cloud radiant about his head with "everywhere-appearing flame." Homer goes on at length about the effect of such a brilliant body.

As when from an island smoke reaches up into the high air from afar, the enemies fighting to either side all day ... but as the sun goes down signal fires blaze out one after the other, so that the ray goes pulsing high for men established round about to see it, in case they might come over in ships to drive off the enemy—so from the head of Akhilleus the blaze shot into the bright air.\textsuperscript{119}

Similar passages abound, as when Priam espies Akhilleus from the walls of Troy:

The aged Priam was the first whose eyes saw him as he swept across the flat land in full shining, like that star which comes on in autumn and whose conspicuous brightness far outshines the stars that are numbered in the night's darkening, the star they give the name of Orion's Dog, which is brightest among the stars and yet is wrought as a sign \textit{sēma} of evil and brings on great fever for unfortunate mortals. Such was the flare of the bronze that girt his chest in his running.\textsuperscript{120}

Passages such as these vividly evoke not just a radiant body but also a situated spectator, a distinct vantage-point: on a distant island or a lofty wall. In so doing they suggest how a flashing light might locate the eye in time and space, as that toward which, or for which, a beam shines, variously as a call for help or a sign of doom.

Such passages provide a way to think about the brightness of statues. Attention-grabbing brilliance discloses some basic phenomenological facts: that one has a viewpoint, that the viewpoint is ambient, that possession of it is integral to being a person of a certain height, in a certain place, in certain weather, possessed of certain senses, moving, standing still, and so on. Brilliance situates you, as Akhilleus situated the Trojans. But it is possible to be more specific. A kouros's sharp transition between cardinal viewpoints likewise dramatizes not just the facts of extraction and carving but also that this entity has viewpoints in the first place, and that we are occupying them, or moving outside them. The work's viewpoints render conspicuous the beholder's own. Everything seen is, of course, seen from somewhere, but not everything makes this fact so readily apparent as a kouros does. It "thematizes" viewpoint or, as Michael Baxandall might say, it makes viewpoint "a source of visual interest."\textsuperscript{121}

Just so, the elevation and aloofness of such figures—the way a roadside kouros, for instance, will seem to stare over the head of one who actually pauses to read its inscription—solicits a displacement of the ordinary: not a clean break with one's walk, but a revelation of the walk's particular situation, its ambit, as one passes to and fro diurnally, striding and "pondering other things." Aloofness implies a recognition of the beholder's own situatedness or entanglement within a topography of assigned relations.\textsuperscript{122} We are part of that world of "other things" from which the kouros is aloof; the aloofness makes our involvement \textit{visible}. In this way, the statue "takes place."

Mortuary epigrams regularly underscore such specificity of place, using the epic formula \textit{engus hodou}, "by the roadway," to mark their own location.\textsuperscript{123} An early Classical inscription from Akarnania, for instance, links the tomb's position by the road with the dead man's actions in defense of his land.
“Prokleidas” shall this sign [sama] by the roadway [engus hodoio] be called, who died fighting for his own land.124

With this phrase, generic space becomes specific ground, becomes part of a narrative twice over: once in the story of Prokleida’s death, and again within a history of family occupation. In this regard the inscription simply makes explicit a basic function of the monument. A kouros by the roadside is, in this sense, like a piece of landscape architecture.

Solicitation of attention has a temporal aspect as well. If nothing else, the monument confirms the finitude of human life: Aristodikos, Kroisos, and the rest are all definitively past. Over against this ephemerality is the permanence of the monument itself. The “imperishable stele” of Mnesitheus (see p. 43) is a good statement of this device, as is a famous epitaph for Midas, attributed in antiquity variously to the sage Kleoboulos of Lindos and to Homer:

I am the maiden in bronze set over the tomb of Midas.
As long as water runs from wellsprings and tall trees burgeon,
And the sun goes up the sky to shine, and the moon is brilliant,
As long as rivers shall flow and the wash of the sea’s breakers,
So long remaining in my place on this tomb where the tears fall
I shall tell those that pass that Midas lies here buried.125

Monumental permanence is the antithesis of human passing. Of course, it is the beholder’s passing, too—not just along the roadway, but into death. That is part of the point of the Sta, Viator! formula. To “stay and mourn,” as the Kroisos inscription has it, is to tarry for a while by the sign of the dead, with a resumption of the gait forever implicit. A base signed ca. 530 by Aristion of Paros (cf. fig. 36) is succinct and explicit on this score. It sets the passerby between the visible stasis of the monument—perhaps, in this case, a pillar—and the terminus of death:

Before the sign of Antilokhos, a noble and wise man, shed a tear; since for you too Death awaits.126

The beholder will resume his movement down the road, where Death sits in stillness as the inevitable terminus.

Conversely, permanence belongs not just to the monument but to the landscape around it. If part of the function of tomb sculpture is indeed to mark territory and even land tenure, then a monument like that of Aristodikos gives the landscape an ongoing history, a past and a future. It positions the beholder’s own passage relative to this duration.127 In the case of the Aristodikos, somebody felt the need to efface this monument, to erase its articulation of meaning. The statue was knocked down, perhaps by the Persians in 480, and mutilated: the face still bears the scars, which are darker than the relatively fresh, white marks left by plow or pickaxe.128

Although these claims may sound subjective (that is, far-fetched) they are not psychological but descriptive. The goal is simply to “unpack” points that are not, in themselves, especially controversial: for instance, that the Aristodikos kouros is “ostentatious” and “aloof”; that it has discontinuous viewpoints; that its permanence alongside a specific stretch of road was integral to its function. Whether there was a conscious intention in the head of the sculptor to suggest discontinuous viewpoints,
or whether any walker on the Anavysos road ever reflected consciously upon these discontinuities as she approached a sēma, are not questions once can really answer. It certainly seems implausible, not to say impossible, and it is not my claim. The ancient Greeks were not aesthetes; that was not an option for them. They did not say things like, “My gracious, I suddenly find myself newly cognizant of my own phenomenological situatedness!” But such attention need not take the form of self-conscious reflection. A simple expression—“O, look!”—or a pause in the gait—a stumble, say—will suffice to register ostentation in the real world. Again: that is part of what I take the word “ostentation” to mean.

Of course, it is forever debatable whether a critic is using words correctly. The claim that the application of predicates like “bright,” “ostentatious,” and “foursquare” entails a further suggestion about embodied beholding is debatable in just this way. Maybe I don’t quite know what “ostentatious” means…. Such debate, however, will not be abstract but practical. It will be about our own practice, our own commitments, to artworks and to words—hence theirs, I mean the Greeks’. But I maintain that ostentation, aloofness, and discontinuity are all “there,” they are facts, as when Merleau-Ponty declares, in the epigraph to this book, “the fact remains that the perceived stone is there … and that we agree on a certain number of statements about it.” Unlike any primary source text that one might bring to bear upon a kouros, moreover, these facts are undeniably pertinent to the monument—for they are part of the monument. The crucial point, however, is that all of these terms, hence all of these encounters, are not private and subjective but, again, exactly as generic as the kouros type itself. Indeed, the kouros-type, in its “sameness,” makes this repetitiveness, this genericness, explicit.

The everyday confrontation with a statue thus brings to the fore the fact of being a particular body in a particular situation of time and space, relative to a particular thing. It brings these facts to the fore as part of a generic structure of beholding. I will call this situation “embodiment.” The question arises, therefore, of how such acknowledgments of embodiment—of standing on a particular road, in particular weather, as a particular body, moving toward and stopping before a particular carved thing—might acquire affect.

One part of an answer would have to do with the very particularity at issue. I am arguing that the generic roadside encounter—seeing a statue as such, as something distinct from rocks and stones and trees—brings out the specificity of a traveler’s situation. This situation is not an object of disinterested contemplation; it is, if anything, constitutive of interest as such. So the thematization of embodiment does not and cannot cut all ties with a beholder’s world. It can only seem to do so. The body, flesh, is everywhere in this encounter.

Another part of the answer would have to do with the fact that kouroi and the like are both depictive and functional. They represent bodies, and they commemorate the dead, delight the gods, discharge obligations, mark boundaries, and so on. The representational content and commemorative function of statuary imbue the roadside encounter with meaning. It is not just any old stone that is “taking place” by the road, but a stone youth. This representational content ought to help determine the encounter. We can be more specific: a kouros does not represent just any old youth, any old body, but a perfect and desirable body. And it displays that body. The statue gives us the body as a whole, parades its nudity, shows it off. It makes much of the body; it makes a fuss, a to-do; it makes the body a “source of visual interest.” Matching the thematization of embodiment in beholders, in short, is a thematization of
carnality integral to the work itself. Kouroi are *all about* bodies, hence embodiment. In this congruence, once again, we have the makings of a machine for the production of fantasy.

How does it work? There need not be just one way to solicit affective response. But it may be useful to sketch one possible way. The machine might work by articulating embodiment and carnality in terms of *erōs*. The verb *mnēomai* means both “to remember” and “to desire, woo, court”; and a *mnēma*, or grave monument, is thus a site of memory and *erōs* both. Some thirty years ago, Emily Vermeule first described a “pornography of death” in Greek art. Not only, she showed, do early Greek writers frequently describe death as a kind of erotic union with the divine, but they also assimilate mourning to desire. Yet the word “desire” is not sufficiently nuanced. Greek distinguishes two forms of longing: *pothos* and *himeros*. The difference, according to Plato, is between yearning for the absent, and possessing the present. Longing for the dead is a version of *pothos*—“a feeling of longing … for someone who is not there, a lover gone overseas, or the absent dead.” Such desire is predicated on its own frustration: those who have gone below do not return. It is precisely this unattainability that Anne Carson locates at the heart of Sappho’s love poetry: the poet signals it with the portmanteau word *glukupikron*, “sweet-bitter.” Graveyards and sanctuaries are important sites of such desire, and sculpture is its catalyst. Statues of the desirable dead, or the beautiful gods, offer fantasies of reunion and gratification that succeed only in myth. Laodameia, the wife of Protesilaos, is a paradigmatic case. Although her husband died at Troy, she slept alongside his statue until he came back to life. This story is one of phantasmatic gratification—the realization of fantasy by means of images. Admetos vows to try the same tactic in Euripides’ *Alkestis*, lightening his soul’s heaviness by sleeping with an image of his lost wife. Crucially, however, the two modes of desire work in tandem to effect this recuperation. For the statue is not absent; desire for it is not *pothos* but *himeros*. Desire (*himeros*) for the present statue and desire for the absent figure (*pothos*) overlay one another.

Kouroi trade quite openly on these modes of desire. Many scholars have observed that these statues bear all the attributes of an ideal *erōmenos*, the junior partner in a homoerotic relationship. “Down to the middle of the fifth century,” writes Kenneth Dover, “the most consistent and striking ingredients of the ‘approved’ male figure are: broad shoulders, a deep chest, big pectoral muscles, big muscles above the hips, a slim waist, jutting buttocks and stout thighs and calves.” The combination of all these features in the kouros can hardly be coincidence. The viewer of such an image, in other words, takes on the role of a lover—just as, on a red-figure cup of circa 500, a statue takes the place of the *erōmenos* in a courtship scene (fig. 30). The eroticization of the tomb-marker allows mourning to take the form of desire for a beautiful boy.

Iconography, viewpoint, and stance all work to this effect. By freezing an ephebe in his prime, the kouros grants the fondest wish of every *erastēs* or lover: that his beloved should remain forever young, with at most a hint of down on his cheeks.
simple, quadrifacial pose is similarly obliging, allowing the body to be grasped at once and in its entirety. Present, real, the kouros holds nothing back, but shows itself entirely to its audience. In this respect it obeys the rules of erotic elegy that, as Bruno Gentili has shown, treat resistance on the part of the beloved as a form of injustice. There is something almost pornographic in this complete openness to the beholder; if its formal conventions are not those of the centerfold, nonetheless, the kouros is as close as the premodern world could come to the dirty photograph’s combination of deathly stillness and total display.

Lastly, the stance: does a kouros step forward to meet its viewer, or does it hang back? In earlier works the issue remains in abeyance. But in the case of the Kritian boy from the Athenian Akropolis—dating perhaps to the 470s, it is arguably the last of the kouroi—the arched back makes this aspect quite explicit (figs. 31, 32). One may compare a profile view of the statue to a cup by the Brygos Painter, now in
Oxford, showing a young boy surrendering to his lover: the poses are almost identical (fig. 33). On offer is a new way of yielding. A roughly contemporary kouros from Akragas arches his back in a similar fashion. As we shall see in the next chapter, this new relation to the beholder marks the end of the Archaic style.

In short, the urge to retrieve the deceased, to make him present, is carnal. Not in a symbolic or abstract sense, but literally: insofar as a kouros bears the attributes of an erōmenos, it is (or ought to be) sexy. At issue is a particular way of seeing a statue—a desiring gaze. This way of seeing is the affective correlate of the statue’s function as the present marker of an absence. The overlay of pothos and himeros is what the doubleness of a statue feels like.

But visual gratification is only part of the story. The statue’s splendid isolation provides a counterpoint. Looming over the roadside on its pedestal, staring off into space, the kouros snubs its beholder even as it gratifies the eye. If the statue solicits a Pygmalion fantasy, still (and for obvious reasons) it tends ultimately to frustrate its beholder’s desires. Statues never really come to life, and they are not supposed to.

Part of the distinctive phenomenology of images is the fact that they are recognized as such in beholding. Insofar as the beholder recognizes a statue as a statue, he or she sees it as a distinct kind of entity—and not as a living being or an ordinary lump of stone. Seeing it in either of the latter two ways is not seeing it as a statue. This fact predicates the erotics of the encounter. Insofar as the statue is seen as such, it is seen as inanimate and nonhuman. To persist in desiring it nonetheless entails
either a pathological refusal to acknowledge its inanimacy (a kind of madness), or the improvisation of a mode of gratification predicated on engagement with the nonhuman and inanimate, or any of the multifarious forms of phantasmatic gratification that lie between these extremes. Laodameia and Admetos are mythological paradigms of such tactics: they were true iconophiles, loving statues while recognizing them as statues. In a later era, Pseudo-Lucian would lampoon such desires in his story of a young man who, inflamed with lust for the nude Knidian Aphrodite of Praxiteles, spent the night in the sanctuary and had his way with the statue. Although it has become a standby of art-historical discussions of ancient “sexuality,” this story has nothing to do with the ordinary desires of beholders. The joke is that the man fails to recognize that the Knidia is just a statue. Unlike Laodameia and Admetos, who take images to bed precisely because they are not the “real thing,” Lucian’s buffoon is not a lover of images, but a ludicrous would-be Anchises.

No doubt such stories are reminders that fetishism and perversion (in the Freudian sense) wait in the wings of everyday encounters with statues. On the one hand, the fantasy at issue is utterly literal, even tactile: the idea of a physical relation, if only a touch or caress. On the other, the fantasy wishes away the material of the image—stone, wood, bronze, clay—in favor of an imagined engagement with its representational content. In the story it is a goddess, but it might as well be a youth or a maiden or whatever. It is not, exactly not, the mere stone or wood or metal that the man desires; there is something that must be overcome. (Of course, people can and do have erotic attachments to stone or wood or metal, and these attachments can overdetermine their responses to images in a variety of ways, but the specific medium is not the issue). The statue is, in this regard, like a tool that does not function properly. As a mere thing it is present to be used for gratification or for anything else; but as a mere thing it can never reciprocate, acknowledge, respond in any way to the desire that it solicits (it can never be other than used). Of course, that is a statue’s job: to solicit a desire that it cannot fulfill, such that it is funny or obscene when someone, like Lucian’s passionate sightseer, actually tries to make it work in the way a body might. It is exactly through this functional dysfunction that the statue clarifies what is at stake in the encounter with images: a mode of comportment to a world that is not quite objective.

Korai (“maidens”) solicit fantasy just like their masculine counterparts, but they do so in a precisely opposite manner: they are clothed and engaging where kouroi are naked and aloof. They interact with their beholders quite literally by offering them gifts: flowers, birds, fruit. But, as Robin Osborne has observed, this implicit narrative of gift giving allegorizes the statues’ function. For korai are themselves tokens of exchange. Erected in sanctuaries and graveyards, they are offerings to the gods or the dead: counters in the economy linking mortals and the supernatural. As nubile maids, moreover, they are items to be “given” in marriage: counters in a purely human transaction. In short, korai are themselves tokens of exchange; they depict tokens of exchange; and they narrate a scene of exchange. It is thus no exaggeration to suggest that when they give flowers and fruit, korai give themselves.

The kore of Phrasikleia, signed by the same Aristion of Paros who made the Antilokhos monument, exemplifies this thematic (fig. 34). Found in a roadside plot at Merenda in Attica, the work dates to circa 540 (fig. 35). A young woman, crowned and bejeweled, wearing a long robe embroidered with flowers, holds a budding lotus in one hand. Her epitaph reads:
The sign [sēma] of Phrasikleia. “Girl” I shall be called forever, having received this name from the gods in exchange for marriage.¹⁴⁹

The text narrates an exchange: “in exchange for marriage,” Phrasikleia has received a name, “maiden.” The statue shows Phrasikleia holding forth a budding flower. Two readings, both compelling, offer diametrically opposed interpretations of this flower. Jesper Svenbro argues that the flower symbolizes the unperishing renown that Phrasikleia receives in being spoken of, “called ‘girl,’” every time a passerby reads aloud her epitaph.¹⁵⁰ Andrew Stewart, on the other hand, sees that flower as the emblem of the maidenhead that Phrasikleia has given up to the gods.¹⁵¹ Both scholars see the flower as a token of Phrasikleia’s traffic with the gods, but they disagree as to whether Phrasikleia is giving it or receiving it. Must we choose? The monument is vague. Steiner aptly observes that, as a token or substitute, the flower is like the statue itself. Phrasikleia’s monument narrates an ongoing exchange, one that lasts “forever,” aiei, and whatever ambiguity may hang about her gesture seems very much to the point. The flower, like the monument, is the token an exchange that never reaches completion.

The offering up of maidenhead has erotic implications. Recognition of the role of erōs, however, does not entail that every figure be conspicuously titillating.¹⁵² Phrasikleia, for instance, is the very figure of modesty. Even here, however, there is pothos. The dead, like the gods, are desirable precisely because they are unattainable; hence one mourns, or worships. The work of a sēma is to elicit this response. Males give themselves through nudity while remaining aloof through pose, while females do the reverse: they give themselves through pose even as they hide themselves under drapery.

Moreover, desire is not exclusively erotic; erōs, erotic love, can shade into philia, familial love. The Barbaliaki stele is a particularly eloquent variation on this theme (fig. 13). It narrates love of family in and as beholding: the reciprocal gaze of mother and child is an axis of philia. In this way, the stele models its own viewing. Because it appears as a play of gazes, the depicted love of mother and child mimics the beholder’s own activity. The mother gazes at her child just as the passerby will gaze at
Thus the familial bond stands as a model for the relation of beholder to image, mourner to mourned. This conceit would become commonplace in the Classical period (see chapter 5). But at this early date it was something of a novelty, as most grave stelai depicted only a single figure. The stele is, nonetheless, a useful reminder that pothos is not exclusively erotic. Grave markers appeal not just to passersby but to mothers, fathers, brothers, sisters, children. The line between erōs and philia may be fine and blurred but is usefully observed.

At the same time, the Barbaliaki stele marks an important difference between freestanding and relief sculpture in this period. In the sixth century, only relief is capable of depicting philia of this sort, because only relief can depict locked gazes. Freestanding statuary inevitably orients itself outward, toward the audience. Even family groups do not interact narratively. The Geneleos dedication from the Heraion at Samos lines up a household on an oblong base (figs. 36, 64). Each member stands as if isolated: they are linked through dress, pose, and style, but not through depicted action or character. Roadside grave precincts, like the one at Phoinikia, most likely arranged statues side by side, each staring outward in an open series. Relief, by contrast, can establish internal relationships between depicted figures, as on the Barbaliaki stele with its closed circuit of gazes and caresses. These internal relationships can then become ways of including the beholder by recapitulating within the monument itself his or her confrontation with the stone.

Whether operating by erōs or by philia, Greek statuary represents a standing invitation to fantasy: to believe that a block of stone can reciprocate affect. To yearn after a kouros, a kore, or any other statue is in some sense to wish—to fantasize—that the absent figure might exist, bodily, in the here and now. Apsukhon dē empsukhon: the inanimate becomes animate. In this way, pothos and himeros recapitulate synaptic themes. They name the affective charge of beholding presence and absence.

It is, interestingly, in just these terms that Plato imagines our entry into authentic philosophical beholding. Socrates tells Phaedrus (whose name means “Radiant”) that the perception of beautiful statues and people is a bodily correlate to the nonsensuous apprehension of the Ideas. It is through such embodied encounters that the noumenal world “shines” into the phenomenal. Socrates explains that, before birth, the soul must have apprehended true Beings (ta onta). But now, having fallen into corporeality, it can no longer do so. Our material eyes cannot see Ideas like Wisdom. Yet there is one Idea that remains perceptible, albeit indirectly: the Beautiful.
We can see the Beautiful’s *eidōlon* or “image.” We see this image in and as the body and face of a beloved, which partake of brilliance and erotic attraction. For this reason, the Beautiful is *ekphanestataton kai erasmiotaton*, the “most brilliant and most beloved,” of the Ideas. The beloved draws the incarnate soul by triggering its memory of the earlier apprehension of Being. This memory presents itself initially as amazement, *ekplēxis*, but settles quickly into the mode of erotic desire.

But he who is newly initiated, who beheld many of those realities, when he sees a godlike face or body which is a good imitation of beauty, shudders at first, and something of the old awe comes over him, then, as he gazes, he reveres the beautiful one as a god, and if he did not fear to give the appearance of a maniac, he would offer sacrifice to his beloved as to a statue and a god.

In the lover’s gaze, a beautiful body is the *mimēsis* and *eidōlon* of the Beautiful. Drawn by *erōs* and brilliance, the soul itself becomes tumescent and rises to behold the noumenal Ideas.

Not for the last time, Plato takes traditional modes of beholding statues as the model for theoretical seeing. This is what is at stake in his appropriation of the word *eidos*, “form” or “outward aspect,” to name that which, in Heidegger’s words, “precisely is not and never will be perceivable with physical eyes.” In *Phaedrus*, the lover’s combination of shuddering and awe before the beloved is explicitly modeled on the confrontation with a statue, an *agalma*. Plato does not say that engaging erotically with a statue entails treating it like a human (in the manner of Pseudo-Lucian’s buffoon, failing to remember its statue-hood). Just the opposite: he says that engaging erotically with a boy entails treating him like a statue. More strongly, it means making him into a statue: “Each one chooses his love from the ranks of the beautiful according to his manner, and fashions a statue of him and adorns it as though he were a god” (252d–e). The whiff of paradox in this formulation is deceptive, since for Plato the ontological hierarchy running from Ideas to sensuous perception ensures that, in fact, the inner encounter with these statues is only an imitation, in retrospect, of the soul’s prior encounter with the supersensible Ideas. We may reason from statues to Ideas, but our epistemology is the inversion of a philosophical ontology, that is, of the true history of the soul.

Still, readers might be justified in suspecting that Plato is merely idealizing the everyday embodied encounter with images, thereby disavowing his own metaphors (this was basically Nietzsche’s charge). The everyday encounter becomes metaphorical and incorporeal, such that actual confrontations of people and statues in specific sites become “theoretical” confrontations of souls and Ideas in the realm of the noumenal. It is the very transparency of Plato’s move, however, that makes his argument a useful document for the history of sculpture. Plato offers, willy-nilly, a theory of beholding statues.

To love, then, is to look on the beloved “as though he were a statue and a god.” It is to see in two ways at once. Just as the boy is the point at which the Beautiful shines into the phenomenal world, so the statue is the place where godhead permeates wood, bronze, or stone. This doubleness runs through Plato’s account. He specifies that the desiring beholder shuttles between *pothos* and *himeros*, longing for the beloved when he is absent and wishing to possess him when he is present. The result is a curious combination of sensations “mixed on either side,” *amphoteroi menigmaenoi*, suffering from absence and rejoicing in the memory of presence.
(251d). Just as the Beautiful is at once noumenal and phenomenal, the most brilliant and most desired, so the beloved is at once a statue and a god, at once a target of desire and a catalyst of memory. That is why the beholder suffers both pothos and himeros, modes of desire that model this doubleness.

These two modalities of desire can be pertinent to the beholding of actual statues. Himeros cannot precede or cause iconicity as such, because it is predicated on the presence of the love object. Unless one already sees the marble as a body, there is, simply, no such object to desire.¹⁶² In such a circumstance, himeros cannot figure into the equation at all. Pothos, on the other hand, certainly might encourage one to see depiction in the first place—for instance, too see a stone as a youth. People see what they want, and pothos is the Greek name for a desire that feeds on absence. In any event, once the beholder does indeed see a stone body, then “himeric” desire amounts to the fantasy that the stone can have erōs. It is a fantasy that the depicted figure is actually coming into presence. Arousal by images seems to involve simultaneously the fantasy that the desired entity is real, not merely depicted, and an acknowledgment that the desired entity is not real, not present, merely depicted—that such presence as it has is the presence of an image. Omitting the latter half of the formula is, to repeat, a device of comedy, as for Pseudo-Lucian: only the erotomanic really forgets the difference between an image and the real thing. Including the first half, on the other hand, implies that a monument can recruit a beholder’s fantasy to the task of making present. Gratification, variously of pothos and himeros, is the incentive these monuments offer their beholders to enter their particular cycles of memory and presentification.

But just as Plato insisted that desire in beholding was the remembered repetition of an earlier encounter, so it is necessary to insist here that pothos and himeros are affective correlates of that general acknowledgement of temporal and spatial situatedness with which this section began. For these modalities of desire are, of course, corporeal. Pothos and himeros, in short, are names for what it feels like when the mutual implication of embodiment and beholding becomes inescapable.

**Wonder**

Desire may set its dialectic in motion, but it is not the only, or even the most important, response to statuary. In Archaic and early Classical literature, the characteristic reaction to a well-crafted image is thauma, “wonder.” Raymond A. Prier has studied the usage of this word in Homer, but it has been almost entirely overlooked in current accounts of Greek art.¹⁶³ But the importance of wonder can hardly be overstated. Even for Plato, “astonishment,” ekplēxis, at the radiance of the Beautiful precedes erotic beholding.¹⁶⁴ Thauma is, in fact, a basic and hugely neglected element of Greek thinking about depiction. It therefore requires a more extended treatment than any of the other categories under discussion.¹⁶⁵

Fearing that one of his children would supplant him, Kronos swallowed them one by one until his wife, Rhea, presented him with a stone wrapped in swaddling clothes in place of the infant Zeus.¹⁶⁶ Although unworked and nondepictive, this lump of rock may stand as the archetypical work of sculpture in Greek epic. Like an artwork, it is a product of craft. It exemplifies the dolos (trick), the mētis (cunning), and the teknai (crafts) whereby Rhea deceived her husband.¹⁶⁷ At the same time, the stone functions as a substitute or double, standing in place of the absent Zeus: it is, in effect, the first “symbole plastique.” So the stone a product of craft, if not of
handicraft; and it represents a person, if not iconically. Zeus himself treats it as one would a statue. After banishing his father, “Zeus set it fast in the wide-pathed earth at goodly Pytho under the glens of Parnassus, to be a sign \textit{sēma} thenceforth and a wonder \textit{thauma} to mortal men.” This upright stone by the roadside suggests nothing so much as the aniconic \textit{kolossoi} of early Greece. A real stone at Delphi, identified with this one, received veneration in later years. It is, one might say, the mythical ancestor of the kouroi and stelai on the Anavysos road; just as, in the Greek imaginary, aniconic blocks were believed to have preceded figural statuary.

That the stone serves as a \textit{sēma}, or sign, comes as no surprise: the semiotic function of Greek art is the starting point for Vernant’s account of the subject. But what, exactly, makes it a \textit{thauma}, a wonder? Wonder, in Greek thinking, characteristically grounds itself in vision. Crafted things in epic can be wondrous for several reasons. Brilliance and glitter can make a work a \textit{thauma idesthai}, a “wonder to behold for itself and oneself,” as is the case with the shining gold chariot of Hera or the flashing armor of the Thracian king Rhesos. Alkinos’s palace instills wonder in Telemakhos and Peisistratos for its gleam or \textit{aiglē}. Elaborate handiwork also evokes wonder: Hephaistos’s autokinetic golden tripods are a \textit{thauma idesthai}, as is the careful weaving of Aphrodite’s woven drapery, Aretē’s purple yarn, the Naiads’ textile work, and Pandora’s veil. Yet it is figural decoration that is particularly wonderful. Three ekphrastic passages are particularly important in this regard: the description of Pandora in Hesiod’s \textit{Theogony}; that of Odysseus’s brooch in the \textit{Odyssey}; and the Hesiodic \textit{Shield of Herakles}. Each is worth treating at length.

Hephaistos and Athena fashion Pandora, the first woman, to punish men for the crimes of Prometheus. She is, famously, a trick or deception: though attractive, she is a bane to men. The two deities adorn her to make her more attractive:

Also [Athena] put upon [Pandora’s] head a crown of gold which the very famous Limping God made himself and worked with his own hands as a favor to Zeus his father. On it were many ornate handiworks \textit{daidala polla}, a wonder to see for itself and oneself \textit{thauma idesthai}; for of the many creatures which the land and sea rear up, he put most upon it, wonderful things \textit{thaumasia}, like \textit{eoikota} living beings with voices: and great grace \textit{kharis} shone all around \textit{ampelampeto} from it. In this remarkable passage, the wonder that a crafted thing evokes derives from two sources. First is the fact of iconicity: the crown is “a wonder to see for itself and oneself” because it has wonderful things crafted upon it—and what makes those things wonderful is the fact that they are “like living beings.” The comparative term, \textit{eoikota} (“like”) is cognate with the word \textit{eikōn} (“image”). In effect, Hesiod tells us that a depiction is a wonder because of the strange way it assimilates one thing into another: because it exemplifies a marvelous doubleness or duplicity. The second source of wonder is the radiance that this particular image possesses. Grace shines all around from the crown. In this regard it resembles Hera’s chariot or Hephaistos’s tripods, which likewise dazzled the eye with their brilliance. The crown is a shining icon doubly wonderful, and indeed Hesiod pleonastically calls it a \textit{thauma} adorned with \textit{thaumasia}, a wonder with wonderful things upon it.

From the crown, the poet moves immediately to an account of Pandora herself: But when he had made the beautiful evil … [Hephaistos] brought her out, delight-
ing in the finery which the bright-eyed daughter of a mighty father had given her, to the place where the other gods and men were. And wonder took hold [thauma ekhe] of the deathless gods and mortal men when they saw that which was sheer guile [hōs eidon dolon aipun], incomprehensible [amēkhanon] to men.\(^{175}\)

Here, as Vernant and others have remarked, the poet assimilates Pandora to the crafted works that adorn her body.\(^{176}\) Just as their iconic twofoldness makes them wonderful, so Pandora herself is a wonder for her incorrigible duplicity: she is a kalon kakon, a “beautiful evil,” a phrase that joins opposites in a manner by now familiar. The iconic wonder of the previous lines shades into wonder at “sheer guile, incomprehensible to men.” Here art-wonder is less at issue than a wonder at inscrutability. Note, however, that while wonder grips both “deathless gods” and “mortal men,” Pandora’s guile is “incomprehensible” to men alone. Men are victims of deception while gods are not. It follows that their respective wonderings will be slightly different: men wonder at that which they do not understand; the gods, at that which they recognize as duplicitous. Like the famous breeze of the sophist Protagoras—cool to one man while warm to another—Pandora is incorrigibly plural: “sheer guile,” indeed.\(^{177}\)

Similar themes appear in Homer. Odysseus’s brooch, for instance, provokes wonder at its depictive vividness:

The front part of it was artful: a hound held a dappled fawn in his forepaws, preying on it as it struggled; and all were amazed [thaumazeskon], how though they were golden, it preyed on the fawn and strangled it, and the fawn struggled with his feet as he tried to escape him.\(^{178}\)

Much the same thing occurs with the shield of Akhilleus at Iliad 18.548–49: a depicted field represented on it was “likened to [eōikei] that which had been plowed, though being of gold: here indeed [Hephaistos] wrought a great wonder [thauma].” In these last two passages, the audience sees the depiction and its material at once, and that simultaneity, that twofoldness, is cause for wonder.\(^{179}\) Like Hesiod, the poet of the Iliad uses the verb eoika to name this likeness-in-difference. Both poets treat iconicity as a joining of medium and image, gold and animals, and both take it to be a wonder in and of itself.

The somewhat later Shield of Herakles consists of an ekphrasis, emulating Homer’s account of the shield of Akhilleus in the eighteenth book of the Iliad.\(^{180}\) An early passage, in which the poet introduces the shield, contains the richest description of the work’s effect.

In his hands [Herakles] took his shield, all glittering [panaiolon]: no one ever broke it with a blow or crushed it. And a wonder it was to see for itself [thauma idesthai]; for its whole orb shimmered [hypolampes] with white gypsum and ivory and electrum, and it glowed [lampomenon] with shining gold [khrusō te phaeinō]; and there were zones of blue glass drawn upon it. In the center was Fear worked in adamant, unspeakable [ou ti phateios], staring back [empalin] with eyes that glowed with fire [puri lampomenois].\(^{181}\)

Three interrelated features make the shield wonderful. First, and most obviously, it is radiant. Even more than Pandora’s crown, it shimmers, glows, and shines. Unlike
the polished mirror with which Perseus killed Medousa, Herakles’ shield does not simply reflect light: it actively casts it. Second, the shield possesses a radical alterity. The Fear in its center stares back, *empalin*, at the beholder, rendering the act of looking strangely passive. That this alterity is of a piece with radiance is evident from the fact that Fear’s staring eyes are “glowing with fire.” (When Aphrodite looks at Helene with “marbling,” that is, flashing, eyes, *ommata marmaironta*, the result is amazement, *thambos*). Third, the wonder that results from this radiant otherness is not a state of free contemplation of the sort posited in modern aesthetics. On the contrary, the sight of “unspeakable” Fear renders the beholder mute, like an image—“silent poetry,” as Simonides puts it. Where Pandora’s crown depicted “living beings with voices,” the shield provokes a loss of speech: the two passages are perfectly symmetrical.

Similar themes turn up in later epic. The joining of antitheses is often wonderful, as when, in the *Hymn to Hermes*, the infant god protests that it would be “a great wonder” for a baby to rustle a herd of cattle; or when, in the *Hymn to Aphrodite*, Ganymede is a *thauma idein*, a “wonder to see,” because he is a mortal in the house of the gods. Even mixture and variegation can be wonderful, like Persephone’s mixed bouquet in the *Hymn to Demeter* (11. 426–27). The *Hymn to Aphrodite* combines radiance, alterity, and craft at lines 5.81–90:

And Aphrodite the daughter of Zeus stood before [Anchises], being like a maiden in height and outward aspect [*eidos*], that he should not be frightened when he took heed of her with his eyes. Now when Anchises saw her, he marked her well and wondered [*thaumainen*] at her appearance and height and shining garments. For she was clad in a robe out-shining the brightness of fire, splendid, golden, all-adorned [*pampoikilos*], which shimmered like the moon over her breasts soft to the touch, a wonder to behold for itself and oneself [*thauma idesthai*].

The formula *thauma idesthai* places Aphrodite in the same category as Pandora and the shield of Herakles. Like the former, she combines a dissimulating likeness with fiery radiance. Like the Fear embossed upon the latter, she is radically alien to the world of men; indeed, when Anchises eventually recognizes her for what she is, his immediate reaction is to cover his eyes in terror. A wonder can strike one dumb, or blind.

Well into the fifth century, wonder involves losing the power of speech. In a marvelous paradox, for instance, Pindar’s Aietes “cried out although in speechless [*aphōnētos*] pain, wondering [*agastheis*],” when he saw Jason perform a feat of strength. Euripides’ recognition scenes contain several such moments. When Iphigenia discovers her brother among the Taurians, she exclaims, “I have come upon things that are beyond wonder, far from speech [*thaumatōn pera kai logou prosō tad’ epeba*].” Likewise, the sight of the true Helen in Egypt fills Menelaos with *ekplēxis* and *aphasia*, astonishment and speechlessness. But the richest account of stupefaction appears at the end of Euripides’ *Alkestis*, when Admetos marvels at the sudden unveiling of his wife. He takes her from Herakles “as though cutting off the Gorgon’s head” (1116), that is, looking away. But when she is unveiled and he gazes upon her, he is metaphorically petrified all the same.

O gods, what shall I say? Here is a wonder past all hoping [*thaum’ anelpiston*]. Is this truly my wife I see here, or does some delusive joy sent by a god steal my wits?
At what, exactly, does Admetos wonder? The sudden return to presence of a dead beloved may seem extraordinary enough, but there is more to the matter. On her return from Hades, Alkestis remains in a strangely twofold state, between life and death: like Hermione at the end of The Winter’s Tale, she is silent as an image, and yet she moves. She is, one might say, “like a living thing with a voice.” Indeed, Admetos has already sworn to replace her with a statue:

An image of you shaped by the hand of skilled craftsmen shall be laid out in my bed. I shall fall into its arms, and as I embrace it and call your name I shall imagine, though I have not her, that I hold my dear wife in my arms, a cold pleasure, to be sure, but thus I shall lighten my soul’s heaviness. (348–54)

The effigy has, as it were, come to life. Like one of the moving statues of Daidalos, the wonderful Alkestis seems somewhere between empsukhé and apsukhé, animate and inanimate; in this regard, she could stand as a paradigm for tomb sculpture, which similarly returns the dead as a mute presence. The reaction of Admetos is characteristic. On the one hand he is filled with desire and embraces what he sees as the “face and frame,” omma kai demas (1133), of his wife (omma means literally the eye but also suggests radiance or light). On the other hand, her silence leads him to speculate that she might be a mere apparition, a phasma (1127). Suspended in wonder, caught between the prospect of his dear wife and “delusive joy,” Admetos is dumbstruck, petrified as though he really were beholding the Gorgon, as though he himself were only like a thing with a voice: “O gods, what shall I say?” Alkestis is a wonder of unprecedented complexity, for what makes her so astonishing is her uncanny combination of the phantasmatic and the real. Here key ingredients of Greek wonder—doubleness, radiance, alterity, and speechlessness—come together in a coup de théâtre.

The dramatic unveiling of Alkestis highlights an aspect of wonder characteristic of later accounts: sudden epiphany or disappearance. It is wonderful when presence and absence interchange—the swifter, the better. Arkhilokhos declares that he will find nothing wonderful now that he has seen a total eclipse of the sun (probably that of 648 BCE).

Nothing is to be unexpected or sworn impossible or wondered at [thaumasion], now that Zeus father of the Olympians has made night out of noonday, hiding away the light of the shining sun, and clammy fear came over people. From now on men can believe and expect anything; let none of you any longer wonder [thaumezetō] at what you see, not even if wild animals take on a briny pasturage in exchange with dolphins and the crashing sea become dearer to them than the land, the wooded mountain dearer to dolphins ...

The passage of the shining sun into darkness and back into light, an oscillation of brilliance and occlusion, presence and absence, is unsurpassably wonderful, as though a dolphin were to exchange sea for land.

The Homeric Hymn to Apollo describes wonder in just these terms. Apollo takes the form of a dolphin and leaps aboard a Cretan ship. The sailors, terrified, wish to land “and comprehend the great wonder and to see for themselves with the eyes [phrassasthai mega thauma kai ophthalmoisin idesthai] whether the monster would remain upon the deck of the hollow ship or spring back into the briny deep
where fishes shoal” (415–17); the Greek manages to allude to Homeric precedent by pairing the words *thauma* and *iedesthai* in a single line. Literally a fish (well, cetaceous mammal) out of water, the dolphin is “a great wonder” for its joining of ocean and shipboard; one thinks of Ganymede, for similar reasons a wonder to behold on Olympos. But it is also the sheer suddenness of the dolphin’s appearance that is marvelous. The sailors, “speechless with fear” (404), wish to see “whether the monster would remain on the deck of the hollow ship, or spring back into the briny deep where fishes shoal.” Will the disappearance be as wondrous as the appearance? In the end, of course, the answer is “yes.”

Then like a star at noonday the lord, farworking Apollo, leaped from the ship. Flashes of fire flew from him thick and their brightness reached to heaven. He entered into his shrine between priceless tripods and there made a flame to flare up, showing forth the splendor of his shafts, so that their radiance filled all of Krisa, and the wives and the well-girdled daughters of the Krisaeans raised a cry at that outburst of Phoibos, for he cast a great fear upon them all. From his shrine he sprang forth, swift as thought, to speed again to the ship, bearing the form of a man, brisk and sturdy, in the prime of his youth, while his broad shoulders were covered with his hair.

Apollo reemerges from his temple in the standard form of a cult statue: that is, as a kouros, a radiant, long-haired youth in his prime. Unlike a kouros, however, Apollo is “swift as thought.” Speed of this sort is not a feature of Archaic statuary; it works otherwise. But, as will become clear in chapter 2, to make a kouros swift as thought is the prime desideratum of the early Classical style. A bright thing rushing is a wonder.

Bacchylides effectively glosses this passage in his seventeenth dithyramb. Once again we are aboard a Cretan ship: that of Minos, bringing the Athenian youths and maidens to Knossos. Theseus has dived into the sea to retrieve Minos’s ring; absent for a long while, he suddenly reappears.

Unbelievable—that which the powers [*daimones*] wish is not thus for thinking mortals. He appears [*phanē*] on the slender-sterned ship. Pheu! In what thoughts did he check the Knossian commander when he came unwet from the salt, a wonder to all [*thauma pantessi*], the gods’ gifts glowing [*lampe*] around his limbs; and the bright-robed maidens with good newfound cheer ululated, and the sea roared; and nearby the unmarried youths raised a paean with a lovely voice.

At the beginning of the passage, Bacchylides signals unmistakably that, like Pandora, what he is about to describe exists in the space between the “powers” (*daimones*) and men: a sight that strains mortal thinking. Theseus steps literally from absence into the here and now, as the poem shifts, momentarily, from first aorist into second: “he appears [*phanē*] on the slender-sterned ship.” This epiphanic figure is radiant, or, more precisely, is rendered so by the divine gifts that shine around his limbs. A figure of dazzling alterity, a moment of limitless present in an otherwise finite, “aoristic” world, Theseus is at the same time grasped in the minds and eyes of all assembled. He stymies Minos “in thoughts,” *en phrontisi*, even as he calls forth a riot of shouting, clanging, and singing. The poet himself can manage only an inarticu-
late “Pheu!” Thus Bacchylides gives us, on the one hand, stupefaction and noise; on the other, the not-unbelievable wishes and shining gifts of the divine. At the joint between the two is the “wonder to all,” *thauma pantessi.*

Many of these themes converge in one of the most famous scenes in Greek literature: Priam’s embassy to Akhilleus in the twenty-fourth book of the *Iliad.* Under the protection of Hermes, the old king passes invisibly through the Akhaian lines and appears out of nowhere in Akhilleus’s tent, grasping the hero’s knees before anyone has even noticed his arrival. Naturally, Akhilleus and the Myrmidons look on this apparition with astonishment, *thambos,* not least because Priam is “godlike in form,” *theoeidea.* As the two men converse, each is brought to tears: Priam, because Akhilleus reminds him of his son; Akhilleus, because Priam reminds him of his father (24.509–12). Each is, for the other, a present reminder of an absent loved one. From suddenness of onset, in short, the poet moves to the phenomenology of doubleness: each seems divine yet mortal to the other, kin yet enemy. After the two share a meal, each wonders (verb *thaumazein*) at the appearance of the other.

But when they had put aside their desire for eating and drinking, Priam son of Dardanos gazed upon Akhilleus, wondering at his size and beauty, for he seemed an outright vision of gods. Akhilleus in turn gazed upon Dardanian Priam and wondered, as he saw his brave looks and looked upon him talking. (24.628–32)

It is as though the two enemies are seeing each other for the first time. They recognize one another, change their way of seeing. Priam now asks Akhilleus for a place to sleep; Akhilleus promises to hold back the Akhaian so the old man has time to cremate his son. The revelation of shared humanity with an enemy is also a kind of wonder.

Later, wonder will become a concern of philosophers. Empedokles, for instance, declares that, at the mixing of Love and Hate, the race of mortals poured forth, a *thauma idesthai.* Theognis, in a reflective mood, wonders at Zeus for allowing injustice in a world of law. Xenophon elaborates the theme in particular detail. In his *Symposium,* Sokrates declares:

> For it is of course no rare event to meet with wonders [*thaumata*], if that is what one’s mind is set on. He may marvel at what he finds immediately at hand—for instance, why the lamp gives light owing to its having a bright flame, while a bronze mirror, likewise bright, does not produce light but instead reflects other things that appear in it; or how it comes about that olive oil, though wet, makes the flame higher, while water, because it is wet, puts the fire out.

Xenophon here gives a list of everyday paradoxes, quotidian versions of Herakleitos’s cosmic “joints.” In each case, wonder derives from the fact that a single thing can somehow be two things all at once.

The Platonic corpus is full of such paradoxical wonders. In *Philebus,* for instance, Sokrates professes *thauma* that some pleasures can be true while others can be false. Taking a cue from passages of this sort, the pseudo-Platonic *Epinomis* says of the essential spirit of water that “it is at one time seen, but at another is concealed through becoming obscure, presenting a marvel in the dimness of vision [*thauma kat’ amudran opsin*].” Here the doubleness of wonder is explicitly a matter of visibility and invisibility. Elsewhere in the same dialogue, however, it is a matter of pure
synaptic joining: geometry is a *thauma* because it is “a manifest likening [homoiōsis] of numbers not like one another by nature.” Parmenides suggests that quotidian wonder, of the sort Xenophon describes, resolves in the ultimate unity of the Ideas.

“If anyone then undertakes to show that the same things are both many and one—I mean such things as stones, sticks, and the like—we shall say that he shows that they are many and one, but not that the One is many or the Many one; he says nothing wonderful [*thaumaston*], but only what we should all accept. If, however, as I was saying just now, he first distinguishes the abstract ideas, such as likeness and unlikeness, multitude and unity, rest and motion, and the like, and then shows that they can be mingled and separated, I should,” said he, “be filled with wonder [*thaumastōs*], Zeno…. I should, as I say, be more amazed if anyone could show in the abstract Ideas, which are intellectual conceptions, this same multifariously entangled confusion [*aporian pantodapōs plekomenēn*] which you described in visible things.”

As in earlier literature, wonder derives from a visible paradox: the passage trades on a distinction between *horōmenai*, “visible things,” and *eidea*, the Ideas or Forms, literally, “that which is seen.” But Plato disqualifies everyday wonder at the paradoxes of stone and wood in favor of an authentic wonder at intellectual impossibilities.

This change is most apparent in *Theaitetos*, in which wonder plays and important role. The dialogue as a whole is a *mnēma* of sorts, a verbal and philosophical “gravestone” to commemorate the title character. As it opens, Eukleides describes to Terpsion how he has just seen Theaitetos. The latter was returning to Athens from a battlefield near Corinth, mortally wounded and suffering from dysentery. The two men reminisce, in a manner gently parodic of martial elegy, about Theaitetos as he was in his prime. He was, they agree, *kaloskagathos*, beautiful and good (142b), so it is not “wonderful,” *thaumaston*, that he acquitted himself well in battle; on the contrary, it would have been a wonder if he had failed to do so. This remark introduces the concept of wonder while neatly disengaging it from martial valor, hence from the ideology of commemoration that subtends everything from kouroi to the *dēmosion sēma*, the common public grave. Commemoration as such, however, remains very much at issue. The main body of the dialogue consists of a reading, by a boy, of a text drawn from interviews between Eukleides and Sokrates, in which the latter reenacted from memory a conversation he once had with Theaitetos and a geometrician named Theodoros. Uniquely among the Platonic texts, that is, *Theaitetos* presents itself as the work of someone other than Plato. It is a mediated document, the transcription of a reading of a transcription of a memory. By means of this reading, Eukleides and Terpsion commemorate the deceased, not as a warrior but as a lover of wisdom.

This memorialization turns out to be, among other things, an extended meditation on perception (*aisthēsis*) in general and *thauma* in particular. As in *Phaedrus*, Plato turns the traditional vocabulary of beholding to his own ends in order to suggest a philosophical alternative to traditional wonder. Theaitetos is the specimen case of the new *thauma idesthai*. Theodoros announces the theme in his description of the boy, saying that he has never perceived (the verb is *aisthanomai*, as in *aisthēsis* and aesthetics) any young man who presents himself so “wonderfully well,” *thaumastōs eu*, in both character and intellect (144a). Theaitetos is wonderful first and foremost in his character, not his appearance. Just so, he is “beautiful
and good,” *kalos te kai agathos*, even though he is not physically handsome (142b). Having thus distinguished inner from outer, Theodoros warms to the topic. “This boy advances toward learning and investigation smoothly and surely and successfully, with perfect gentleness, like a stream of oil that flows without a sound, so that one marvels *[thaumasia]* how he accomplishes all this at his age” (144b). There is a subtle irony to this line: so far from being swift and radiant, this *thauma* is slow, glistening, oleaginous. Theaitetos himself has just anointed his body with oil (144c) when these words are uttered, but that is not what attracts the older men; his radiance is metaphorical. Lastly, Theaitetos is a *likeness*, a spitting image: he closely resembles (*proseoi*ke) Sokrates, with a snub nose and bulging eyes (143e). But this fact, we learn, is a matter for painters to consider; the real interest is whether their souls are attuned (144d–145a). The attempt to answer that question underscores the difference between knowledge, the raw material of philosophers, and clay, the raw material of image makers, *koroplathoi* (147a–b). Socrates opposes true knowledge, which is a *mimēsis* of the Ideas, both to mere practical knowledge and to Theaitetos’s identification of knowledge as perception. The latter is a mere image, *eidōlon*, of true knowledge (150b–151c), which is why it is appropriate that it should be presented by a living image of Socrates. In short, Plato uses the vocabulary of wonder and sculpture to establish a fundamental distinction between inner and outer, ideal and appearance.

The attempt to define philosophical knowledge occupies much of the dialogue. It leads, eventually, to one of the most famous accounts of wonder in Western literature (155b–d). Theaitetos voices *thauma* at the fact that six dice are at once more than four and less than twelve—that a single number can be large and small at the same time. Twofoldness, as always, elicits wonder. Sokrates replies that “this feeling of wonder is that of a philosopher, since wonder is the only beginning of philosophy, and he who said that Iris was the child of Thaumas did not trace the genealogy poorly” (155d). With this line, Sokrates detaches wonder once and for all from the ideology of the archaic *sēma*. We have already been told that images are false (150c, 151c). Now, divine genealogy becomes allegorical of philosophy’s own genesis; *thauma* is a reaction to a philosophical dilemma, not to a work of human craft. Its endpoint will be philosophical beholding of the Ideas, that is, *theōria.*

In short, *Theaitetos* offers a wholesale redefinition of the *kalokagathos* and his commemoration. Plato reconfigures the aristocratic memorial as a philosophical text, and *thauma* as a reaction to nobility of soul, not to physical beauty or military *aretē*. Wonder ceases to be a given of phenomenology and becomes a problem of ethics—of ethics, that is, defined as a domain of philosophical cognition. In effecting this shift, Plato decisively, and fatefully, reorients beholding, making it essentially an issue of *mimēsis*. The forgetting of the Archaic discourse of images is well under way; the reign of Imitation has begun.

The identical transformation occurs in *Symposium* 215a–217a, when Alkibiades compares Sokrates to a hollow terracotta *silén* containing a divine image (*agalma*). First, the difference between the philosopher’s superficial licentiousness—hanging around with boys—and his true *sophrosunē* is said to be “a wonderful power.” As usual, the gap between inner and outer induces wonder (see chapter 4). Then, when Alkibiades finally “sees” the inner images (now plural), he characterizes them as “divine and golden and all-beautiful and wonderful [*thaumasta*].” The language of beholding statuary, of *theōria* and *thauma*, has become a means to articulate the confrontation of souls. Alkibiades, with the wisdom of experience, says that when
he first met Sokrates he felt that he had met with “wonderful good luck,” *thaumasta eutukhēma*, in encountering an old man he could lead around by the nose. But he would outgrow this wonder. As the narrative of their relationship proceeds, Alkibiades finds himself wonder-struck over and over (219c, 220b, 221c) at Sokrates’ powers of self-control—that is, at the gap between his undistinguished exterior and his daimonic interior. He looks ridiculous but he is great of soul. Eventually Alkibiades learns that “what deserves all wonder is that he is like no other human being” (221c). In the end, that is, it is Sokrates’ sheer *unlikeness* that is wonderful. He transcends the representational: the wonder is not that inner and outer do not correspond, but that *nothing* corresponds in the way that Alkibiades had come to expect. *Mimēsis* of things in this world is bankrupt. If Sokrates is a statue, he is in this sense an aniconic one, a statue that represents nothing, a statue that is no statue—which may be why the clay silens are said to be sold in shops of “herm carvers,” that is, crafters of images that are minimally iconic (215b).

Aristotle echoes Plato in *Metaphysics*, repeating the assertion that philosophy beings in wonder. Overall, however, his approach to the topic is more traditional. In the *Poetics*, he writes that pitiable and fearful matters

arise above all when events occur contrary to expectation yet on account of one another. The wonderful [*thaumaston*] will be maintained in this way more than through show of chance or fortune, because even among chance events we find most wonderful [*thaumaston*] those which seem to have happened by design (as when Mitys’s statue at Argos killed the murderer of Mitys by falling on him as he looked at it: such things *seem* not to occur randomly).

In this case wonder derives from an apparent conjoining of chance and necessity: it is the reaction, in beholders, to the imitation of such a dissonance. The example Aristotle gives of such wonder is, perhaps, significant: a supernaturally overdetermined relation of image to beholder.

In sum, from Homer to the fourth century, the quintessential wonder is a spectacle of radiance, speed, and radical alterity. Each of these characteristics is in fact a variant on the basic quality of all *thaumata*, which is twofoldness, doubleness, “multifariously entangled confusion.” Wonder is the perception of a synaptic joint, most notably in artworks. Its renders its beholders speechless.

It is a commonplace of recent historiography that discourses of wonder domesticate and exoticize novel phenomena. But this line is inadequate to the Greek case. Indeed, Greek wonder is the very opposite of a reductive discourse of “Otherness.” Not only are the “objects” of wonder characteristically twofold, but wonder is itself duplex. This point emerges from Raymond A. Prier’s remarkable analysis of the phenomenology of *thauma* in Homer. Prier argues that the language of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* does not cast sight and appearance in terms of a fixed relation of subject viewing and object viewed. Instead, it presupposes a continuum or force field linking two “relational projections,” which Prier terms the “‘this’” and the “‘other/that.’” On the side of the “‘this’” is seeing, the casting of an eye outward; on the side of the “‘other/that’” is appearing, showing forth to, for, or at someone. The gods, heroes, beasts, and things of the Homeric poems exist as relative points upon this continuum. Instead of setting entities within an abstract, Cartesian space, Homer’s language articulates relationships of projection: a dialectic of darting eyes “here” and radiant presences “there,” of the “this” and the “other/that,” nearness and distance.
Particularly characteristic of the “other/that” are the gods, beings of numinous power that the mortal eye cannot master. Indeed, one might define godhead procedurally as that which is stipulatively distant, hence reveals distance as such. The gods (like wonders generally) are frequently described as glowing or radiant—think of Hera’s chariot, or Apollo rushing to heaven in a shower of sparks—for light is the medium of interaction between the two poles. The “other/that” is often a ray that strikes one from outside, as when Semele is reduced to ashes by the blazing radiance of Zeus. The “this,” by contrast, is a source of light. Crucial to Prier’s argument is the idea that these spatial relationships are not fixed but relative: it is possible for something “here” to project itself at, to appear to, something over “there,” just as it is possible for something “there” to cast its eye on something “here.” A concise way of putting the matter would be to say that the great debate of Hellenistic optics between theories of extromission and theories of intromission would make no sense in an Archaic vocabulary, for early Greek does not recognize the underlying distinction as anything but contingent.

As for wonder, it forms a hinge or joint linking the poles of “this” and “that.” The word *thauma*, “wonder,” is itself intermediate between the two. It does not simply name a class of objects, but also a state of mind: in Greek as in English, one wonders at wonders. The word itself shuttles between “here” and “there.” More specifically, the formula *thauma idesthai*, “a wonder to behold for itself and oneself,” is used exclusively to describe crafted works, like the blazing chariot of Hera or the shining armor of Rhesos. These artifacts partake of the radiance of the gods even as they are themselves no more than possessions. Hence, Prier argues, the *thauma idesthai* “is balanced between the place of the gods and that of men.”

It is a brightly wrought object surrounded by light, one that is quite clearly “other” in origin. It is, however, in the hands or in the sight of mortals and hence a property of the “this.”

These objects have a dual allegiance: radiantly “other,” they are yet possessed by the “this.” The shield of Herakles is a possession even as it strikes terror; Aphrodite and Pandora are inviting and radiant at once, alluring even as they dissimulate. The complex grammar of the phrase *thauma idesthai* brings out the point. The verb *idesthai* is an infinitive of the middle voice, for which there is no equivalent in English. The middle voice usually denotes that the grammatical subject acts on itself or for itself. But because an infinitive is, strictly speaking, a verbal noun, it does not always have a well-defined grammatical subject. With *thauma idesthai*, the subject could be either the wonder itself or the beholder, the “that” or the “this.” Hence the laborious translation, “a wonder to see for itself and oneself,” which makes the duality explicit. A *thauma idesthai* exists in grammatical middle even as it occupies a phenomenological “middle” between grasping sight and radiant light.

As we have seen, to wonder, *thaumazein*, is the characteristic reaction to doubleness or duality. Prier’s point is that, in Greek, this doubleness is not merely psychological, but ontological. *Thaumata*, wonders, are analytically middle. Their doubleness is not a contingent property, still less is it “in the eye of the beholder.” It is definitional, part of what wonders are. Certain phenomena bring this doubleness to light, as when the twofoldness of Odysseus’s brooch, its play between depiction and material support, causes the assembled crowd “to wonder,” or when Admetos wonders whether Alkestis is real or illusory even as he himself is struck still. As a state,
therefore, *thauma* is not *aporia*, in the literal sense of having “no passageway,” but a mute indecision in the face of two alternatives that seem mutually exclusive but in fact are not. To wonder, in Greek, is to be poised between two possible reactions. But since wonder is not a property but a state, this formulation cashes out to mean the following: to wonder, in Greek is to be poised between two possible modes of existence, to shimmer between what we might be tempted to call subject and object. Greek wonder reveals the poverty of those very terms.

In short, Prier’s account of the *thauma idesthai* amounts to nothing less than a phenomenology of the synapse, the “joint” of presence and absence. If a wonder is a twofold or doubling sight, then by the same token wonder itself is a twofold or doubling occurrence, named with a twofold or doubling word. This doubling up of double predicates accounts for wonder’s frequent identification as a kind of attunement with the world. In this sense, wonder as a state of mind is the phenomenological correlate of a mode of relating to the world that makes explicit the mutual implication of beholder and beheld. The psychological vocabulary (“I wonder”) voices the feeling of a revelation of such twofoldness in the world (“it is a wonder to behold for itself and oneself”).

It is important to stress, however, that not all Greek authors deploy these words in the same way. Though the language of wonder and radiance turns up with remarkable consistency from Homer to Aristotle, still the word evolves as time goes on. Later authors continue to call artworks *thaumata*, though the specific phenomenological connotations gradually disappear over the course of the fifth and fourth centuries. For Herodotos, anything prodigious is a wonder. The word has no special connection with the visual, nor with alterity, still less with iconicity. That Mardonius set up democracies in Ionia is a wonder (6.43.3), the fertility of Cyrene is a wonder (4.199.1), the round boats of Babylon are wonders (1.194.1), and so on. By the fourth century the word comes to mean “puppet.” Though the uncanny vitality of the marionette has a clear affinity with the vivid effect of statuary, the word has become trivial through overuse. The Hellenistic poet Posidippos, perhaps our best source for practices of beholding between Alexander and the coming of Rome, speaks of wonders only vaguely. For Pausanias the phrase *thauma idesthai* could be used interchangeably with *theas axia*, “worth seeing.” Homeric wonder gives way to the curiosity of the tourist. Insofar as *thauma* had an afterlife in the Greco-Roman world, it was chiefly in Pseudo-Longinus and the critical jargon of the sublime, which in some ways represents a professionalization and academicization of the older concept. Still, a Hellenistic riddle continues to associate wonder with paradox:

Do not speak, and you will speak my name. But must you speak? Thus again, a great wonder [*mega thauma*]: in speaking you will speak my name.

The answer being Silence. The enduring power of the concept is clear from a characteristically intricate, offhanded satire in Lucian: the protagonist of *Eikones* (*Images*) says that, on seeing a woman of statuesque beauty, he “was struck stiff with *thauma* and almost became a stone instead of a human.” Lucian manages with extraordinary economy to burlesque what had become a cliché: he reduces stupefaction at the divine in images to an ordinary erection. Yet earlier accounts of *thauma*—at paradox, doubleness, and iconicity; at radiance; at sudden epiphanies; at the radically alien—and of
the stupefaction it entails remain invaluable guides to understanding the way the Archaic and Classical Greeks beheld their artworks. From Homer to Plato, twofoldness is wonderful, and images are twofold.226

Back to the Roadside

A network of metaphors links the extraction of a stone in the quarry to a beholder’s wonder at a finished statue. Each of the five themes of this chapter—Carving, Sameness, Joining, Embodiment, and Wonder—tropes all the others. They are all interchangeable, because they all posit analogous relations between the image, its representational content, and the beholder. One might, for instance, see the kouros’s interplay of solid and void as a metaphor for that of presence and absence in a σέμα. But one might also see it as a metaphor for the interplay of literal stone and depicted flesh in erotic fantasy. Or one might do the reverse: see the play of presence and absence as a trope for that of solid and void. Or one might do both at the same time. More generally, the play of beholder and beheld may be taken to figure that of depiction and material support, of reality and fantasy, of present and past, token and type, solid and void, block and figure. The metaphors are mutually reinforcing; once the first connection is established, the others follow easily. As a practical matter, pothos and philia, desire and affection, might be the most likely points of entry into this network, insofar as a statue’s appeal to corporeal fantasies may be presumed to be particularly seductive. But it must be stressed that no one figure has necessary priority over any other. One can, in theory, enter the system at any point: by grieving before the statue of a loved one, for instance, and then fantasizing her presence in the here and now; by standing in mute wonder before a dazzling cult image, and then marveling at its vividness though made of stone; by chiseling at block of marble and then, like Pygmalion, feeling desire awaken at what lies beneath one’s hand. The cunning of this dialectic lies in its ability to accommodate almost any route of interpretation. The point, however, is that an internally consistent set of metaphors structures all of these reactions. There is a lucid cultural logic at work.

The power of this construction is most apparent when it collapses. In 291 BCE, the Macedonian general Demetrios Poliorketes entered Athens. The populace came out to meet him in a long procession, spread flowers before him, and worshipped him as a god. They sang, “For the other gods are either far away, or do not exist; either they do not hear, or they do not care; but you, Demetrios, are here and we can see you, not in wood or stone, but in living truth.”227 This hymn negates the logic of early Greek statuary, which existed expressly to conjure “living truth” out of “wood or stone.” The power of images was, exactly, to make present that which was “far away” in time or in space: to posit a powerful force that “animates the inanimate.” But the power of Demetrios was utterly of the here and now. The “Besieger of Cities” was not a σέμα and a thauma, a “sign” and a “wonder,” like Rhea’s stone at Delphi; his arrival did not elicit speechless wonder, but logorrhetic flattery. The Macedonian army swept away many traditional structures of Greek social life, and with them the temporal and spatial synapses that Greek sculpture existed in order to conjoin.
The Speed of Light

Holden has turned down Toulouse shedding light as he goes. An aura of heightened reality moves with him and all who fall within it feel it. Now everyone is aware of him.

Walker Percy, *The Moviegoer*
In the shift from Archaic to Classical in Greek sculpture, modern scholars typically
discern three broad tendencies. There is a change of pose, from relatively static and
closed to relatively open and active. There is a change in anatomy, from a relatively
superficial marking or incising of bones and muscles to the evocation of hypo-
dermal structures. And there is a change in psychology, from smiling exteriority to
the suggestion of inner life or ēthos. Taken together these changes may fairly be said
to comprise the “Greek revolution” in statuary, and they have provided the basis for
extravagant claims about “the discovery of the mind,” die Entdeckung des Geistes,
from Hegel to the present day. Chapters 2–4 discuss these elements in turn. They
argue that the novelty of the Classical does not consist in any epistemic or concep-
tual shift, nor in any sudden advent of empirical knowledge. It consists, rather, in
a gradual reconfiguration of the relation of image to beholder. What matters is not
the way an image connects with the world (or fails to do so) but the way it connects
with its audience (or fails to do so). Classical statues engage their audiences, interact
with them, in a new way; but they do so on the basis of old assumptions about the
nature, the power, and the function of images. A principle of method, this claim
subordinates reference to use: at issue is what statues do to people, and what people
do to statues.

The present chapter is about pose, medium, and wonder. As we have seen, an
important function of Archaic artworks was to induce thauma in beholders. Liter-
ary texts suggest that a wonder is a spectacle of twofoldness, of a "synapse" between
here and not-here. In the event, it is usually something radiant, radically alien from
the world of mortals, sudden in appearance or disappearance. Precisely these terms
characterize much early Classical sculpture. By reorienting attention away from
the relation of image to model, in favor of the address of image to beholder, it becomes
possible to reconfigure the history of the medium. If wonder was a normative good
in artworks, then it is at least plausible to suggest that the inducement of wonder
was of an important ambition of Greek sculptors. This claim is perhaps extravagant,
and I do not propose to give an all-purpose explanation for each and every piece
of sculpture that survives in original or in copy from fifth-century Greece. Many
works do not fit easily into the proposed schema. Most obviously, the present chap-
ter ignores relief sculpture entirely (it reappears in chapter 5). My aim is not to build
a Procrustean bed for Greek art but to suggest a new vocabulary for discussion of
the evidence to hand.

Shining Stone, Gleaming Bronze

The suggestion of movement in three dimensions has been understood to be a key
element of the Classical since the late nineteenth century. Emanuel Loewy—the
teacher of Ernst Gombrich and a dedicatee of Art and Illusion—addressed the issue
in an important monograph on Lysippos in 1891, and elaborated it further in a book-
length treatment, Die Naturwiedergabe in der älteren griechischen Kunst, in 1900.
For Loewy, the Classical style consisted in the movement from frontal, planimetric compositions to fully plastic and three-dimensional ones. He integrated this formal change into a traditional Geistesgeschichte: to the change in composition there corresponded a shift from a reliance on primitive memory-images to rational inference. In keeping with many contemporaries, Loewy took optical impressions to be essentially flat: the eye was understood to see silhouettes (see chapter 5). To comprehend these impressions as three-dimensional forms required an act of rational synthesis. The development of the Classical style came to appear, therefore, as the historical emergence of this rational capacity as an objective, material expression. This argument had immediate and pervasive influence. Alois Riegl essentially reiterated it in his Historical Grammar of the Visual Arts of 1899, as did Edmund von Mach in his Greek Sculpture of 1903, and many others. Rhys Carpenter, perhaps the most acute student of Greek sculpture in the history of American academia, was heir to this tradition: “The cardinal esthetic problem in the analysis of the sculptural appeal is the determination of the way in which the statuary works on our sense for spatial construction.”

Although Loewy’s argument about memory seems quaint today, motion in three dimensions remains a basic component of the Classical style. One of the best treatments of the issue in recent years is Nikolaus Himmelmann’s essay, “The Stance of the Polykleitan Diadoumenos.” It addresses the question of whether figures in contrapposto are to be seen as standing or walking. Himmelmann insists upon the fundamental affinity between the stance of the Diadoumenos and the kouros type (fig. 37).

[It is exactly the ambivalence of stance between standing and walking, or more accurately, between nonspecific and specific motion, that characterizes early periods of Greek art. . . . “Polykleitan” figures show that the timeless, “automatic” potential of movement of kouroi had also not died out in the Classical period.]

For Himmelmann, the difference between Archaic and Classical poses comes down to a contrast between “nonspecific and specific motion,” that is, between figures who exhibit a “contextless potential for motion” and those “whose motion corresponds obviously to a specific narrative content.” The pose of the kouros type is on this view, not so much ambivalent between motion and stasis as the expression of a nonspecific, contextless potential for motion. Fifth-century works like the Diadoumenos employ contrapposto to similar effect: we are not to imagine the Diadoumenos as ambling along while tying a fillet round his head, but as standing still while exhibiting a latent potential for motion. But, as Himmelmann notes, other fifth-century figures use the identical pose to indicate unambiguous forward motion, like the grave relief of Khairidemos and Lykeas in Piraeus (plate 9). Such instances, he argues, represent an adaptation of the stance to a specific narrative tableau. With greater specificity of narrative comes greater specificity of movement, and generic potential becomes specific action.

Himmelmann’s insistence on continuity between Archaic and Classical is welcome and useful. It becomes possible to see the celebrated rhythmos of the Classical statue, its chiastic interplay of flexed and relaxed, motion and stasis, as a variation on a traditional theme. Just as Archaic memorials and cult-images stage, and collapse, a distinction between absent and present, so too do their Classical descendents. The difference is not so much in the basic metaphorics of the image, as in the density
of its presentation. The slight torsion of Classical contrapposto, such that one shoulder and one hip pivot toward the beholder while the others pivot away, has no counterpart in Archaic work. But Himmelmann allows us to see it as the extension and amplification of the traditional, Archaic play of contraries. Contrapposto ratchets up the tensions internal to the kouros pose, makes the play of motion and stasis ever more emphatic, even as it extends that play to govern even the smallest details of the figure.

In its details, however, Himmelmann’s position is open to two serious objections. First, the distinction between “specific” and “nonspecific” seems vague. Why is the Diadoumenos generic and contextless when Khairedemos and Lykeas are not? The Polykleitan work is a victor statue: it commemorates and represents a specific athlete celebrating a specific victory. That we know the name of neither the man nor the event is immaterial: the Diadoumenos is no less specific than the gravestone. Similar difficulties bedevil most other instances of the alleged distinction. Greek art is so stereotyped that all figures are a bit generic and contextless—that is, in effect, the principle of “sameness” articulated in chapter 1—and while stock figures are commonplace, still it would be hopeless to try and correlate degrees of generic-ness to degrees of depicted movement. Second, the argument is hard to sustain on chronological grounds. There is plenty of narrative specificity in Archaic art, yet there is on Himmelmann’s account little or no “specific motion,” that is, naturalistic movement, in that period. This simple fact seems to disprove the argument. If narrative (or “specificity”) were the necessary and sufficient condition for the naturalistic depiction of motion, then there is no reason why Archaic Greek art should not have been identical to the Classical. This is not to deny that that narrative plays an important role in these matters; but it cannot be the case that Classical sculpture is, as it were, more narrative than Archaic. Himmelmann’s developmental model may be exemplary, yet the question of pose remains open.

Another factor is medium. The Greeks made sculpture from a broad but finite range of materials, including marble, limestone, wood, precious metal, ivory, bronze, and terracotta. The previous chapter alluded to several ways in which early sculptors bestowed metaphorical value on these media: emphasizing the fact of carving; alluding to real or fictive origins in a stone block or a wooden cylinder; using “ foursquariness” as a paradigm of nobility. As these and other examples demonstrate, the materials of sculpture could themselves be meaningful. The medium was, if not the message, then at least a part of it.

Marble is particularly rich in such connotations. As we have seen, it is the medium par excellence of early Greek sculpture. The Greeks reserved white marble for the most prestigious projects: the material itself was significant. When, for whatever reason, a temple had to be built of less expensive stone, it was often covered
with a thick coat of white stucco in order to approximate the effect of marble; the early Classical temple of Aphaia on Aegina is a good example of this practice. Like a kouros, one might say, a temple is made of marble even when it is not. Although a full review of marble's connotations in early Greek thought remains to be written, still it is possible to single out one aspect of the stone that is particularly germane: marble is radiant. Fine white marble does not reflect all of the light that hits it. It allows some to pass through the crystalline structure, with the result that a marble statue or building will appear to glow in the Aegean sun. On the other hand, because the Cycladic marble of much early sculpture is micaceous, a slight but noticeable sparkle offsets this light-absorbing and diffusing property. Both qualities register in the stone's name: “marble,” or marmaros, derives from the verb marmairó, “to shine or flash.” Marble is, literally, “shining stone.”

There are functional reasons for the use of marble in early Greece. It is plentiful in the Aegean basin, and its fine grain allows it to take detailed chiselwork. But these qualities alone do not account for the material's importance. In Laconia, for instance, marble was plentiful—but only with a bluish cast. The local sculptors largely ignored this resource and turned instead to wood, ivory, gold, and bronze: materials that lack marble's fine grain, but that do take a polish. Almost the opposite situation pertained in Italy, where white marble was extremely rare until large-scale exploitation of the Carrara quarries began under Augustus. The Greek cities of Magna Graecia were not content with local limestones, but imported marble from the Aegean at great expense. Notably, they only imported white marble; the color of the stone seems to have mattered. If marble's hardness and the fineness of its grain were the only criteria, then there is no reason why the western Greeks—and, for that matter, those of the mainland—should not have exploited native Greek colored stones. Cipollino, serpentine, verde antico, and rosso antico all come from the Greek mainland, and were standbys of Roman and Hellenistic decorators and sculptors. Even the Mycenaeans used such stones: the façade of the “Treasury of Atreus” employed both serpentine and rosso antico from quarries in Mani. But the Greeks of the Archaic and Classical periods ignored these materials almost completely. In other words, non-white stones suitable for carving were ready to hand, but the early Greeks eschewed them even as they went to great length to obtain pure white marble.

Clearly, whiteness mattered. Why? The western Greeks used marble for the fleshy parts of figures while employing cheaper limestone for drapery and the like, a technique called “acrolithic.” Chryselephantine statuary, a legacy of the Bronze Age, used white ivory for skin, and gold for everything else. One might therefore suppose that white was deemed more “realistic” than, say, rosso antico when it came to representing exposed skin. Yet the Greeks routinely employed bronze to represent both men and women. Skin did not have to be white to be beautiful or realistic. It follows that realism alone cannot explain the preference for white stone. The answer must lie, rather, in some common feature that marble, ivory, and bronze all share.

As Andrew Stewart has argued, the Greek fascination with white marble is best understood in terms of thauma. An artwork was supposed to be a wonder; and a wonder was usually radiant. The roots of this preference go back to the Near East, where Irene Winter has documented an “aesthetics of radiance.” The Greeks positively valued glitter and glow in their artworks, and marble has few rivals in this regard. Basalt is harder; lapis glitters more brightly; but no other stone combines a fine grain and translucence as marble does. The aesthetics of wonder helps explain.
this attachment to “shining stone.” If marble was not sufficiently shiny, it could be improved by the addition of precious metal. The famous “Ballplayer Base” from the Kerameikos in Athens, which supported a kouros of circa 500 BCE, depicted the *jeunesse dorée* of Athens in low relief; the background plane was coated with bright tin or silver foil, making it *argupheos*, “silver-shining,” an epithet of well-wrought works in epic.²¹

Of course, Greek sculpture was painted. But this fact does not diminish the importance of white marble. Recent reconstructions of Archaic and Classical statuary by Vinzenz Brinkmann and others have been invaluable reminders of the importance of polychromy in Greek sculpture.²² But they have also been “maximalist,” restoring as much polychromy as possible. Brinkmann is always scrupulous about distinguishing facts from guesswork in his writings, but the plaster reconstructions that have gone on display in museums around the world are unabashedly speculative. In particular, the restorations have tended to use heavy coats of pinkish-grey pigment for areas of exposed flesh. Unlike Brinkmann’s revelatory discoveries about the polychromy of early Greek drapery, however, the restorations of skin pigment do not adduce much in the way of new evidence. Instead, they rely on a 1960 study by Patrik Reuterswärd.²³ Three points deserve notice. First, Reuterswärd distinguished between painted limestone and painted marble: the former may have required surface treatment due to its coarse grain and cannot be used as evidence for the treatment of fine marble. Second, Reuterswärd actually refused to draw a general conclusion about the question of painted skin, arguing instead that customs were varied and various. At most he discerned a general trend away from the application of paint to areas of skin: while color was used for flesh in early Archaic marble sculpture, from the late sixth century it was increasingly left white in three-dimensional sculpture; the chief surface treatment was a waxy application (*ganosis*) that added luster to the surface. Finally, Reuterswärd’s data suggest a distinction of medium. He provided a list of eighteen works of Greek sculpture with painted flesh, ranging from the Archaic to the Hellenistic periods. Of these eighteen works, twelve were reliefs. Painted flesh, in other words, is twice as common in relief as in freestanding work. This point is unsurprising in itself, given the “pictorial” quality of relief, but it suggests that relief may in some regards have resembled mural painting more than freestanding statuary.²⁴ Moreover, even some of the reliefs are not straightforward. The Aristion stele from Athens (fig. 118), for instance, has clear traces of paint on the face—but nowhere else on the body: was the face specially painted, as seems sometimes to be the case on Attic black-figure vases? There are also some questions about the six works of freestanding sculpture on the list: a kore from the Athenian Akropolis; two small scribes, also from the Akropolis; a female head in Avignon, and two kouroi from Actium in the Louvre.²⁵ The kore, however, is said to be “highly questionable,” the rosy coloring on its cheeks being perhaps an effect of interment in the soil.²⁶ The coloring on the other figures seems no longer to be visible; Brinkmann includes only one (a scribe) in his 2003 catalog, and there he makes no mention of painted flesh. Even Brinkmann does not suggest that the flesh of female figures was regularly painted.

At the center of Brinkmann’s work is a new reconstruction of the polychromy of the pedimental figures from the temple of Aphaia on Aegina. Although Brinkmann gives them heavy, pinkish-grey flesh tones, there does not seem to be direct evidence for doing so. This coloring rests upon an analogy with the Iskhys kouros on Samos (fig. 93). Traces of hematite have been found on the body of the kouros;
Brinkmann takes this discovery to suggest that all statues had such coloring. But a bit of caution may be in order. First, the Iskhys kouros is made of blue-grey marble shot through with greenish veins. As with limestone, the application of polychromy to such a surface is not necessarily a good indicator of how fine white marble was treated. Second, it is by no means clear how thickly the hematite was applied to the Iskhys kouros. The possibilities range from a delicate rouging, of the sort Antonio Canova gave to his neo-Classical confections (and, perhaps, flushed the cheeks of the Akropolis kore mentioned above), to the heavy, opaque coats that appear on Brinkmann’s restorations. Third, hematite’s dark tone (“dark violet-red,” in Brinkmann’s words) means that it would have been necessary to lighten it with lead if it were to represent skin. Brinkmann assumes that something of the sort was done, but there is no hard evidence. Absent evidence of lead, the exact role of the hematite must remain uncertain. On the basis of this hypothesis about the Iskhys kouros, however, Brinkmann restores sculptures from the temple of Aphaia at Aegina with heavy coats of pink paint. To his credit, he himself admits that “there is no evidence whatsoever for the intensity of the brown [sic] tone.”

These considerations suggest that Reuterswärd’s caution was justified. provisionally, it seems reasonable to conclude that flesh was painted more frequently on reliefs than on freestanding statues; that limestone and nonwhite marble were more likely to be painted than white marble; and that male flesh was more likely to be painted than female. In general, the evidence is not consistent with most, or even many, freestanding marble statues of either gender having painted flesh.

It may be significant, in this regard, that chryselephantine statuary used white ivory for flesh—even of male figures. It is hard to believe that marble sculpture did not employ a similar color scheme; indeed, the use of ivory for skin would be hard to explain if there were not a standing tradition of using white materials for such a purpose. On analogy with chryselephantine statuary, it seems more plausible that painted areas would have offset expanses of white or lightly tinted stone to produce a variegated effect. A similar color scheme would have animated acrolithic sculpture.

Interestingly, the verb marmairō (“to glitter or shine”) is not usually applied to marble itself (it would, presumably, be a pleonasm, like saying that “marble marbles,” or “shining shines”). Instead, Hesiod speaks of “the shining ray of the thunderbolt,” augé marmairousa keraunou; Homer of “the shining eyes,” ommata marmaironta, of Aphrodite. Most often, however, marmairō is used of the other great medium of Greek statuary: bronze. Homer’s poems are full of khalkoi marmairontes, “gleaming bronzes.” Later poets employ similar language; the brilliance of bronze is constantly remarked. “And the great hall gleams marmairei with bronze,” says Alkaios (fr. 140.1 PLF). If the very name of marble connotes radiance, then bronze attracts a panoply of adjectives connoting a similar quality. Akhilleus running across the plain of Troy gleams like the Dog Star, “his bronze flashed so” (Iliad 22.32). Of the hero’s armor, Homer says, “And all round about the bronze flashed like the ray of blazing fire or of the rising sun” (Iliad 22.134–35). Earlier, Hektor was also likened to a star among clouds, and “all in bronze he was flashing like the lightning of father Zeus who holds the aegis” (Iliad 11.65–66). The bronze spearheads of Diomedes’ troops are said to have “shone afar like the lightning of Zeus” (Iliad 10.153–54), and later the same god watches the “flashing bronze” (Iliad 11.83). Telemakhos, for his part, feels reverence before the bright gold, bronze, electrum, and ivory that he sees in
Menelaos’s hall in Sparta (Odyssey 4.72). In short, where marble glows, bronze glitters, flashes, and blazes.

That the Greeks valued this quality is clear from the fact that they were willing to spend money to attain it. Although Archaic and Classical bronze casters often included lead in statuettes, for larger figures they employed a pure alloy of copper and tin. This material is more expensive and more difficult to work than leaded bronze, but it takes a significantly brighter finish. Later Hellenistic and Roman sculptors gradually abandoned the practice and used lead in all their statues, large and small. The figures are, literally, “leaden” by comparison. The metal is duller. The Classical sculptors had every incentive to use lead, and they knew how to do so. That they did not implies that surface brilliance was an overriding goal.

Toward the end of the sixth century, Greek craftsmen began producing large bronzes in significant quantities for the first time. It is important to stress that this development did not result directly from the advent of a new technology. The Greeks produced large bronzes in piece molds by indirect lost-wax casting. This method began with a detailed clay model. Clay master molds were taken from this model in sections. Molten wax was brushed onto the inside of each master mold, followed by progressively heavier layers of slip and clay. If necessary the clay could be reinforced with metal bars. The master mold was then removed to reveal a wax version of the original model over a solid clay core. Slim, stemlike rolls of wax were then affixed to this model to function as vents, and the ensemble was invested with clay. The wax would be burnt away, leaving an empty space between the clay core and the investment mold. Molten bronze was poured into this space; the vents prevented the heat from cracking the mold. After cooling, the investment mold would be discarded. The result was a bronze replica of the wax replica of a section of the original clay model. The separate bronze sections would be welded together to produce a finished statue. During this process, the clay core inside the statue was often removed. Where it survives, however, analysis of the clay can provide evidence of a statue’s place of manufacture (assuming the clay was local!). Last of all, cold work included smoothing, polishing, and adding details through incision and inlay.

Both piece molds and indirect casting had long histories in Greece; their combination went back to the middle of the sixth century at the very latest. However, it was only ca. 520–500 that the technique became commonplace. Its adoption revolutionized Greek sculpture (fig. 22). Because of its high tensile strength, bronze permits open and active poses that are simply impossible in marble. Figures can hold their arms away from their bodies or kick one leg forward—they can throw, smite, run, supplicate. The stiffness of the Archaic style gradually disappeared, and in its place figures acquired a new suppleness and poise. The result was what Ridgway aptly calls the “eloquent silhouette”: formulaic poses that, like the gestures of dramatic actors, typify certain activities or moods. At the same time, the rendering of musculature became increasingly volumetric, reflecting the fact that bronze statues are initially modeled in soft materials like clay and wax. The technology encourages a plastic over a glyptic approach. This change marks the birth of the Classical style in Greek art.

Yet there remains a chicken-or-the-egg problem: did the Greeks develop the techniques of large-scale bronze statuary because they wanted open poses, or did they develop open poses because the new casting techniques gave them new options? Did style guide technology, or did technology guide style?
“A Great Light Came into Being”

A key monument in this shift is the Tyrannicides memorial in the Athenian Agora (figs. 38–39). The statue group depicts Harmodios and Aristogeiton, two Athenian aristocrats who killed Hipparphkos, brother of the ruling tyrant Hippias, in 514 BCE. The act itself was the result of a lovers’ quarrel, stemming from the fact that Hipparphkos and Aristogeiton were rivals for Harmodios’s affections. But following the expulsion of Hippias a few years later, the young Athenian democracy came to look upon these “Tyrant Slayers” as its founding heroes. Sometime before 480—probably around 509 but possibly quite a bit later—the city commissioned the sculptor Antenor to make a statue group in bronze. The Persians carried off these figures when they sacked Athens in 479; although they are said to have been returned by Alexander the Great, we are ignorant of their appearance. In 477/76, the Athenians dedicated a replacement group, by Kritios and Nesiotes (“The Islander”).

This second group was famous in Antiquity and is known from Roman marble copies and from fragmentary casts taken from the originals themselves.

These Tyrannicides mark a decisive break with the Archaic style. They charge forward with swords at the ready, bearing down upon their beholders. Their victim is not depicted but, instead, remains an ever-present absence: the war against tyranny has no end. Stylistically the group is a benchmark in the history of Greek sculpture. No earlier work so convincingly unites the depiction of subdermal musculature with that of vigorous movement. As Stewart puts it, “The Kritian group literally marks the birthday of the classical style in Athens.”

Yet there is considerable continuity with Archaic practice. Although the statue group did not mark the assassins’ grave, and is not funerary in nature, nonetheless it recuperates the dead as effectively as any memorial on the Anavysos road. Their bodies are perfect: as with Hector beneath the swords of the Greeks, as with Kroisos destroyed by Ares, here “all is fair” for the absent dead. Just so, as Fehr and Stewart have each remarked, the monument takes desire, pothos, as a chief theme. That Harmodios and Aristogeiton were lovers is integral to the group’s appeal: in effect, it presents both partners in a traditional homoerotic relationship, the beloved and the lover. Pose evokes the two roles relatively straightforwardly. Aristogeiton, the lover, holds his sword level with his pelvis, a surrogate phallus, even as he thrusts his left arm stiffly forward. This attitude epitomizes what Thucydides, in his account of the assassination, called Aristogeiton’s erotic rage, “erotic rage” (6.57.3). Harmodios, for his part, is the very image of ephebic desirability, “radiant [lampros] in the bloom of early manhood,” as Thucydides puts it (6.54.2). The result is, in effect, a kouros in motion; and it is not wholly irrelevant that the last example of the kouros type, the so-called Kritian boy on the Akropolis, is named for its similarity to the Tyrannicide (figs. 31–32).

It is useful, in considering this aspect, to recall the erotic charge of the Kritian boy’s arched back. Both Harmodios and Aristogeiton share this feature. If copies are any guide, the sculptors accentuate the arched back through a judicious manipulation of bodily proportions: each figure combines a great booming chest and ribcage with relatively slender hips. Although the back is indeed arched, this bit of artifice makes the effect even more dramatic: the chest feels closer than it is. Thus, when seen from the side, the figures seem to press their bodies toward the beholder even as they run off in another direction. All of which is a prolix way of saying that, by Greek standards, these men are sexy.
Yet the presence of the Aristogeiton—a violently jealous lover—complicates the group’s eroticism. He stands as a reminder that to desire Harmodios is, potentially, a form of tyrannical arrogance. Every desiring beholder risks occupying the role of Hipparkhos. The only real alternative is to emulate Aristogeiton, and to desire the youth while striking at the hubris of tyrants. The narrative thus channels po-thos to political ends. The erotic bond between the two men—and between statue and beholder—becomes emblematic of the bond between citizens in a democracy. “Look upon the city daily and become its lover,” says Perikles in his speech for the war dead. The Tyrannicides are a way to make that exhortation a practical reality.

What led Kritios and Nesiotes to depart from traditional formulae? Standard answers come in two types: idealist and functionalist. For Martin Robertson, one of the great postwar historians of Greek art, the change derives from “a change
of spirit, that is, from Geist in English translation (as often in this field, German idealism wears the guise of British empiricism). For others, as we have seen, developments in bronze casting technology caused the break. The open poses of the Tyrannicides are ill suited to marble—the Roman copyists had to add struts to support the outflung limbs—and as it were celebrate the indirect lost-wax method. Each of these theses, however, begs the question of why Greek sculptors should have wanted open poses in the first place. The idealist account appeals vaguely to national spirits and inner sparks; in the end it is an appeal to a deus ex machina. The functionalist account reduces stylistic change to technological change, but then leaves technological change unmotivated. After all, Greek foundries had been capable of producing large bronzes for more than a generation before they actually began doing so in earnest. So the question remains open. Why bronze—why now?

A neglected piece of evidence provides a clue. On the base of the Tyrannicides group was an epigram by Simonides of Keos. Fragments of the inscription have been found in the Athenian Agora; the full text is known from literary sources. It consisted originally of two elegiac couplets:

A great light [phoōs] came into being at/for the Athenians, when Aristogeiton killed Hipparkhos with Harmodios
[line missing]

[and they] made their fatherland's earth [equal under the laws?].

The epigram trades on a productive vagueness as to just exactly whom, or what, it is naming. Taken strictly literally, it commemorates, and names, the real, historical Harmodios and Aristogeiton. Yet its placement on the monument implies that it is also a gloss on the two brazen statues. It therefore provides a set of terms in which to understand the latter.

This poem is itself an epic in miniature. Its strangest feature is that it violates one of the cardinal rules of Greek elegy by splitting a single word between two lines: Aristogeiton. In so doing the poet dramatizes the name’s compound structure. Aristogeiton translates literally as “Noble Neighbor,” with the “nobility” in question being that of the Greek elite, indeed of aristo-krateia, “aristocracy” or “rule of the Noble.” The line break violently separates these two halves—Aristos, “Noble,” from Geitōn, “Neighbor”—a gesture that is, in this context, something like a diagram of civic disharmony. Immediately after this startling breach of decorum we pass through the assassination—the words “killed Hipparkhos”—and then the couplet closes with the name “Harmodios,” which means “Fitted Together.” Thus the poem narrates a progression from internal disjunction, via political violence, to reintegration.

Turning to the statues, the poem’s conceit is that, in their headlong rush, the two figures of polished bronze are like a dazzling flash coming at us from afar. We are present at the coming-into-being of this “great light.” To name this flash, Simonides uses the word phoōs, a variant of phaos. In Homer and elsewhere, such a light is a stock figure for salvation, as when Penelope greets Telemakhos as her “sweet light,” glukeron phaos, come to save her from the suitors (Odyssey 16.23). The phrase phoōs Athenaoisi, “a light to/at/for the Athenians,” may even allude to the Homeric phoōs Danaoisi, “a light to/at/for the Danaans,” used of both Patroklos and Teukros. Appropriately, however, the word could also be used to address a lover, as in Anakreon’s “Cheers, dear light [philon phōs], with a smile on your lovely face.” Heroism has an erotic tinge.
Of interest here, however, is less the literary pedigree of the conceit than the visual effect it evokes. In his account of the Homeric vocabulary of sight and appearance, Prier identifies the phaos as a light that comes streaming at the beholder from elsewhere, as opposed to a glow projecting out from the viewer. Simonides emphasizes this quality by putting “the Athenians” in the dative case, thereby suggesting that the light is shining at them, moving in their direction. The Athenians are the targets of light’s movement. One might contrast the way that Pindar, in his second Isthmian ode, calls his patron Akragantinōn phaos, “light of the Akragantines”: where Simonides’ light shines at the populace, Pindar’s is possessed by them, not dative but genitive. At the same time, the verb genesthai, “come into being,” emphasizes the transience of the light ray: it is in a constant state of becoming, genesis. Shining, charging, from “there” to “here,” Harmodios and Aristogeiton flash at and for the Athenians—at and for the passersby who, it is hoped, will stand stupefied for a moment, like deer in the headlights. Simonides and Kritios constitute their beholders—their theatai, or “theorists”—as datives, not nominatives; the monument localizes them, not conversely.

The statues add an element of menace to this charge. In their brilliance, Harmodios and Aristogeiton are like Akhilleus as he bears down upon Hektor:

Akhilleus was closing upon him in the likeness of the Lord of Battles, the helm-shining warrior . . . while the bronze around him was shining like the flare of fire or the sun in its rising. And the shivers took hold of Hektor when he saw him, and he could no longer stand his ground but left the gates behind him and fled, frightened . . .

Already in Homer, a violent charge strikes with the force of a light ray. As a brilliant onrush of just this sort, the Tyranncides put the beholder in the place of Hektor—or, more specifically, of Hipparkhos. Everyone is a potential victim, every citizen a potential tyrant; the city must be forever vigilant. The light’s impact is visceral, it can give you the shivers.

These metaphors all pertain to the visible appearance of the statues. In so doing they integrate the group’s medium with its narrative content. The statues are like a ray of light in at least two respects: they are made of gleaming bronze, and they bear down upon the beholder with dazzling force. The inscription shows how these two features—medium and narrative—go together. To rush at the beholder, it suggests, is to be a bright light; while literally to be bright, to shine like marble, is to strike the eye with something close to violence. The shift from marble to bronze entails a shift from diffuse radiance to gleaming highlights, from figures that absorb and shed light to figures that reflect and concentrate it. This intensification of light-effect corresponds to an intensification of pose. Medium recapitulates narrative, and conversely.

This assimilation of statues to light derives from the stock vocabulary of Archaic wonder. Simonides effectively declares the statue group to be a thauma: a radiant, onrushing, and radically “other” artifact. Indeed, Denys Page has observed, quite independently, that the phrase “a great light,” é mega phoōs, recalls the epic é mega thauma, “a great wonder.” Like the sun emerging from the moon’s shadow, or Apollo shedding fire “like a star at noonday,” or Theseus appearing out of nowhere with “the gods’ gifts glowing around his limbs,” Harmodios and Aristogeiton shine
at the Athenians even as they rush forward with unprecedented drama. Both bronze and open poses fall into the category of the radiant, hence the wonderful.

This metaphorical assimilation has important implications for histories of Greek art, insofar as it dissolves the chicken-or-the-egg problem that, as we have seen, be-devils the field. By asserting a figural relation between shining bronze and an active pose, the epigram suggests that neither need have historical priority over the other. The dichotomy itself is false. Both pose and medium may be understood as means to a single end: the inducement of *thauma* in beholders. One way to make an image wonderful is to make it impinge more forcefully on the beholder. Another way is to make it brighter, *marmaroteros*. Both tendencies come together in the Tyrannicides. Simonides’ epigram encourages us to see the evolution of the Classical style as the ongoing amplification and intensification of standard Archaic effects. Such a development is essentially recursive and retrospective as opposed to anachronistic and progressive: so far from forging boldly into the future or flashing into reason, Greek sculptors may be seen more plausibly as striving to outdo their predecessors in the inducement of wonder.

As with all crafted *thaumata*, the essential is that the occurrence should be twofold. It is perhaps not too literal-minded to note that the Tyrannicides group includes two figures, in marked contrast to the solitary kouroi that had become the norm for Athenian memorials. Just so, the sculptors contrive to make each figure inherently double. The active poses are largely a matter of extended arms and legs: in each case, the torso and the head remain rigid and upright, retaining a stable center of gravity. The active limbs radiate from a static, vertical core. Thus the dynamism of Harmodios’s uplifted sword arm and his trailing left leg has a counterpart in his solid, upright, and heavy trunk. Aristogeiton, likewise, stands bolt upright over energetic, extended legs. The muscles neither flex nor stretch. Partly this effect may be a result of the copyist’s translation of the statues into marble, which encourages an even distribution of weight. But the same upright torsos appear in versions of group in other media, such as the Elgin throne, suggesting that they were features of the original bronzes. The net effect is that the figures charge, but they do so ar-thritically: it is as though only the arms and legs were really moving, while the torso remained still. Just this strategy underlies the kouros type’s distinctive combination of stasis and striding. Kritios and Nesiotes retain the distinctive thematic of the Archaic type, but modify it.

In a related vein, it has often been noted that there is little in either figures that twists or turns or occupies a middle ground between profile and frontal views. This, too, is familiar. Like kouroi, the Tyrannicides have cardinal views at front and profile: torsos are at right angles to limbs and faces, and the transitions between the two are abrupt. From the side, the figures are as resplendently visible, as firmly present, as any kouroi. Each effectively hides the other, and so appears as a virtual singleton. From the front, the bodies are less comprehensible, but the effect of being in the path of an onrushing charge is correspondingly greater. The two privileged views, profile and frontal, thus correlate affectively with stasis and motion and with singularity and doubleness. Either you grasp a single figure in his entirety, and with him the distinctive combination of upright and outflung; or you grasp two figures only partially, even as they bear down upon you with daggers drawn. The figures are inconclusive, duplex, which is of a piece with their wonderful brilliance.

In one sense it is unsurprising that the Tyrannicides should share formal features
with kouroi. Progressivist history manages these features by calling them “transitional”: they are either lingering archaisms or signs that Kritios and Nesiotes had not attained the fluency of Classical artists. But this formulation has no meaning outside a purely formal sequence. Although not all things are possible at all times, as Wölfflin put it, still the horizon of possibilities at any given moment is a topic for criticism, not a solution to its questions: a beginning, not an end. When the history of art is no longer the narrative of a life of pure forms, then to say that the Tyrannicides are formally similar to kouroi is to say something about their meaning. It is hardly coincidental that the “transitional” character of these statues, neither Archaic nor Classical, is in its own way fully appropriate to their commemorative function. If the pose of the kouros articulated a wonderful doubleness, then the same should be said of the Tyrannicides’ composition. Their twofoldness is familiar even if their poses are not.

In the case of the Tyrannicides group, then, the new, open poses of the early Classical style are in keeping with the Archaic thematics of wonder. By projecting the figures into the beholder’s space, the assassins’ headlong rush accentuates the very qualities that were, in the Archaic period, the defining features of marble sculpture. There is, to be sure, a trade-off: in place of the much remarked autonomy and alterity of the kouros type, the new formula offers the startling and invasive phenomenon of the phoôs. Nonetheless, this new conception of the statue-as-ray retains the distinctive combination of presence and absence that Vernant has identified at the heart of Archaic figuration. To see a statue as a light that comes from afar is to see it as at once utterly distant and wonderfully present. Eternally en route from “there” to “here,” the Tyrannicides remain in between, in the space of the thauma idesthai, the “wonder to behold.” The oddly hybrid nature of the group is only anachronistically understood as “transitional” between Archaic and Classical. On its own terms, as the very icon of a great light coming into being, it is a success.

There is little precedent for this effect. The chariot epiphanies of Archaic architectural sculpture, such as the metopes of temples C and Y at Selinous, seem to move toward the beholder, but there is no emphasis on speed or suddenness of apparition. In much the same way, Archaic equestrian sculptures stood on oblong bases with a short end facing the roadway, but the horses stand still or, at best, walk slowly. For the speed of the Tyrant Slayers, the nearest Archaic parallel may be a life-sized Gorgon from Paros, dating to the early sixth-century (fig. 40). Originally standing atop a tall column, the Gorgon rushes directly at the beholder. Far more typical is the roughly contemporary Gorgon on the pediment of the temple of Artemis at Corfu. The pedimental figure adopts the standard “kneeling run” or Knielauf pose to convey speed: she runs off to the right while staring out at us (fig. 41). Not so the Parian statue. Here the wings project dorsally, not laterally as is the norm, and the figure speeds directly forward. With her terrible face, snaky belt, and feathery garment, she is a figure designed to provoke beholders. Medousa is the very figure of petrifying otherness, much like the glowing, unspeakable
Fear at the center of the shield of Herakles. The Parian represents an early attempt to combine the thematic of wonder with the rendering of speed; but it did so under very specific iconographic circumstances, and the experiment was not repeated.

In this sense, the Tyrannicides do not break with the past so much as they intensify the dazzling effect of a kouros. What the old style achieved through a play of motion and stasis, individuality and anonymity, Kritios and Nesiotes achieve through headlong rush and shining bronze. The Tyrannicides are, in this sense, supercharged kouroi, deploying a familiar chiasmos but amplifying and intensifying its basic elements: not one figure but two, not poised but charging, not shining stone but gleaming bronze. The Tyrannicides are *more wonderful* than anything that preceded them, but they are better understood as the extension and elaboration of Archaic practice than as something miraculous or revolutionary. *The stylistic innovations become comprehensible when understood as a means to a historically specific end: the inducement of wonder.*

The recognition that the Tyrannicides were *thaumata* thus provides a way out of the impasse that bedevils discussions of the late Archaic and early Classical styles. It does so by bracketing the question of the statues’ mimetic accuracy—what scholars from Pliny to Gisela Richter have termed their *veritas* or “truth.” Simonides’ epigram pivots on the look of the statues, their beholding or *theōria*. The look of the gleaming bronze men is, it suggests, like the look of a light flashing at, for, on behalf of, the Athenians. At issue is not the realism of the figures, not their fit (or lack thereof) with a model or prototype in the world, but their effect on beholders. By following the epigram’s lead and attending to the phenomenology of statuary, it is possible to replace the anachronistic model that presents Archaic artists as trying and failing to be Classical. Instead, we may see the Classical style as a logical extension of Archaic practice. There is no need to invoke any mechanism beyond an ongoing effort on the part of sculptors to outdo the competition in the attainment of traditional goals. The result is not a march of progress, so much as a drift.

What Aristotle said of the development of tragedy could apply equally well to the emergence of the Classical style: “In their experiments, it was not art but chance that made the makers discover how to produce such effects.”
“Brightly Flash the Rays from Him”

As noted earlier, the Tyrannicides group is the pivotal monument in the shift from Archaic into Classical, at any rate in current scholarship. Yet its fundamental affinity with older, Archaic practice suggests that its distinctive inflection of the rhetoric of wonder may have broader relevance. In fact, many of the most important examples of late Archaic and early Classical statuary lend themselves to description in terms derived from the Tyrannicides monument. One especially clear example is the bronze god dredged from the sea off Cape Artemision (fig. 42, plate 1). The clay core inside the figure has an Attic provenance, suggesting very strongly that the statue was made in Attica, and was probably the work of an Attic sculptor.
A masterpiece of circa 470–460, the figure is usually identified as Zeus throwing a thunderbolt (now lost). The identification derives from close parallels in small bronzes, including a late Archaic statuette from Ugento in the heel of Italy, and a figurine from Dodona (figs. 43, 44). A rival theory, seeing Poseidon with a trident, founders on the fact that such an implement would have obscured the god’s face. As for the statue’s function, it could have been a cult statue or a votive. Composition provides the only clue. Because the statue is impressive from multiple vantage points, it is best suited to viewing in an open space with easy circulation. This fact suggests that it was a votive offering. Cult statues stand at one end of a long, narrow temple cella, facing the doorway. As a result, they tend to be frontal in orientation. Votives, by contrast, can stand in the open air with ambient spectators, a situation far more congenial to the Artemision bronze.

Unlike the Tyrannicides, the Zeus does not run, and there is no accompanying epigram. Thematically, however, the depicted action is the virtual literalization of Simonides’ light metaphor. If there is anything more dazzling than a great light shining from afar, then surely it is the spectacle of Zeus argikeraunos, “the wielder of bright lightning,” preparing to let fly. At Metaponto he was worshipped as Zeus Aglaios, “the Brilliant.” Like a statue, the lightning bolt is (in Homer at any rate) a bright sign or sēma: the Iliad describes “the lightning-flash that the son of Kronos taking in his hand shakes from gleaming Olympos, showing a sign [sēma] to mortals: brightly flash the rays from him.” Pausanias (9.12.4) even suggests that the assimilation of statues to lighting bolts could be quite literal.

There is also a story that along with the thunderbolt hurled at the bridal-chamber of Semele there fell a log from heaven. They say the Polydoros adorned this log with bronze and called it Dionysos Cadmus.

Polydoros’s ancient, aniconic statue is the substitute for, the equivalent of, Zeus’s flashing sign. In the case of the Artemision god, the idea of brilliant light moving from “there” to “here” is not a poetic conceit so much as an integral part of the iconography. Shining bronze is the ideal medium for this figure, for it is already a
commonplace of epic that this metal is like a thunderbolt in its brilliance, as when Homer says that Hektor “all in bronze was flashing like the lightning of father Zeus who holds the aegis, lamψ’hōs te sterepē patros Dios aigioiakoio.” The Artemision Zeus is a shining figure throwing a shining thing into the space of the beholder. The sculptor has emphasized just this projective aspect by modifying the position of the left arm by comparison with the earlier Ugento Zeus. The latter flexes the arm and, originally, held something (probably grapes) in the extended hand. These devices mitigate the figure’s forward or projective movement. The Artemision sculptor abandons them: the left arm juts forward like an arrow. The effect is so striking that it obscures the fact that the thunderbolt is not actually parallel to the arm. The god holds it at a slight angle to his body: it is, with the right foot, the only part of the statue that does not adhere to one of the primary axes of the body. The effect is subtle, most apparent in a view like that of plate 1.

It seems at first that the Zeus is meant to be seen from the side. The National Museum in Athens encourages this viewpoint through the layout of its galleries, and most postcards and books take advantage of the obvious satisfactions of this approach. But for those who have never seen the statue in person, a three-quarter view can be revelatory. As one moves around it, the seemingly self-contained, instantly comprehensible pose breaks up into a series of subtly divergent trajectories: a spatial rhythm to which the subtle contrapposto is a sort of syncopation. The result is a play between the “eloquent profile”—a body that presents itself as immediately intelligible—and a confusing, even threatening godhead. The logic of early Greek sculpture virtually dictates that a moment of clarity inevitably should find a corresponding moment of opacity. Presence requires its antithesis; and a σεμα, be it a statue or a thunderbolt, is always predicated on the absence of its referent. In this instance, there is a narrative rationale for the dialectic. Zeus is the god of brilliant lightning, but also of the “black-bearing cloud,” melankeuthēs nephos, as Bacchylides puts it (3.55). The clarity of the one seems to necessitate the obscurity of the other.

In the rendering of anatomy as well, the effect on the beholder is of prime concern. Notoriously, the sculptor elongates the god’s arms for effect. The left arm in particular, extended as if to mark the path of “the shining ray of the thunderbolt,” augē marmairousa keraunou, is of positively simian length: were it to hang limp alongside the torso, it would reach almost to the knees. Rather than seeing such infelicities as transitional—as steps on the way to a perfection that is, in fact, never attained—it is better to accept their strangeness as fully in keeping with fifth-century understandings of the nature and function of statues. The overriding concern, to which trivial matters like arm-length are clearly subordinate, is the dramatic projection of the statue into the lived space of the beholder. The sculptor uses every means at his disposal to effect this projection. Narrative (throwing a lightning bolt), material (gleaming bronze), and anatomy (elongated arms) are all, in this respect, working to a single goal. This evidence tends toward the conclusion that the sculptor’s goal was not the attainment of an undreamt High Classical naturalism, but the elicitation of wonder. The benefit that such an occurrence confers upon the beholder is clear from a famous passage in Pindar:

A shadow in a dream is man; but whenever a Zeus-given brightness comes, a shining light rests upon men, and a lifespan sweet as honey.

Pindar sings specifically of the radiance of athletes, and it is to this class of images that we now turn.
“As the Shining Moon in the Mid-Month Night Sky”

By virtue of inscriptions and iconography, the Tyrannicides and the Artemision Zeus are especially clear instances of the rhetoric of light and wonder in early Classical statuary. But a remarkable number of contemporary works strives for similar effects. Carpenter, for instance, compares the Artemision god with Roman copies of the Discus Thrower, or Diskobolos, of Myron (ca. 460–450 BCE; figs. 45, 46). His account is, as usual, worth quoting at length:

Myron’s Diskobolos . . . shows no actual torsion . . . but merely a superposition of bodily members in a continuous plane. No advance in stereomorphic composition is evinced in the magnificent bronze salvaged . . . from the sea off the northernmost headland of the island of Euboea and now . . . superbly displayed in the Athens National Museum. Various known as the Poseidon or Zeus of Artemision, this slightly-over-life-size striding figure of a heroic nude poised in the act of hurling a trident or a thunderbolt shows, like the Diskobolos, violent action immanent in a moment of rest and, like the Diskobolos, depends on construction along a single plane of composition as a vividly outlined silhouette. The anatomy is static with no differentiation between contracted and expanded muscles; and the torso shows no response to the spreading arms or the straddled legs. The statue does not owe its extraordinary effect of concentrated energy to the physically accurate reproduction of a living model thus engaged but the restriction of all significant appearance within a single silhouetted form in overwhelmingly
eloquent outline. Despite the extreme, almost polar, difference between the two poses, it is the vivid and vital graphic delineation which makes these masterpieces so instantly intelligible and emotionally so persuasive; yet it leaves them stereomorphically immature.79

Apart from its overarching commitment to progressivist history, two features of this account deserve special notice. The first is, again, Carpenter’s extraordinary power of observation and description; he ranks with Johannes Wilde, Otto Pächt, and Clement Greenberg as one of the great formalists of the mid-twentieth century. While there is much to disagree with in his account, there is also much to be learned. The second is that the analysis utterly neglects the relationship of image to beholder. One obvious similarity between the two statues is that each is in the act of throwing something into the space of the audience. Both the Zeus and the Diskobolos break through the barrier that separated kouroi from their beholders. Both do so, moreover, in the same way: through gesture and the promise of an imminent trajectory from “there” to “here.” Carpenter could not care less. Tellingly, he places these gestures in the relatively vague category, “violent action immanent in a moment of rest.” In so doing he omits the narrative specificity of the images and their engagement with the beholder. There is no reason, on the face of it, to place greater importance upon the articulation of planes than upon this new affective appeal. Constricting the new open poses of the Classical style within the parameters of the “eloquent outline,” Carpenter does his best to separate the statues from the world. In so doing he cleaves to Modernist orthodoxy. Carpenter’s formalism, exemplary of its kind, entails that both the statue and the critic must be independent of the real world, and of each other, in order to ensure the all-important disinterest of the aesthetic encounter.80

The resulting neglect of the beholder is the mote in one of art history’s sharpest eyes. For it is highly debatable that these statues restrict “all significant appearance within a single silhouetted form in overwhelmingly eloquent outline.” Like the Zeus, the Diskobolos is routinely photographed only from the side (fig. 46). Flattened already by the translation into a two-dimensional image, the Diskobolos acquires that “graphic delineation” so congenial to High Modernism.81 But there is more to the matter, for the statue presents different things from different viewpoints. Seen in a front three-quarters view, for instance, it becomes vigorously three-dimensional, its gesture toward the beholder explicit. The right arm recedes, the left arm projects; in a moment, the toss of the discus will reverse these relative positions. A new geometry of arcs and angles also becomes apparent in this view. The sweep of the arms now carries without interruption into the left leg, while the torso and the right thigh come together at something close to ninety degrees. The statue, in other words, resolves simultaneously as a flat pattern and as a composition in three dimensions. In a sort of three-dimensional Gestalt switch, it is possible to see the long arc from right hand to left foot variously as a flat, “graphic” scrawl and as a movement through space from far to near and back again.82 Carpenter, in other words, sees only half the story. But the virtual effacement of such views from modern textbooks is symptomatic. A distinctive doubleness has been lost. Like the shining ray of the thunderbolt, the hurtling discus has ceased to engage the space of the beholder.

To get a sense of what is at stake in such effacements, it is useful to set alongside Myron’s statue this passage from a contemporary ode by Bacchylides. Victorious Automedes, says the poet, “stood out among the pentathletes as the shining moon in the mid-month night sky outshines the light of the stars.”
In such a way, amid the vast circling crowd of the Greeks, did he display his wondrous body [thaumaston demas], hurling the wheel-shaped discus, and raise a shout from the people as he flung the shaft of the dark-leaved elder-tree from his hand into the steep sky.

He executed the flashing movement of wrestling, and brought strong-limbed bodies down to the earth with such high-spirited strength, then returned to the dark-whirling waters of the Asopus. . . .

In these lines, the poet deploys a series of interlinked metaphors, the common threads being light, celestial bodies, and circular movement around a pivot. Automedes is first a radiant moon among his fellow athletes. Then the light-metaphor dissolves into a series of circular figures. The stars around the lunar disc become the Greeks in general, circling round him like wheeling stars, and then his “wondrous body,” thaumaston demas, becomes a hub for the “wheel-shaped discus” as he swings it into the sky. The cycle of the heavens and the motion of the crowd cohere in the circular movement of the athlete’s throw; at the same time, the discus in the air is like the moon in the sky. In the next lines, the trajectory of the javelin up into the air leads to the downward thud of an opponent’s body on the wrestling floor. Once again, Automedes is a light, executing “the flashing movement of wrestling.” The net effect, however, is familiar: as always, shining and projection bring to mind wonder, even as the “shout” of the crowd recalls the singing and ululating that attended Theseus’s reappearance on the Cretan ship in Bacchylides 17.

Three specific qualities make Automedes—or, more specifically, his body, demas—wonderful: he is radiant, he is at the center of a moving circle, and he hurls or flings things before an audience. The statue shares these qualities. Cast originally of bright bronze, caught in the act of hurling a “wheel-shaped discus,” the great arc of its arms famously evokes the full circular motion of a swinging throw. That, as has been often observed, a real live discus thrower would never strike quite this attitude is as irrelevant as “incorrect” proportions of the Artemision Zeus. As Claude Rolley puts it, “Myron knew perfectly well that he was distorting the ‘truth.’” What matters is the presentation of a meaningful (not merely “decorative”) pattern. The statue sets the athlete’s body in the center of a notional circle even as it describes a movement that remains, as yet, incomplete and invisible. Although there is no question of any direct connection between statue and poem, it is significant that Myron singles out the very features that, for Bacchylides, make a body “wondrous.” The statue is like a three-dimensional version of the poem’s Automedes: not because there existed an actual, causal relation between the two—there did not—but because they both make similar assumptions and cater to similar expectations.

Textbooks often evoke the Diskobolos to exemplify a broad preference in Classical Greek art for the depiction of a pregnant moment—catching a gesture that seems to include both the immediate past and the immediate future. J. J. Pollitt has plausibly identified such poses with the Greek term rhythmos. But the description, while apt, requires thickening. Standardly one connects the strong evocation of narrative time with the allegedly intrinsic Greek narrative impulse. As we have seen, however, that impulse is too vague to have any explanatory value. What the Diskobolos evokes, irresistibly, is the invisible: a movement, a gesture, that has either just now slipped into the past or will, any second, come to be. Rhythmos is a real phenomenon, but one comprehensible according to the logic of the synapse and the rhetoric of wonder.
Temple Pediments and Movement in Marble

The technical constraints on dramatic movement in marble sculpture do not pertain in an architectural setting. Struts and other forms of support that would be unseemly in a freestanding figure are all but invisible in a temple pediment. Thus the history of the Classical pediment tracks that of bronze statuary in a way that the history of freestanding marble does not. Here again, the overriding tendency is toward a dramatic address to the beholder.

The textbook example of early pedimental sculpture is the west pediment of the temple of Artemis on Corfu, dating to the beginning of the sixth century (fig. 41). Medousa, her face a staring mask, runs in whirligig pose to the left, accompanied by her offspring Pegasos and Chrysaor. Flanking the central group are large panthers, their faces also turned toward the beholder. Occupying the angles on either side are elements of the Gigantomachy: at right, Zeus smites Mimas with his thunderbolt; at left, an enthroned Gē appeals to a god with a spear; in the corners lie dead giants. This assemblage is not quite the incoherent jumble it may first appear. Euripides reports that the Gorgon was born of Gē to be the ally, the symmakhos, of the Giants in their battle with the gods. The entire pediment thus narrates a single coherent story. Yet such thematic coherence is clearly subordinate to an overriding demand for confrontational frontality. The dominant feature is the mask of Medousa. Some decades later, at Selinous on the south coast of Sicily, the great shrine known as Temple C would dispense with narrative entanglements and fill its pediment with a simple, staring Gorgoneion (fig. 47). Temples at Sicilian Naxos, Gela, and Himera adopted the same motif. Whether we wish to call such masks apotropaic or not, the confrontational effect is undeniable.

More generally, however, the combination of a frontal, epiphanic figure at center with flanking groups in profile is a basic principle of early pedimental composition. This pattern organizes examples on the Hekatompedon and the old temple

of Athena on the Athenian Akropolis (ca. 560 and ca. 510–500, respectively), the Siphnian treasury at Delphi (ca. 525), the Alkmeonid temple of Apollo at Delphi (ca. 510), the temple of Apollo Daphnehoros at Eretria (ca. 499–490) and its later Classical replacement (ca. 430), the Athenian treasury at Delphi (ca. 489–85), the temple of Aphaia at Aegina (ca. 490–75), the temple of Zeus at Olympia (ca. 470–57), the Parthenon at Athens (ca. 437–32) and the Contrada Marasà temple at Epizephyrian Locri (ca. 425). There are exceptions, notably a series of small Archaic pediments from the Athenian Akropolis and the Megarian treasury at Olympia, but the overall pattern is clear.

Robin Osborne has argued that the purpose of this arrangement was to guide the viewer’s attention. He suggests that pediments on the east, or front, ends of temples tend to concentrate attention toward the center, hence to lead the eye toward the main entryway into the cella, while those on the west, or rear, sides tend to have radial compositions that deflect viewers around the building’s flanks and, by extension, toward the main entrance. Although this east-west distinction does not hold good everywhere—for instance, at Aegina’s Aphaia temple—it is still noteworthy. The temple of Zeus at Olympia offers the clearest example. On the west, the frontal Apollo literally points off to the side, while (according to one widely accepted reconstruction) the battling Greeks and Centaurs move generally from the center toward the corners (figs. 48, 137). On the east, over the main doorway, upright, static figures flank the central Zeus, while chariots press in from either side (fig. 49). A pilgrim approaching from the west would thus be directed by Apollo himself to circle the building; arriving at the east he would find his attention focused on the center of the façade, hence the main entrance to the temple. Sculpture guides not just the eye but, as it were, the whole body of an ambient beholder.

But there has got to be more to the matter. Functionalism, like formalism, tends to purge artworks of narrative or ideological significance. Pediments may be good signposts but, after all, was such expensive signage really necessary? Osborne suggests, in passing, that the frontality of axial figures might be in some way evocative of the power of the gods. It is this aspect that stands most in need of explication.

The Corfu pediment—the earliest preserved—certainly makes this power visible (fig. 41). Positioned centrally, facing the viewer with a monstrous grimace and a petrifying gaze, Medousa is at once alien and confrontational. As Vernant writes, the face of Gorgo “represents in its grimace the terrifying horror of a radical otherness with which you yourself will be identified as you are turned into stone.” She recalls nothing so much as the Fear “worked in adamant, unspeakable, staring back with
eyes that glowed with fire” at the center of Herakles’ shield. The shield is a *thauma idesthai*, and it is perhaps significant that, for the later critic Lucian, to be petrified by the Gorgon is to be “struck stiff with *thauma.*” The sculptor of the Corfu pediment accentuates the confrontational effect of the Gorgon’s face by superimposing it over the upper frame of the pediment, so that it seems to burst out of the triangular space. The frontal face appears to press toward the viewer even as the profile feet remain firmly anchored on the groundline.

There is a corresponding doubleness in the treatment of narrative time. The *Knie lauf* pose is, as we have seen, a characteristically Archaic device for the simultaneous suggestion of motion and stasis. More specifically, however, it has often been remarked that the Corfu pediment conflates several different moments in the story of Medousa: Chrysaor and Pegasos are born from the monster’s neck after Perseus cuts off her head, but here they accompany their mother while she is still alive. Just as the Gorgon is at once inside and outside the pedimental frame, so the present and the future of narrative time collapse into a single instant. The Corfu pediment, in short, conforms perfectly to the Archaic thematic of the joint or synapse. It may not be radiant, but it is confrontational and dramatic—which, in the hands of Greek sculptors, is very nearly the same thing.

Later pediments elaborate this theme without changing it fundamentally. The frontal figures at center are often gods who are not visible to the battling figures around them, like the Apollo and Zeus of the Olympia pediments. The mortals take no notice of the deities in their midst, but carry on unawares. In such instances the spatial and temporal relations are more integrated than on the Corfu pediment. Instead of conflating different moments, and even different stories, into a single pedimental space, the sculptors focus on a single event. The spatial and temporal unity of Greek narrative is a constant theme of academic scholarship, typically under rubrics like *kairos* or *rhythmos*. Often overlooked, however, is a correlate disjunction between the axial deity and the surrounding actors to whom the epiphany is invisible. Unity of space and time actually premises a certain discontinuity between the axial figure and those to either side. The Gorgon of the Corfu pediment was not invisible to the figures in the corners, insofar as the center and corner narratives did not share a common space or time. The Apollo of Olympia, by contrast, is indeed invisible to Theseus, Pirithoos, and the Centaurs (fig. 135). Famously, the east pediment at Olympia allegorizes this gap in the figures of the old “seers,” who stare in horror—or is wonder?—at Zeus and the heroes at center. For the break between narratives, these pediments substitute a break within narratives.

Knitting the pediment together in this way entails the omission of non-narrative elements like felines and serpents. On the Archaic Athenian Hekatompedon, for instance, the lions in the center have nothing to with the combats in the angles, nor do the combats relate in any obvious way to one another (fig. 50). Eighty years later, at the temple of Aphaia on Aegina, a single scene fills the entire pediment, and the axial Athena is in the thick of battle even she rises above the fray (figs. 51, 52). On offer in these later pediments is a contrast between a confrontational, frontal epiphany at center and narrative action at the flanks. The goddess stares out at us, the beholders; the warriors to either side concentrate on killing one another, taking no notice of the immortal in their midst. The distinctiveness of the type emerges when one contrasts it to a fifth-century Etruscan pediment from Pyrgi, in which the central figures of Athena and Zeus are thoroughly embroiled in the savagery around them (fig. 53). Classical Greek pediments, in short, display an almost Aristotelian
unity of time, place, and action. But that dramatic unity corresponds to an equally emphatic disjunction between the axial epiphany and the action to either side.

Maintaining this correspondence is a tricky business. Non-narrative elements like lions and snakes endure at least until the “Alkmeonid” temple at Delphi, ca. 510 BCE (fig. 54). Purging them naturally increases the prominence of the subsidiary actors. No longer confined to the extreme angles of the pediment, they now vie for attention with the epiphany at center. Once the pedimental narrative has been unified and the axial figure has been integrated with its neighbors, there is a danger of dissipating the dramatic, confrontational force that had been so integral to the Corfu pediment and its descendants. The centrally placed deities of Classical pediments do not burst through the frame like the Corfu Medousa, nor do they dwarf the other actors (though they are invariably taller). The compositions are, in short, more balanced. It thus becomes imperative to find new ways to mark the distinction between the epiphanic god and the other actors if the confrontational force of the former is to be preserved.

Innovations in pose provide a solution. From earliest times, the stances of pedimental figures are far more open and active than those of sculpture in the round. Even at Corfu, Zeus in the left corner raises his thunderbolt in a way that has no counterpart in large-scale statuary of the same period (fig. 41). Yet it is significant that at no point in the history of Archaic and Classical pedimental sculpture do the figures engage the beholder in the manner of the Tyrannicides, the Zeus of Artemision, or the Diskobolos. The Corfu Medousa does break out of her frame, coming as it were at us, but her main line of movement is to exit stage right. Later figures may seem almost to fall out of the pedimental space, like a dead soldier from Aegina, but this movement, significant as it is, is hardly the explosive starburst of the Tyrannicides (fig. 55). Again, what matters is the contrast between the central epiphany and everything else. One way to emphasize that contrast is to make the flanking figures relatively more active and the central deity relatively more static. Sculptors, indeed, do everything they can to make the implied motion of subsidiary figures faster and more violent. The old temple of Athena on the Athenian Akropolis showed a Gigantomachy: Athena strides and smites with far greater dynamism than, say, the earlier Zeus of Corfu; her opponent, likewise, twists dramatically as he falls, and looks away from the beholder. In the middle, a frontal chariot rides directly toward the beholder (fig. 56). The central horses mediate between center and sides: in order to stare outward, they must turn their heads to the profile. (Horses are useful because, having eyes on the sides of their skulls, they can be seen frontally and in profile at the same time). Where similar innovations in freestanding bronze sculpture may be seen as an attempt to overwhelm the beholder, in pediments these new poses are part of a larger system of contrasts. Activity is a counterpoint to stasis, to the dramatic, epiphanic figure at the center. That counterpoint becomes more
ornate with time, but the basic principle remains unaltered. Formal doubleness, the defining characteristic of a *thauma idesthai*, is also a defining characteristic of Classical pediments.\(^9\)

The contrast between center and sides is not a mere reflex of function, nor is it trivially formal. Within the depicted narratives, it plays out as a distinction between what “we” the beholders see, and what “they” the actors see. This relation had always had its place in pedimental compositions. The Corfu pediment, for instance, laid heavy emphasis on the petrifying stare of the Gorgon: not only did we see her, but she was to be imagined as seeing us as well. The Classical pediments complicate matters by giving equal importance to the invisibility of the central deity to the other actors, even as they integrate all the figures into a single narrative. The Greeks and Centaurs of Olympia are oblivious to the Apollo in their midst, just as the various combatants at Aegina and Eretria are oblivious to Athena. *What is visible to the audience is not visible to the characters in the drama.* Although sharing the same space, the figures within the pediment are blind to one another; although the beholder stands in a different world, he both sees and is seen, takes in the spectacle and locks eyes with the deity. In this regard, our position is analogous to that of Akhilleus in the first book of the *Iliad*, when Athena appears to him with flashing eyes, “and of the rest no one saw her.”\(^9\) The hero’s reaction is stunned amazement: “And Akhilleus was amazed,” *thambēsen d’Akhilleus*. The poet specifies that this amazement derived not just from the presence of the goddess, but also from the fact that nobody else can see her. (Later, Aeschylus would dramatize this problem of vision and beholding in the figure of Cassandra, the visionary who “sees” what those around her obstinately do not. Agamemnon and the other Greeks disbelieve her, but the audience in the theater knows that she speaks truth: what is visible to her, hence in a way to us, is not visible to them). In temple sculpture, this disjunction *within* the
fiction of the narrative reiterates the formal disjunction of the overall tableau. For it occurs in and through the contrast between center and sides, between full frontality and sundry variations on the profile view. If seeing a god that others do not see is amazing or wonderful, then the Classical pediment is a veritable machine for the production of *thauma*.

The Corfu Gorgon combines dynamism and stasis, lateral movement and forward, profile and frontal, present and future, in a monstrous spectacle. All that happens in the following two centuries is the assaying of these antitheses into separate figures within a unified narrative. In the Classical pediment, the central deity is static, frontal, and addresses the beholder; the flanking actors are dynamic, move from side to side, and ignore the beholder. The entire pediment becomes as amazing and as wonderful as the single figure of the Gorgon.

By this account, the natural impulse would be for the central figure of the pediment to become as dramatic and striking as narrative coherence will allow. It should do the work of a *megale phaos*, “a great light.” The designer of the west pediment of the Parthenon seems to have taken this brief literally (figs. 57, 58). He did so by omitting the central, epiphanic figure entirely. The story is the contest of Athena and Poseidon for dominion of Athens, but neither deity occupies the central position. Instead, each recoils from a central element, now lost. Erika Simon has argued convincingly, on the basis of parallels in vase-painting, that this explosive force was a thunderbolt: Athena and Poseidon recoil as Zeus separates them with a blast from the sky. On Parthenon West, therefore, the epiphanic element was none other than “the lightning-flash that the son of Kronos taking in his hand shakes from gleaming Olympos, showing a sign [sēma] to mortals.”

This particular lightning bolt is a *sēma* twice over. Within the diegesis, it signifies Zeus’s displeasure at the quarrel between his brother and his daughter. As sculpture, however, the thunderbolt is a sign in the sense that does not *depict* a meteorological phenomenon, but rather *denotes* it. The thunderbolt is, in Greco-Roman art criticism, a byword for that which is beyond depiction. The one in the pediment, for its part, is not so much the image of, as the symbol for, a light-burst. Although the actual thunderbolt from the Parthenon is lost, it probably resembled that on a red-figure hydria believed to derive from the pedimental group (fig. 59). An ideogram occupies the center: a *sēma* that, like Zeus’s stone at Delphi, is a *thauma* at the same time. Parthenon West, in short, distills the repulsion, shock, amazement, and wonder of the sixth-century Gorgon masks into a visible sign. Flanking it on either
side are dramatically active figures, whose amazement models that of the ideal beholder even as their depictive bravura stands in marked contrast to the abstraction of the symbol at the center. At the apogee of High Classicism, we find not a mythical coincidence of form and content but a sort of difference-engine, a work structured around the opposition of icon and symbol, figures and lightning.

Seen from afar, ranged on a plane in shallow space, pedimental sculpture cannot effect the multiplication of viewpoints that one finds in freestanding statuary. Just so, the active poses of Classical pediments do not, in themselves, engage the beholder in the manner of their bronze counterparts. They do not charge, they are not great flashing lights. But because the overriding point is to establish a contrast between center and sides, frontal and profile, the new open poses work in the interest of such engagement all the same. They frame the central epiphany, and thereby establish the crucial visual contrast. Once again, the tendency of Classical sculpture is to assay out the individual elements of Archaic figures and then to amplify each one. The process may culminate in the Parthenon but, again, it is not a revolution or a miracle so much as an ongoing elaboration of established precedent.

**Chryselephantine**

Bronze and marble are both radiant, and a shining stone temple is wonderful. But, as Pindar says, “Gold shines preeminent” (*Olympian* 1.1–2), and the only medium more prestigious than marble is the only one to surpass it for glitter and glow: *chryselephantine*, that is, gold and ivory used in combination, the latter for exposed skin, the former for drapery. Pindar may even have had the technique in mind when
he noted (fr. 222) that, among its many virtues, gold is immune to moths: that is, golden drapery is better than cloth. The technique’s history has recently been studied in depth by Kenneth Lapatin, whose magisterial treatment I follow.¹⁰⁴

The use of gold and ivory in tandem goes back to Bronze Age Greece and is known in the Archaic period as well. But it really comes into its own only in the fifth century BCE. Pheidias’s Athena in the Parthenon at Athens, as well as his Zeus at Olympia, were among the most famous statues of Antiquity (fig. 60).¹⁰⁵ Not surprisingly, both statues are lost and must be reconstructed on the basis of ancient descriptions and copies. The Athena, completed by 437, showed the goddess standing upright, wearing an Attic helmet with cheek-flaps raised, a tunic, the scaly aegis, and sandals. In her outstretched right hand she held a Nike. Her left hand rested on a shield that stood by her side, and she cradled a spear in the crook of her left arm. Coiled by her right side was a snake, the legendary Athenian king Erichthonios; at some later date it seems to have been moved over to the left side in order to make room for the addition of a column to support the extended right hand and the Nike. The Zeus, made some years after the Parthenos, was seated on a great throne, scepter in one hand, Nike in the other, a cloak wrapped round his lower body, his torso and his arms exposed. In each case, smaller figures in relief adorned nearly every available surface, from the sides of the shoes to the furniture and the armor: a teeming array of decorative and narrative elements that added visual density and complexity to an already overwhelming statue.

The importance of these figures is difficult to overstate. They were, for five centuries or more, the touchstones of the Classical style in Greek sculpture. It was commonplace to compare Pheidias to Homer, especially in his rendering of the Zeus: the statues were the equivalent, in the visual arts, of the most revered of Greek poems. For Cicero they were “the most perfect of their kind ever seen”; Dio devoted an entire oration to the Zeus, an “awe-inspiring masterpiece of surpassing beauty”; Kallimakhos devoted a poem to the same statue; Lucian called it one of “the nobles masterpieces the world has ever seen” and spoke of its “grandeur and supreme quality”; for Pliny it had “no rival”; Epiktetos speaks of those who regarded it “a misfortune to die without seeing” the statue; the Zeus was one of the Seven Wonders of the World. In short, Pheidias’s giant statues acquired a prestige comparable to that of the Sistine Chapel or the Last Supper in early modern Europe: they came quickly to seem the distillation and essence of a privileged historical moment. Flattery, in the form of imitation, came swiftly. The only serious rival to these works was an equally large statue of Hera at Argos, creation of Polykleitos, itself celebrated by Martial and said by Strabo to be the most beautiful in the world. As far as the ancients were concerned, these figures were the acme of the sculptor’s art.

As Lapatin has shown, the chief innovation in each instance was one of scale. Pheidias’s statues were colossal, filling the height of their respective temples, and required elaborate armatures of wood. In this regard they followed recent precedent, such as a forty-five-foot-tall bronze Apollo at Apollonia on the Pontus, made by Kalamis probably in the second quarter of the fifth century, or Pheidias’s own Athena Promakhos on the Akropolis, its flashing spear-point visible even to ships at sea. Gigantism is of course impressive, even wonderful: as Pausanias says of an Apollo at Pergamon by the early Classical sculptor Onatas of Aegina, “they wonder at it both for its size and its art.”

To such already powerful monuments, Pheidias added the cachet of mind-boggling expense. Chryselephantine giants employed staggering amounts of precious material: the bare chest of the Zeus, a broad expanse of snowy ivory, was among other things an exercise in ostentation. The Athena Parthenos in fact functioned as a treasury reserve for the city of Athens: her solid gold drapery was removable and could be converted to bullion in a crisis. Indeed, sheer cost goes a long way toward explaining the high status of chryselephantine. Diodoros seems to have little more than expense in mind when he describes gold and ivory as “materials held to be wonderful [thaumazomenōn] to men.”

But lots of things are costly; and no one can suggest that elephant tusks and hippopotamus teeth are an ideal medium for monumental statuary. Ostentation is at best a partial explanation for the use of chryselephantine. As both Andrew Stewart and Kenneth Lapatin have observed, equally important was the Greeks’ magpie fascination with things that shine. A huge gold statue, glittering in the lamplight of a temple interior, the ivory details standing out in the half-darkness, would have been imposing and luminous at once. Pheidias went to great lengths to achieve this effect. Excavations of his workshop at Olympia have revealed molds for making drapery and decorative elements out of glass; the garments in question probably belonged to the subsidiary figure of Nike, but the god himself may have been similarly attired. The precise effect will have varied depending upon the backing to the glass—dark, light, golden—but the god’s variegated, sparkling, elaborate robe must have resulted in a figure of unprecedented size, complexity, and radiance.
The large scale of Pheidias’s statues did not preclude a naturalistic rendering, but it did make open poses impractical. Both the Zeus and the Parthenos were relatively static. The former sat; the latter stood stiffly (although her right arm was thrust forward, the pose differed little from that of a typical Archaic kore). To be sure, there was a certain restlessness to each: Athena stood in *contrapposto*, Zeus thrust forward one leg. But there was nothing to compare to the relative dynamism of the Parthenon sculptures. In pose, at any rate, the Pheidias’s statues were rather old-fashioned.

Lapatin has demonstrated that the development of chryselephantine giants postdated that of large-scale bronzes by more than fifty years. Yet chryselephantine cannot be seen as a step on the road to empirical accuracy. The sheer size of the figures should temper the more extravagant claims of progressivism: these glittering giants were monstrously unnatural. The result is that the greatest and most admired statues of Classical Greece do not fit easily into standard chronological and stylistic schemata. For this reason, the chryselephantine masterpieces of the fifth century have long been something of an embarrassment to progressivist history (it is to Lapatin’s credit to have systematically retrieved them for scholarly attention). That the High Classical should have valued above all others such flagrantly unrealistic, inhuman sculptures would seem to undermine the entire scholarly enterprise. Rhys Carpenter’s solution was simplest: in his grand survey, *Greek Sculpture: A Critical Review*, he simply omitted to mention Pheidias’s masterpieces, and indeed Pheidias himself. Polykleitos did appear, but not his famous gold-and-ivory Hera. More recently, Guy Métraux has made the surprising claim that, after the middle of the sixth century, there are no more colossal male nudes; he goes on to marginalize the chryselephantine masterworks as “special” cases in order to claim that Classical statues were more realistically scaled than their Archaic forebears.¹¹⁶ Drastic as they are, such measures are required if one is seriously to maintain that “naturalism was . . . a predetermined goal of the sculptor’s art” in Greece.¹¹⁷

Yet the masterworks of Pheidias and Polykleitos become more comprehensible when seen as *thaumata*. For Plato’s Alkibiades, a truly memorable image is “divine, golden, supremely beautiful, and wonderful”—all terms that Pheidias and his imitators may be said to have rendered quite hyperbolic.¹¹⁸ For Strabo (8.3.4), a chryselephantine statue by Kolotes is *thaumaston idein*, “wonderful to see.” On these terms, there is no contradiction between the Tyrannicides, rushing at the beholder like a ray of light, and the enormous cult statue sparkling out of the half-darkness. Each works, in its own way, toward a single goal, and each deploys a similar set of themes. The results are in one sense dramatically different, but they share certain basic assumptions about the importance of radiance and wonder. If brilliance, alterity, and epiphanic appearance are the key elements of a *thauma idesthai*, hence the key desiderata of Classical statuary, then phenomena as seemingly diverse as glass drapery, *contrapposto*, and open poses all relate cogently to one another.

**Recapitulation**

The preceding argument has been that the history of fifth-century sculpture is not one of progress toward naturalism, or empirical accuracy, or truth. It is, on the contrary, an ongoing adjustment of the relation of image to beholder, and an ongoing elaboration of that dialectic of presence and absence, which characterizes Greek statuary from earliest times. The culmination of this history is not perfection and
harmony—not Atticism in any of its various guises—but an amplified and expanded rhetoric: an aesthetics of overwhelming size and dazzling radiance, of statues that strike the eye by shining even as they charge, throw or rush at the beholder, loom overhead or glitter out of the darkness. Briefly put, the operative change is not in the relation of image to model, but in the relation of image to beholder.

Not everyone was convinced, as a fragment of Aeschylus can attest. The poet laments the loss of the Archaic style, in what must be counted one of the first instances of nostalgia and antiquarianism in the history of art: “Those ancient statues, though simply made, are to be considered divine, while the new kind, though elaborately worked and inducing wonder [thaumazesthai], have a less divine aspect to them.” Aeschylus was unsympathetic to recent developments in sculpture, but there is no mistaking the terms in which he understood them. The Classical was the style of wonder: thauma was everything and that, for Aeschylus, was its problem. One aspect of Archaic statuary had come to dominate, with the result that images had come to seem “less divine,” if more wonderful. This opinion was evidently in the minority. The sheer success of the fifth-century style suggests that, for most contemporaries of Aeschylus, wonder and elaborate workmanship were the very acme of divinity in sculpture.
In those cases in which the Greek artist, too, was obliged to clothe the beautiful body, which sculpture alone can and should form, when a law commanded that he hide it under weeds, did he dispose of any means by which he could escape this foreign burden or help to accommodate it? Could he clothe the body in such a way that nothing is hidden? Could he drape a body and yet allow it to retain its stature and its beautiful rounded fullness? What if the body were to show through? In sculpture, in something that is solid, nothing can show through…. Yet look!

J. G. Herder, *Sculpture*¹
CHAPTER THREE

Surface-Effect

The basic claim of the previous chapter was that the open, active poses of fifth-century sculpture are best understood as attempts to strike wonder in beholders. From Homer through the fifth century, artworks are supposed to be wonderful, *thaumastos*. In practice, this brief entailed that a work should seem radiant, swift, sudden, and twofold. Over the course of the sixth century, sculptors went to increasingly extreme measures to attain this effect. By the early 400s, it came to seem that a true *thauma idesthai* should strike the eye with all the force of a dazzling ray of light. The result was an amplified, hyperbolic version of the Archaic style. Classical *contrapposto* ratcheted up the internal inconsistencies of the kouros stance, and Classical movement bet everything on striking and awing the beholder. From the poise of the kouros to the headlong rush of the Tyrannicides is a natural evolution. But evolution does not work as a purposeful advance, still less as a headlong rush. Kouroi walk, after their fashion; the Tyrannicides run; but the real history of Greek sculpture might better be seen as a meandering, looping drift.

Pose, however, is but one aspect of the “Greek revolution.” Equally important is the way Classical statues evoke the unseen: that which is hidden by skin or drapery or which is itself intangible and invisible, like *ēthos* or “character.” The drapery of Classical figures, famously, clings to the body, and thereby reveals it; the sculpted surface undulates to suggest bones and sinews; pose and facial expressions intimate hidden depths of personality. The surface of the statue seems to cover something: there is something *inside*. Such effects are pervasive in Greek sculpture, to the point that their sheer strangeness is easy to overlook.

It is useful to think of depth in sculpture on analogy with space in painting. A statue, like a painting, is just a surface. Just as pictorial depth is an illusion, a trick of perspective or a play of figure and ground, so there is nothing beneath a statue’s notional skin but solid, unworked stone, the struts and clay that support a cast bronze, or the void inside a terracotta. Lucian mocks this fact in the *Gallus*, with reference to chryselephantine, speaking of “the great *kolossoi* that Pheidias or Myron or Praxiteles made, each of which is outward a beautiful Poseidon or a Zeus, made of ivory and gold . . . but if you stoop and look down inside, you will see a tangle of bars and struts and dowels driven right through, and beams and wedges and pitch and clay, and a quantity of such ugly stuff housing within, not to mention legions of mice and rats that sometimes conduct their civic business there.” The Greeks, like we, tended to speak of statues as though they actually possessed muscles and veins and bones. It is an effect of language not unlike that which Aristotle described in the *Rhetoric*, speaking of mere things like statues as though they were capable of action: “the inanimate [is] animate,” *apsukhon dē empsukhon*. Lucian’s joke is to note the inner workings of a radiant artwork, thereby forcing attention to facts that ordinarily pass below the threshold of perception. It is satire in its debunking mode.

In the *Poetics*, when Aristotle comes to discuss “the Wonderful,” *to thaumaston*, in tragic plots, he suggests that it derives from “false inference,” or paralogism.
In tragedy one needs to create a sense of the Wonderful, but epic has more scope for the irrational \([\text{alogos}]\)—the chief cause of the Wonderful—because we do not actually see the agent. The Wonderful is pleasurable: witness the fact that all men exaggerate when telling stories, to give delight. It is above all Homer who has taught other poets the right way to pursue falsehood \([\text{pseudē}]\): that is, by false inference \([\text{paralogismos}]\). When the existence or occurrence of \(b\) follows from that of \(a\), people suppose that, if \(b\) is the case, then \(a\) too must exist or be occurrent; but this is false. So, if the antecedent is false, but were it true some further fact would necessarily exist or occur, the poet should supply the latter: because it knows the truth of the consequent, our mind falsely infers the truth of the antecedent too.\(^6\)

Aristotle is speaking of poetry and plots, but his definition of paralogism suggests broad applicability. Surface-effect is false in just this way. Seeing a sculpted garment, the mind infers the presence of a body beneath the surface. Doing so sets it on the way to \(\text{thauma}\).

Although paralogism is “false” and “irrational,” \(\text{pseudos}\) and \(\text{alogos}\), it is not mere error. Implicit in Aristotle’s argument is the suggestion that false inference must somehow be recognized as such in order to produce wonder. The falsehood must seem true while yet remaining, somehow, an \(\text{evident}\) falsehood. Otherwise, paralogism would be unexceptional: it would have nothing wonderful about it. In a tragic plot, this recognition will coincide with the denouement or \(\text{lysis}\). Just so, the effect of interiority in sculpture is not quite an illusion, not quite a mistake. As Wittgenstein puts it, a picture of a steaming pot is a picture of a pot full of hot water, even though the water itself is not to be seen.\(^5\) For instance, it is true, not false, that the figures on the Parthenon pediments wear thin, revealing garments. Insofar as they are figures, not pieces of stone, to just that extent they do wear clothes; and those clothes are sheer. Yet this formulation is too pat. It seems part of seeing the statue as a statue, and not as “the real thing,” that at the same time one should not see sculpted cloth as covering anything at all. Part of seeing it as a statue is knowing that there is nothing under there; if you do not know that, if you do not see that, then you are not seeing it that way. As Herder puts it, “in sculpture, in something that is solid, nothing can show through … yet look!” Something does show through.

The result is not paradox but paralogism: a distinctive feature of the confrontation with sculpture. More even than panel painting, figural sculpture trades on constant shifts and adjustments in perception, moments of awareness of the “thingly” status of the image, and corresponding moments of bedazzlement or captivation. The “blockiness” or “trunkiness” of Archaic statuary does much to foster this effect, as described in chapter 1. But, as Herder observes, it is in the perception of the surface of the statue—the constitution of surface as such—that the stakes are highest.

Rainer Maria Rilke offers perhaps the best account of this phenomenon. In his second lecture on Rodin, he discusses the material conditions of sculptural \(\text{poiesis}\).

But those who study these conditions thoroughly soon learn that they do not pass beyond the surface and nowhere penetrate the core of the thing; and that the most one can do is to produce a surface that is self-contained and in no sense fortuitous, a surface which, surrounded, shadowed, and illuminated like natural things by the atmosphere, is absolutely nothing but surface. Removed from the
pretentious and capricious rhetoric, art returns to its humble, dignified place in everyday life, to craft. For what does it mean to produce a surface?

Let us consider for a moment whether everything before us, everything we perceive and explain and interpret, does not consist simply of surfaces. And as for what we call mind and soul and love: are they not all just a subtle change on the small surface of a nearby face? And doesn’t the artist who has formed this surface have to keep to the tangible element that corresponds to his medium, to the form he can lay hold of and imitate?

For all happiness that has ever thrilled the heart; all greatness that has nearly destroyed us with its force; every broad, transforming thought—was once nothing but the pursing of lips, the raising of eyebrows; the shadows on a face: and this expression on the mouth, this line above the eyebrows, this darkness on a face—perhaps they were always there in exactly the same form: as a marking on an animal, as a crack on a rock, as a bruise on a piece of fruit.∗

For Rilke, sculpture is a thing with a surface—but a surface with a distinct phenomenology. His concern is to investigate the grammar of surfaces, that is, what we do when we see a surface as a surface. Seeing it as a surface means: as something that is “before us,” something that “we perceive and explain and interpret.” The contrary would be failing to see, or notice, the superficiality of a surface. He summarily identifies this operation as linguistic. It is a form of denomination or calling, as in “what we call mind and soul and love.” It is important to read this phrase (and indeed this whole passage) superficially, as meaning just what it says. The poet, presumably, does not invoke language in order to debunk it, as though the phrase “what we call” somehow qualified or trivialized “mind and soul and love.” He is not suggesting that we are merely calling, merely using words, when we perceive, explain, interpret a subtle change on the small surface of a nearby face in such a way. On the contrary, he is describing something we do; and the wonder is that words can squeeze so much from stones. Mind and soul and love add up to the inner, to what Rilke has earlier called, without irony, “the core of the thing,” to which we never “penetrate.” Rilke does not deny that the “core” exists, rather he sublimes it. The consideration he urges is whether the unattainable inner, indeed the very idea that things have cores, might be a reflex of denomination, but no less thrilling for all that.

Surface implies depth, as the epidermis implies something beneath the skin, a hypo-dermis. The wonder of sculpture, as distinct from mere real things, consists in its being “absolutely nothing but surface” while yet displaying “what we call mind and soul and love.” It is a pure exteriority that nonetheless suggests “what we call”—what language names—interiority. Part of Rilke’s point is to deny the inner, deny the core, as something distinct from surface. But another part of his point is to underscore the irresistible pull of the language of the inner. He signals as much by his use (hence acceptance) of the term “core” and of the everyday terminology of “mind and soul and love.” Surface, in short, constitutes depth as such. To “produce a surface,” even a surface that is “absolutely nothing but surface,” is to produce the suggestion of a depth, that is, to produce a relation of surface to depth.

For Rilke, the importance of sculpture lies in the way it reveals the constitution of “mind and soul and love” in and through surface. Sculpture makes visible the constitution of depth by surface while yet giving depth its due. In so doing it reveals a whole world. Rilke modulates from the play of surface and depth in sculpture to
an equivalent play in human society, from the “tangible element” of the sculptor’s medium to “the pursing of lips, the raising of eyebrows.” Sculpture therefore presents in microcosm the philosophical problem of other minds. By satisfying the criteria of interiority while yet remaining superficial, clarifies the concept of the inner. To revert to the Aristotelian formula: if the confrontation of sculpture and language causes us to animate the inanimate, *apsukhon dē empsukhon*, then our own *animae* or psyches may come to seem no more and no less than appellations, as natural as a marking on an animal or a crack on a rock. Behavior—“a subtle change on the small surface of a nearby face”—is all there is, and the rest—“what we call mind and soul and love”—is the work of language. Aristotle calls it metaphor. Which is not to say that we should stop using those words; we need them. Even for Lucian, the satirist, the inside of the statue is a place where “civic business” gets conducted.

Rilke, like Herder before him, draws attention to what might be called *surface-effect* in sculpture: the constitution of a surface as such. This formulation is meant to capture the uncontroversial point that a surface is always the surface of something, it is over (*sur*) a form (*face*). Surface implies depth, even (especially) when it is “absolutely nothing but surface.” All entities with fixed extension in space have an outermost boundary, that is, a surface, however complex. But surface-effect in sculpture is the express constitution of that outermost boundary as overlaying something hidden or unseen—when that hidden something is part of the depictive content of the image. Surface-effect is the bestowal upon surface of a conspicuous superficiality.

Greek sculpture makes much of surface in this specific sense. Although it has not escaped the notice of Classical scholars, they tend to fold surface-effect into mimetic and progressivist accounts: Greek artists get better and better at showing what really truly lies beneath the surface of a body or a garment, and their greatest, world-historical achievement is the representation of the innermost *ēthos* or character, “what we call mind and soul and love.” This achievement, carefully shielded from the implicit doubts of Lucian, Aristotle, and Rilke, constitutes what Hegel called *der Blitz der Individualität*,

So now the temple [that is, architecture] is erected for the God; his house stands ready, external nature has been wrought into shape, and suddenly it is pierced by the lightning bolt of individuality [*der Blitz der Individualität*]. The God stands there in nature, it exhibits him: the statue rises in the temple.

The formal emphasis on interiority in Greek architecture is, for Hegel, the material trace of the irruption of interiority, hence individualism, into the progress of the human spirit. Mastery of appearances, a triumph of empiricism, becomes mastery of the self, a triumph of the spirit. It is this account that needs reappraisal.

**Showing-Through**

The Greeks themselves had a way of talking about surface and depth in statuary. In separate studies, Christopher Faraone and Deborah Steiner have shown that the idea of a statue as a container or a receptacle was powerful in Greece. The mythological paradigm is, of course, the Trojan Horse, itself one of the first incidents from the Trojan Cycle to appear in Greek art. But epic provides numerous other
examples, like the magical automata into which Hephaistos sets mind, wits, voice, and strength (noos, phrenes, aude, and stenos), or Pandora, a fair form containing a bitch’s brain and holding her sealed jar. Other accounts mention a bronze lion into which Hephaistos sets beneficial pharmaka or drugs, and a hollow statue of Artemis into which Medea likewise sets pharmaka, these ones harmful. The legendary Daidalos was specially associated with the quasi-magical filling of statues: he animated a statue of Aphrodite by filling it with mercury, built the hollow bull in which Pasiphaë conceived the Minotaur, and also the giant robot Talos, filled to the brim with vital fluid, ichor, in which the Argonauts would eventually drain. More prosaic, perhaps, is the great bronze bull in which the tyrant Phalaris of Akragas was said to have roasted his enemies, listening to their screams, and the pot or dinos that the clowns of Aristophanes’ Clouds worship as an idol, ludicrously mistaking any hollow thing for a potential cult statue. Plato provides several examples, like the hollow bronze horse in which Gyges finds a giant corpse and a ring of invisibility (Republic 2.359d–e). More famous are the terracotta silens of Symposium, each of which conceals, beneath its lumpen exterior, a little image of the god. Such figures are, for Alkibiades, metaphors for Sokrates, an ugly man of divine soul. What these varied examples share is a sense that statues are somehow hollow. Sometimes they contain secrets, drugs, or an evil nature; other times they hold a vital force, like Talos’s ichor, or the simulacrum thereof, like the cries of Phalaris’s bull. In the Greek imagination, a statue is a vessel, for good or ill.

The sphyrelaton technique of early Greece, whereby bronze images were made by hammering metal sheets over a wooden core, will have encouraged this view. The resulting statues were, literally, containers, holding other images, as armor holds a body. But Faraone has shown that this understanding of the statue belongs to a long Near Eastern tradition. Throughout the broader community of the eastern Mediterranean, the notion that a statue is a receptacle for hidden powers is a way of thinking the sacred and talismanic function of images. It expresses the essentially idolatrous belief that the image is the seat of divine power. The god inhabits the statue literally, in the sense of being somehow inside it. As Deborah Steiner puts it, in her own important contribution to this line of research, “Just as numinous powers choose to hide themselves, or only allow a rare glimpse of their epiphanic presences, so the idols that housed the god should properly do the same.” Faraone and Steiner may be taken to have confirmed the basic importance of a play between inside and out, surface and depth, in Greek understandings of the image. If the true character of a figure is inside it, so too its basic vitality. The question is how, or whether, this inner essence will manifest itself on the surface.

A passage from Herodotos provides a clue. Although entirely overlooked by scholars, it is in fact the most extraordinary meditation on the interiority of images to survive from the fifth century BCE. The historian is describing Ethiopia, an idealized land where the men are “the tallest and most beautiful” in the world and live to be a hundred and twenty years old, where gold is more plentiful than bronze, and where everyone feasts perpetually at the Table of the Sun. In this Utopia, even the images are perfect. Describing Ethiopian mortuary customs, Herodotos writes,

They cause the dead body to shrink, either as the Egyptians do or in some other way, then cover it with gypsum and paint it all as far as possible in the likeness of the living man; then they set it within a hollow pillar of crystal…. In the pillar
the corpse shows itself through [diaphainetai] the crystal, no evil stench nor anything unpleasant proceeding from it, and it has every appearance similar to the corpse itself [ekhei panta phanera homoiōs autōi tōi nekui]. The nearest of kin keep the pillar in their house for a year, giving it of the first-fruits and offering it sacrifices; after which they bring the pillars out and set them round about the city.\(^{18}\)

Although these pillars are not actually statues, the Ethiopians treat them as such: the offering of first-fruits and sacrifice (theusia) assimilates them to cult-images, while the subsequent arrangement at the perimeter of the city suggests tomb sculpture. The pillars are the functional equivalent of statuary; as usual, the historian's ethnography is an allegory of Greek practice. In keeping with the rest of the Ethiopian tale, the crystal pillars represent an effort to imagine what a perfect statue might turn out to be.

Herodotos's pillars combine semiotic and mimetic conceptions of the image. Literally a kolossos in the sense of an aniconic column, the pillar nonetheless “has every appearance similar to” its model. The similarity occurs through a series of mediations, more indexical than iconic. The Ethiopians layer image on image, first coating the body with plaster, then painting the resulting effigy, then setting the effigy into crystal where it will "show itself [verb diaphainō] though the stone." These relations between each stage are complex. When Herodotos says, “In the pillar the corpse [nekys] shows itself through the crystal . . . and it has every appearance similar to the corpse [nekys] itself,” the objects of comparison are unclear: What is similar to what? It sounds as though the corpse resembles itself. Alternately, Herodotos could be using nekys, "corpse," to refer first to the gypsum mummy, then to the deceased as he was in life. In context, however, that sentence would be redundant: Herodotos has just told us that the painted mummy is “the likeness of the living man.” The emphasis, rather, is on the total package: crystal, paint, gypsum, and body. What “has every appearance similar to the corpse itself” is not the effigy itself but the effigy as it shows itself through the crystal. This phenomenon—or, better, this diaphainomenon—has the appearance of the corpse, that is, the painted effigy; and the painted effigy has the appearance of the corpse, that is, the dead man. The key operation in each case is the showing-through of a veiled interior. The Ethiopian pillars establish a chain of replications, each diaphanous to the one immediately prior. Each link in this chain is literal, indexical, hard and clear as crystal. Aniconic kolossoi that nonetheless function as firmstanding sēmata, the pillars are thus paradigms of sculptural perfection.

An exact contemporary of the High Classical style in sculpture, Herodotos was able to think the image as the fantastic juxtaposition of depiction and signage—a juxtaposition realized, effected, in the showing-through of an essential interior. This is what a Greek statue would be like, if it could be. For real live sculptors, however, crystal pillars were not an option. Actually to stage the diaphanous, to treat the surface of a statue as the interface of inner and outer, was a technical challenge. The present chapter will track the phenomenon of showing-through—the Rilkean surface-effect—in three interconnected domains: anatomy, or the illusion of hypodermal structures like muscles, bones, and sinews; drapery, or the illusion of a body just underneath the surface of a sculpted garment; and éthos, or the illusion that a mere statue is the repository of a character, a psyche, a soul.
Veils

It is traditional in modern aesthetics, hence in modern histories of Greek sculpture, either to overstate or to deny the importance of drapery. Schiller and Kant, respectively, may stand as exemplars of these tendencies, which in various ways persist into the present day. For Kant, sculpted drapery is a quintessential example of the ornamental, the supplemental, in art.

Even what we call *ornaments* (*parerga*), i.e., those things which do not belong to the complete representation of the object internally as elements but only externally as complements, and which augment the satisfaction of taste, do so only by their form; as for example the frames of pictures, or the draperies of statues or the colonnades of palaces.\(^{19}\)

Draped forms presuppose a naked body underneath—the nude body is, one might say, the metaphysical a priori of the draped.\(^{20}\) It follows that attention to drapery is essentially *uncritical* in the Kantian sense of the term: it remains captivated by epiphenomena instead of exercising the rational faculty to think back to premises. Attention of this sort can appeal only to taste and not to aesthetic judgment; for, in Kant’s account, aesthetic judgment is, exactly and by definition, a critical judgment. The commonplace observation that this opposition is gendered—Classical nudity being generally a masculine trait, drapery being a correspondingly feminine one—is less significant for present purposes than its sheer reductiveness. Jacques Derrida, in a famous discussion of this passage, insisted on the mutual implication of the *ergon* and the *parergon*, body and drapery. The autonomy of the body—and, by extension, of the artwork as such—depends dialectically upon its negation in superfluous ornament. Derrida concluded that Kant’s distinction begs “the question of the representative and objectivizing essence, of its outside and its inside, of the criteria engaged in this delimitation, of the value of naturalness which is presupposed in it, and, secondarily or primarily, of the place of the human body or of its privilege in this whole problematic.”\(^ {21}\) The *parergon* names the suspension of these oppositions, delimitations, and values.

Well and good, but the question is not merely abstract. In what sense does a statue’s drapery “not belong” to it? Kant asserts, as by fiat, the logical priority of the body as the object of aesthetic judgment. This transcendental gesture is definitive of critical philosophy, but it willfully disregards the actual phenomenology of statues. It is not a trifling matter that, if we remove the drapery from a statue of Aristogeiton, we will not find an arm underneath it (fig. 38). Awareness of this fact is of the essential to the viewing of statues (to seeing them as statues). Taking the antithesis of nude and clothed as between depth and surface, essence and supplement, tends to occlude the importance of what might be called *hypodermal structures* in Greek sculpture: the all-important evocation of something—bones, muscles, sinews—beneath the surface of stone or bronze. The nude body, supremely the nude masculine body, is itself a field for the play of surface and depth. Skin functions as a second drapery, drapery as a second skin. But while humans can shed their clothes, they cannot shed their skin. In such cases the opposition of *ergon* and *parergon* becomes difficult to sustain (this is Derrida’s point), even as the statue solicits the idea of something *innerlich* (this is Kant’s). The implication of surface and depth, epidermal and hypodermal, drapery and body, tends to get lost when the nude masculine body functions as a logical placeholder for the idea of profundity itself.
In “Die Götter Griechenlands,” Schiller takes a related but contrary view. Here the Classical is a dreamtime,

When poetry’s magic cloak
Still with delight enfolded truth,

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Everything to the initiate’s eye
Showed the trace of a God. 22

For Schiller, drapery is again a veil of sorts. So far from being supplemental to aesthetics, however, it figures poetry itself. More generally, drapery figures figures and signs, the Spuren or “traces” of the divine that show forth to the initiate’s eye. Figural or poetic language is a cloak, and the Classical functions as an imaginary moment at which that cloak hugged the contours of that which it hid so closely, with such “delight,” that everything was revealed for those with eyes to see. Between the cloak and the truth, the trace and the God, there is a perfect or “magical” equivalence. Drapery in this poem is a way to figure a hylomorphic language—a language that the Greeks possessed, unavailable to modernity if not unthinkable in it (if only by means of figural substitution). Schiller thus idealizes bodily form just as much as Kant does. He constitutes the body-as-form (or Form) as an underlying reality to be seen through veils.

The difference between Kant and Schiller, in this regard, consists in the value that each assigns to drapery. For the one it is a supplement to essence, hence decorative; for the other it is a magical sign of essence, hence a version of realism. 23 Much writing on Greek sculpture consists of a negotiation between these two positions. But neither Schiller nor Kant is really adequate to the sculptures themselves, since neither attends properly to Rilke’s crucial observation: the sculpted surface is “absolutely nothing but surface.” The challenge for criticism is to find an alternative vocabulary while yet respecting the legacy.

Taken together, these various Romanticisms articulate what Stanley Cavell has called “the myth of the body as a veil,” the conviction that there exists in each of us a private inner world that the body hides or, at best, signifies. 24 Against this metaphysics of reference, Cavell sets Wittgenstein’s insistence that “The human body is the best picture of the human soul.” We will return to this thought. Sculpture has been a way to think this question of “the metaphysical hiddenness of the other”; it may yet be. 25

**Archaic Drapery**

We can begin by running through some of the representations of drapery in Archaic literature and then turn to some Archaic statues. As we shall see, the setting in play of surface and depth, seen and unseen, is a prime function of the various cloaks and tunics that adorn the bodies of sculpted men and women in Greece. 26

The *Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite*, recall, sets drapery in the category of wonder:

Now when Anchises saw her, he marked her well and wondered at her appearance and height and shining garments [heimata sigaloenta]. For she was clad in a robe out-shining the brightness of fire, splendid, golden, all-adorned, which shimmered [elampeto] like the moon over her breasts soft to the touch [stēthesin amph’ hapaloisin], a wonder to see for itself and oneself. 27


Plate 7 * Right, charioteer (?) from Motya (Mozia). Marble. 460–440 BCE. Mozia, Whittaker Museum. Photo: Scala/Ministero per i Beni e le Attività Culturali/Art Resource, NY.

Plate 10 • Attic grave relief from Salamis ("the Cat stele," "the Salamis stele"): youth releasing a dove, with boy and house cat. Marble. Circa 420–410 BCE. Athens, National Archaeological Museum inv. 715. Photo: author.
The radiance and surface richness of Aphrodite’s drapery is integral to its effect and fully in keeping with other wonders in Greek literature and art: “shining garments” are wonderful when “all-Adorned,” *pampoikilos*. This last term comes from the root *poikilia*, “Adornment,” or, more generally, “shimmering sheen and shifting movement.”6 It denotes visual complexity of any sort, as of dappled things like fawns and snakes, changeable things like chameleons and cuttlefish, or ambiguous things like gestalt-shifts or optical illusions. Plato’s gloss is clearest: the *poikilos* is “that which is never the same as itself,” *oudepote tauton.*7 Most especially, as I have argued at length elsewhere, *poikilia* names the complexity of pictorial depiction itself, the uncanny way in which images are *twofold*: in the perception of, say, a painted lion, one sees both the image and its material support, both the lion and the mere facture of the painting.8 *Poikilia* is the Greek word for this doubleness in seeing. It is commonly used of drapery in the Archaic and Classical periods. Some contexts are prosaic, as when the building accounts of Pheidias’s Athena Promakhos on the Akropolis mention that silver has been allocated for *poikilia*, that is, inlaid patternwork on the drapery.9 Others are poetic, as when Sappho calls Aphrodite *poikilothronos*, “of the elaborate robe.”10 Drapery is a shifting, variegated, complex sort of thing.

The *Hymn* suggests an internal relation between radiance, *poikilia*, and wonder. The complexity of Aphrodite’s robe is of a piece with its brilliance: it is part of what makes the garment a wonder to behold for itself and oneself. More precisely, the description proceeds from the robe’s dazzling brightness, via its adornment, to an effect of shimmering translucence and overlay: from the light that shines out from the robe, to the robe itself, to the “tender breasts” that lie beneath it, at once visible and invisible through a garment as (in)substantial as moonlight. The garment covers the breasts even as it reveals them to be *hapaloisin*, “soft to the touch,” so the eye touches the body as it were from afar, touches that which is underneath the cloth, hence does not touch it at all. This highly eroticized play of hiding and revealing, looking and touching, is appropriate to Aphrodite at her most seductive. But it is also consistent with the broader thematics of wonder in Greek literature. The peplos is a wonder to behold for itself and oneself precisely because it is radiant and revealing at the same time. It strikes the eye with external brilliance even it suggests depth; suggests touch even as it remains untouched; shows even as it conceals. Drapery, in this poem, is a radiant hinge between the divine body and the beholding eye. In Greek, *poikilia* names this quality, as *thauma* names its distinctive mode of disclosure.

Aphrodite’s drapery is a *thauma idesthai* as well at *Odyssey* 8.366, as is Aretē’s purple yarn at 6.305 and the “sea-purple webs” of the Naiads at 13.108.11 Other passages are less explicit but no less important. Immediately following the description of Odysseus’s wonderful brooch, a *thauma idesthai* with its golden hound and fawn (see p. 59), the poet mentions the hero’s “shining tunic,” *chitona sigaloenta*.

It was like the dried-out skin of an onion,
sore sheer it was and soft, and shining bright as the sun shines.
Many of the women were gazing at it for themselves with a sense of wonder [*etheesanto*].12

The same verb, *theaomai*, appears at *Odyssey* 8.264, when Odysseus beholds young boys dancing on the island of Phaiakia: “Then Odysseus looked with a sense of wonder [*thēeitō*] at their bright-beaming [marmaraugas] feet, and felt wonder [*thaumaze*] in his breast.” *Thauma* and *theaomai* go together in response to a radiant and
complex display of skill, be it the weaving of threads or of dancing feet. In the case of the tunic, however, the poet specifies that it is the combination of onion-skin translucency and solar brilliance that produces the effect. Taken together, the robe and the brooch as, as Prier observes, sēmata to recognize, markers of, Odysseus’s identity. Wonders, that is, taken for signs.

But the closest parallel, in epic, to Aphrodite’s shimmering robe is the veil of Pandora in Hesiod’s Theogony: “And the goddess bright-eyed Athena girded and clothed her with a silvery garment, and down from her head she spread with her hands an elaborate veil [kaluptrēn daidaleēn], a wonder to see for itself and oneself.” The progression from silvery garment to elaborate veil encapsulates the play of surface and depth that characterizes Pandora herself. Pandora is a beautiful evil, kalon kakon, attractive while containing within herself a bitch’s brain, kuneos noos; she at once shines like metal and conceals herself behind elaboration, daidala. Her garments, alternately gleaming forth and covering up, exemplify this wonderful duplicity: exemplify, that is, a duplicity at once ethical (Pandora’s character as an antithesis of surface and depth) and phenomenological (the thauma as that which is constitutively in between, at once gleaming to the eye and grasped by it, at once visible and invisible). One might compare this radical distinction of surface and depth to Iliad 3.41–20, where Helen wraps herself in “a bright shining mantle,” heanōi argēti phaeinōi, and passes unseen by all the Trojans. Once again, there is between cloak and body a complete antithesis. Helen is unseen because she wears a bright mantle, as though conspicuous brilliance were the condition of invisibility. Robes hide even as they shine: they hide because they shine.

Drapery functions analogously in Archaic sculpture. One of the earliest large-scale dedications on the Athenian Akropolis is the Calf Bearer or Moskhophoros of Rhonbos. Erected circa 560, the statue is sometimes associated with the sculptor Phaidimos. It depicts a bearded man—presumably Rhonbos himself—in the distinctive half-step of the kouros, bearing a sacrificial calf on his shoulders (fig. 61). Such figures are not uncommon in Archaic art, although it is more usual for a ram to be the victim; they range in size from a colossal marble on the island of Thasos to small bronze figurines. The guiding conceit of the genre is that the statue narrates its own function: it depicts an offering even as it functions as one. The Rhonbos dedication takes this reciprocity of narrative and function as the starting point for an elegant figuration of the sacrificial economy itself. It does so through its striking juxtaposition of the faces of man and beast; an effect of rhetorical antithesis. The one smiles winningly, its eyes originally inlaid with some bright material like quartz; the other, dull-eyed, stares uncomprehendingly. This difference is between killer and victim—Rhnobos is carrying the calf to its death—and it reveals what is at stake in blood sacrifice: the superiority of men over beasts. Yet, as Vernant has argued, the ritual slaughter also establishes the superiority of gods over men: mortals kill animals to please the deathless. Thus the pairing of calf and man brings out their essential similarity even as it marks their difference. For all his optical glitter, Rhonbos is himself an offering no less than the calf he bears. The statue emblematizes this relation in the perfect X comprising the man’s crossed arms and the victim’s legs (a pose that, as is often remarked, would require a real calf’s legs to be pulled out of joint). The Moskhophoros is a diagram of the sacrificial economy: it links man and beast chiastically in difference.

This theme organizes the image down to small details. Sticking to drapery, Rhonbos wears a cloak over his shoulders and upper arms; its weighted corners fall to his
thighs, leaving his muscled torso and his lower body bare (fig. 62). Hardly a wrinkle or a fold disturbs the surface of the cloth. It overlays his body like a membrane, revealing its every contour (or, more precisely, making it all but impossible not to see the body even where it is “hidden” by cloth); between elbow and ribcage it stretches like the webbing of a duck’s foot or a bat’s wing. In its original state, this drapery will have been painted; as there is no evidence of garish patterns, color alone will have dramatized the contrast between the clothed and the nude. The upright rectangle of naked torso stands out, even today, between the relatively smooth surfaces of clinging drapery to either side; how much more striking the effect must have been when the white marble flesh was offset by reds and blues. Drapery is a means of exhibiting and hiding, or, more precisely, exhibiting by hiding.

There is something a bit teasing about such a display. As Roland Barthes put it, in a different context:

Is not the most erotic portion of a body where the garment gapes? ... [I]t is intermittence, as psychoanalysis has so rightly stated, which is erotic: the intermit-
tence of skin flashing between two articles of clothing (trousers and sweater), be-
tween two edges (the open-necked shirt, the glove and the sleeve); it is this flash
itself which seduces, or rather: the staging of an appearance-as-disappearance.42

This view has good Greek precedents. Sappho, for instance, notices the special at-
traction of a glimpsed ankle:

What country girl seduces your wits, wearing a country dress, not knowing how
to pull the cloth to her ankles?43

Aristophanes echoes this sentiment, in his own way, in Frogs:

chorus: For I just now caught a sidelong glance of a very cute girl, a partner in
our dance, and through a rip in her chiton I saw a titty peeping out.44

So does Plato, in Charmides:

He gave me such a look with his eyes as passes description, . . . and when all the
people in the wrestling-school surged round about us on every side—then, ah
then, my noble friend, I saw inside his cloak and caught fire, and could possess
myself no longer.45

By drawing the eye to the nude torso—by staging its nudity as exposure—and by
pointing as with two arrows in the direction of the genitals (now lost), the Calf Bear-
er’s drapery works to just this effect. It works to mobilize the beholder’s pothos or
“desire” and hence, as argued in chapter 1, to recruit the beholder to the task of “pre-
sentification.” The statue is an agalma, a “delight” for the goddess and the audience
alike. More broadly, the use of drapery to stage “an appearance-as-disappearance”
reiterates the chiastic structure of the monument as a whole. Surface and depth,
clothed and nude, hidden and revealed, all harmonize with the main theme of a sac-
rificial economy placing men halfway between the beasts and the gods. These varied
chiasms relate structurally to one another. As an emblem of the reciprocity linking
gods, men, and beasts, the Calf Bearer trades on the economy of the statue itself.

It is useful to compare a roughly contemporary female figure, the so-called
Pomegranate kore from the Akropolis (plate 2, fig. 63).46 Here again, the subject is
an offering bearer, and the drapery falls like a plumb line from the shoulder to frame
the middle torso.47 The change in gender, however, necessitates that the figure be
fully clothed, and a contrast between nude and draped is therefore not an option. As
if in compensation, the sculptor layers the drapery, piling vertical plane on vertical
plane by means of a long sash and a curtainlike mass of cloth that falls from the left
forearm; even the subtle zigzag folds at the lower hem work to this effect, using line
to give the drapery a sense of three dimensions. By this means the kore achieves
plastically what the Calf Bearer did through color and texture. In each case, drapery
flanks a central oblong of revealed torso. With the kore, however, this contrast is
spatial: the layered folds draw the eye inward, into depth. Color and pattern ac-
ccentuated this effect but did not determine it exclusively. The drapery bore rich pat-
ternwork: the outer garment carried different designs from the inner, dramatizing
the contrast between the two; broad meander patterns along the various hems will
have emphasized each overlapping plane.48
Over the shoulders and arms the cloak lies closely, unwrinkled yet tight; as on the Calf Bearer, a projecting elbow results in taut yet strangelly elastic cloth. The crinkly linen that sheathes the left forearm at once reiterates the principle of layering on offer in the torso and makes a counterpoint to the smoothness of the cloak. The latter reveals nothing at all of the lower body, but every contour of the upper, specifically the rippling muscles of the arms and the unnaturally high breasts.

These feature have been called masculine—more precisely, non-feminine—in that women's bodies do not easily develop in this way. Greek sculptors, the argument goes, erase the specificity of the feminine in a manner redolent of misogyny. This account is compelling in some instances, as when coroplasts at Paestum modified Metapontine molds for kouroi in order to produce nude female goddesses. In general, however, it gives perhaps too much emphasis to the mimetic. Lack of fit between sculpture and the world is not necessarily pernicious or even a mistake, but it can be revealing of priorities. In this instance the inaccuracy results in a more active surface, more suggestive of a body underneath the visible drapery. Far from assimilating women to men, in other words, the sculptor may be employing a technique without regard to the gender of the person depicted. Rippling muscles are a good way to suggest something underneath skin or underneath cloth, no matter whose body is at issue. The high breasts are neither masculine nor feminine (they are anatomically incorrect either way) but they are richly evocative of some projecting structure hidden by cloth.

The sculptors of Samian korai achieve a similar effect by partially wrapping the right hand in the mantle, such that the knuckles are hidden and the hem runs between thumb and forefinger; this small but significant detail makes revelation and occlusion a point of visual interest (fig. 17). Regarding gendered physiques in particular, one might compare the roughly contemporary figure from the Geneleos dedication at Samos: the sculptor emphasizes a luxuriant plumpness, to the point that the male figure seems almost to have breasts (fig. 64). Neither mimetic accuracy nor appropriately feminine anatomy is at issue in this art. Rather, the sculptor's priority lies in the emphatic evocation of the invisible.

Returning to the Pomegranate kore, the evocative upper body has its inevitable antithesis in the unmodulated skirts. Linking the two halves are the straight folds that depend from the horizontal left forearm. In their lower reaches they obscure even the light modeling of the left knee; where they enfold the arm they function as "modeling lines," emphasizing volume; at the upper reaches of the body, they lead into the crimped hair, three locks to a side, which will originally have framed an unveiled face. Thus from hem to head there is a progression from hidden to revealed, veiled to visible, in which drapery itself provides most of the incident. The point being that ambitious Greek sculpture works to stage a familiar dialectic: it both hides and reveals. This overarching, eminently rhetorical structure—khiasmos, a trope—is the system in which the articulation of gender occurs.
Gender is, nonetheless, crucial to the kore’s argument. It is no coincidence that the figure holds two offerings: a seed pod, probably a pomegranate, and a large ring, usually interpreted as a wreath. Such wreaths may have had a sacral function, but in sculpture their symbolism was overt: a slightly earlier kore from Gela in Sicily, wearing a similar costume, holds one directly over her pelvis to suggest the vaginal opening. A symbolic orifice and a fecund container, the kore’s attributes suggest a hidden yet accessible interior. This gendered, not to say eroticized, interiority is the kore-type’s own special version of invisibility. The seeds of immortality rattling hidden in a pod, the living body hidden under cloth, the ephemeral ritual of votive dedication made eternally present in the statue: such are the absent referents of attribute, drapery, and pose. The idea of statue-as-container was not exclusive to women, but it was, for Greeks, a nearly irresistible way to think the feminine.

A dramatic instance of this conceit is the so-called Peplos kore from the Athenian Akropolis (figs. 65, 66). Vinzenz Brinkmann’s study of the figure’s original polychrome decoration has established that, the nickname notwithstanding, she does not wear a peplos. The garment is instead a long robe with a cape. Belted at the waist, it parts over the navel to reveal an ependytes, or outer tunic. This tunic is embroidered with sundry beasts and cavalrymen; it is worn over a fine linen chiton, the hem of which is visible by the ankles. As Brinkmann observes, the ependytes is an Eastern garment signifying divine power, worn by Artemis of Ephesos, Hera of Samos, Artemis Orthia of Sparta, and Aphrodite of Aphrodisias. Its identification on the Peplos kore suggests very strongly that she represents a goddess. Logical choices are either Athena or Artemis, since both had cults on the Akropolis. The absence of a helmet or aegis ought to rule out Athena. Ridgway notes that a drill hole in the kore’s right hand indicates that she held a long, cylindrical object. She adduces as a point of comparison the seventh-century dedication of Nikandre from the Delian Artemision: the figure has a similar drill hole in her hand and almost certainly represented Artemis holding a bow and arrow. The Peplos kore may likewise have held an arrow in her right hand and a bow in her left: she would therefore represent Artemis.

On the Akropolis, Artemis received worship in the Brauroneion, a counterpart
to a much larger shrine on the North coast of Attica. The Arkeia festival of Artemis Brauroneia was an important rite of passage for the young girls of Attica; it was probably celebrated not just at Brauron itself but on the Akropolis as well. Important to the ritual was the donning and/or shedding of a saffron robe, known as the krokotos. The nature of that robe is unclear, but it is at least intriguing that the Peplos kore does in fact wear a garment unparalleled in Greek sculpture: neither a true peplos nor a chiton, it is something unique and therefore special. It may also be significant that the upper part of the garment was painted yellow, the color of saffron. It is intriguing, in this light, to return to Brunilde Ridgway’s suggestion that the Peplos kore might be the representation of a cult statue, “a statue of a statue.” Ridgway based her argument on elements of costume and iconography, which the new
findings only amplify. Combining these various speculations leads to the hypothesis
that the Peplos kore might be an Athenian version of the cult statue of Artemis at
Brauron, clad in the distinctive saffron robe of Brauronian ritual.

Whatever the exact identification, however, the statue uses drapery as a meta-
phor in a familiar manner. Her outermost garment parts at the navel, opening like
a pair of drapes to reveal a teeming mass of creatures. Two pendant ends of her
belt frame the pelvic region. The affinity with later fertility figures from Asia Minor,
such as the Artemis of Ephesos or the Aphrodite of Aphrodisias, is telling. Where
the later cult figures have birds, beasts, and insects crawling over their lower bodies,
here the parted folds of cloth reveal hidden depths, full of life. As with the Pome-
granate kore, layers of drapery suggest an interior, and that interior is figured as a
place at once hidden and fertile. In each case, the suggestion that fabric hides some-
thing, hence that the sculpted body is a container, is a way to yoke together concepts
of femininity and fecundity.

The widely exported terracottas of the Aphrodite group literalize this figure. Pro-
duced in Miletos from ca. 575 until the collapse of the Ionian Revolt in 494, they
consist of hollow mold-made korai, either figurines or, more commonly, scent
bottles (fig. 67). Not all plastic vases are feminine, but the korai are by far the most
common and popular type of the sixth century. Here the female body becomes a
vessel in the most literal way possible.

Later korai elaborate this metaphor. The standard garment changes from peplos
to chiton after the Persian conquest of Ionia in the 540s, but stylistic development
follows a familiar pattern of ratcheting up the contrasts, as between drapery that
suggests an underlying body, and drapery that seems to mask it beneath rich surface
pattern. Particularly extravagant in this regard is Akropolis 594, dating to the last
quarter of the sixth century (fig. 68). As with the Pomegranate kore, layered gar-
ments here lead the eye inward to the pelvis. In this case, the preserved paint shows
how color could work to the same effect, as the bold pattern of labyrinthine meanders
and squares accentuates the crotch and deepens the shadows over it. Movement
into depth suggests a body beneath the clothes and, at the same time, sexes the figure.
The hidden interior is feminine. This suggestion occurs as part of a larger counter-
point of drapery that alternately hides and reveals. Cloth is pulled tight over the legs
to reveal every bump and contour; the kneecap and the tibia are almost irresistibly
present. Over the upper body there is a rich confection of patterned folds that barely
hangs together as the mimēsis of real cloth. As patternwork it is bewildering at first
yet obeys a contrapuntal logic of its own. The heavy locks of hair, for instance, splay
downward and outward; in response, crinkles, and fold lines radiate outward and
upward over either shoulder to produce a visual syncopation. Just so, the nested,
U-shaped folds that drip from the right arm respond to the upward tug of the miss-
ing left arm, and resulting radiate folds over the thighs. To the heavy mass of drapery
at right there would have corresponded a sliver of open space between left arm and
body; to the pull of gravity, the maiden’s delicate upward tug. And so on.

A late Archaic kore from Eleusis takes a different approach to the same end
(fig. 69). Emphasis here is on the vertical cascade of the mantel, its doughy texture
and clean lines finding counterpoint in the busy crinkles of the linen chiton under-
neath. Attention focuses on the narrow aperture running down the middle of the
torso: a place “where the garment gapes.” The zigzag folds to either side rhyme with
the crimped hair even as they part to reveal, or suggest, an interior. As much as it
is decorative pattern, this drapery functions as a vaginal metaphor—appropriately

67 * Oil flask in form of a fe-
male with bird, from Thebes.
Terracotta. Late sixth century
B.C.E. Athens, National
Archaeological Museum inv.
5699. Photo: Alison Frantz
Photographic Collection,
American School of Classical
Studies at Athens.
enough given the centrality of Demeter and Persephone, fertility goddesses both, in the Eleusinian cult.

Discussions of kore drapery have, until recently, tended to the iconographic, with emphasis on the identification of particular garments and the decipherment of a “language of dress.” But it is possible to build on this foundation. Andrew Stewart, for instance, sees the femininity of drapery as constraining. In Greek sculpture, he argues, “a woman’s body must be contained by clothes, constricted by a girdle, capped by a veil, controlled by a man—and it’s still dangerous even then.” The logic of surface-effect suggests a small but significant modification to this formulation. Of course what Stewart says is true. But one can also say that, in sculpture, nothing is ever contained or constricted or capped, still less controlled, by its clothes. Understood as surface, drapery does not contain the body, it constitutes it as that which is veiled or girdled or clothed. Clothes make the woman, not the other way around. It is exactly the acknowledgment of this profound superficiality that distinguishes the perception of a sculpted figure from that of a real living person. To see a statue as such—as opposed to mistaking it for a mere stone or a fellow person—is to
maintain superficiality in perception while yet seeing depth. Even to say, *you know you are seeing a statue*, is not quite right. Knowing, as distinct from seeing, has nothing to do with it. You are seeing a statue, plain and simple. For to see a statue *just is* to remain on the surface while yet seeing depth.

It follows that the constricting drapery of feminine statuary does not regulate an extant gender so much as it constitutes an absence, a negativity, or void: that-which-is-not-seen. To this negativity, a gender may be assigned if need be (usually but not exclusively feminine). It is just this dynamic that Barthes seems to have had in mind in speaking of “the staging of an appearance-as-disappearance.” It is crucial that the effect should be *staged*. At issue, in short, is not really the gendering of a body but the gendering of a particular mode of seeing: the gendering of the invisible as absence.

**Classical Drapery**

Fifth-century sculptors develop a broad array of techniques for suggesting bodies under drapery, and modern scholarship has responded with an equally impressive vocabulary. Ridgway, for instance, distinguishes between catenaries, eye folds, modeling lines, motion lines, omega folds, press folds, railroad tracks, ribbon drapery, sanguisuga folds, scratched drapery, selvages, swallow-tail motifs, tension folds, transparent drapery, and triangular aprons.

This lexicon distills generations of empirical research into a wonderfully supple resource for the formalist history of Greek statuary. But such proliferation of terms, each with its own precise definition, is both a liability and a strength. Useful as it is, the exercise of classification tends to distract attention from the more basic question of *why* the Greek should have developed such a rich repertoire of folds. It is here that Archaic precedent becomes relevant. For one of the chief features of Classical drapery, in all its diversity, is an emphatic assertion of surface-effect. Classical drapery insists that *there is something beneath the carved surface*.

One can only imagine the effect of colossal chryselephantine statues like Pheidias’s Athena Parthenos or Polykleitos’s Hera of Argos. The golden drapery of such works will have shimmered and revealed like the peplos of Aphrodite; or, more prosaically, they will have combined brightness and depth more forcefully, more emphatically, than anything known previously. Drapery was explicitly at issue in the case of the Parthenos: not only did the frieze running round the building narrate the presentation of a new peplos to Athena Polias, but the statue’s base depicted the adornment of Pandora—the moment she receives her “silvery garment.”

The statues themselves are lost, but a short poem by Parmenion entitled “On the Statue of Hera,” gives a sense of what was on offer.

The Argive Polykleitos, who alone with his eyes saw Hera, and fashioning what he saw, revealed her beauty to mortals so far as was lawful; but beneath her folds [*hupo kolpois*] we, the unknown forms [*agnōstoi morphai*], are reserved for Zeus.

Parmenion addresses explicitly the mysterious sense of a body underneath sculpted folds. These forms remain unknown and absent, reserved for the husband, even as they speak to the reader in the voice of the poem. Constitutively absent, their speech is heard only through the material inscription of the poet’s lines, such that words on the page function as so many *kolpoi* or folds to be read as limning an unknown.
Such effects are the stock-in-trade of Classical sculpture. At an extreme of complex drapery we may set the so-called Ludovisi throne, discovered in the Gardens of Sallust at the end of the nineteenth century and now in the Palazzo Altemps in Rome (plates 3–5). It is not a throne at all, but an architectural relief; still, the name has stuck. Made of Thasian marble and dating circa 470–460 BCE, the work is generally believed to have come originally from Epizephyrian Locri, a Greek city near the toe of Italy. It is very close stylistically to a series of early Classical terracotta plaques from the sanctuaries of Aphrodite and Persephone in the town—the so-called Locrian pinakes. More compellingly still, its dimensions conform exactly to those of a pit—a bothros or adyton, or perhaps a lustral basin—in the cella of Aphrodite’s temple at Lokri (fig. 70). It has been argued plausibly that the “throne” was a balustrade of sorts around this pit. Cuttings for brackets at the lower corners of the main panel suggest a framing device of metal.

The central panel of the Ludovisi throne depicts Aphrodite emerging from the sea, into the waiting arms of the Hōrai or Seasons, who rush to cover her with a woolen cloak. This event is the subject of the sixth Homeric Hymn, which specifies that, when the Hōrai had dressed the newborn Aphrodite in her “immortal himation,” the assembled gods “wondered at the outward aspect of violet-crowned Kytherea,” eidos thaumazontes. The story is that of a thauma in the making. Visually, however, the composition derives from anodoi, scenes of Gē, the earth mother, emerging from underground. Situated above the bothros, this iconography assimilates Aphrodite’s marine birth to chthonic cult. According to the narrative, the goddess rises from the sea; visually, she arises from the earth. The short side at left depicts a naked flute girl, that is, a prostitute. She is the first nude female in monumental Greek sculpture:
such figures are unknown outside the often obscene genre of symposium ware. Flute girls, albeit fully clad, are shown worshipping Aphrodite on Locrian pinakes, and it has been plausibly suggested that this woman is in fact a temple prostitute. Temple prostitution is documented at Aphrodite’s sanctuary in Locri, and indeed a large stoa surrounding the temple, punctuated with numerous small cells, may have been dedicated to this function. The opposite end of the throne depicts a veiled matron sprinkling grains of incense into a thymaterion. Some commentators have seen in this juxtaposition allusions to the double nature of Aphrodite, carnal and celestial, pandēmos and ourania. But, as Margherita Guarducci observes, it may equally allude to a double festival of Aphrodite of a sort attested at Corinth, which temple prostitutes and free matrons each carried out concurrently.

Such possibilities are enticing, but in the absence of direct evidence they must remain speculative. What is clear, however, is that drapery is a major source of visual interest on the throne. This prominence is not surprising: the Locrian pinakes attest to the importance to textiles in local cult, often depicting the storage and use of ritual fabric (illustrated here is a pinax of type 5/2; fig. 71). Jon Scheid and Jesper Svenbro have discussed at length the special associations of Aphrodite with robes and garments: as the goddess of sexual intercourse, she is also the goddess of the matrimonial blanket, and this blanket does double-duty as a robe. On the throne, however, it organizes the entire ensemble: the three panels make a simple triad of total nudity at one end, heavy veiling at the other, and semitransparency in the middle. A similar structure pertains to the individual panels. In the main scene, for instance, the sculptor is careful to show each of the two main styles of Greek dress: the Hōra on the left wears a heavy Dorian peplos, while that on the right wears a fine Ionian chiton. The goddess herself combines the two textures, a chiton clinging to her upper body, a woolen “receiving blanket” masking her lower (fig. 72). Aphrodite is, in this sense, the synthesis of all the other figures on the throne. The pairing of linen and wool means that, as the eye moves upward, it proceeds from broad, U-shaped catenary folds, barely suggestive of a body underneath, to the goddess’s torso, its every swell and pucker dramatized by waving vertical striations, to her upturned face. The sculptor carefully minimizes the potentially distracting expanse of exposed flesh at the neck by framing it with striated locks of wavy hair; a few loose strands fall over the right shoulder to merge, imperceptibly, with the rivulet folds of the chiton. Aphrodite becomes progressively more visible from bottom to top: she seems to rise swiftly from the sea even as the lines of hair and drapery stream off her like water from a rock. The metaphorical function of drapery could hardly be more explicit. In this narrative of epiphany, the goddess literally becomes visible before our eyes while yet remaining veiled. The close set, watery folds of her garment are simultaneously revealing and concealing: they (seem to) make visible every contour because they (seem to) cover the body so closely. The result is a sculpted equivalent to the poet’s shimmering, all-adorned peplos: a wonder to behold for itself and oneself, masking the body even as it reveals it. Drapery is the medium of epiphany.
Aphrodite appears as from nowhere, or from below: she is only partly present, her lower body cropped by the edge of the throne, that is, by the rim of the pit or *bothros*. Suddenness of appearance is a familiar aspect of a *thauma idesthai*; there is in this sense an affinity between the throne and the Tyrannicides monument. But where the statues used pose to achieve the desired effect, here it is drapery that does the work. The sculptor shows evident concern to show cloth lightly veiling the underlying body: to suggest that which is hidden, in a highly eroticized (and, in this context, highly sacralized) play of surface and depth. To that end, he sacrifices realism with a readiness that some modern commentators have found disturbing. Thus the skirts of each *Hōra* fall, impossibly, over the calf of the far, or free, leg. The effect is most dramatic in the case of the “Ionian,” at right: her drapery should hide entirely her flexed right leg, but instead the cascade of linen breaks cleanly along the calf, creating a rich, volumetric effect despite the incoherence of the pose. The same is true of the left, or “Dorian,” *Hōra*; here the far leg actually crosses the near one, such that the left toe overlaps the right heel. The reward for this contrivance is the field of broken lines marking the left calf: instead of a relatively dull curtain of vertical fold lines, we have a delicate suggestion of leg under wool. Even subtler is the way the “sleeve” of each *Hōra* overlays Aphrodite’s upper arm, veiling it while expressing its volume through use of line. It is as though the sculptor wished to hide the goddess’s flesh wherever possible: not in the interests of modesty, but so that her splendid body should be seen everywhere as through a veil. The chiton reveals and hides at once, it “shimmers over her breasts” just as it does in the goddess’s hymn. The sculptor uses *poikilia* to induce wonder and to narrate epiphany.

Where the birth scene trades on the simultaneous visibility and invisibility of the body under drapery, the short sides provide the counterpoints of total nudity and total veiling. The flute girl is something of a shock, if only for her nudity (plate 4). She is the very figure of erotic availability: none of Barthes’ teasing *jouissance* here, but instead a quasi-pornographic allure, redeemed chiefly by the holiness of her act. The prostitute is making a sacrifice of her own body, giving it up for the goddess of sex, here on a parapet of sorts around the sacrificial *bothros*. By comparison with the rich patterning of the other figures, her body almost uninflected across its surface: for all the nudity, there is little to delight the eye. The matron at the opposite end uses different means to a similar end (plate 5). Totally veiled, her modesty is a marked contrast to the piper’s wanton self-exposure. Her sacrificial act is accordingly demure: she offers not her body but the smoke of incense to the goddess. Carnal pleasure and burnt spices are virtual antitheses, standing to one another as raw to cooked, honey to ashes. Yet the matron’s drapery is as lively as the girl’s body is uninflected. Pulled taut over her shoulders, tucked tightly beneath her rump, stretched like a webbing between elbow and rib, it is everywhere elastic and revealing.

Taken as a whole, the throne is a systematic inflection of sculpted drapery, figuring the *thauma idesthai* that is Aphrodite’s epiphany in and through a play of shimmering cloth and revealed body. It frames this dramatic, dazzling apparition with two extremes of nude and veiled, carnal and ethereal, sex and smoke. She is the goddess of erotic mixing—the Derveni Papyrus makes “to Aphrodize,” *aphrodisiazein*, synonymous with “to mingle,” *misgein*—and her body is correspondingly duplex. Drapery, it seems, is “good to think with” when it comes to the representation of the deity.

That the throne itself seems to have served as the balustrade to an offering pit, or *bothros*, only accentuates the point. A stone frame to circumscribe a void, the throne
itself recapitulates the logic of the surface-effect. Just as carved drapery solicits the fantasy that there is something underneath the surface of the stone—the illusion that sculpture has depths, that there is something inside the marble—so the marble balustrade surrounds a literal absence, a hole. It the drapery of the bothros. This metaphor is gendered quite explicitly. The pit is an orifice in the earth: by the logic of the birth narrative, it is a vaginal opening into a chthonic womb that contains the deity. Drapery is, in short, the throne’s chief structuring element; it functions metaphorically to constitute the feminine as a fecund void behind a cloth of stone.

One might say that the Ludovisi throne exploits surface-effect in the interests of epiphany. On the one hand, it is integral to surface-effect that we should see the inner, the hidden as preceding the superficial, that we see a surface as manifesting depth rather than constituting it. On the other, it is equally integral that we should recognize surface as such. That, to repeat, is what separates seeing sculpted entities from seeing real ones, and seeing sculpted stones from seeing mere rocks. The throne thematizes surface in and as drapery. But it does so in order to suggest that it is exactly by getting past surface, by getting past drapery, that we might see the goddess. This is elementary eroticism in viewing, appropriate to the goddess of erotic relations. The narrative and desire exploit surface to suggest that the goddess, which is to say, a radiant embodiment of love, has come from nowhere to appear suddenly in vision as that which shows through a veil. The appropriate response to such a wonder would be mute stupefaction, or noisy expostulation, or just “Pheu!”

This basic stratagem characterizes many High Classical statues of Aphrodite. The so-called Hera Borghese is a good Roman copy of a Classical bronze of circa 420 BCE, as shown by a fragment of an ancient cast of the original in plaster from Baiae (fig. 73). Its modern name notwithstanding, the figure probably represents Aphrodite. She originally held a cornucopia in the crook of her left arm, making her fertility conspicuous. But the statue overall displays a progression from veiling to revelation identical, in its outlines, to that of the Ludovisi throne. A heavy cloak disguises the lower body; massed folds over the pelvis draw attention to the genitals; linen covers the upper torso like a second skin, with the collar sliding suggestively over the breast, its arabesque hem describing the volumes “underneath.” A wide array of High Classical Aphrodites—from a colossal statue of circa 425–400 now in the Getty Museum (but soon to be returned to Italy), to a figure from the Athenian Agora, to the Louvre-Naples (or Fréjus) type—ring the changes on this formula (fig. 74). For all the dazzling variety of their tactics—catenaries, modeling lines, omega folds, and so on—the guiding strategy is uniform: a Barthesian staging of appearance-as-disappearance. Such works are hyperbolic in their insistence upon the presence of
the invisible, such that the body seems almost to materialize from behind the cloth. The Getty Aphrodite, for instance, pairs fine, transparent drapery over the body with heavy motion lines streaming from the back, such that she seems virtually to be stepping through her clothes into full epiphanic presence. The Brazzà type, often thought to derive from an original by Pheidias, expressly thematizes hollowness and concealment by resting the goddess’s foot atop a tortoise: whatever cultic overtones (if any) the creature may have, its hard shell makes an obvious counterpoint to the filmy garment of the goddess (fig. 75). In either case, the result is less an aberration than the extreme logical extension of a practice going back to the early sixth century at least.

As the Homeric Hymn makes clear, the filmy drapery is a wonder, a thauma, charged with eroticism. The chain of associations is remarkably consistent: if something is wonderful, then, necessarily, it must also be radiant. In the Ion, Kreusa recalls to Apollo how he raped her as she was gathering saffron on the Akropolis slopes:

You came to me with your locks shining [marmairôn] with gold when I was plucking into the folds [es kolpous] of my dress, crocus flowers that countershone with golden light. 

Taken in context, the flower-filled folds of the maiden’s dress convey a erotic charge. In response to the shining gold of Apollo’s hair, the flowers “countershine with golden light,” literally “gold-counter-shine,” khrusantaugê, from within the overfold, the kolpos or “gulf,” of the peplos. Kreusa’s speech emphasizes the trauma of the encounter, but Euripides also suggests two mutually responsive flashes of brilliance. The movement from inside to out, here explicitly eroticized, is one of light and counterlight. When eroticized in this way, the folds of a maiden’s robe are radiant, that is, acquire an attribute of wonder.

The iconography of Aphrodite is one route to take from the Ludovisi throne. The medium of relief sculpture is another. Although it narrates a different story, a large slab from the sanctuary of Demeter at Eleusis employs a similar formal stratagem (fig. 76). Dating to circa 440 BCE, it is one of the largest of all Greek reliefs, and was sufficiently famous in Antiquity to attract the attention of Roman copyists. Its exact function remains unclear: it is exceptionally large for a votive, but a cultic function is difficult to envision. Like the Ludovisi throne, this Great Eleusinian Relief rings the changes on the theme of drapery. At center stands a boy, probably Ploutos, the personification of the earth’s wealth (fig. 77). He is in the moment of casting off his cloak, which frames his body like a curtain. Flanking Ploutos are Demeter and Persephone; like the Hôrai on the throne, they wear a Doric peplos and an Ionian chiton, respectively. Demeter carries a scepter and hands the boy an object, probably an ear of grain; now lost, it was originally added in metal. Persephone holds a torch, emblematic of the Eleusinian mysteries, and crowns Ploutos with a wreath, also originally in metal.
The composition effects a simple juxtaposition of draperies: cloth as that which covers, or suggests by covering, and cloth that reveals completely, that does not lie on top of flesh but behind it, as a backdrop or frame. Ploutos is not a major deity, not himself epiphanic in the manner of the Locrian Aphrodite. He is, rather, the agent of divine favor: we see him preparing to depart to bring the gifts of the goddess to his fellow men. As such it is he, and not the goddesses, who exposes himself to the eye. It is a strange apparition. By the logic of the narrative, Ploutos has not yet come to mankind. He remains secluded with the goddesses, like a mystes undergoing initiation, and has not yet sojourned to human society. We, however, see him all the same. We see that which is, by diegetic logic, hidden, invisible: a sneak preview of revelation. If, as is sometimes suggested, the relief stood in the Telesterion, the Hall of Mysteries at Eleusis, then this vision will have suggested solidarity between the depicted figure and the beholder who himself undergoes transformation. If it stood out in the open air, then the image hints dangerously—albeit un informatively—about the secrets of the mystery cult. Either way, the relief shows the invisible or unseen, and drapery is the instrument of that presentation.

This tendency in Greek sculpture culminates in the High Classical style of the later fifth century. Often understood as an aberration—a bump in the road from Archaic stiffness to the full-blown realism of Hellenistic statuary—the “wet” or “windblown” drapery of the Parthenon pediments fits uneasily into traditional categories.
of empirical observation or idealizing generality (fig. 78). It is for just this reason that the Elgin Marbles caused such controversy when they first arrived in England. The first certain exemplars of High Classicism, they did not conform to the early modern idea of the Classical. To some extent they still fail to do so. Yet they dominated Athenian sculpture in the second half of the fifth century, particularly the last three decades. Carpenter traces the “illusion of diaphanous texture” back to the incised fold lines on early figures like the Lyons kore on the Athenian Akropolis. In his account, the shift from incised lines to raised ridges is a rationalist advance: it permits sculptors “to distinguish adequately between the textural substance of the nude flesh and the cloth which was supposed to adhere to it.” The Greek need for clarity motivates the technical change. Judging by the results, however, rationalism seems a misplaced concept. Of the Parthenonian figures Carpenter writes, “If a uniform color was spread over all, such as a dyed costume might show, our desire to make sense of sensuous appearance will force us to see nude flesh behind a colored film of cloth, much as we peer beneath the surface of a pool of water to descry the deeper things therein.” It takes a strong a priori commitment to Greek rationalism to see the dazzling surface-effects of such figures as limpid springs. Parthenonian drapery is transparent and diaphanous and filmy, to be sure: but it is also ostentatious, eye-catching, and impossible to ignore. Black paint in the folds emphasized their patternwork over surface. Figures L and M from the east pediment take drapery as their chief source of visual interest: they are all about drapery, and the suggestion that the beholder simply brackets that surface “to descry the deeper things therein” is capricious. Just the reverse: the Parthenon pediments play upon the distinction between surface and depth with a greater intensity even than the Ludovisi throne.
They work hard to construct depth as that which is revealed by surface, that is, to stage the agnōstoi morphai, the “unknown forms,” that we never do descry. The windblown style is not, in this sense, an aberration. Rather, it represents the amplification of a longstanding practice of using drapery as a vehicle for metaphor.

“Ahead of Time They Dart Along”: Drapery in Motion

The thematic of drapery shares certain features with the onrushing thaumata of the previous chapter. Images of Nike, the personification of victory, are especially clear in this regard. Archaic versions adopt the traditional Knielauf or “kneeling-run” pose (fig. 26). Such figures display the same combination of direct address and oblique movement that occurs on the Corfu pediment (fig. 41). With time the legs straighten, but as a general rule Archaic Nikai do not look where they are going: they run to the side while turning their heads to face the beholder (fig. 79). The logic of such disjunction is familiar, but its effect is very different from that of, say, the Artemision Zeus. For just this reason, it is instructive to see what happens to Nike—and the related figure of Iris—in the fifth century. Both types share essentially the same iconography: they are winged females who bear tidings, usually of victory. Iris, the messenger of the gods, carries a herald’s staff, and Nike may hold a wreath or some other token of victory, but otherwise the difference is negligible. Indeed, absent such clarifying attributes, the goddesses are not merely interchangeable but indistinguishable; many a so-called Nike could in fact have been Iris.

The rendering of these messenger goddesses changes in the second quarter of the fifth century. The “Nikai” that serve as akroteria on Classical buildings no longer rush off to one side. Instead, they often seem to alight on the rooftop: the movement is forward and downward. What was exceptional in the sixth century becomes the norm in the fifth. An early example in the collection of the Capitoline Museum in Rome exemplifies the change (figs. 80–81). Dating to the 460s and made of Thasian marble, the figure almost certainly comes from Magna Grecia. The socket for the neck suggests that the head was thrust slightly forward and downward, as if the goddess were taking care where she stepped. Her body responds, tilting forward noticeably. Nike seems to be moving forward even as her feet have touched earth—like a parachutist, stumbling slightly as she alights. The roots of the wings are still apparent behind the shoulder and must originally have swept high above the head. Where the Capitoline figure differs, however, is in its frontality and its forward movement. Freestanding sculpture does not provide good precedents for these traits. One must turn to the minor arts. A late sixth-century bronze mirror handle, perhaps of Tarentine origin, strikes essentially the same pose (fig. 82). It is likely that the sculptor of the Capitoline Nike has simply monumentalized a south Italian type of mirror support, omitting the reflective disk but retaining the symmetrical, strutlike arrangement of the wings.

Unlike the bronze mirror handle, however, the Capitoline figure takes the inverted parabola of the wings as a leitmotif. Echoes of it run through the broken
The overfold of the peplos reiterates the motif as a long arc across the midsection, leading into the hands before breaking at the wrists; the forearms make a counterpoint. In this way, a single pattern can indicate the pull of gravity on cloth, the slight billow brought on by descent, and the sweep of the wings. The doughy folds at the armpits recall the catenaries over the chest; at the same time, with their vertical extension and their assertive volume, they impart weightiness. From the side, they make strong obliques, emphasizing forward movement. Responding to them is a series of shallower vertical folds over the torso. Some originate as high as the breasts, others as low as the belly. They resemble the flutes of a column—the Nike is architectural sculpture—and emphasize the figure’s downward thrust. The entire ensemble, in short, suggests strong but qualified descent. Nike lands, but she does so gently, resisting gravity even as she comes to earth.

The Capitoline Nike is, in this regard, closer to the Tyrannicides than to the Artemision Zeus or the Diskobolos. Instead of hurling something into the viewer’s space, she appears as it were from an unspecified “elsewhere.” Compared to the Tyrannicides group, however, she is relatively reserved. There is none of the bronze’s drama and violence, and there is no implication of speed. The debt to Archaic mir-
mirror handles thus entails a stylistic conservatism. Although unquestionably “Severe” in the rendering of drapery, in pose the Capitoline Nike remains Archaic. The point is revealing of the sculptor’s priorities. By abandoning the Knielauf for one derived from small bronzes, he sacrificed the suggestion of speed for that of frontality and forward movement. What mattered, in short, was that the figure should seem to move toward the beholder. Everything else—including speed and dynamism—fell by the wayside.

That the sacrifice was necessary in the first place is probably a result of the technical constraints of marble working. Although later sculptors would be more daring—largely spurred on by the need to emulate bronze—at this early date the medium precluded a more active pose. The Capitoline Nike is by no means timid—the slablike wings must have been spectacular in their original state—but it remains firmly within the norms of sixth-century sculptural thinking. Carried forward by the momentum of flight even as her feet make contact with the earth, poised between arrest and movement, she is cousin to the kouroi and korai of the sixth century. The cardinal difference with older figures like the Nike of Arkhermos lies in the direction of her movement. The Capitoline Nike comes toward the beholder unmistakably. The sculptor has subordinated everything to this new, almost theatrical mode of engagement. Classicism here takes the form of a new address to the beholder.

Archaic sculptors had emphasized the rapid movement of their winged messengers, and indeed speed is the distinguishing characteristic of Iris (but not Nike) in early poetry. Homer speaks of “windswift fleet Iris” (podēnemos nōkea Iris), “storm-swift Iris” (Iris aellopo), and “swift Iris” (Iri takheia). For Hesiod she is in fact the daughter of Wonder, Thaumas, and Brilliance, Elektra. Her sisters are the Harpies.

And Thaumas wedded Elektra the daughter of deep-flowing Ocean, and she bore him swift Iris and the long-haired Harpies, Aello (“Storm-swift”) and Okupetes (“Swift-flier”) who on their swift wings keep pace with the blasts of the winds and the birds; for ahead of Time they dart along [metakhroniai gar iallon].

The passage contains one remarkable and obscure Greek word: metakhronion. Translated here as “ahead of Time,” the term was confusing even in Antiquity. A compound of meta, “with, after,” and khronos, “time,” its literal meaning would be something like “happening afterwards.” In the present context, however, the meta.prefix suggests an overturning, upending, or reversal; applied to Time, it suggests goddesses who are forever outrunning themselves, so forever catching themselves up. The word, in short, is more than a little paradoxical, hence appropriate to characterize the offspring of Wonder and Brilliance.

Nike, by contrast, is for Greek poets a more august figure. In Hesiod she is daughter of Styx and Pallas, sister of Emulation. For Bacchylides, her descent from “right-judging” (orthodikos) Styx implies fairness as an arbiter: hence she stands beside Zeus and bestows victory. Both Bacchylides and Herodotos call her “Lady,” potnia, while for Euripides she is mega semnē, “greatly revered.” In short, the literary Nike is not a servant, nor even a messenger properly speaking, but a queenly judge. This aspect of the goddess is not what appears on temple rooftops,
alighting to bring news. The sculptors do not show a figure of majesty but a variant of the stormswift herald.

The tendency in fifth-century sculpture is to integrate the Capitoline Nike’s address to the beholder with the speed and energy of the old, Archaic figures: in effect, to make winged, female versions of the Tyrannicides. This general rule holds true both for Nikai that served as corner akroteria and for Nikai that served as apical akroteria. Function (hence viewpoint) was not the determining factor: Nikai on column dedications are little different from those serving as corner akroteria. If the Capitoline Nike follows the early Classical tendency toward engagement with the beholder, the challenge for later sculptors was to combine this new motif with the traditional speed of the messenger goddess. Drapery was a means to this end. A Nike from Paros, slightly later than the Capitoline figure, employs many of the same devices (fig. 83). Where the Parian figure differs most significantly, however, is in the treatment of the cloth over the legs. Instead of the vertical “flutes” of the Capitoline messenger, broken, winglike chevrons rise from ankle to mid-torso. Even in its present, ruined state, the figure seems to rise slightly, as though standing on tiptoe.

At the same time modeling suggests air pressing the cloth to the limbs. In this way, drapery, more than pose, suggests forward movement. Sculpted clothing thus does double duty: it suggests simultaneously an underlying body and a forward momentum. Two of the great concerns of the Classical style thus coincide.

All the same, the Parian Nike flutters instead of rushing. She moves toward the beholder but not in an especially forceful way. Representing the opposite tendency is the corner akroterion from a High Classical building now in the Athenian Agora (fig. 84). The figure is essentially an updated version of the Archaic type: the technical constraints on marble working were no different in 420 than at any other time. Hence the pose is not significantly different from the very first winged Nike, Arkhermos’s statue on Delos (fig. 26). Once again, the goddess races off to the side in a pinwheel, supported by a pillar of cloth that falls between her legs. The chief difference is that the Athenian artist uses wildly agitated drapery to suggest speed. Even by High Classical standards, this rendering is extravagant. With strong forward motion still a challenge for freestanding work in marble, the sculptor compensates by exaggerating the fluttering, streaming folds of the garment. Motion lines dominate, and hidden volumes are secondary to sheer energy. Light is more important than mass: the thinly cut marble beneath the arms would be translucent to one looking up from ground level in the Aegean sun. Here drapery does not evoke hidden depths but the brilliant speed of the daughter of Wonder. The result is the antithesis of the earlier Nike of Paros: significant dynamism moving perpendicular to the beholder. By contrast a central akroterion, possibly from the same building, adopts the Parian formula: forward movement combined with relatively tame drapery (fig. 85). In this case, the position on the building is obviously a factor in the choice of rendering, since central figures have a predetermined frontal viewpoint. In the Archaic period, however, apical akroteria were not necessarily frontal. Function does not wholly explain style.

It is not until the last quarter of the century that sculptors effectively combine the rapid motion of the Archaic type with the frontality of the Severe versions. The most spectacular example is a work roughly contemporary with the Ares temple: the Nike of Paionios at Olympia, dedicated in 421 by the Messenians and Naupaktians to
celebrate a victory over the Spartans (plate 6). The statue is an accelerated version of the Capitoline Nike, integrating Archaic speed with Classical frontality. This Nike swoops down onto a high, triangular pedestal, her cloak billowing behind her, artfully exposing one breast and one leg in the process. The garment itself is transparent, an extreme instance of the wet or windblown style. Ridgway’s characterization is telling: “the effect is achieved by making the drapery cling flat to the body in between folds, as for instance over the breasts, which are clearly modeled, as it were, behind the ridges.” This seems exactly right. The drapery does cling flat, but then again there is nothing for it to cling to; the breasts are indeed behind the cloth, but only “as it were.” Such qualifications register the near impossibility of naming sculpted drapery as such while yet acknowledging that it is, in Rilke’s phrase, “nothing but surface.” The resulting dissonances in perception are the stock-in-trade of this style. They are not unique to High Classical art, but High Classical art makes them an overriding source of visual interest.

To these revealing folds, Paionios juxtaposes streaming motion lines. If the cloth over the body appears gauzy-thin, the deep-cut folds that fly from her calf suggest a weightier material. The drapery is, impossibly, both heavy and light. The evident ambition is to combine the diaphanous effect with the kinesis appropriate to a golden-winged goddess; the result is unrealistic but effective all the same. Other sculptors employed the same strategy: the akroterion of the Athenian Hephaistion, for example, similarly combines diaphanous drapery with heavy, although in that instance the figure is an abductee. The rational and empirical approach to sculpture, so often invoked in modern accounts of Classicism, is not in evidence; and Nike’s garment is neither a parergon nor Schiller’s “magic cloak.” But this impossible figure is perfectly in accord with the duplex logic of Greek sculpture. Nike is bright and rushing, like the Tyrannicides, a great light coming into being. At the same time, she both shows and conceals the body beneath shimmering robes, like Aphrodite or Hera. The result is a programmatic thauma  

By Greek standards the Nike of Paionios is almost shockingly erotic, revealing far more skin than was acceptable in polite society. The effect will have been even more noticeable when the statue was painted, for the white flesh would have stood out against the colored drapery. Women were supposed to be modestly attired, even veiled, in public; more to the point, female nudity was virtually unknown in statuary. By flouting these conventions, Paionios appeals unambiguously to the desire, the pothos, of the beholder. Literature provides some precedents. Pindar (Nemean 5.42) figures athletic victory as “falling into the arms of Nike,” Nikas en ankónessi...
To win is to receive the embrace of the goddess. This assimilation of masculine victory to erotic conquest is, no doubt, one of the chief reasons for the success of the Nike type. Here, however, ideology coincides with the functioning of the image as such. As argued in chapter 1, pothos harnesses the beholder’s erotics to the task of presentification. The fantasy of erotic gratification encourages a phantasmatic suspension or bracketing of the knowledge that one is looking at a stone. Beholding and desiring coincide, such that to do one is to do the other, and to do both is to enter an ideological circle.

What matters for present purposes, however, is the mechanism by which this ideology operates, which is to say, the articulation of this eroticism within a system of drapery. The Nike stands out against a sheet, like Ploutos in the Great Eleusinian Relief; she combines exposed flesh with the flimsiest of garments, like the Aphrodite of the Ludovisi throne (figs. 76–77; plates 3–6). These two interactions of body and drapery are homologous: the play between exposed and covered reiterates that between the dramatically projective figure and her planometric cloth backdrop. Drapery is a foil to the body; the body appears against it, or through it, as a sudden epiphany. Paionios thus stages the body notionally behind cloth—what might be called “the body ‘as it were’”—as absences precisely in order to redeem them as glimpsed presence. Drapery is the medium of desire, hence of gratification.

It is also the medium of victory and of carving—of victory as carving. As Andrew Stewart has observed, the accompanying inscription states clearly that the Nike in question belongs as much to the sculptor as to the dedicants.

The Messenians and Naupaktians dedicated this to Olympian Zeus as a tithe from their enemies. Paionios of Mende made it and was victorious in making the akroteria for the temple.

The Nike is a technical tour de force: a single, massive block of stone has become weightless and hovers high overhead. Most spectacular in this regard is the great billowing cloak, a sheet of stone exceedingly difficult to carve. This technical virtuosity commands attention. As much as it elicits pothos, therefore, the drapery stages carving (glyptikē). It brings to mind Paionios’s physical labor: the act of extraction, chiseling, the removal of stone in order to make present the divine. Awareness of facture colors the sculpture, it colors what one sees—it makes the statue astonishing.

Integral to the overall effect is the Nike’s allusive property. On the basis of the hairstyle, Evelyn Harrison has shown that the figure’s head copied that of the Nike in the outstretched hand of the Athena Parthenos. In a monument erected at the height of the Peloponnesian War to celebrate one of the Athenian side’s greatest victories, the allusion is both deliberate and pointed. Such richness of connotation extends the old Archaic preference for “sameness” and gives it an overtly political content. As we have seen, following Rainer Mack, the replication effect in kouroi is a technology for the articulation of a Panhellenic elite. This class understood itself to transcend the local concerns of the polis, and articulated itself through practices of guest friendship, gift exchange, competition at games, extravagant dedication, intermarriage, and so on. Kouroi and korai were one element of this system. With the Nike of Paionios, however, the polis itself adopts this technique. The imagined community that the Nike invokes is not a class but a politico-military alliance: the Athenians and the Messenians, over against the Lakedaimonians and their allies. Allusion instantiates state policy, not class ideology. That policy was avowedly pragmatic and the alliances in question were always understood to be temporary. It is
perhaps for this reason that the invocation of timelessness, so integral to the kouroi, does not pertain. Permanence is not at issue; speed and force are everything.

A nearly perfect masterpiece in Greek terms, Paionios’s Nike is at once removed from the terrestrial realm and emerging into presence; highly eroticized yet unattainable; rushing forward yet coming to a stop; a tour de force and an item in an implicit series. Lesser-known works of the Classical period, like the Palatine Nike or a later Parian Nike, indicate the widespread appeal of such figures (fig. 86). They combine rushing speed, technical bravura, and bold eroticism into a confection fully comprehensible in traditional terms. In their own way, they are as wonderful and as brilliant as the “great light” that first flashed at the Athenians in the 470s.

Paionios erected another Nike at Olympia: an akroterion for the temple of Zeus, financed by the Athenians themselves to commemorate a victory over their Spartan enemies. This figure is lost, but presumably bore some resemblance to the preserved version. Yet the temple akroterion differed from the Messenian dedication in one important respect: it was girt. Such treatment was unusual but by no means unique: the akroteria of the temple of Athena Nike at Athens was similarly covered with gold. More importantly, the Parthenon itself contained the treasure of the Athenian state in the form of solid gold Nikai. Such works had an effect on literary representations of the goddess. In the Birds, for instance, Aristophanes says that Nike “flies on golden wings,” pterugoin khrusain; the phrase makes little sense without some implicit reference to sculpture, since gold is anything but featherweight. Gleaming while rushing, these golden Nikai will have combined speed and brilliance no less effectively than the Tyrannicides. They literalize, in beholding, the affinity of speed and brightness. If, as is very likely, their drapery resembled that of the Agora Nike or Paionios’s monument, then the assimilation of hidden depths to radiant wonders will have been complete.

Recapitulation

From the sixth through the fifth centuries, in a broad array of works, Greek sculptors employ sculpted cloth to metaphorical effect. They trade upon the irresistible impulse to see drapery as a veil or a cover in order to stage “appearance-as-disappearance.” Because it is the feminine body that is most often clothed, such stagings are conveniently assimilated to gendered notions of fecundity and void. The High Classical style of Pheidias and Paionios is the logical extension of this tradition, working carved cloth into extravagant confections of poikilia. In the case of Nikai, this thematic coincides with another important tendency in Classical sculpture, namely, the evocation of wonder, thauma, by means of dynamic poses and implicit narratives of sudden appearance. This interplay of surface and depth, veil and veiled, provides a template for understanding an even more fundamental relation: that of the surface of a human body to whatever it is that lies within. Such bodily contents are many and varied, ranging from bones and sinews to the very soul itself. When a statue is diaphanous, everything can become visible. Indeed, as we shall see, the diaphanous constitutes the interior as such.
To lose our fascinating and crippling expressiveness might be the precondition for our moving within nature, moving as appearances registering, and responding to the call of, other appearances. No longer darkened by the demand for love, we may be ready to receive something like the splendor, the “dazzling radiance,” that Homer’s “blazing eyed Athena” casts at the mortals she protects.

Leo Bersani & Ulysse Dutoit

The thought beneath so slight a film—
Is more distinctly seen—
Emily Dickinson
The Tunic of the Flesh

Empedokles of Akragas, a thinker active in the middle decades of the fifth century BCE, declared that the soul is clad “in the unfamiliar tunic of the flesh.” Just as clothing can be a second skin, so skin can be a second clothing. The conceit has sculptural analogues. On a metope from the temple of Zeus at Olympia, Herakles drags Cerberus from the Underworld (figs. 87, 88). The hero wears a tunic of fantastic transparency. Its ruffled edge simply fades into his hip; the torso is carved as if nude, with every detail of the navel rendered precisely. Only paint, and those all-important ruffles, will have made it apparent that Herakles was wearing anything at all. Cloth becomes carnal.

A more elaborate version of this conceit organizes one of the more spectacular Greek statues to emerge in recent years: the so-called Motya Charioteer, discovered in 1979 at a Punic site in western Sicily (plate 7, fig. 89). Clearly a work of Greek craft and datable to circa 460–440 BCE, the Charioteer is related stylistically to the metopes of Temple E at the nearby polis of Selinous on the island’s southwest coast. His most arresting feature is a long, sleeveless gown of crinkly linen, which seems to


clinging to his body. Wrapped tightly around his chest is a broad band of cloth. Standing almost jauntily with his left hip cocked and his left arm akimbo, the youth twists from right to left to stare over the viewer’s right shoulder. His right arm is almost entirely missing, but was held away from the body at an angle just above the horizontal.

Visual interest derives chiefly from surface-effect. The garment is fantastically snug; its close-set folds are even more revealing than those of the Aphrodite on the Ludovisi throne (plate 3). As with the Aphrodite, there is an explicit eroticism to the drapery: the vertical fold lines accentuate a bulge between the man’s thighs, with the odd result that the sex is more conspicuous than if the statue were nude. More generally, however, the garment’s main function is to suggest volume. Its vertical striations emphasize the body’s plastic shape and its superficial undulations, ridges, and depressions. The net effect is to make the Charioteer seem dramatically, carnally present; veiling is, disconcertingly, a form of exposure. One might contrast this effect to that of the later “wet” style in sculpture. With the Nike of Paionios, for instance, drapery seems to lie flat against the skin; paint, along with ridge folds widely spaced, does the work of suggesting cloth (plate 6). The drapery virtually disappears, and the effect of transparency depends upon a systematic contrast with naked flesh. With the Charioteer, on the other hand, the whole body is veiled in order that it may seem to strain at its confines. The tight band across the chest only emphasizes this sense of constraint. In the finer details, meanwhile, the sculptor emphasizes puckers and swellings. The fingers of the left hand press into the hip, with deep undercutting for emphasis; the gown overflows the chest strap; the flesh beneath the left armpit billows out (fig. 89). The result is a masculinized version of a familiar thematic. So far from enclosing a void, the Charioteer’s gown enfolds a body that is everywhere tumescent.

The depicted skin works to similar effect. Like the garment, it seems to fit closely over something underneath. Even the exposed flesh seems distended. Every muscle is apparent, and the veins pop off each shoulder. Such details may suggest that the Charioteer has just left off strenuous exercise—he is “pumped”—and thereby evokes a narrative moment that has just slipped into the past. But it is also an efficient way to evoke hypodermal features. The veins strain at the skin that sheathes them; which is to say, the veins are a way to make the stone surface seem superficial, a covering or outer layer, literally an epidermis. In a work that sets such store in the power of cloth simultaneously to reveal and conceal, it seems fair to say that this treatment assimilates skin to cloth. The flesh is not literally a tunic, but it works like a tunic. It is a close-fitting veil, a membrane, showing every contour of what it hides. Comparison with a late Archaic figure of the “draped kouros” type—an east
The plastic evocation of the hypodermal marks an important stylistic development. Sculptors of the late seventh and early sixth centuries often incised anatomical details onto the body. On offer were the signs of muscles, their markers, and only minimally their iconic depictions. One of the earliest kouroi extant is a torso of circa 600–580 from Sounion—the destination of chapter 1’s Anavysos road (fig. 91). It consists of a foursquare block into which crescents have been gouged to mark shoulder blades, a long line to mark the spine, and so on. Surface modulation is minimal, while an incision can denote either a depression (the spinal furrow) or a ridge (the scapula). The overall approach has much in common with epigraphy. From a technical standpoint, there is no difference between the denotation of a shoulder blade and the incision of a letter: each is an inscription on stone. Anatomical features on this statue are, like letters, discrete, iterable, and minimally iconic. Of course, they are not letters, but the affinity is clear from the fact that many early figures have texts carved into their flesh alongside their notations of anatomy. The votive inscription on an early seventh-century bronze Apollo from Boiotia runs in boustrophedon over the thighs, such that the root similarity of two modes of carving—alphabetic and depictive—becomes evident (fig. 92).*

Mantiklos gave me as a tithe to the Far-Darter of the silver bow. Do you, Phoibos, give something pleasing in return.®
The mark on the surface of the stone is a sign, a *sēma*, of the bones and muscles underneath the skin. Rooted in carving technology, the “epigraphical” handling of anatomy encourages the distinctive Greek identification of statues and signs. Conversely, there could be no better illustration of the early Greek identification of *sēmata* and depictions than these graphic notations of anatomy.

Not all Archaic statuary is epigraphic in this way. The colossal kouros of Iskhys from Samos, dating to circa 560, makes a useful contrast to mainland styles (fig. 93). Like the Mantiklos Apollo, the Samian giant bears letters on the body: the dedicatory inscription is carved directly into the thigh. Muscles, however, are neither discrete units nor epigraphic signs. On the contrary, the kouros’s body is a terrain of smooth gradations. Transitions are blurry, producing an effect of fleshiness characteristic of Ionian sculpture (the Geneleos dedication is another instance: fig. 64). The surfaces in such works are evocative but only vaguely so: the sculptors sacrifice precision to suggest a palpable softness in the stone. The surface seems almost elastic, as though it would yield to the touch. The sharply incised letters on the thigh only heighten this effect by contrast.

One might, following Hegel, see such epigrams as a wonderful coincidence of sign and referent: the epigram is cut into the very thing it names, such that the referent is always literally present in the text. Writing on the body means that word and thing are materially continuous: a fulfillment of all an Archaic monument can hope to achieve.

By the fifth century, however, sculptors commonly articulate surfaces in order to suggest unseen bones and sinews. The tendency toward plasticity and softness combines with the tendency toward specificity in the marking of anatomical features. It is a commonplace that this change owes much to improvements in casting technique. Instead of extracting stone from a block to reveal a statue, the bronze worker builds up a model of clay, with the result that surfaces tend to be more plastic in execution. As in the case of open poses, however, it is by no means clear whether bronze casting is the cause or the effect of this development. The evolution of plastic modeling has been described most convincingly by Gisela Richter in her treatment of kouroi (1970), a predominantly glyptic figure type in which the effects of bronze are indirect at best. Sticking to the Anavysos road, the statue of Aristodikos presently an evocative and rippling surface, even though the actual technique of its carving owed nothing to clay working or bronze casting.

This development is often described as a naturalistic advance. It is, along with open poses, the conquest of space, modeled drapery, and psychological drama, one of the key elements of “the Greek revolution.” Carpenter, once again, provides a lucid example. With his usual precision, he sets the phenomenon squarely into the progressivist narrative. On the subject of the Parthenon pediments, he writes:

> To an extraordinary degree, the invisible vital structure of the fully mature male body has been expressed in terms of the clearly silhouetted outline of its ordered elements and an enveloping surface deftly modulated to suggest the functioning of its hidden mechanism. Nevertheless naturalism has not yet proceeded so as
far as to eliminate the tectonic differentiation of the structural parts of the body, but still tolerates their articulation as typical and separate shapes.  

In this account, the suggestion of a “hidden mechanism,” an “invisible vital structure” beneath “the enveloping surface,” is part of naturalism. That the Parthenon does not use this effect to naturalistic ends, but rather “tolerates” certain infelicities, is for Carpenter a mere bump in the road. As usual, the teleological premise produces an anachronistic account, in which works are judged not on their own terms but with the benefit of twenty-twenty hindsight.

The naturalistic evocation of “hidden mechanisms” goes hand in hand with a realistic precision in the rendering of anatomy. There is no denying that Classical statues adhere more rigorously to the invariancies of the human body than did their Archaic predecessors. There is a clear and legible correspondence between depicted muscles and actual ones in fifth-century art. For instance, where Archaic sculptors tended to be cavalier about the number of abdominal muscles a human being may possess, depicting sometimes too many and sometimes too few (fig. 6), Classical sculptors invariably showed the actual number (six). Yet it would be premature to identify this change with “a precise, objective, and even scientific realism.” For the new style does not dispense with distortions. On the contrary, the new “realism” goes hand in hand with new modes of stylization, new departures from the objective and scientific facts. It is therefore worth wondering whether naturalism or realism as such are really at issue in the new style.

The Motya Charioteer presents just this dilemma. The sculptor seems to have bet everything on the dramatic evocation of “an enveloping surface” and “a hidden mechanism.” Yet the gown is absurd if one is looking for “precise, objective, and even scientific realism.” It is impossibly snug, more a sheath than a garment. But it does provide a medium for the evocation of anatomy that is, relative to work of the previous century, very realistic and precise. There is a contradiction, in short, between anatomy and drapery. One way to resolve such contradictions is to follow Carpenter and insert the statue into a teleological history. The garment becomes a holdover, or an archaism: a sign that the goal has not yet been reached. Suspending such anachronisms, on the other hand, reveals a stranger picture.

### Skin and Bones

The need for such suspension is nowhere more pressing than in the rendering of anatomy. The accuracy of Classical musculature is a commonplace of modern literature, which routinely posits the dissection of cadavers as a means to explain the new development. Such praise is not exactly wrong: Classical anatomy is, in some ways, very realistic. But the Classical style also has its own distinctive infelicities and distortions, which should not be smoothed away in the interests of a satisfying art-historical narrative. It is Guy Métraux who, more than anyone else, has drawn attention to these distortions. They come in three broad types: the statues can distort the proportions of human bodies; they can evoke hypodermal structures that have no equivalent in real human anatomy, or they can contort the body grotesquely in order to display as many suggestive surfaces as possible.

We have already seen one example of distorted proportions. As noted in the previous chapter, the Zeus of Artemision has unnaturally long arms (fig. 42). There
is no good reason to suppose that the Greeks found long arms particularly attractive in a man, as they clearly found large bottoms, small penises, and straight noses to be.\footnote{16} It is not an idealizing feature. As we have seen, it is altogether more likely that the Zeus has elongated arms because they emphasize the statue’s projective, intrusive force when seen from the front and its foursquare solidity when seen from the side. As the king of the gods, Zeus is by definition perfect; but to call this feature an idealization would seem to stretch the concept beyond all utility and to ignore the most salient features of the statue’s impact.

If Zeus’s arms are too long, then by the same token the genitalia of many Classical males are simply too short. Men are sexually immature relative to their physiques.\footnote{17} The Kritian boy is a fine example of this tendency: he has the muscles and the proportions of an eighteen-year-old, and the sexual development of a prepubescent boy. The High Classical bronze warriors from Riace Marina—and, indeed, many other Greek nude males—exhibit a similar incompatibility (plate 8, figs. 94, 95).\footnote{18} The result is as strange, in its own way, as Centaur or any other \textit{Mischwesen}. The Greek male nude is a composite monster, a hybrid not of man and beast but of age classes:
adult and child. Here again, the cultural logic behind such behavior is for now beside the point. The simple fact is that Greek artists, like most others, distort the proportions of the human body in ways that do not accord with familiar concepts of realism, naturalism, or idealism.

The second example is an inaccuracy or infelicity found on nearly every male nude in the history of Greek sculpture, from the earliest kouroi into the Hellenistic period. It is the “athlete’s girdle,” a continuous line formed by the iliac crest and the inguinal ligament, or meeting of thigh and torso. This line does not exist on a real human body, even a well-toned one. The iliac crest is real, and the inguinal ligament is real, but their assimilation into a single, continuous arc is not. It is a stylization to which Greek sculptors were addicted. They were addicted, presumably, because the line made a pleasing effect. The nature of that effect is something to which we shall return.

Finally, Greek sculptors often contort the body for effect. Métraux has shown, for instance, that Classical sculptors routinely depict human forearms with physically impossible pronation. They twist the forearm so that its underside faces the beholder, even as the wrist and the upper arm remain in a prone position. The right arm of Warrior A from Riace Marina is a case in point (fig. 96). The inner face of the forearm turns forward even as the palm faces the thigh. To achieve this effect requires the radius—the smaller bone of the upper arm, on the thumb side—to bend unnaturally just below the wrist. The left leg undergoes a similar distortion. Once again the pronation is excessive. The whole limb twists away from the body, to our right, and the thigh and calf do not match up; too much of the inner thigh is visible. In a real human body, such deformations would be the work of a torturer: the knee is out of joint, so to speak. Once again, the results do not conform easily either to realism or to idealism.

Despite such oddities, it has been argued that the Riace bronzes were made using casts taken from living models. The statues derive, on this hypothesis, from a production process that guaranteed a one-to-one correspondence between bronze bodies and real ones. This suggestion requires bracketing all that is patently unrealistic in the statues (unless we are to imagine that the living models were tortured on the rack before serving as molds). For just that reason, it is a diagnostic symptom of scholarly preoccupations. There seems to be a felt need that artworks of such magnificence should, somehow, body forth truth. If it was characteristic of an earlier age to identify this truth with the sensuous manifestation of an Idea, so it is characteristic of current scholarship to define the truth in
sculpture as an indexical relation to real bodies, mediated in and through technology. But the evidence points to the contrary.

Classical sculpture is not more realistic or natural than its predecessors in any absolute sense; indeed, it is not clear what absolute realism or naturalism might be. It combines a new and in some ways more thoroughgoing notation of what we, today, are prepared to recognize as the real with an equally new distortion of it. The two elements are linked. It is only because Classical statues invoke the facts of anatomy so insistently that their departures from those facts become significant: the painful pronation of Classical forearms only registers as such in the context of an otherwise naturalistic image. Earlier figures had their own modes of contortion. Statues of the Geometric and Archaic periods often stood with their torsos frontal and their heads and limbs in profile. If they do not seem contorted, that is because naturalism is not really an issue in these works: they are neither natural nor unnatural, for the concepts do not pertain. Nobody says of the Mantiklos Apollo that its neck has been painfully stretched, or of the Corfu Gorgon that she must have trouble balancing that giant head on such a tiny body. New modes of realism bring with them new modes of unrealism, and conversely.

Departures from realism inevitably raise the question of idealism. Classical figures are impossibly perfect, with absurdly toned muscles and regular proportions. But idealism is, in this matter, something of a canard. It often serves as a convenient way to shield Greek artists from charges of irrationalism. Carpenter sometimes takes this route. He describes the end of the Archaic style as follows:

That the archaic manner is conventional and artificial and untrue to physical appearance may be considered by many to be wholly irrelevant to its artistic worth ... And yet—unless some transcendental purpose intervenes, such as religious ritual, magic, or superstition, or spiritual distrust of the reality of the world of sense—it is precisely its failure to be mimetically true to the external world of visual appearance that causes archaism’s dissolution.21

But when it comes to Classical art’s own conventionalism and artifice, he invokes the principle of canonic proportions to salvage a rationalist alternative to superstition.

[T]he so-called idealism and lack of individualization which we recognize as typical of early classical art were the direct outcome of archaic schematization reinforced by canonic abstraction ... [N]umerical ratio was interpolated everywhere into structural form, and abstract number ruled over casual appearance, thereby applying to the nude body a formal device that by a strange paradox was invoked to insure truth to nature and yet made complete mimetic fidelity impossible.22

No “transcendental purpose” intervenes in Carpenter’s account: instead, we have a “strange paradox” in which idealism is at once nonmimetic and truthful.

Brunilde Ridgway, in her classic treatment of fifth-century sculpture, takes a similar position. In anatomy, “emphasis is on articulation and structure ... Thus certain elements in the male nude are particularly emphasized or even exaggerated to increase their tectonic appearance.”23 On this account, what look like distortions of
anatomy turn out to have an eminently rational end: they reveal tectonic structure. A similar logic obtains to classical drapery, which is said to be “rational rather than realistic,” “not depicted per se but utilized and even exploited to express motion . . . or to model the human figure . . . .” In short, Greek artists cannot lose. When they cleave to the facts of anatomy, they are scientific realists; when they do not, they are idealists, or analytic architects, or rationalists, or aesthetes. This dialectic can domesticate even the oddest sculptural effect. “Great artists are wisely negligent,” wrote Winckelmann, a propos of Pheidias, “and even their errors instruct.” We should all be so lucky. But Winckelmann’s view lives on today. To get out of this circle it is necessary to forego the language of negligence and error, mimēsis and accuracy, and to accept Classical art on its own terms.

That is why the idea that Greek artists were struggling to maintain a “precarious balance” between idealism and realism runs into trouble. The two alternatives are inextricable, the one a function of the other. What counts as realistic is a function of what counts as nonrealistic or idealistic, and conversely. Indeed, the clean separation of the two is largely a function of a progressivist understanding of stylistic development, which takes as a premise the fixed character of one or both of these terms. A refusal of teleology, on the other hand, entails accepting the exaggerated, the implausible, and the distorted as the flipside of the new anatomy: it is to insist that complexity and polyvalence are defining features of the Classical style, not holdovers to be purged in a march toward a perfection that is neither defined nor realized.

But if scientific realism is not the foregone conclusion of Greek art, then what to make of the new plastic modeling, the new anatomical realism, the new distortions and exaggerations of the Classical style? By way of answering, we can go back over the examples: abnormal proportions; the iliac-inguinal line; twisted limbs.

There need not be a single reason for the varied proportions of Classical statues. Greek sculptors are believed to have at times employed proportional schemes, of which the Canon of Polykleitos is only the most famous. But it has proved singularly difficult to track such schemes in the preserved sculptural record. Notoriously, for instance, the known versions of Polykleitos’s Doryphoros, the statue in which he exemplified his canon, have differing proportions (fig. 97). The New York kouros seems to employ an Egyptian proportional scheme, but other examples do not, even they do resemble Egyptian works in other ways (figs. 6, 7). The sheer inconsistency of Greek practice suggests that local, ad hoc explanations are more credible than sweeping generalizations. The elongated arms of the Artemision Zeus contribute to a wonderful, striking effect; no further explanation is necessary (fig. 42). The juvenile genitalia of most Classical male nudes have been explained by a combination of factors: Greek pederasty valued certain youthful features, while a large, exposed phal·lus was considered a sign of an incontinent nature. Thauma,
wonder, and *pothos*, desire, are the operative terms in these instances, not spiritual ideals or mimetic design.

As Métraux observed, the iliac-inguinal line, while false as anatomy, contributes to the forward thrust of the figure. Because Classical figures tend to arch or “sway” their backs to a greater or lesser degree, the swell of the abdomen over the artificial furrow causes the pelvis to press forward (or seem to do so), enhancing the effect of the arched back. Métraux understands this feature as an attempt to suggest respiration, the motivation for which he finds in Hippocratic writings on the pneumatic theory of the soul. Unfortunately, the texts in question were almost without exception written centuries later than the pertinent sculptures. Moreover, the interpretation is gratuitous: there is no need to invoke the abstruse thoughts of physicians when basic Greek assumptions about the nature and function of images will suffice. More pertinent than Hellenistic medical writings are visual parallels with fifth-century Attic pottery. A subtle pelvic thrust, such that the genitals are forward of the pectorals, characterizes the desirable ephebe. The Brygos Painter’s cup in Oxford has already been mentioned as a counterpart to the Kritian boy, and it is not an isolated case (figs. 32, 33). The pose is common in Athenian courtship scenes. Most of the *erōmenoi* in such scenes are muffled, a motif suggestive of *aidōs* or shamefastness (more on this below). But when the young men are nude, they are often sway-backed. An amphora by the Dikaios Painter is a good example: the nude youth at left, receiving a crown from an admirer, describes a distinct arc across the curving surface of the clay (fig. 98). Along with large thighs and high buttocks, a forward pelvis was plainly considered a desirable attribute from at least as early as the sixth century. This pose does not necessarily connote phallic potency: it is also adopted by youths in the act of intercrural sex. In short, the pose connotes generally heightened eroticism and, at the same time, a certain receptivity. If vase-painting is any guide, then the obvious conclusion is that the swayback and the iliac-inguinal line are omnipresent in Greek sculpture because they were considered sexy. That is, they elicited certain erotic responses.

This iconography represents a datum in the history of sexuality. But for present purposes it shows that Classical sculptors routinely distorted the facts of anatomy in order to make a persuasive and desirable figure: the ancient equivalent of the airbrushing and Photoshopping that goes into the manufacture of a centerfold. Questions of mimetic fidelity and truth were secondary to the titillation of beholders. It follows that scientific realism is not adequate to account for the new style.

Regarding impossible twists and pronations, a clue comes from Métraux’s astute observation that Classical sculptors gain something by twisting the forearms of their figures. They gain a broad, flat field for the display of the cephalic and cubital veins. This trade-off is revealing of the priorities of Classical sculptors: realism was secondary to the evocation...
of veins. Interestingly, the right arm of Riace Warrior B is a Roman replacement and lacks exactly this feature. Perhaps the Romans corrected the Greek craftsman’s “mistake.” But why should Greek sculptors wish to show veins in the first place? Métraux offers an elaborate account of the importance of veins in Greek medical writing and concludes that Classical sculptors were intimately familiar with such texts. Once again, however, the texts in question are later than the statues, hence of doubtful relevance. One alternative is Deborah Steiner’s suggestion that the veins “showcase . . . the virtuosity of the statue maker, who has chosen to demonstrate his ability to achieve a detailed and accurate description in this particular area.”35 Yet one is entitled to wonder what virtuosity might mean in this context, and why it should express itself in the rendering of veins as opposed to, say, the correct articulation of the human arm (why is the arm virtuosic and not inept?). Since the “accurate description” of veins is contingent upon an inaccurate description of the forearm as a whole, there must be more to the matter than simply a display of virtuoso accuracy.

Unless one is willing, with Métraux, to attach special importance to veins as such, it seems best to leave medical writing aside and focus on the simple visual fact that the sculptor of Riace A twists the forearm and the calf in order to provide an articulate and evocative surface. The important point is perhaps not the veins but the showing of them. What unites the new plastic modeling, the new anatomical realism, and the new distortions of the Classical body is simply this: they all relate cogently to the evocation of invisible, hypodermal structures. The exposed forearm provides a ground that the sculptor can enrich and elaborate with a snaking pattern of lines, each of which will read as something hidden beneath the skin. If the invisible entity thus evoked corresponds closely to some part of a real human body, then so much the better. The invitation is all the more seductive, the outward signs all the more legible. But strict realism is clearly a secondary concern—since, to repeat, it depends on unrealistic pronation as its enabling condition. The priority is not veins as such, still less realism as such, but the elicitation of a projective fantasy from the beholder. That fantasy is that there exists something underneath the bronze surface, something unseen inside the statue.

So the evolution from the epigraphy of the early kouroi to the rich plastic surfaces of Riace A is not simply a progression from abstraction to imitation. Classical statues do offer a more thoroughgoing or “replete” notation of anatomy than their Archaic predecessors. But the progressivist teleology cannot recognize the hybrid results as successful works on their own terms. For every well-crafted and accurate set of abdominal muscles there is an elbow wrenched out of joint, a knee twisted, a pelvis stylized, an arm stretched. These extremes go together. Certain distortions are only recognizable as such in the context of a work that is otherwise mimetic. Greek sculptures seem, at any given moment, to be hybrid things. If we are not to resolve such multiplicity in the unity of a transhistorical goal—idealism, realism, rationalism, or empiricism—then we must explain it historically. Distortions are not mere errors or obstacles to the attainment of an art-historical destiny, but practical devices employed to a particular purpose.

That purpose is, I suggest, the intimation of the invisible. Between the Sounion kouroi and the Riace bronzes, the surface of the statue becomes more and more a skin, a membrane, on which one can see the traces of hidden structures. The body becomes increasingly diaphanous, that is, increasingly like Herodotos’s fantasy of the crystal pillars of Ethiopia. What matters is that its surface should evoke an absence redeemed in the moment of viewing. The pictogram anatomy of the Sounion
group kouroi suggested a maximally attenuate relationship between external sign and inner referent. Later works are more replete with iconic detail. But it would be misleading to conclude that they are simply more accurate. Rather, they take the play of real and unreal to new extremes. Just as the kouros, in its economy and its graphic technique, elasticized the relation between visible mark and depictive content, so Riace A sets realistic veins on an unrealistic arm. The kouroi make the bronzes less strange. They share a single thematic: the perception of the unseen in and through the visible. No less than the Sounion kouroi, but in a different way, the Riace bronzes distort the body to make it a field of significant marks. Reading such signs, seeing the absent in the present, is quintessentially wonderful. It is, moreover, integral to the functioning of the image. Like the pose of a kouros, the anatomy of a Classical nude allegorizes the statue’s basic task of making present, “presentifying,” the invisible. The means change, the end does not.

Xenophon and the Diaphanous Image

The body shows through drapery as muscles show through skin. What has most impressed modern commentators, however, is a final diaphanous progression: the soul showing through the body. As we saw in chapter 3, the sheer strangeness of surface-effect—or, more precisely, the strangeness of the fact that it should be ordinary and unavoidable—interested both Rilke and Aristotle. But it was Hegel who established its importance in the historiography of Greek art. For Hegel, the evocation of an inner character in Classical art was a world-historical event. Der Blitz der Individualität, the lightning bolt of individuality, marks, in tangible form, the entry of self-conscious rationality into world history. In modern accounts of Greek art, the rendering of êthos is the material correlate of what the German philologist Bruno Snell called “the Discovery of Mind among the Greeks.”

This claim remains a keystone of progressivist art history. J. J. Pollitt, in his classic *Art and Experience in Classical Greece*—a bestselling textbook to this day—reiterates the claim. In his first chapter, aptly titled “Consciousness and Conscience,” he describes how the East pediment of the temple of Zeus at Olympia “embodies not action, but thought,” and is therefore “a triumph of rationality.” As in the *Aesthetics*, the suffusion of matter with mind is the work of art; perfection in this enterprise is the signal achievement of the Greeks and marks an advance in the history of human consciousness. The fact that there is no explicit reference to Hegel in Pollitt’s text only underscores the debt. The philosophical premises are so pervasive that they go unrecognized as such. Hegelianism is a background assumption.

Amongst Classical authors, however, Xenophon offers the most sustained account of surface-effect as it pertains to “what we call mind and soul and love.” The discussion occurs in the *Memorabilia*, in a well-known passage in which Sokrates visits three craftsmen: Parrhasios the painter, Kleiton the sculptor, and Pistias the armorer. Xenophon deploys a number of familiar motifs to establish a connection between the representation of visible appearances and the representation of an invisible interiority. The names, for instance, are canting and form a triad. Parrhasios means “outsoken,” and signals a perfect adequation of outer expression to inner thought. As Michel Foucault puts it, a *parrhesiastes* avoids “any kind of rhetorical form that would veil what he thinks.” Kleiton, on the other hand, means “renowned.” It suggests an equivalent adequation of public esteem to individual comportment. Pistias, lastly, means “trusty,” and names a general adequation of inner and outer,
the opposite of dissimulation. These names cue unmistakably what is at issue in the discussion: the relation of appearance to character.

In the first visit, to Parrhasios, Sokrates contrasts the representation of a human body to the representation of a human character (ēthos). The body is visible, while the ēthos is invisible; the one can be imitated directly, the other cannot. ēthos does, however, “show through [diaphainei] in the face and in the poses [skhematōn]” (3.10.5). The body is diaphanous—that word again—to inner character, and the resulting external signs of inner states can be depicted. Sokrates prefers beautiful bodies and beautiful characters, but it is possible to depict “shameful, grievous, and hateful” ones as well. The body is thus a veil to the soul, revealing its contours while concealing the form itself.

In the next visit, to Kleiton the sculptor, Sokrates assimilates the representation of visible bodies to the representation of the invisible soul. The mediating term is skhēma or pose. Pose reveals that which is, in the most literal way possible, “inside bodies,” en tois sómasi. It reveals the flexion and relaxation of muscles, the things that are “drawn down and drawn up and compressed and outstretched, and taut and loose.” Kleiton can and does represent muscles and sinews in a true and convincing manner, even though they are not themselves visible to the eye. The representation of character, ēthos, proceeds in an analogous manner. It, too, “shows through in the face and poses” (3.10.5). By depicting “the threatening look in the eyes of fighters” and “the triumphant expression on the face of conquerors,” the sculptor depicts “the works of the soul [ta tēs psukhēs erga]” (3.10.8). In each case, the sculptor shows the visible correlate of an invisible activity: flexion or feeling, either one. The sculpted body is diaphanous to its interior.

In his final visit, to Pistias the armorer, Sokrates refines and qualifies this analogy. At issue is what constitutes a good fit in breastplates, that is, what constitutes the ideal relationship between outer and inner, armor and body. The regulating term is not skhēma but proportion. A breastplate fits well if its proportions match those of the body it covers: “if it is a good fit it is well-proportioned” (3.10.11). Sokrates insists that goodness in such cases will be relative. A breastplate can be well proportioned even if it is made to fit an ill-proportioned body: what matters is the quality of the fit, the convergence of the twain. Indeed, such fit is more important than the material from which the breastplate is made: a poor-fitting breastplate would be trash though it were plated with gold (3.10.14). The pertinence of this point emerges in comparison with the preceding discussion with Parrhasios, which had discovered that it is possible to make a good picture of base characters. The discussion with Pistias clarifies the particular goodness involved. What matters, in breastplates as in pictures, is the relative fit between inner and outer. Just as a breastplate is good if it fits snugly and well, so, by implication, a picture is good if it establishes an appropriate relation or “fit” between visible body and known ēthos.

Xenophon’s language is in one sense traditional. In particular, his use of the verb diaphainō (“character … shows through [diaphainei] in the face and in poses”) puts him in a long tradition. Herodotos used it in connection with the corpses inside the crystal pillars of the Ethiopians; the image as a diaphanous container was something of a commonplace. But Xenophon does depart significantly from these precedents. Where the earlier accounts had stressed the way that images are diaphanous to an inner body, Xenophon extends the structure to include mental states and characters. The chief interest of his account lies in this assimilation of inner character to a
body under wraps. The image is still diaphanous, but what “shows through” is not just the body but whatever it is that inhabits a body. It is the psukhē and the ēthos. The inanimate becomes animate in and through surface-effect.

Xenophon was not the first to extend the metaphor in this way. To the accepted view of an image as a diaphanous container he adduces the philosophical conceit that the body is a garment to the soul. Empedokles, as we have seen, spoke of a female deity “clothing [the soul] in the unfamiliar tunic of the flesh.” But Xenophon uses this idée reçue to understand statuary and, in particular, the evocation of inner states in the Classical style. He is not alone in this regard. There is a comparable passage in Plato’s Symposium, where Alkibiades likens Sokrates to a clay silen concealing a golden image: lumpen and deceptive on the outside, pure and true on the inside. In drawing this famous analogy, Alkibiades declares that his old teacher throws his external appearance round himself like a cloak, verb periballō. The silen conceals the image as the body conceals the soul—and, crucially, as a cloak conceals the body. One might see Xenophon’s account, therefore, as a graft of two established ideas: the notion of the image as a diaphanous container and the notion of the body as the soul’s veil.

And sculpture? Until the beginning of the fifth century, Greek statues tend to wear the “Archaic smile,” a facial expression that probably does not signify dramatic emotion but social class (fig. 27). The elites of some Greek cities were known as “the Smiling Ones,” Geleontes. This term is not wholly free of psychological characterization: the rich smile because they are happy, and they are happy because they are rich. But the state of happiness is more social than psychological, as we might speak of finding oneself in a “happy situation.” In sculpture, accordingly, the expression applies even to figures under duress or in the thick of battle. On the north frieze of the Siphnian treasury, for instance, Artemis wears a fixed grin as she attacks the Giants; elsewhere, however, a boulder-throwing Giant scowls, and a dead one grits his teeth (fig. 25). These smiles do not make much sense as psychological characterizations within the depicted narratives; they are more likely to be attributes of the elevated status of figures in question.

The situation changes around the end of the sixth century, as figures acquire downturned mouths and brooding expressions. The Blond boy from the Akropolis of Athens (circa 480 BCE) is the standard illustration (fig. 99). At about the same time there is a brief spate of interest in grimaces and transient emotions—the Lapith women from the west pediment of the temple of Zeus at Olympia are textbook examples (fig. 100). This latter tendency dies out rather quickly: impassioned figures like Priam from the pediment of the early fourth-century Asklepaion at Epidaurus, or the mourning hero on a Tarentine relief in New York, are exceptions to the general rule (fig. 101). That said, the face does betray some emotion in High Classical art. Thus Riace A, with his knitted brow, gritted teeth, and tense posture, is prey to all the fleeting emotion of the Olympia figures even as he exercises a fittingly heroic self-control (fig. 94). The sulk of the Blond boy has an afterlife on funerary stelai, such as the girl on a Parian stele in New York (fig. 132) or the slave on the so-called Cat stele in Athens (plate 10). The difference between such scenes of quiet grief, and the quick anger of the Riace warrior, is not great. In each case there is a narrative rationale for the depicted emotion. The slave on the Cat stele is grieving because his master is dead; the Riace warrior, whoever he may be, is part of a larger narrative group, hence a character in a sort of drama.
99 * Above left, kouros (?) head from the Athenian Akropolis (the Blond boy). Marble. Circa 480 BCE. Athens, Akropolis 689. Photo: Alison Frantz Photographic Collection, American School of Classical Studies at Athens.

100 * Above right, temple of Zeus at Olympia, west pediment: Lapith woman (B). Marble. Before 457 BCE. Olympia, Olympia Archaeological Museum. Photo: Alison Frantz Photographic Collection, American School of Classical Studies at Athens.

101 * Right, grave relief from Taranto: visit to the tomb. Limestone. Circa 325–300 BCE. New York, Metropolitan Museum 29.54.
The gritted teeth of the Riace warrior recall Pliny’s description of the great painter Polygnotos of Thasos, a contemporary of the bronzes.

Polygnotos of Thasos … first represented women in transparent draperies and showed their heads covered with elaborate headdresses; and … he introduced showing the mouth open and displaying the teeth, changing the face from its primitive rigor.\(^{50}\)

Aristotle called Polygnotos an *agathos ēthographos*, a “good ēthos painter,” and Pliny evidently has something similar in mind.\(^{51}\) His chronology, however, is faulty. The motif of gritted teeth does not originate with Polygnotos but has antecedents in Athenian vase-painting of circa 500 (e.g., Sarpedon on Euphronios’s great krater from Cerveteri) and, earlier still, on the Siphnian treasury at Delphi. It is nonetheless significant that Pliny should associate transparent drapery, *tralucida vestis*, with the representation of character. For him, at any rate, diaphanous garments make a natural pair with the rendering of expression or *ēthographia*. This idea is worth pursuing.

Even in large narrative groups, like pedimental sculptures, the specificity implicit in Riace A is a rarity. The great innovation of the fifth century is the development of studied neutrality in facial expression. Figures tend to have no determinate expression at all but maintain a studied neutrality (fig. 119). Christopher Hallett is eloquent on this score:

[T]he neutral Classical expression appears to take on a subtly different emotional tenor in different situations—largely though the postures and gestures of the figures. In a violent struggle it can seem resolute and intent; in a stately procession serene and composed; in a grave stele melancholy yet resigned; in a victor statue modest and reflective; in a cult statue inscrutable—passionless and perfect. Its apparent vacancy is in fact its greatest strength; for it renders the expression potentially ambiguous, or—more correctly—multivalent; and the beholder will tend to supply feelings appropriate to the context.\(^{52}\)

Hallett takes a cue from Xenophon. It is the *skhēmata*, the “poses and gestures of the figures,” that allow *ēthos* to show through the body. The Motya youth may stand as a good example of the effect: its face is blank yet, in context, reads as assertive, even prideful (plate 7). But Hallett adds an important insight into the psychology of beholding. Where Xenophon cast the representation of *ēthos* in terms of the mimetic representation of a preexisting idea, Hallett insists upon the beholder’s share. It is the spectator who projects *ēthos* onto the figure. What Xenophon sees as showing through is in fact more complicated. The statue, by means of pose and other devices, encourages the beholder to read a psychology into a blank figure.

Richard Wollheim, writing of Manet and Degas, used the term “lure” to name this technique, whereby an artwork solicits expressive projection from its audience by presenting a neutral surface.\(^{53}\) What Xenophon, like Herodotos, idealizes as a mimetic revelation of essence is more plausibly understood as a circuitry of invitation and response. The inducement of such responses was, in fact, a crucial component of Classical oratory: in the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle devotes considerable attention to the elicitation of *pathos* in hearers. For the public speaker, it is a technique of persuasion; but the ambitions of sculptors are rarely so precise as those of advocates and politicians.
Xenophon himself raises some such possibility, only to dismiss it. In the passage immediately following the discourse with the artisans, Sokrates and his friends visit Theodotē, a courtesan. She is having her portrait painted as they arrive; we are told she is in the custom of having such pictures made (3.11.1). The visual arts are still very much at issue. Noticing that Theodotē is “sumptuously dressed” (polutelōs kekosmēmenēn) Sokrates suggests that she possesses some “contrivance” (mēkhanē) for gaining suitors. He compares this contrivance to a spider’s web, a “trap” (thēratron) and a net (diktuon) for catching hares: the woven fabric of her garment is really a snare (3.11.5–8). But when Theodotē exclaims, “Nets! What nets have I got?” (3.11.10), Sokrates replies, “One, surely, that wraps very well indeed (mala eu periplekomenon): your body!” In a remarkable inversion of the structure of “showing through,” the courtesan’s very body becomes a textile. It is no longer an ideality hidden behind or beneath a veil; instead, the veil is all there is, the body is fabric. Sokrates then adds, “And inside it [i.e., the body] you have a soul (psukhē) that teaches you what glance will please, what words delight . . . ” The soul is inside the body, but it is part of the trap as well; it is the bait, the lure.

Even bait can be a positive presence behind the veil or inside the net. But Theodotē is a surface with nothing underneath, and the bait in this snare is in fact an absence. Sokrates suggests that, to be an effective courtesan, she must snare men by inciting their desire, and inciting desire means suggesting a lack. Why, in the first place, you must not offer it to them when they have had enough, nor prompt them until they have thrown off the surfeit and are beginning to want more; then, when they feel the want, you must prompt them by behaving as a model of propriety, by a show of reluctance to yield, and by holding back until they are as keen as can be; for then the same gifts are much more to the recipient than when they are offered before they are desired. (3.11.14)

In one sense, the philosopher is simply suggesting that Theodotē play hard to get. In context, however, the advice has a special significance. Sokrates suggests that the veils, which comprise her clothes, her body, and even her soul, exist in order to suggest something hidden, something withheld. She is to offer nothing but an absence of gratification; pothos will do the rest. Theodotē is a constitutive absence or void: there is nothing to her but allure.

Sitting for her portrait, Theodotē stands in a literary tradition going back to Pandora: the feminine is a way to think artifice and deception. In the case of Pandora, however, the fair exterior concealed something very definite on the inside: a bitch’s brain, kuneos noos. The symmetrical inversion of Pandora would be Sokrates himself: as presented in Plato’s Symposium, he is a clay silen containing a golden god, an ugly exterior hiding a beautiful soul. Theodotē is different. In her case, the exterior is all there is. There is nothing inside: she is a pure surface. The deceptive veils hide only a void, a lack to incite desire. It is almost as though Xenophon were imagining a philosophical equivalent to the Ludovisi throne. Just as the sculpture triggers desire by means of drapery, assimilating the eroticized feminine body to a bothros and its garments to a balustrade, so Xenophon imagines Theodotē as a void of sorts, wrapped round (periplekomenon) with seductive finery. There is, of course, no direct connection between the Locrian monument and the Athenian author. What they share is a grammar of concepts, a way of articulating femininity and sculpture. Coming on the heels of Sokrates’ visits to the artisans, this episode complicates
Xenophon’s account of the visual arts. There is an implicit analogy between the courtesan herself and the portraits for which she sits. Theodotē “shows as much as decency allows,” suggesting that the pictures advertise her wares (3.11.1). Indeed, the portraits are part of her “contrivance” or “mechanism,” mēkhanē; they are only the most widely cast of her nets. Like Theodotē’s clothes, body, and soul, her image is snare, a web, a garment clothing nothing. Where the discussion with the painter Parrhasios had revealed that character “shows through” the painted body, here Xenophon implies the opposite. The courtesan’s portrait is diaphanous to nothing. It is a surface that implies depths only in order to incite desire.

Yet Xenophon is not being inconsistent in any simple sense. There is a difference between Parrhasios’s work and the portraits of Theodotē. It is not a difference between good and bad subjects, for Xenophon has already detached quality in artworks from the merits of the person or thing depicted. Nor is there any indication that the pictures of Theodotē are poorly executed compared to those by Parrhasios. The difference emerges, rather, in the conclusion of Sokrates’ dialogue with the courtesan. She compares her solicitation of clients to Sokrates’ solicitation of pupils, and suggests that the two of them should go into business together (3.11.15). Sokrates refuses, good-humouredly, suggesting that he has his own “spells and potions and magic wheels” to keep young men about him. This ending to the interview suggests that Xenophon’s larger point is to contrast the love of wisdom with carnal love, philosophical friendship with the cash transactions of prostitution (and, by implication, sophistic teaching). A similar difference pertains between the two conceptions of painting on offer in the Memorabilia. Theodotē’s portraits are snares, and whatever psyche shows through their surfaces will, of necessity, be as fugitive as the courtesan’s own. Parrhasios’s pictures, on the other hand, offer an authentic mimēsis of the visible signs of a soul. His art is genuine, as Sokrates’ friendship with his pupils is genuine; Theodotē’s portrait is as false as she is. There are good pictures and bad pictures as there are good teachers and bad ones, philosophers and sophists, friends and hangers on.

In this scheme, the feminine represents a standing threat. Theodotē’s portrait encourages a eroticized mode of expressive projection, in which beholders seek a body, a soul, that is not quite there. The portrait thus makes a negative foil to the art of Parrhasios, Kleiton, and Pistias. The distinction hinges on whether the beholder is correct to infer something beneath the surface. In Theodotē’s case, he (sic) is wrong to do so: this woman’s very soul is a net. But in Sokrates’ case and in the case of the three artisans, the inference is correct. There is a body underneath the breastplate, there are muscles underneath the skin, there is a character that shows through the body. Theodotē is, in this sense, more hollow, more artificial, than a well-made statue.

These valuations matter less, for present purposes, than the structure of surface and depth they presume, and the role of the beholder they imply. Xenophon offers commonplace ideologies of the image and of gender, in a way fully in keeping with Greek authors from Hesiod to Herodotos. His good images are not unlike the Ethiopian pillars; his bad images are not unlike Pandora. But he complicates the matter by emphasizing the role of the beholder, if only as a negative counter-example. Theodotē’s portrait incites the beholder to imagine an essential form where there is none.

Although Xenophon’s stigmatizes this structure, it in fact corresponds more closely to what actually happens in Classical sculpture than do his positive examples.
(that is, perhaps, why he needs to stigmatize it in the first place). It is not simply that, as Rilke insisted, sculpture is “nothing but surface.” It is, more specifically, that Classical sculpture characteristically invites beholders to project “what we call mind and soul and love” onto a blank or neutral screen: the expressionless faces of the Classical ideal. Not only is there nothing inside a marble body but stone, nothing inside a bronze statue but Lucian’s “tangle of bars and struts and dowels,” but Classical figures have singularly unrevealing faces. But, as Hallett observed, this studied neutrality is integral to their effect. Long before Kuleshov’s experiments in cinema, Greek sculptors had learned that a blank face takes on character from its immediate context. That context is, in Xenophon’s view, the skhêma or pose. But one might add as well the handling of drapery and anatomy, or background knowledge of a depicted narrative, or the general setting of an image in a graveyard or a temple precinct. The assertive, even prideful aspect of the Motya Charioteer depends entirely on such cues. The result is a quintessential example of Wollheim’s “lure,” permitting—even encouraging—expressive projection in beholders. The neutral expression is a standing invitation to imagine an ēthos where there is none. In short, Classical statuary works by constituting an absence. Like Theodotē’s clients, forever seeking to redeem a void, to find a soul where there is nothing but cloth, the beholders of these images find character in a blank visage.

This strategy is effective, hence presumably intentional; but not necessarily conscious for all that. It is, in fact, a logical extension of earlier practice. Xenophon is a late representative of tradition of thinking about images that extends back to Homer and forward to Aristotle. With remarkable consistency, Greek sculptors and writers deploy a coherent set of relations: drapery/body, epidermal/hypodermal, body/soul. Each of these relations is a version of the essential one: presence/absence. From the Pomegranate kore, with her layered folds of drapery that lead the eye inward to a hollow seedpod, to the Ludovisi throne, with its systematic articulation of drapery and voids, to the Blitz der Individualität in the Classical period, there is perfect continuity. The evocation of an absence inside the image, and the invitation to redeem that absence in beholding, is arguably the traditional gambit of Greek sculpture.

Kallistratos, admittedly a later figure but one steeped in antiquarian lore, identifies this effect with wonder. Writing of a statue of Dionysos by Praxiteles, he declares it to be “wholly beyond the limits of wonder [pantos ēn epekeîna thaumatos] in that the material betrayed signs of feeling pleasure and the bronze feigned an exhibition of emotions.” Like Odysseus’s brooch, which was “a wonder to behold for itself and oneself” because its figures seemed alive “although they were gold,” the Dionysos surpasses thauma by showing material, hylos, and emotion simultaneously. Kallistratos is a late source, a writer of the Second Sophistic. But even Plato, in his famous comparison of Sokrates to a clay silen containing a silver god, describes the hidden agalma as “wonderful,” thaumasta. Seeing character in an image as a revelation of what is hidden and in a coincidence of image and material support: this is the logical extension of a practice going back to the beginnings of the Archaic period: the play of inner and outer is as wonderful, in its own way, as brilliance and speed.

Veils, Modesty, and Mêtis

Ēthos often works this way in the art of the later fifth century. Recent scholarship, for instance, has devoted a great deal of attention to “the figure of aidōs”: a young man or woman who displays a seemly modesty or shamefastness. Anne Carson
vividly describes *aidōs* as “a sort of voltage of decorum discharged between two people approaching one another for the crisis of human contact, an instinctive and mutual sensitivity to the boundary between them.” Part of the reason for recent interest in this quality is its social dimension. As Andrew Stewart puts it, “*aidōs* is what ancient Greeks feel when they recognize their place in the social structure in general and the current context in particular, and accept the obligations these bring.” It is an ethical quality, in the Greek sense of being an attribute of character, but it is equally a social and reciprocal one.

*Aidōs* occurs in the field of vision. It is at once an awareness of being on view to others, and a self-control that keeps one’s own gaze in check. As Sappho puts it (fr. 137 *PLF*):

> Yet if you had a desire for good or beautiful things and your tongue were not concocting some evil to say, *aidōs* would not hold down your eyes but rather you would speak about what is just.

The opposite of *aidōs* is in this sense *hubris*, characterized by an insolent stare either given or received. As a positioning of the self by the self, however, *aidōs* also stands opposed to *nemesis* or “blame.” *Aidōs* is what you do yourself or display to others; *nemesis* is what others inflict upon you in the event that you behave with *hubris*. Both terms presume a beholder and a beheld; the social dimension of shame plays out in the reciprocity of gazes.

*Aidōs* and *Nemesis* were, for Hesiod, sisters, “their fair skin wrapped in white robes.” The line emphasizes the importance of drapery and concealment to both concepts. Not only is *aidōs* a refusal to stare at others, but it is also a concealment of oneself. Thus, as Gloria Pinney has shown, *aidōs* can be worn like a garment. Herodotos is explicit: “Together with her dress a woman sheds her *aidōs*” (1.8). Conversely, Odysseus, Penelope, and Plato’s Phaedo all wrap themselves in robes to indicate *aidōs*. Shamefastness involves concealing the body under cloth.

It is in this form that *aidōs* enters the iconographic repertoire of the fifth century. The figure of *aidōs* is a youth or maid with downcast eyes and a heavy robe. The garment functions like the blank stare of a statue: it lures projection by concealing everything. Such figures appear frequently in Attic red-figure but are monumentalized in the Parthenon frieze (fig. 102). The young Athenians in the procession lower their eyes, staring shyly at the ground: there are no assertive stares. As they marshal their steeds, the beautiful and good of Athens retain a seemly, even attractive, modesty. In doing so, they show that they are conscious of being watched. The gaze from which they demur, hence the gaze in which their *aidōs* occurs, is that of the beholder. This mutual implication of spectator and image is precisely what Xenophon rejected in the figure of Theodotē. The courtesan shares with the chaste youths the fact that her *ēthos* is constituted in and as an imaginative projection from beholders. In the case of the Parthenon frieze, drapery does not merely symbolize *ēthos*: it constitutes it, enacting the ethical as a projected internalization of social norms.
Importantly, the gaze of the beholder in such situations is free to roam as it pleases. No taint of *hubris* attaches to ogling a statue. Stewart cites an important passage in Plato’s *Charmides*, a dialogue set in 432 BCE. The title character, a youth “wonderful,” *thaumastos*, in beauty and stature, is surrounded by admirers: “None of them, not even the smallest, had eyes for anything else, but ... they all gazed at him as if he were a statue [ʰősʰer ᵃɡᵃˡᵐᵃ ɐθᵉʰʰᵩʰte]” Sokrates and his interlocutor join in, undressing Charmides with their eyes:

Then Khairesphon called me and said, “How does the youth strike you, Sokrates? Has he not a fine face?”

“Immensely so,” I replied.

“Yet if he would consent to strip,” he said, “you would think he had no face, he has such perfect beauty of form.” (154b–c)

Staring at the muffled figure only inflames Sokrates, who manages to get a peek: “He gave me such a look with his eyes as passes description, ... and when all the people in the wrestling school surged round about us on every side—then, ah then, my noble friend, I saw inside his cloak and caught fire, and could possess myself no longer ...” (155d). The boy, however, retains his modesty: “Charmides blushed and ... looked more beautiful than ever, for his modesty [ʰaidʰos] became his years” (158c).

Charmides is wonderful, he is modest, he is a statue. Plato establishes the traditional connection between *thauma* and sculpture, and he articulates the distinctive twofoldness of art-wonder in terms of erotic glimpse of the hidden body. A blush, a look, and a cloak conceal what the eye desires. But they also constitute an *ēthos*, a seemly and decorous character. What Barthes called “the staging of an appearance-as-disappearance” here corresponds not just to the construction of a body but to the construction of a soul as well. Like Theodotē, Charmides comes into his own in the field of vision. The mode of beholding that produces such an *ēthos* is what Plato calls “gazing at someone as though he were a statue.”

Because the iconography of *aidós* is relatively straightforward, it provides a matrix for understanding more complex examples. The so-called Mourning Penelope is a case in point (figs. 103, 104). Dating to the third quarter of the fifth century, the statue was well known in the Classical period and existed in more than one version. Roman copies exist, and yet a Greek original of circa 460 BCE was discovered amid the ruins of Persepolis, whither it was presumably brought either as booty or as a gift. Since Alexander the Great destroyed Persepolis in 331/30 BCE, the Romans cannot have seen this original and must have based their versions on a variant or replica. Now in Tehran, the Persepolitan statue shows a veiled woman sitting cross-legged and resting her head in her hand. The narrative setting is known from the Melian reliefs of circa 470–450 and from an Athenian skyphos of the 420s (figs. 105, 106). The identical type could represent Elektra at the tomb of Agamemnon, as on a Melian relief of circa 460–440 (slightly later than the earliest terracottas with Penelope but roughly contemporary with the statue in Tehran). The similarity may be intentional—Elektra effectively fills the function of Penelope in the story of Agamemnon’s homecoming—and need not imply that the type was generic. But it is certain that the Persepolitan figure represents Penelope, since fragments of a wool basket or *kalathos* like the one in the Vatican version were found with the figure.

Having failed in her ruse—weaving a shroud for Laertes only to pull it apart each night—Penelope now covers her head in an attitude rich with implication.
104 * Right, "Mourning Penelope." Roman version of a Greek original of the later fifth century BCE. The original must have closely resembled the statue in fig. 103. Marble. Vatican, Museo Pio Clementino. Photo: Scala / Art Resource, NY.


106 * Below right, Attic red-figure skyphos from Chiusi: Penelope and Telemakhos. The name-piece of the Penelope Painter. Circa 420 BCE. Chiusi, Museo Archeologico 1831. Photo: Soprintendenza Archeologica per la Toscana—Firenze.
The vase-painter makes the analogy between shroud and veil obvious by setting the “radiant web,” *aglaos histos*, in the background; there is not likely to have been an equivalent prop behind the statue itself, and the connection must have remained implicit. The gesture of veiling signals mourning, hence the withdrawal of the wife into widowhood; it appears on numerous Athenian gravestones (fig. 107). At the same time, however, the veil recalls nuptial imagery: one might compare the many brides on Athenian vases, or Helen, seated on the lap of Aphrodite while deciding whether to leave with Paris, on an amphoriskos of circa 430 (fig. 108). The resulting ambiguity is not iconographic in any trivial sense; it is, rather, a version of Penelope’s own uncertain position within the narrative. It is, one might say, an ambiguity for her. Trying to decide whether to be a widow or a bride, Penelope strikes a pose that could embody either one or the other. This dilemma is the very one she ponders: veiling externalizes it, or seems to do so.

Talk of externalization, however, amounts to paralogism: a misreading from effects to causes. No statue is expressive; statues are inanimate and have nothing to express. It would be more precise to say that the veil triggers an effect of surface in which the key term is not a body beneath drapery, or veins beneath skin, but the movement of the soul. The veil does not express Penelope’s inner state, but rather is constitutive of her *ēthos* as such. It is constitutive because it presents an iconographic ambiguity that, within the depicted narrative, *betokens* ethical uncertainty.


Penelope’s veil does not hide anything (there is nothing to hide) but it does suggest hidden depths. More than that: it characterizes those depths in social and psychological terms. Visible ambiguity of iconography becomes invisible ambiguity of étos. Penelope is sorrowing even as she ponders whether to be a widow or a bride. The act of self-veiling may, in this sense, be said to be allegorical. It acts out the way in which surface-effect reveals by hiding and, in so doing, constitutes intentionality and character in sculpture. In short, Penelope’s étos is the narrativization of surface-effect.

Homer, interestingly, suggests affinities between Penelope’s inner thoughts and her weaving. The Penelope of epic is, as Nancy Felson and others have argued, a veritable figure of pregnant silence. Most famous is her silence in recognizing her husband in his return: her thoughts remain veiled, so it is never clear at just what point she has realized that the beggar in her palace is none other than Odysseus. The operative structure is that of the “lure”—the solicitation of expressive projection onto a neutral screen. What is visible and knowable is textile craft. The famous shroud is, of course, the tangible sign of Penelope’s métis or “cunning intelligence.” Just so, she earns kleos, renown, for her weaving, her good sense (phrenas esthlas), and her clever counsels (kerdea): intelligence and textiles go together. But the key phrase comes in the nineteenth book, when the poet employs the metaphor of weaving to describe Penelope’s very thoughts. Describing the ruse of the shroud, she declares, “I spin my wiles,” dolous tōlupeō, a phrase both literally and metaphorically true (19.137). Weaving is thinking. A similar figural substitution is basic to the statue: drapery stands to thought “in the paradoxical manner of a double.” It is thought’s sēma.

Surface-effect had functioned metaphorically since the sixth century at least, as the Attic korai demonstrate. The importance of the Mourning Penelope lies in the way it narrativizes surface-effect and, in so doing, psychologizes it. Surface-effect becomes a metaphor within the narrative context, and this metaphor becomes a way to think the étos of a depicted figure. This development marks a significant extension and elaboration of Archaic practice. The sculptor has exploited the available metaphor in the interests of dramatic narrative.

### Tragedies of Beholding

Such effects are not uncommon in the later fifth century. The famous Terme Niobid in Rome, likely part of a larger pedimental group, is a somewhat flashier example of the same thing (fig. 109). Dramatic action, here, consists in the penetration of a woman by an arrow, originally added in metal; her nudity, conspicuous in its day, makes the sexual overtones explicit. The arrow enters her body, breaches its surface, and in so doing precipitates two reactions: first, a distinctive pose (back arched, hands clawing at the shaft); second, a contorted face. Breaching of the surface of the stone, that is, the skin, precipitates vivid dramatic characterization. The statue figures this characterization as an exposure of the inner. For, along with pose and facial expression, the most striking feature of this statue is a dialogue of skin and drapery. Like the flute girl on the Ludovisi throne, this statue is unusual in its unveiling of the female body at a time when most representations of women kept them chastely clothed. Much care went into the contrast between the body and the textile that conceals it, hence reveals it. The cloth over the right leg and the long folds that fall from the shoulders and spill over the left calf at once frame and occlude the body, offsetting (hence dramatizing) its nakedness. Paint will, of course, have made the
effect even more striking. This revelation of the body under or in front of drapery recapitulates the surface-effect at work in the constitution of character. The body is revealed as the soul is, in the same sculptural devices.

The story of Niobe is the perfect vehicle for this exercise, for it is itself an allegory of how a stone can seem to possess ἔθος. Niobe’s fate, after the slaughter of her children, was to become a stone herself upon Mount Sipylos, forever weeping as a spring welled from her depths. “Inside the stone she exists,” says Homer, “nursing her god-given sorrow.” A connection with statuary requires no great leap of imagination; indeed, fourth-century vase-painters in Apulia showed Niobe changing into a marble effigy (one even includes a daughter in the metamorphosis). In short, narrative and style reciprocate in the Classical Niobid. Yet the violence that attends this constitution of the interior is very much on the surface, and very obviously gendered. Misogyny, here, provides the medium, that is, the basic terminology, of the constitution of the inner in sculpture.

A third, extended example may clarify what is at stake in these statues. The Prokne and Itys group of Alkamenes, dedicated on the Athenian Akropolis circa 430–10, combines drapery, body, and character with unique sophistication and power (fig. 110). The sculptor, a Lemnian by birth, was a follower of Pheidias and
a major figure in his own right; the system of drapery has much in common with the Erechtheion caryatids (which must predate 409) and, to a lesser extent, with the Parthenon pediments. Pausanias gives a brief description, on which hinges the attribution: “Prokne too, who has already made up her mind about the boy, and Itys as well, a group dedicated by Alkamenes.”89 The attribution has been contested, although the main reason for doing so is the allegedly low quality of the carving; Boardman rightly calls this argument “churlish.”90 As an original work that can be attributed with fair certainty to a named and important sculptor, the Prokne and Itys group deserves more attention than it usually receives.

The story is sufficiently horrific to have served as the basis of tragedies by both Philokles and Sophokles and to have been lampooned by Aristophanes in the Birds.91 Prokne, daughter of Pandion king of Athens, was married to the Thracian Tereus; the couple had a son, Itys. But Prokne was unhappy in Thrace. Sophokles gives her one of his greatest female laments.

But now I am nothing on my own. But I have often regarded the nature of women in this way, seeing as we amount to nothing. In childhood in our father’s house we live the happiest life, I think, of all mankind; for folly always rears children in happiness. But when we have understanding and have come to youthful vigor, we are pushed out and sold, away from our paternal gods and from our parents, some to foreign husbands, some to barbarians, some to strange homes, and some to homes that are abusive. And this, once a single night has yoked us, we must approve and consider to be happiness.92

At Prokne’s request, Tereus escorted her sister Philomela to Thrace for a visit. On the way, however, he raped her and, to ensure her silence, cut out her tongue. Philomela contrived to speak all the same, using what Sophokles famously calls “the voice of the shuttle,” kerkidos phōnē: she wove the story into a tapestry.93 When Prokne saw the cloth and learned what had happened, she killed Itys in revenge during a festival for Dionysos. She then served him up to Tereus for his supper. He, on being appraised of the truth, pursued the sisters with a sword. As they fled, they were transformed into songbirds: in most accounts, Prokne became a nightingale, Philomela a swallow. Tereus then became a hoopoe.

Alkamenes shows the moment immediately preceding the murder of Itys. Since the heads are missing, contemporary understanding depends on pose or skhēma.94 Prokne pauses, her head slightly inclined. She raises her left arm in a pensive gesture; her left hand most likely held a knife (compare fig. 113). With her right hand, she pulls back her son’s head, exposing his throat to the knife. Like a victim at sacrifice, Itys wears a festal crown, added in metal. He is otherwise nude, hence vulnerable, and his body twists like a corkscrew.95 Photographs do not adequately convey the plastic effect of this torsion, nor the resulting contrast with the solid and stereometric mother. Even in reproduction, however, the boy’s agitation is obvious; his pose drives Alkamenes’ most remarkable conceit. Itys, in his distress, twists himself into his mother’s skirts, pressing between her thighs, his left shoulder obscured already by cloth (fig. 111). Deep undercutting causes shadows to gather over the shoulder, emphasizing the sense of inward movement, even penetration. It is as though, at the moment of his death, the child were returning to the body that gave him life.

As an evocation of character, this device is unsurpassed in Classical sculpture. Alkamenes does not evoke a generalized state, such as aidōs, but a complex set of
thoughts and fantasies that derive from a specific narrative situation. There is some precedent for the conceit—albeit in a very different register—on the east pediment of the Parthenon (fig. 78). Figures L and M, frequently identified as Aphrodite reclining in the lap of her mother Dione, share a comparable intimacy: Aphrodite seems almost to sink into her mother, her bare shoulder pressing down on Dione’s clothed breast, her elbow disappearing into the pelvis. The figures interpenetrate. This effect depends, however, on the overall rendering of drapery. The Parthenon pediments famously exploit surface-effect, the “wet style” garments seeming to flow over massive physiques. Dione and Aphrodite are particularly extravagant in this regard. Everything works in support of a the sense that the surface of the stone is permeable, transparent, diaphanous. The perception of something underneath the drapery is at once visually significant and overtly eroticized (Aphrodite, for instance, exposes one shoulder). Yet these techniques are not unique to the Parthenon; there is a clear relation between this Aphrodite and, for instance, the Getty goddess (fig. 74). What makes the pediment special, as well as a precedent for the Prokne group, is the fact that the interplay of surface and depth, outside and in, has a narrative function. It intimates an ēthos. Aphrodite’s virtual submersion into the body of her mother expresses a form of intimacy, a philia to go along with the erōs that Aphrodite herself incarnates.

Alkamenes worked on the Parthenon, and the Prokne group likewise effects a reciprocity between drapery and character. Pausanias, as we have seen, noted the group’s emphasis on internal drama: Prokne, he says, appears “having already taken counsel with herself [bebouleumenēn autēn] about the boy.” Comparisons with Sophokles are inevitable. It has even been suggested that Alkamenes might have been involved in some way with Sophokles’ production, perhaps as producer. Such theories are attractive and have yielded useful political interpretations. Yet they are ultimately speculative. What is relatively secure is the intensity with which the sculptor evokes ēthos. Alkamenes figures complex mental states through pose: a combination of reflection and action in the case of Prokne; anguish, incomprehension, and even fantasy in the case of Itys. Xenophon and Herodotos would have approved: this group exemplifies diaphanous “showing though,” using pose, skēma, to induce the beholder to project inner states onto stone.

But the relationship between pose and character is in fact complex. The organizing principle is chiastic. Prokne and Itys contrast as stasis to motion, frontality to torsion, two dimensions to three. They also contrast as knowledge to ignorance. Prokne knows what is about to occur; she “has already made up her mind about the boy” but has not yet killed him. Itys may or may not know he is about to die, but he
is certainly agitated, not abstracted. He is fully alive to his situation, regardless of whether we are to imagine that he understands it. Similar contrasts abound. Prokne is in the moment of emerging from distraction into action, having just taken counsel with herself; she holds her knife pensively even as she tugs back her son’s head; Itys seeks refuge from the preset action in a union with his mother. Prokne is about to cut herself from her husband and her son and even from her humanity; Itys seeks the opposite. The two-dimensional, distracted, static figure is, as it were, emerging into narrative presence; the plastic, agonized one is seeking to leave, his shoulder merging into the mother stone. It is there, at the point where the represented body disappears into the block, that the narrative drama becomes a drama of beholding as well: where the desire of a child to hide in his mother’s skirts shades into the desire of a beholder to imagine something underneath the surface of a stone. Because, to repeat, there is nothing beneath the surface that the beholder does not put there.

Prokne herself belongs to a sequence of pensive peplophoroi going back to the east pediment of the temple of Zeus at Olympia (fig. 112). Yet one detail of her pose has troubled scholars: she holds the knife in her left hand instead of her right. Left-handedness is unusual in Greek art; a relief in the Vatican, often thought to depend on a fifth-century original, shows a woman very like Prokne holding the blade in her right hand (she is preparing to murder her father, Pelias; fig. 113). There is, however, a rationale for this oddity. It has often been noted that, in her pose and even in some details of carving, Prokne closely resembles a woman on metope South 19 of the Parthenon (fig. 114). The figure is fragmentary, but Jacques Carrey’s drawing of 1674 gives a sense of its original appearance (fig. 115). Recently, Alexander Mantis has shown that woman to be spinning wool: in her original state, she held a metal distaff in her upraised left hand and drew thread with her lowered right. This pose has numerous parallels in Athenian vase-painting (fig. 116). The affinity between Prokne’s pose and that of these spinning women complicates matters. It suggests that Alkamenes has combined two stock poses: one signifying pensiveness or crisis and another signifying spinning. Where the figure on South 19 holds a distaff, Prokne holds a knife; where the one holds a thread, the other bares the neck of her son. It is unclear whether this affinity represents a specific allusion or a general one: whether Prokne is to be understood as striking the pose of one particular spinner—the one on Parthenon metope South 19—or merely a spinner in general. Either way, the allusion came at a cost: it entailed making Prokne left-handed.

But this explanation only raises another question: why should Alkamenes have made Prokne strike the pose of a spinner? Wool working (talasia) is crucial to the depicted narrative: the “voice of the shuttle,” Philomela’s woven story, precipitates the murder of Itys. That Prokne should adopt the pose of a wool worker at this of all moments is an irony.
worthy of tragic drama. As she leaves her accepted, feminine role as mother, and indeed precipitates her own exit from the human race, she unconsciously strikes the most matronly of poses. This irony organizes the monument. Alkamenes deploys a stock metaphor of Greek social and political thought, one common to Homer, Aristophanes, and Plato: life is a thread—the Moirai, or Fates, spin it and cut it—and human society is therefore a weaving. “For thusly have the gods spun the thread [eplekōsanto] for wretched mortals,” says Homer, “that they should live in pain; and [the gods] themselves are sorrowless.”

Spinning, as Plato says, is synkritikos, an art of combination; it produces a thread, that is, a desmos or “bond.” The failure of society is, accordingly, a tear or cut in the fabric of the state or the family. Hence the irony: Prokne spins threads as if to bind, even as she cuts family ties with horrific literalness. By means of pose, Alkamenes makes the two gestures simultaneous: spinning and severing are one and the same. So, where Aristotle saw tragic plots as moving from plokē, “weaving,” to lysis, “unraveling” or dénouement, Alkamenes causes the one to coincide with the other: the perception of a cut overlays, so to speak, the perception of a thread. It is as though, somehow, to cut were to spin, hence, by extension, to weave or bring together. Here, pose does not simply reveal character: it glosses it, ironizes it, and complicates it.

115 * Above right, Parthenon, Metope South 19 (detail): woman spinning. The distaff would have been added in metal. Drawing by Jacques Carrey, 1674.

Yet pose is not the sculptor’s only resource. Carving a story manifestly concerned with textiles, he makes drapery meaningful. As one would expect, Alkamenes uses the Phedian style’s standard means of intimating “unknown forms,” agnostoi morphai: ridgelike folds to suggest fine, clinging cloth over the upper body, and deep undercutting to suggest heavier fabric over the legs. The carving is not subtle, the ridges abrupt and widely spaced. The goal is evidently to produce heavy, slicing shadows in the sunlight. In this instance, however, the drapery articulates the work’s central drama: the chiastic relation of mother and child. Itys merges with his mother—or tries to do so—by covering himself with her skirts. His attempt to wrap his naked body in cloth figures a psychological state, indeed a fantasy of reunion with the maternal. It is also grimly proleptic, for Itys will soon be ingested, literally, by his father. Drapery, in short, functions within the narrative. It is not just a clue to “unknown forms”: it is also the very medium of tragic character. Finding the body, getting underneath the cloth, is finding ēthos.

So the suggestion of psychology— that is, the elicitation of expressive projection from beholders—depends upon the pretence, the fantasy, even, that the stone has an interior. The narrative action thematizes this conceit: Prokne’s knife will slice into her son’s exposed neck, and the boy will enclose himself within a cloth that, to borrow Xenophon’s phrase, “wraps very well indeed;” mala eu periplekomenon. In this way, the depicted action recapitulates the structure of “showing-through,” the diaphanous movement whereby inner communicates with outer. The suggestion of a body beneath drapery coincides with the suggestion of an inner life to the figures. With singular economy, Alkamenes suggests the most ineffable of hidden forms, the ēthos, by showing two figures finding this inside in the most literal way possible: by cutting in and wrapping round. Alkamenes presents the myth as a drama of finding the inside of bodies and garments alike. His figures act out the very fantasies of interiority which pose and drapery elicit, such that the narrative action recapitulates its own surface-effect.

The resulting drama implicates the beholder. To see how this is the case, it is useful to contrast Alkamenes’ group with the representation of mothers and children on grave reliefs. The Barbaliaki stele, encountered in chapter 1 along the Anavysos road, likewise shows a mother and child (fig. 13). The dead mother enfolds her infant in her cloak; the hem of the mantle, added in paint, bridges the gap between them. Their reciprocal look provides a standing invitation to nostalgia, mourning, and the making-present that is integral to the function of an Archaic gravestone. The stele does not imagine a failure of human ties, a cutting of the bonds of philia itself. Just the reverse: it assumes sympathy or arrogates it, much as a mortuary epigram might command a traveler to stay and mourn. Philia overcomes death. This mode lived on in works like the stele of Ampharete from the Athenian Kerameikos, roughly contemporary with Alkamenes’ group (fig. 117). Both the familial relation and the making present of the dead appear, in this instance, as emergence from cloth. Woman and child unite under a single cloak, from which the latter’s head emerges in a sort of parturition, even as the former’s body shows through diaphanous folds. Ampharete is not, as it happens, the mother, as the inscription makes clear:

It is my daughter’s child that I hold here with love [philon], the one whom I held on my lap while in life we looked on the ray [auge] of the sun, and whom I am holding now, dead as I am dead.
The grandmother and her grandchild are united in death, and the maternal relation between them is metaphorical: Ampharete is a family matriarch. Biology is secondary to genealogy and *philia*, as they are enacted in and through the gaze. The relation of beholder to beheld is maternal, familial, regardless of the literal relation between the two.

The Prokne group, by contrast, takes the *cutting* of familial bonds as its chief theme. It thereby makes a different claim upon the beholder. Alkamenes narrates a negation, a severance of ties between mother and child, husband and wife, tending toward a loss of humanity itself: cannibalism and metamorphosis. His gambit is that
the presentation of this cut will elicit a response in beholders: it will be, to borrow
a phrase from Aeschylus, eleeinos eisoran, “piteous to behold.”113 The audience may,
for instance, find pathos in Itys’s squirm or horror in Prokne’s thoughts.114 Doing
so, however, effectively reaffirms the very social bonds that Prokne is cutting. Bear-
ing witness to a loss of humanity, a severance of human ties, repairs those ties. To
use Aristotle’s terms, such a spectacle awakens pity and fear by narrating a horrific
pitilessness and a loss of humanity.115 In this way, the sculptor implicates beholders
in an ethical and emotional web.

The move is significant, because the story of Prokne and Itys is not simply one of
very bad deeds, but of a loss of humanity. Unlike that other great infanticide, Medea,
Prokne will not remain a person after she commits her crime; she will become a
bird. Itys, likewise, will be transformed from a boy into meat, a beast to be slaugh-
tered and consumed. In his case, however, the transformation is undeserved and, to
the precise extent that the beholder undergoes pathos, incomplete (insofar as we
pity him, he is not a mere meal; his father’s discovery is monstrous because a boy’s
remains remain nonetheless a boy). The humanity of these characters, or the lack
thereof, is at issue in the narrative (the neat Aristotelian division between character
and plot does not pertain in this case). It is, moreover, a theoretical issue as well—
an issue of beholding, of theōria. To undergo pathos or horror before the statue is
to see it as something other than mere stone: it is to find an éthos in either mother
or child, that is, to see the mother and child as such, as animate not inanimate, as
people not as blocks.116

The result is tragedy, or something like it. As with tragedy, the Prokne group
tends toward katharsis, that is, “clarification” or “clearing up”: a perspicuous repre-
sentation of mutual implication.117 That is the ethical work of such drama. We see
as Prokne does not; we find humanity where she does not. Such seeing is the work
of theory, theōria. Only we animate the inanimate, as the Rhetoric insists. In this
instance, doing so reaffirms that humane and familial kinship, philanthrōpia and
philia, which the narrative negates. We have seen such reaffirmation already once
before: at the end of the Iliad, when Priam and Akhilleus seemed to see each other
for the first time, and found themselves struck with wonder.118

Like the Mourning Penelope, the Prokne and Itys group both narrativizes and
psychologizes surface-effect. But it also interrogates the beholder’s capacity for symp-
thetic identification.119 In a scene of the severance of human ties, it clarifies what is
at stake in human responsiveness, philanthrōpia. The depicted narrative allegorizes
surface-effect, figuring interiority through a narrative of cutting and enveloping.
More generally, however, it allegorizes the economy of beholder and statue, the mu-
tual interweaving of seer and seen. That loop or knot, which Xenophon associated
phobically with the feminine and the void, is for Alkamenes the very substance of
ethical, narrative, and sculptural interest. His brief is not simply the making present
of a deceased or a deity, but of a recognizably human character. This interrogation,
more than any subject matter, constitutes the group’s real affinity with tragic drama.
As in tragedy, the character at stake is that of the audience: it will emerge in the mo-
ment of identification with the stone figures, the moment of expressive projection
in which the bonds of humanity—philanthrōpia—are reaffirmed.

But are they really? One might argue just the reverse: that the fact that we have
seen éthos in stone only goes to show that we have muddled the issue. For the fact
is that stones do not have consciousness and stones are not people, and whenever
one sees a statue *as a statue* then this distinction is, precisely, not up for debate. Wittgenstein asks the key question:

Could one imagine a stone’s having consciousness? And if anyone can do so—why should that not merely prove that such image-mongery is of no interest to us?²¹⁰

The question might lead one to suppose that, whatever one’s response to Prokne and Itys, *philanthrópia* is not at issue; at most, the issue might be some perverse *philolithia*, or “love of rocks.” Whatever it is we do, whatever criteria we employ, when we see *ēthos* in a stone, it *cannot* be what we do, they *cannot* be the same criteria we employ, when see consciousness in one another (or in cattle?). But it is significant that Wittgenstein phrases the matter as a question; he does not provide an answer. Elsewhere he writes,

We do indeed say of an inanimate thing that it is in pain: when playing with dolls for example. But this use of the concept of pain is a secondary one. Imagine a case in which people ascribed pain *only* to inanimate things; pitted *only* dolls!²¹¹

Or only statues. Is it so easy to imagine such a case? What would such people be ascribing to the doll if they *never* ascribed it to animate creatures? The difficulty suggests that image-mongery may be of interest, after all. Elsewhere Wittgenstein remarks that “‘Grief’ describes a pattern which recurs, with different variations, in the *weave* of our life.”²¹² Prokne and Itys may be said to unravel that metaphor.

This constitution of interiority has all the hallmarks of an operation of power. It may be tempting, for instance, to see this construction of the feminine interior as patriarchal. Following Laura Mulvey’s important account of the Pandora myth as a “topography of curiosity,” one might trace the following steps in the operation.

(a) Delimitation of an interior in and through surface-effect.
(b) Feminization of this interior through iconography.
(c) Characterization of this feminine interior as an *ēthos*, or ethical substance, in narrative.
(d) Equation of the recognition of this feminine, interior *ēthos* with political sociability.²¹³

One would then conclude that this process is ideological. The constitution of the hidden feminine interior occurs, on this account, precisely in order that its recognition may instantiate and legitimize a particular operation of power. In patriarchy, sculpture constitues the feminine as an inscrutable, veiled void in order that the penetration of the veil, the filling of the void, may comprise communal or polis life.

There is much to be said for this account, and we shall return to it, or to a variant, in chapter 5. But it does not seem adequate to the Prokne and Itys group. For the group never simply delimits an interior, never simply genders it, never simply figures an *ēthos*, never simply identifies beholding with community. Part of the problem is that (b), above, is reductive. The loss of humanity and the constitution of interiority pertain to both mother and son, hence are both masculine and feminine. But if that were the whole problem, then it would still be possible to reconfigure the argument
by omitting the specific claim about gender while retaining the essential point that interiority is an effect of power. (It helps that Itys is a naked boy, hence in Greece both “subaltern” and potentially erotic). But even this claim seems reductive. For the movement from surface to depth in this statue group is never complete or direct in the way ideology critique requires. The key point about surface-effect is that the surface does not disappear, is not bracketed but, rather, becomes diaphanous. In delimiting an interior, constituting a surface as that-which-overlays-a-depth, the sculpted surface always retains its visual and thematic prominence. To see a surface as diaphanous is not to fail to see it; to see a stone as depictive is not to fail to see its “stoniness” but, on the contrary, to see it continuously as both stone and figure. It is only because of this aspect that the breaching of fabric, like the slicing of skin and the incorporation of a body, can be a way to think a loss of humanity and a confirmation of philia. The interiority that such works constitute is neither private nor veiled, neither public nor un concealed, hence does not map onto the “topography of curiosity” that a Mulvey-esque account would discern.

So once again the question arises: why should such image-mongery be of any interest? Here is one possible reason. The argument thus far has been, in a nutshell, that the Prokne and Itys group narrativizes and psychologizes surface-effect in such a way as to provide a cathartic clarification of philanthropia. In so doing, it shows that the perception of consciousness, that is, seeing someone as human, is indeed a very public (nonsubjective, noninteriorized) way of seeing—as mothers see children, children see mothers, husbands see wives and sisters-in-law, sisters see each other, humans see birds and meat and carved stones. And that might be of interest to anyone.

Recapitulation

Surface-effect can be variously acknowledged, and the standard Greek strategy, from the sixth century into the fifth, is to do so in a very particular way. Herodotos idealizes this concept of the statue in his story of the Ethiopian columns. The statue is a container of some sort, and its surface bears the traces of whatever is inside. The keyword in this concept is diaphainein, “to show through”: the image is diaphanous to its inner essence. Such showing-through can be wonderful, thaumastos. In this regard, the Classical style may be seen as the elaboration and extension of traditional modes of image making. There is a recognizable kinship between, say, the stele of Ampharete and the Barbaliaki stele; between the epiphanies of the Parthenon pediments, the Ludovisi throne, and the Peplos kore. Certain fifth-century sculptors, however, come to acknowledge explicitly the beholder’s role in constructing this effect. Whatever is inside, underneath, concealed, known through traces—be it a body under clothes, bones and sinews under skin, or a human character—requires a beholder. Such is the case with Alkamenes, whose Prokne group implicates the beholder in its moral crisis; Xenophon’s Theodotē may stand for a misogynistic construction of the same economy. Although there is no reason to see the resulting circuit of mutual implication as a Blitz der Individualität, a Discovery of the Mind or an irruption of “Consciousness and Conscience,” still its exploitation is not formal in a pejorative or limiting sense. It is not a mere formality.

The fifth century may not witness the discovery of mind in world-historical perspective, but it does witness the construction of a distinctive ethics of beholding. If Plato, in Theaitetos, reconfigured wonder as a matter of the soul, effecting a shift.
from phenomenology to psychology, then Alkamenes may be said to have anticipated him by a generation or more, and do have done so within, not against, the craft of statue making. He casts ἔθος in sculpture, hence ethics, not as a matter of expression, nor of Plato’s “most radiant” visibility of an Idea in the world, but as one of formal relations between people and things. The Prokne group makes a claim on its beholders that calls for a response: it implicates instead of suborning. This claim deserves to be called political precisely insofar as it is reciprocal. It pertains to human relations under certain specific material conditions (in the narrative, and in the beholding of the narrative). And so the politics of wonder in sculpture will be the subject of the next and final chapter.
There was a time when archaeology, as a discipline devoted to silent monuments, ... aspired to the condition of history, and attained meaning only through the restitution of historical discourse; it might be said, to play on words a little, that in our time history aspires to the condition of archaeology, to the intrinsic description of the monument.

MICHEL FOUCAULT

Space and Politics
The preceding chapters have described two key features of the Classical style. First, the new, open poses of the fifth century represent an ongoing adjustment of the relation of image to beholder. Statues come to interact spatially with their audience in a dramatic and “wonderful” manner. Second, surface-effect becomes increasingly important as a way to articulate a dialectic of seen and unseen. These two features—spatial continuity and an exploitation of surface—come together in the medium of relief sculpture. This medium had three prime venues: architecture (chiefly metopes and friezes, insofar as Classical pedimental sculpture is very nearly in the round), gravestones, and votives. A survey of all three would double the length of this book. But it is possible, instead, to focus on one, particularly important, class of reliefs: the gravestones produced in Athens during the years of the Peloponnesian War, 431–404 BCE. Doing so has the added advantage of showing how the arguments of the previous chapters fare when confronted with the grit of a particular historical moment. There has been no shortage of case studies in the preceding pages, but the specificity has for the most part been that of artworks and not of social conditions. In the present instance, Classical Athenian reliefs depict space in a new manner: they relate depicted space to the lived space of the beholder. But the claim is that this “conquest of space” had a political charge. It was in fact a kind of conservatism: that “the Greek revolution” was, in the cemeteries of Athens, a return to the past. Indeed, the way grave reliefs organize figures and space can best be understood, not as a quest for truth or for narrative, but as a relic of politics in the radical democracy.

Conquests of Space: Hildebrand, Riegl, Carpenter, and Summers

Relief is crucial to modern understandings of the Classical style. The writings of three scholar-critics are exemplary in this regard. First is Adolph Hildebrand, author of Das Problem der Form in der bildenden Kunst—arguably the most influential account of classicism in the modern era.² Published in 1893, this pamphlet takes relief as a principal concern. Hildebrand’s project was to present Greek classicism as the fulfillment of Kantian aesthetics and, simultaneously, to ground it in contemporary psychologies of perception. His starting point was the insight that both Kant and nineteenth-century psychologists described vision as a two-step process. Kant, in his third Critique, describes how the eye initially apprehends a manifold of disparate quanta (how this initial quantification occurs goes unexplained); subsequently, the cognitive faculties comprehend those quanta in accordance with transcendental schemata, thus transforming them into experience present to consciousness.³ The Beautiful is that which unites these two, or more precisely their structural analogues, at the level of the faculties: it creates harmony between the Imagination and the Understanding.⁴ Hildebrand argued that the special task of the artwork was to exploit this dualism in perception in order to present a form of maxi-
mum clarity and unity. “The visual arts alone,” he wrote, “reflect the active operation of consciousness: the activity that seeks to bridge the gap between ideas of form and visual impressions and to fashion both into a unity.” The distinction between “ideas of form” and “visual impressions” is essential. In most ordinary experience, Hildebrand claimed, there is a disjunction or “gap” between the way forms present themselves to the eye and the way the mind knows them to be as such. But art can overcome this disjunction. It can do so by presenting clear and unified forms. Such forms will produce a pleasing harmony between the raw “visual impressions” and the schematic “ideas” by which they are ordered. What you see is what there is.

Hildebrand combined these broadly Kantian formulations with the idea, then current in psychological theory, that raw visual perceptions make a two-dimensional image on the retina, while preset cognitive schemata provide the subjective experience of the third dimension. The eye sees only flat planes; depth is something the mind infers. Hildebrand boldly equated the psychologists’ distinction between retinal and cognitive with the Kantian distinction between “visual impressions” and “ideas of form.” Consequently, the economy of apprehension and comprehension cashed out as a “gap” between the perception of flatness and of depth: “While evoking two-dimensional effects, the artistic representation contains that which the eye needs in order to develop a spatially clear image of nature, that is, a recognizable image of the object on the surface and a coherent depth dimension for the sensation of volume.” If the task of art is to reconcile apprehension and comprehension, seen and known, then as a practical matter that means the reconciliation of surface and recession in relief, sculpture, and painting.

For Hildebrand, the paradigmatic resolution of flatness and depth into “unity of form” occurred in the art of classical Greece: “This method of artistic representation … is none other than the idea of relief that prevailed in Greek art.” Greek art, and specifically Greek relief sculpture, was true simultaneously to both knowledge and perception. The important thing was the combination: Classical relief, for Hildebrand, combined a legible, two-dimensional outline (what the eye sees from afar) with a fully plastic, three-dimensional form (what the mind knows is actually present in the world).

In thus combining practical art criticism with both Kantian and psychological theory, Hildebrand helped set the terms of German aesthetics for a generation or more. Of course, his account is open to numerous objections. Most damning is Michael Podro’s observation that Hidebrand reverses cause and effect.

What [Hildebrand] regards as a search for clarity in perception is in fact a search for features in perception which can be seen in terms of a classical relief. What counts as clarity is what can be seen in terms of relief, and seeing in terms of relief is a sustained harmony between the sense of the continuous relief surface and the three-dimensional suggestion.

So far from vindicating the claims of transcendental idealism and perceptual psychology, Classical relief provides the model for Hildebrand’s aesthetic system. Yet, despite its circularity, Hildebrand’s account was influential. In their different ways, Alois Rieggl’s historicism and Rhys Carpenter’s empiricism both derived from this source.

Rieggl historicized Hildebrand’s account. First he recast the opposition between “the image of the object on the surface” and “the coherent depth dimension” in his fa-
mous distinction between optic and haptic modes of representation. Then he wrote the history of ancient art as an ongoing dialectic between the two. For Riegl, the two poles of the Classical style were Polykleitos and Lysippos. The one presented human figures as they are, the other as they appear to be.

Not only the Doryphoros but all pre-Lysippic art in general represented the “being” as opposed to the “being seen.” We also now know what “being” means: objective, autonomous being, the “thing in itself.” The “being seen,” in contrast, signifies the thing as perceived by the human faculties.

Space was crucial to this development. Indeed, Lysippos’s great achievement was, for Riegl, to have “discarded the last remnant of flatness, the attachment to a single plane.” Although Riegl devoted little attention to actual Classical reliefs, he constantly emphasized its supreme importance. “The movement of classical composition is freest on two-dimensional surfaces: reliefs and paintings.” That is because, in contrast to Egyptian relief, that of the Greeks admits “the simulation of a spatial dimension.” Relief sculpture, with its intertwining of figure and ground, epitomized the gradual disengagement of subjective perception from objective knowledge that Riegl took to be the central drama of Antique art. Thus the quasi-Kantian metaphysic of Hildebrand’s account becomes part of an elaborate historical dialectic—the legacy of Hegel.

Rhys Carpenter worked in what might seem to be an entirely different milieu. Yet he effectively recast the Hildebrandian position in empiricist terms. Eschewing the relativizing historicism of Riegl, Carpenter wrote the history of Greek sculpture not as the emergence of subjectivity but as the attainment of objectivity. Relief, once again, was central to the story. Like Hildebrand, Carpenter saw Classical relief as essentially duplex or hybrid. The Classical style entails “a treatment of relief so fully sculptural that the only adequate comparison of the figures would be to statues-in-the-round which have not yet fully emerged from the marble mantle out which they were being cut.” Once again, Classical relief displays an essential tension between surface and depth, between the slab of stone and voids it contains or suggests. Like Riegl, Carpenter historicized this phenomenon. He did so, however, in the interests of a totalizing empiricism. Carpenter was not a Kantian insofar as he admitted no distinction between things in themselves and the rational, scientific perception of them. In his account, therefore, the Classical hybrid eventually assays out into a precise and objective reproduction of the world as it is.

The continuing pertinence of these issues is everywhere apparent in David Summers’s informed and sophisticated account of relief in his recent book *Real Spaces*. For Summers, the crucial feature of relief as such is its projection of a groundline as a potentially infinite, recessive plane perpendicular to the vertical axis of the relief slab itself. Accordingly, he defines “relief space” as the arrangement of overlapping, parallel planes atop this virtual, horizontal ground. Relief is thus a matter of fretted planes; Summers distinguishes between an “original plane,” identical with the front of the relief slab, and a “secondary plane,” identical with the back of the relief. On the one hand, the establishment of a secondary or rear plane renders the original or front plane “transparent.” On the other, multiple overlapping planes, in progressively lower relief, tend to virtualize the secondary plane or backplate. Consequently, according to Summers, increasing complexity of relief space tends inexorably “toward both the virtual and the optical.”
Summers’s key example in this discussion is the east frieze of the Parthenon, which is said to strike “a kind of balance” between “clarity in the presentation of the figures themselves” and “clarity in the virtual dimension itself.” As for Hildebrand, the Classical style is defined as the harmonious combination of an eloquent, defining contour with both a real and a virtual third dimension. To make this bid for balance and opticality, however, Summers inevitably must omit some key features of Greek sculpture. First, he simply ignores any distinction between the representation of parallel, overlapping planes and that of oblique, projective, or recessive ones. For Summers, stipulatively, relief space consists of rigidly planar overlapping, or “fretting.” Distribution of forms across planes, or “faceting,” passes unnoticed (although, in fairness, he does address foreshortening when he gets to the Renaissance). Summers also ignores the possibility of projection beyond the “original” plane of the relief slab, either literally through doweling and metal attachments or implicitly through narrative action.

But while Summers’s account demonstrates the continuing viability of certain clichés about Greek art (as being closed, balanced, lucid, and true to materials), it does clarify certain issues. For arguably the most important move in Summers’s account is the initial assertion that the “original plane” of a relief is necessarily transparent, “little more than the limit for the height of the relief.” From this premise, relief sculpture’s tendency toward “both the virtual and the optical” is a foregone conclusion. Summers’s account suggests that projection and recession in general, and the breaching of the front plane in particular, might repay closer attention, insofar as they represent the unargued premises of the most up-to-date and sophisticated account of Classical relief on offer today.

This outward movement from depicted space to the surrounding environment need not be a mere formality. As we have seen repeatedly, the constitution of space is nothing if not political. Hildebrand, Riegl, Carpenter, and Summers are in broad agreement about the formal character of Classical relief, even if they disagree in their interpretations of that character. Their positions are, roughly speaking, Kantian, Hegelian, empiricist, and post-formalist, respectively. All, however, display a singular disregard for anything pertaining to Greek history, literature, or archaeology. Moving outward, attending to the front plane of the relief as well as to the back one, entails recasting these concerns in concretely political terms.

The Stele and the City

Archaic Athens had two basic formats of grave marker: the freestanding figure—typically a kouros or a kore—and the relief stele. Both types stood along the Anavysos road. Kouroi never have attributes: they hold nothing and wear nothing (save the occasional ribbon, belt, or boot). “Draped kouroi” of the kind seen in figure 90 are an altogether more restricted phenomenon. By contrast, the figures on relief stelai always wear or carry something, like the armor of a hoplite or the oil flask of an athlete (figs. 11–13, 118). On the Anavysos road, the contrast between the Diskobolos stele and the kouroi is subtle but significant. The youth on the stele has an attribute—his discus—while the kouroi have only their bodies. Figures on stelai can also have company. Two may crowd into a single panel, as on the Brother-and-Sister and Barbaliaki stelai (figs. 12–13); alternately, the deceased may stand above a predella containing a running Gorgon or a chariot. Of course, a sphinx may crown
the stele itself. Kouroi can have sculpted bases, but in such instances the subsidiary decoration is in relief: there is a contrast between the upright statue and the horizontal relief panel that simply does not pertain in the case of stelai. Thus where the nude, freestanding kouros is self-sufficient, comprehensible, and removed from the everyday world by his elevated base and his nudity, the clothed figure of a relief stele is thoroughly implicated in the everyday society of the polis.

Although this point has been made before, what still needs underscoring is that technique, here, has a metaphorical value. The freestanding kouros is literally removed from any attachment to his local civic community: his only peers, or hōmoioi, are his fellow kouroi, a generic type that transcends any one city-state. The relief figure, by contrast, is enmeshed in polis society just as surely as he is enmeshed in a block of stone. Rather than caricaturing this difference as one of total nonengagement versus total integration, it would be more accurate to see two types of integration, two opposed communities, Panhellenic and local.

These differences correspond to two broad trends in the poetry, politics, and the visual arts of Archaic Greece, two ways of laying claim to cultural status and political legitimacy. One way emphasized sources of prestige beyond the local community: with the gods, via hereditary priesthooods or claims of divine descent; with other city-states, via gift-exchange, family friendships, and intermarriage; with the Near East, via the display of costly imports or the affectation of Eastern clothes and customs. The other way made the local community the arbiter of status, as when the poet Phokylides said that a well-governed polis was “better than silly Nineveh,” or that noble birth was useless in itself. Most Greeks, of course, found themselves somewhere between these two extremes.

But tomb sculpture was not so equivocal. The choice of medium could position the deceased—and, more importantly, the living mourners—relative to these two, opposed ideals. It might be appropriate to speak of an ideology of medium in Archaic funerary sculpture, on analogy with the ideologies of genre that Leslie Kurke, Gregory Nagy, and others have discerned in Archaic and Classical literature. If so, then how did this ideology inflect the making and beholding of sculpture?

Contests of Space

Throughout Greece the fifth century brought with it a wave of restraint in funerary expenditure. Lavish marble grave monuments became increasingly rare. Nowhere was this shift more pronounced than in Attica. Although the region’s elites had by far the most extravagant graves in the Archaic period, tomb sculpture disappeared after circa 480. Whether this change was connected to sumptuary legislation, as implied by Cicero in an oft-cited passage, is less significant than the broad shift in attitude it implies. For about fifty years, the fanciest graves in Attica consisted of low tumuli with, at most, undecorated slabs. While mortuary display was declin-
ing throughout Greece in this period, places like Paros and the Ionian cities continued to produce stelai. It is striking that members of the Delian League should have produced fancier tombs than “imperial” Athens. The shift in the Attic record is exceptional both for its abruptness and for its extent.

It is difficult to avoid connecting the pattern at Athens to the rise of democracy. In the Kerameikos cemetery, the decline in sculpted monuments brought with it a surge in the number of archaeologically visible graves: many more people were being buried, with humbler offerings than before. This change probably does not indicate a higher death rate so much as the democratization of an elite burial ground. Costly burials did not, however, disappear from Athens. They became the exclusive prerogative of the state, in its commemorative ceremonies for war dead. After circa 465 at the latest, men who died for the city received an elaborate interment in the dēmosion sēma, the common public grave. Private tombs, by contrast, were austere. Tellingly, Myrrhine, the priestess of the state cult of Athena Nike on the Akropolis, was commemorated with a simple inscribed slab: her official status is in keeping with the restraint of her memorial. In short, the rhetorical opposition of elite and middling, statue and stele, was replaced by a new one: the democracy versus tomb sculpture as such. Elites, who presumably had the means to underwrite conspicuous tombs, seem to have acceded to this arrangement; whether in response to legislation or social pressure remains unclear.

Soon after the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War in 431, however, tomb sculpture reappeared in Athens—first as a trickle, then as a flood. This change represented an abandonment of restraint in Athenian tomb sculpture. In reverting to a mode of commemoration that had been out of favor for some three generations, they expressed a certain nostalgia, a dissatisfaction with the status quo. Nostalgia, of course, is not intrinsically antidemocratic. But in Classical Athens, where the status quo and democracy were the same thing, it is hard to see how the revival of tomb sculpture could be anything other than a rejection of the leveling tendencies of popular rule. Indeed, given that lavish funerary spectacle had by this time become a state prerogative over and against the austerity of private graves, the abandonment of restraint in the 420s amounts to an appropriation—or, better, re-appropriation—of the democracy’s own symbols. Athenian tomb sculptures of the late fifth century are, in short, fossils of political dissent. This is not to say that they necessarily conveyed coded political messages. Rather, the abandonment of restraint encourages us to think of politics in terms of behavior, not ideas. Commissioning, erecting, and using grave monuments expressed dissatisfaction with, or nonconformity to, democratic norms.

Significantly, when grave monuments did reappear in Athens, there were no more freestanding men and women. Kouroi and korai, the old icons of the elitist tradition, were no longer an option. The only acceptable format, in the 420s, was the “middling” relief stele. The earliest examples, like the stele of Eupheros from the Kerameikos cemetery, adopted the single-figure composition and the shallow carving of Parian stelai (fig. 119). The “conquest of space” had not yet begun in earnest. There is no compelling functional explanation for this renunciation of freestanding sculpture that, as we have seen, flourished in Athens a hundred years previously, and that was still being produced in other contexts in the Classical period. It seems more likely to be a question of politics—a politics of tomb sculpture—in which the rejection of a democratic status quo would not or could not go so far as to revive the outmoded freestanding statue.
What we have in the 420s is a somewhat uncomfortable fit between medium and message. Circumstantially, the abandonment of restraint implies dissent from democratic norms and from the state monopoly on mortuary display. But nobody went so far as to revive the freestanding monuments of the late Archaic period. The only format for private tomb sculpture that was even moderately acceptable in this period was the one associated with the values of the polis community. Hence the problem facing sculptors might be formulated as, How to convey the affective charge of a freestanding statue in the format of a relief? How to use this medium, how to make it congenial to upper-class nostalgia? At issue in such questions is the articulation of an ideologically charged structure of beholding. The central claim in what follows is that the answer to such questions lay in the manipulation of depicted space; more strongly, that the manipulation of depicted space was a solution to these questions.

One approach, adopted early on, was to appropriate the imagery of freestanding statuary in the most literal way possible. The stele of Agakles son of Phrynikhos, circa 430–420 BCE, adapts the Archaic convention of representing the deceased as an athlete, as on the Brother-and-Sister stele (fig. 120). As in Classical Parian reliefs, the relief is shallow. Significantly, however, the sculptor does not depict Agakles himself but a bronze statue of him. His stance, with arms held forward, is that of a pankratiast (“extreme” wrestler) preparing to enter a bout. It is part of the traditional iconography of victor statues, as is clear from a cup of circa 480–470, where we see just such a figure under construction in a foundry (fig. 121). In the stele the figure stands, unambiguously, on a statue base; presumably, it is Agakles’ own victor statue. Modern scholars have tried to identify this depicted statue as a famous midcentury work by Pythagoras of Rhegion. Although the hypothesis probably represents wishful thinking, it suffices to note the confounding of genres that this stele achieves. The Agakles memorial uses one medium to evoke another, in a way that is overdetermined just to the extent that it is gratuitous. The device makes more
sense, however, if it is understood to present a costly and ostentatious statue in the relatively restrained format of a relief. In a manner reminiscent of fifth-century epiphanian poetry, the relief presents the glory or *kudos* of an athletic victor in a format acceptable to the broader citizen community.\(^48\)

A feminine version of this conceit appears on a gravestone of the late fifth or very early fourth century, showing a woman leaning on a loutrophoros (fig. 122).\(^49\) Vases of this type served to draw a bride’s nuptial bath and therefore marked the graves of women who died before marriage. To make the theme even more explicit, the woman draws her veil with her right hand, a gesture we have encountered already in scenes of Penelope. Such imagery recalls, in this context, lines from Euripides’ *Alkestis* (produced in 438):

> For when she understood that the fatal day
> was come, she bathed her white body with water drawn
> from running streams, then opened the cedar chest and took
> her clothes out, and dressed in all her finery
> and stood before the Spirit in the Hearth and prayed . . .\(^50\)
There is, in short, an implicit narrative of marriage to death. Appropriately, therefore, the pose derives from a statue of Aphrodite, often associated with a work of Alkamenes (fig. 123). Now known only through Roman versions, the type’s Classical pedigree is secured by its appearance on a red-figure epinetron of the late fifth century. The goddess appears leaning on a pillar, with legs crossed and right arm upraised (such a pose actually makes much more sense than leaning on a clay water vessel, which would likely break or tip over under the woman’s weight). The religious implications of this allusion, and the potential for impiety, have exercised modern scholars, but the equation of a young would-be bride with the goddess of love does not seem especially momentous. After all, Marriage to Death is already a metaphor: there is no question of really identifying a mortal with a deity, in the manner of Arachne or Salmoneus.

The stele overall is another “topography of curiosity.” At lower right is a cipher-key to the whole composition. Drapery cascades from beneath the woman’s elbow and spills over the shoulder of the nuptial vessel, the fold lines modeling its volume. It is an exercise in surface-effect: for in emphasizing the vessel’s swelling roundness the folds contribute to the sense that it is indeed a vessel, that it is hollow. But of course there is more to the matter. The vessel at lower right, its shoulder exposed by ripples of drapery, has a counterpart at upper left, in the exposed shoulder of the woman herself. In this way the stele proposes the familiar trope of woman-as-vessel. Drapery is, as usual in Greece, a favored tool for this metaphorical work. As on monumental Aphrodites, the filmy drapery evokes the thauma idesthai that is the goddess’s shimmering garment. But in this case, cloth is not the only tool. Relief, unlike freestanding statuary, can use depicted space to similar effect. The woman stands in a shallow naïskos, with pilasters flanking her on either side. Both she and the vessel overlap this frame and seem to project forward from the depicted space. Particularly dramatic in this respect is the upper hem of her veil, just visible at top left as a serpentine line running from background to foreground. This projective quality underscores the figure’s allusion to freestanding statuary. As with Agakles, the evident aversion to grave statues leads some Athenians to choose the next best thing: stelai with statuesque figures.

Other early stelai adopt a similar tactic. That of Khairedemos and Lykeas in Piraeus makes reference in just this way to one of the most famous statues of the Classical age, the Doryphoros or “Spear-Bearer” of Polykleitos: that is, to the premier Classical version of the generic, frontal, nude male (plate 9, fig. 97). This figure is as close as Classical art gets to the kouros. One view holds that this allu-
sion is a way of heroizing the deceased. This reading, however, relegates Lykeas—fully clothed and not especially statuesque—to a purely subsidiary role. Yet the memorial is his as well. More important is the fact that Lykeas is also allusive: not to freestanding statuary, but to the traditional profile hoplite of Archaic relief (fig. 118). The two men are, in fact, complementary: nude and clothed, visible and obscure, frontal and profile, foreground and background, freestanding and relief. It is as if the two formats of the Archaic period—kouros and stele—had been compressed into a single panel.

Where Agakles retains the strict profile and shallow carving of older styles, here “the conquest of space” is more in evidence. The sculptor uses several devices to counteract the flatness of the marble slab. An architectural frame, affixed by metal clamps, originally surrounded the piece; it will have provided a boxy space for the figures to inhabit. Khairedemos himself projects dramatically from the relief. No fewer than three parallel planes intervene between him and the backplate (his own shield, Lykeas’s body, and Lykeas’s shield). Fretted one behind the other, these planes make the relief seem deeper than it actually is, and they push Khairedemos forward into the space of the living (here again, the Brother-and-Sister stele makes a useful contrast; fig. 12). More innovative is the way Khairedemos’s body is at an angle to those planes, such that one shoulder forms a projective salience while the other literally recedes into what was once a dark blue background; his spear makes a corresponding, oblique facet in the opposite direction. Set before the hollowed bowl of his shield, Khairedemos seems to occupy a void even as he disappears into the stone. The sculptor thus exploits one of the chief resources of relief sculpture: its unique capacity to combine depicted and actual space. The deep undercutting on Khairedemos’s right (our left) does literally disengage him from the blank wall of the slab, even as a portion of his body is absorbed, as it were, into that slab. Lykeas is by contrast resolutely flat, his profile establishing the back plane and thus serving as a foil to the presentness of his comrade. In short, depicted space on this gravestone is but one element within a larger dialectical system. Flatness and depth, freestanding and relief, are mutually implicated.

The result is like a diagram of the logic of early sculpture. The two figures epitomize the key themes of the Archaic memorial: radiant presence versus obscure absence. Khairedemos is present in the manner of an Archaic kouros. Projecting from the relief, alluding to the freestanding Doryphoros, he bids fair to inhabit the same lived space as the beholder. Yet these very qualities of radiance, nudity, and projection are what inspire some scholars to see Khairedemos as a hero. They distance him from the everyday world of mortals even as they push him into it. The quotidian has its representative in Lykeas—who is largely hidden from view. In this chiastic interplay, the stele represents a summation of the formal history of Athenian tomb sculpture.

But politics—and the specificity of politics—is inescapable. The name Lykeas is exceptionally rare, but it turns up on an Athenian state casualty list of 411 BCE; as has long been recognized, it is probably the same person. In other words, our Lykeas was memorialized twice, once on a public and once on a private monument. Such redundancy is a reminder that, merely by depicting dead soldiers as such, the Piraeus relief departs from the orthodoxy of the public grave and the state monopoly on the commemoration of war dead. The gravestone is intrinsically dissident: its very existence testifies to the inability of radical democracy to accommodate the aspirations of at least some of its wealthy citizens. The year 411 was important in
this respect, for it witnessed a successful but short-lived coup d'état in Athens by oligarchic opponents of war with Sparta.\textsuperscript{61} Lykeas’s own sympathies are clear from the fact that a fragment of Old Comedy puts him in the company of the oligarchic ringleader Peisander, abusing both as “big apes,” \textit{megaloi pithekoi}.\textsuperscript{62} We should, however, resist seeing a simple, reflexive link between the stele and reactionary violence. Dissident it may be; but it is not, for all that, revolutionary. The Piraeus relief establishes a circumstantial noncontradiction between depth and flatness, hero and citizen, statue and stele; which might be seen as a noncontradiction between elitist and democratic modes of communication. As on the Agakles memorial, here dissent from the democratic status quo uses the \textit{acceptable} medium of relief in such a way as to assert its ultimate compatibility with the \textit{unacceptable} medium of sculpture in the round. The result is not revolution but dissident accommodation.

This gravestone, deeply political even as it eschews strident propagandizing, belongs to what I have elsewhere called an iconography of \textit{diallagē}, that is, of “reconciliation and exchange.”\textsuperscript{63} Such images assert the compatibility of opposing positions by fiat, as when the Tyrannicides group takes aristocratic lovers as the founders of citizen equality, or when the Parthenon frieze depicts the radical democracy as a community of aristocratic horsemen, or, as here, when the antithesis of kouros and stele is simultaneously stated and cancelled. The Athenians had a distinctive knack for finessing ideological differences in this way. Again and again, they cobbled together representations of their polis that were ideologically multivalent, conveniently vague. The Piraeus stele is typical in this regard: here, the potent image of a phalanx causes the city’s internal divisions—violently apparent in the coup of 411—simply to disappear.\textsuperscript{64} This reading clarifies another well-known stele. Now in Worcester, Massachusetts, it comes from the borderlands between Athens and Megara (fig. 124).\textsuperscript{65} A single adult male, partially clad, strides to our right. He clutches a conical felt cap or \textit{pilos} in one hand, with a spear in the other, and a shield on his arm. The connection between this stele and the one from Piraeus is obvious. It is as though Khairedemos and Lykeas had been compressed into a single figure: this man adopts the pose of the former—the pose of the \textit{Doryphoros}—even as he wears the clothes of the latter. No surprise that connoisseurs have attributed the two monuments to a single sculptor.

Two details warrant special mention. First, the man stands before an altar, largely missing due to a break but still just visible at lower right. What does this detail signify? For some, it suggests that this relief is not a gravestone at all, but a votive relief for a hero. The format, however, is unusual for a votive relief, which tend to be relatively small and horizontal. More plausible, therefore, is the suggestion that the altar is a reminder of the fact that, in Classical Athens, all casualties of war were, by definition, “heroes.” What nudity does for Khairedemos, the altar does for this warrior: it removes him from the everyday, makes it difficult to tell if he is an epiphany of the divine or a mortal citizen.\textsuperscript{66} The second detail concerns the felt cap, the \textit{pilos}. When this relief first came to light and was still poorly published, there was lively debate as to whether the cap were hard or soft, bronze or felt. Classical fighters sometimes wore bronze caps, readily identifiable by their offset rim (fig. 125).\textsuperscript{67} But a felt cap is strange gear for a warrior. It was J. D. Beazley who, in 1929, showed conclusively that our warrior holds a soft cap: his hand clearly compresses the material.\textsuperscript{68} The detail is not especially
conspicuous in the present state of the stele. Presumably, however, the original polychromy would have made the distinction between felt and bronze readily apparent.

An iconographic oddity demands explanation. The felt pilos is, as it happens, a fairly specialized piece of headgear. It has a particular association with Lakonia and its dominions. Thucydides notes that Spartan troops at Pylos in 425 BCE were particularly vulnerable to volleys of arrows because their felt caps offered them no protection. Plutarch mentions that Spartan admiral Lysander wore a pilos, and Strabo even goes so far as to speak of a pilos Lakonikos, a Lakonian conical hat. In art, meanwhile, Hermes in Arkadia wears such a cap; and Arkadia was under Spartan control in these years. Likewise, the famous frescoes in the Knidian clubhouse at Delphi depicted the Messenian hero Nestor wearing a pilos; Messenia being, of course, under Spartan sway until the fourth century. More generally, the pilos is the special attribute of Kastor and Polydeuces, the Dioskouroi, who were specially venerated at Sparta. Pausanias tells a story of how some teenage pranksters once dressed up in piloi and rode into Sparta, causing the inhabitants to believe that the Divine Twins had arrived among them. It seems, in fact, there is no literary reference to any Greeks, other than the Lakonians and their immediate neighbors, wearing felt piloi. It thus seems safe to say that the cap is a specifically Lakonian piece of equipment. Indeed, a state relief from Athens, commemorating men killed in battle against the Megarians and the Spartans, shows an enemy foot soldier wearing a pilos (although it is unclear whether this example is of felt or bronze; the distinction would presumably have been clear when the stele was painted).

The presence of this hat on an Athenian gravestone of the Peloponnesian War is surely significant. It is only a small interpretative leap to suggest that it aligns the deceased with the pro-Spartan, antidemocratic faction in Athenian politics—the party that favored a speedy end to the war, and to which Lykeas and the other “big apes” belonged. Erected in the countryside, well away from the rabble in the city, the warrior stele is at once profoundly Athenian in its style and format, and yet very much at odds with the political regime of the day.

Once again, then, doubleness. Doubleness of status—epiphany or warrior?—and doubleness of allegiance—Athenian or Spartan? The familiar theme here acquires a markedly political inflection. As in earlier works, moreover, the point is to hold both options in suspension: to efface contradiction by staging its resolution. As with the Calf Bearer, erected on the Akropolis roughly a hundred and fifty years previously, the Worcester stele is a chiasmos: the figure bears an enormous X across the chest (fig. 61). And space responds. Not only does the warrior make allusion to the freestanding Doryphoros by means of pose, but he actually twists like a corkscrew, such that his feet and legs are at a sharp angle to the relief plane, while his shoulders are very nearly parallel to it. His right shoulder, in particular, differs in a subtle but important way from that of Khairedemos. It does not project forward but cleaves to the background slab. Unlike Khairedemos, moreover, this warrior looks out at the viewer, with the result that his face coincides with the relief plane instead of standing at an angle to it. These features assimilate the warrior to the flat marble block.
But others have the opposite effect. The head, for instance, overlaps the crowning molding, hence stands free from the relief plane; contrast the Piraeus stele once again. In short, the bearded warrior maintains an ambiguous relation to the slab, as flatness and depth intertwine in a single body. This play of space recapitulates the odd doubleness of the figure’s social and political role. Spatial ambiguity answers to political complexity, the one figuring the other.

Speculation

It is useful to contrast such tactics with what was afoot in contemporary architectural sculpture. Attic gravestones more closely resemble friezes than metopes or pediments. Metope South 27 of the Parthenon, for example, exhibits all the projective “pop” of freestanding statuary (fig. 126). The frame of the panel is now a boundary to be crossed; the figures no longer cleave to the front plane of the block but leap from it. Here the dialogue of drapery and body takes the form of a stark antithesis that maps onto the distinction between figure and ground; the Nike of Paionios would adapt this background sheet to three dimensions. But such a three-dimensional charge was not an option for gravestones until well into the fourth century. At issue, therefore, is not sculptural ability but decorum.
Space could be exploited to metaphorical, not to say ideological, effect. This possibility is equally apparent in a group of gravestones showing women with mirrors. The mirror indicates the social status of the woman: notionally at toilette, she is the mistress of a house. Like the Worcester stele, these examples trade on the interplay between that which is parallel to the relief plane and that which is offset from it. Two stelai of the late fifth–early fourth century show the basic type (figs. 127, 128). Although the women themselves are in profile to the right, in the manner of Cycladic antecedents, they hold their mirrors at an angle to the relief plane, such that the reflecting surfaces are visible to the beholder. This rendering is not conventional in any trivial sense of the word: the Athenian tradition of offset mirrors is distinctive. Other options were available to the sculptors. For instance, a mirror appears in profile on the early Classical “Albani pasticcio” in Rome, while mirrors are shown both frontally and in profile on Locrian pinakes. Setting the mirror at an angle is the result of a sculptural choice. Its effect is clear enough. The mirror is available simultaneously to our gaze and to that of the depicted woman. It invites us to look into the reflecting surface ourselves, there to lock eyes with the deceased in the disk of polished bronze. The stele of Mika and Dion makes the role of the mirror explicit by placing it midway between the interlocked gazes of husband and wife (fig. 129). The specular circuit is thus an open one, linking the beholder’s own lived space to the Flatland of the stele.

Here again, the two-dimensionality of relief gets suspended in favor of a dynamic interplay between actual and depicted space. These stelai, it should be stressed, make no iconographic allusion to freestanding work. In their own way, however, they bracket or suspend the carved slab in the interest of a more active engagement with the beholder. After their fashion, these reliefs aspire to statuary just as overtly as do works like the Khairedemos and Lykeas stele. Mirrors, an iconographic marker of social position, here function as a way to engage the beholder.

That said, it is not quite right to speak of “reflecting surfaces” and “disks of polished bronze.” The depicted mirrors, for all that they are proffered to our eyes, do not reflect anything at all: their surfaces are not of bronze but of marble, hence they absorb light instead of reflecting it. Nor is there any evidence that “reflections” were painted onto the marble. The marble mirror does not literally reflect, but the conceit of the relief is that it might do so. It might be seen, therefore, as an invitation to entertain an appealing fantasy: the idea that we as beholders can actually meet the gaze of the departed through the medium of stone. Within the logic of the depicted scene, an image or eidōlon—the imagined reflection in the mirror—becomes the vehicle of a communion between living and dead.

Such fantasies of connection are the stock-in-trade of funerary art; yet this instance is more complex than most. On the one hand, the mirror establishes symmetry between the depicted woman and the beholder. Each is looking at an eidōlon, a mere shadow, “appearances but not beings in truth,” as the Republic puts it. Thus the woman’s (depicted) action exemplifies that of the actual, living viewer. On the other, the mirror’s offset angle—and the attendant implication that we are locking gazes with the departed—establishes a direct connection between living and dead. Though it is a mere shadow, yet it is (virtually) real: this is the logic of the Archaic image, reconstituted and elaborated for a Classical audience (for Xenophon, recall, the mirror image was one those quotidian wonders, thaumata, that excite the philosopher). The stele thus acts out or allegorizes its own beholding, even as it holds forth the promise of a fully realized “presentification” of the absent. The blank disc


at an angle to the relief plane is the very type of the new, Classical relief figure, a schematic version of offset figures like Khairedemos.

**Flitting**

The allegorical structure of the mirror reliefs, whereby the stele narrates its own function, organizes one of the earliest, and greatest, of the Classical Athenian gravestones: a work of high Parthenonian style known as the “Cat stele” (plate 10). Beneath an exquisite palmette-lotus frieze and a smaller Lesbian cyma stands the deceased, a young man. His torso is frontal, his face in profile, and he holds a dove in his left hand. He raises his right, palm open, to a birdcage. Immediately below the cage is a slab of stone, a standard attribute of the _palaistra_ or exercise yard. Atop the slab sits the eponymous cat (its head is missing but once faced the beholder). Leaning on the slab is a mournful boy, either a slave or a relative; from his pose he seems to have held something, perhaps athletic equipment, in his hands.

In its simple masses and strict adherence to planarity, the work exemplifies many of the features associated with Classical sculpture in the modern imagination. The overhanging lintel establishes both the front plane and the depth of the relief, while the palmette-lotus chain itself—vertical florals distributed horizontally—elegantly diagrams the extension of the slab in two dimensions. All the figures adjust themselves to the basic quadrature thus laid out. The boy, the cat, and the slab comprise a series of planes standing parallel to the front of the stele itself—even as, through overlapping and frontality, they recede directly toward the background. The standing ephebe likewise conforms to the main axes of the marble block, though in his case the sense of volume is achieved by means of a virtuosic treatment of drapery, particularly the closely packed folds that swoop around his hip and over his shoulder, and the flaky modeling lines that cling to his legs (fig. 130). The style is so close to that of the Parthenon frieze—most obviously the piecrust selvage of the youth’s cloak—that most scholars take it to have been carved by a member of Pheidias’s team, presumably after the completion of the great temple. Clear, coherent, and totally self-contained, the Cat stele is textbook classicism. One imagines Hildebrand in ecstasy.

Iconographically the piece adapts and combines two older, Cycladic types. An island relief in Delphi, dating to about the second quarter of the fifth century, provides a precedent for the pairing of youth and boy; the faces are missing but the boy’s pose seems mournful (fig. 131). Even more influential is a series of Parian stelai showing a young girl with one or two doves.
A relatively early example, dating to circa 470 BCE, comes from Rome, whither it was removed in late Republican or Imperial times. Slightly later, from around mid-century, are exceptionally fine stelai in New York and Thessaloniki (figs. 132, 133). In none of these cases is it necessary to interpret the birds as symbols of the human soul, as some have done, to see that they evoke a general sense of transience and ephemerality. The girls always hold the birds tightly; in the examples in New York and Thessaloniki, a visual rhyme between its wing and a fold of cloth over the girl’s belly assimilates each to the other. The exquisitely shallow relief binds the girl to its surface, and thus holds her close, holds her in presence, just as the girl holds the bird before it flies. Just as, in an Archaic funerary epigram from Athens, death may be said to “hold fast,” *kathekhei*, a dead man: “Diodoros set up for all to see this sign of his dear son Stesias, whom tearful death holds fast.”

In wartime Athens, the dove motif turns up early and quickly becomes popular. The chief difference from the Parian antecedents is a marked preference for boys as subject matter instead of girls. It is possible that there might be pederastic overtones to this shift, as though in Athens the bird came to be understood as a love gift, hence inappropriate to the representation of young maids. The Cat stele participates in...

---

this tradition, with some modifications. Most obvious are the frontal pose and the upraised right arm. This gesture has long been the subject of controversy. The open palm indicates that the youth is neither reaching into the cage nor closing it, and the most plausible interpretation is that he has just released a dove from the cage, and it has flown away. A good point of comparison is a sculpted base of circa 410 from the Akropolis: a seated man releases a dove, which appears in flight just above his open palm. On the Cat stele, however, the absent dove remains implicit. The beholder must supply it imaginatively, much as she must supply a reflecting surface to a depicted hand mirror on other stelai (figs. 127–29). Like the hand mirrors—and, for that matter, like Khairesdemos—the birdcage stands at a sharp angle to the block itself. In each case, the discordant oblique provides a link between the relief and the world around it. Here again, in other words, the boundary between the two spaces is porous, continuous, such that a bird can flit between the two, can fly out of “that” world and into “this” one.

Such porosity is, in fact, the stele’s main theme. As has long been recognized, the cat perched on a slab of stone recalls the watchful sphinxes that once crowned Archaic gravestones (fig. 12). The riddling monster is diminished, domesticated (the effect would be comic were this not a context of the utmost gravity). What has not been sufficiently appreciated is that this allusion is a key to the entire monument. For if the cat is a sphinx manqué, then the slab on which he sits is in some sense a grave stele—and the young boy stands in the place of the figure on a stele. It is as though the boy on the Brother-and-Sister stele had come alive: as he leans beneath the miraculously animate feline, the boy is like a stele figure who has stepped out into life. This implicit movement reiterates that of the departed dove. Just as the bird has flown out of the stele and into our own, lived space, so the boy has emerged from depicted relief into depicted actuality—into the world of the older youth.

The stele thus allegorizes its own mode of address. Within the depicted scene, we see the boundary between monument and world break down, such that a feline and a boy come to life. Then the stele itself narrates an identical movement in the flight of the dove, which has just been released from the stone to fly into our world. In this way, the stele acts out the permeability of the world of relief to the world of the living, and vice versa. The narrative recapitulates its own internal organization. Even this account, however, risks making things too explicit. The Cat stele does not narrate a Pygmalion scene; on offer is an allusion, a conceit, not plodding literalism. Meanings here are fugitive, like doves.

With this conceit, however, relief really does attain to the spatial impact of freestanding sculpture. If the Agakles memorial effectively absorbed a statue into a relief,
the Cat stele does the reverse: it projects relief outward into the lived space of the beholder, and thereby makes it robustly statuesque. The magnificent youth seems almost to reach out into our own world; he seems almost to follow the dove and step forward, like a kouros, into presence. Almost.

It is part of a stele’s task to trigger this fantasy; the analogy with a kouros is not misplaced. It is something of a cliché to pair this stele with the seated Apollo of the Parthenon’s east frieze (fig. 134). The stylistic affinity is undeniable. Yet a more obvious allusion, perhaps, would be to a distinctive hybrid of relief and sculpture in the round: that is, to pedimental sculpture and, specifically, to the great epiphanic Apollo in the west gable of Zeus’s temple at Olympia (fig. 135). Kouroi, recall, were also versions of Apollo: here the tenor of the Archaic metaphor remains, but its vehicle has changed.

So presence is a potential, a fantasy that this stele solicits. Yet the absence of the dead is permanent, and ultimately it is hubristic to think otherwise. Aeschylus compares the insatiable Paris to “a child who chases a winged bird”: he always pursues the unattainable, remaining forever unfulfilled. The stele suggests something similar. The departure of the dove mirrors that of the dead man even as it enacts the continuity of depiction and the everyday world. The bird is nowhere to be seen; the magic that occurs in depiction—the transformation of hard marble into fur and soft flesh—is always potential, never actual. The dead differ in this respect from doves. They do not return home, save as images or phantoms, but flit about eternally in Hades.

Counter-Memories

The Cat stele suggests that the clarity and closure of textbook classicism are only half the story. Equally important are invisibility, complexity, and porousness. In the case of grave reliefs, moreover, this stylistic tendency is bound up with contemporary history. The “conquest of space” seems less a step in the march of progress than a reactionary attempt to reconcile the politics of relief with that of freestanding statuary. “Politics,” here, does not reduce to a propagandistic message, or even to symbolism of the sort familiar from Aristophanes. It is rather a question of affect and comportment, a way of placing oneself spatially within a world of meaning or “assignment relations.”

However, not all early Athenian gravestones aspire, in this way, to the condition of freestanding work. On the contrary, there exists a second tradition, or countertradition, which dramatizes the surface of the relief slab, and insists on the separation of depicted and actual space. A stele from Deligeorgi Street in Athens exemplifies the pattern (fig. 136). Two men of equal height, both standing, clasp hands (dexiosis) while looking eye to eye. Such confrontations, it has long been recognized, model family affection and sociability under democracy; similar compositions appear on Athenian document reliefs to allegorize political agreements and treaties. No hierarchies here, no slaves or servants, just an encounter between
men who meet as equals while yet bearing the attributes of a high class lifestyle: a hunting dog and a flask of scented oil. As on the Cat stele, a heavy overhanging lintel dramatizes the foreground plane. Careful stacking of planes creates a shallow yet replete space. At lower left, for instance, the young man’s two legs overlap the dog, whose own legs overlap in turn. At right, the elder man’s knee peeks from between long slashing folds, once again establishing a series of layers leading to the backplate. The upper bodies rotate outward slightly, the near shoulder in each case thrust well back, so the upper half of the scene seems almost to open like a pair of French doors. The torsos are, in consequence, slightly distorted, “smeared” over the surface of the stone; it is a long distance from the young man’s pectoral to the ball of his shoulder. These men, in short, stand within a world, a sliver of space, that is self-contained but
does not communicate with this one. The emphatic statement of the foreground plane prevents interaction, while the play of gazes is strictly lateral, perpendicular to our own. We are closed out. If this be a world of idealized democratic sociability, it is a world with clear boundaries.

Other reliefs develop this theme. On a fragmentary stele from the Ambelaki necropolis on Salamis, dating to circa 410–400 BCE, a young man sits facing to the left (fig. 137). Only his head remains. He extends one arm to hold before him a theatrical mask. To judge by the expression and the noble features it is a mask from tragedy; the face seems to be female. Opinions vary as to whether the deceased was a poet, an actor, or both (a tragikos). If a poet, he would have most likely have held a scroll in his left hand, but absent this detail it is impossible to specify. In any event, the relief
belongs to a class of early stelai that depict men with the attributes of their professions. Other instances include the stelai of Sosinos of Gortyn, a coppersmith, and Xanthippos, a cobbler. The men on these reliefs have little in common with nude, quasi-heroic figures like Khairodemos. All are tradesmen: citizens and metics who have become wealthy by using tekhnē for pay.

The Actor’s stele glosses, even ironizes, scenes of dexiosis. It presents a spectacle of contemplation, as the tragedian exchanges looks with his own mask. Once again, the sightlines run across the plane of the stele, emphasizing its flatness and segregating the space of the relief from that of the beholder. Both mask and face are in strict profile; this stele is as planimetric as any Archaic gravestone. There is no direct appeal to the world outside the frame. Unlike the Cat stele, where imitation and reality are part of a single continuum, here two worlds remain distinct. An even more pertinent contrast is with the woman-and-mirror stelai (figs. 127–29). In each case, looking at an image is itself a theme; in each case, that is, the scene allegorizes its own beholding. The mirror stelai, however, use the figured image to connect beholder and beheld. Because the mirrors are held at an angle, our gaze meets that of the dead woman (in fantasy, at any rate). On the Actor’s stele, by contrast, the economy of the gaze remains closed. The stele thematizes beholding, but it does not forge a connection with the actual beholder. There is no continuity between depicted and actual. Instead, depicted looking is the mimēsis, the imitation, of actual looking.

Within the depicted scene, the mask represents an equivalent mode of difference. On stage and in the visual arts, the mask is often a figure of radical otherness,
and this case is no exception. The actor holds it the
way Athena and Perseus hold the head of Medousa
in Classical vase-painting, as on an Apulian krater
of circa 400–385 BCE, by the Tarporley Painter (fig.
138). Yet the mask of Medousa is invariably frontal
to the beholder, while this one turns its gaze on the
actor himself. Its stare confronts him, and him alone.

Two further features underscore the mask’s
uncanny alterity. The first is its gender. The mask
is feminine or, as Euripides puts it, *thēlumorphos,
“woman-shaped.” Like Pentheus, the actor can
change his gender under the power of Dionysos:
dramatic performance is a kind of transvestitism.

The second difference is that of affect: the mask is
contorted with grief, the actor’s face impassive. This latter contrast is particularly
suggestive, for it raises precisely the issue that, from Pandora to Theodotē, haunts
Greek thinking about images: the possibility of deception, of an image that is di-
aphanous to nothing. For all its sorrow, the mask is empty, and its excess of feeling
is a version of the manic abandon of the Dionysian stage: a loss of self, akin to the
uncontrolled grief of the female lament or the frenzy of a bacchante. Conversely,
the actor’s neutral expression and stiff pose are emblematic of *sophrosynē and en-
krateia, virtuous restraint and self-control. They are revealing of character precisely
because they are blank.

If these features suggest an antithesis of actor and mask, others suggest a deeper
affinity. For one thing, the mask is, of course, something to be worn; the actor will
don it and doff it. But the deeper affinity is structural. Like the mask, the actor is
himself a subject of interested contemplation, himself a figure of sorrow. In a tradi-
tion going back to the Barbaliaki stele and beyond, his contemplation of the mask
models the beholder’s own activity. The Greek language encourages this assimila-
tion: the same verb, *theaomai, means both “to contemplate” and “to view as a spec-
tator.” The actor studies the woeful visage, much as a passerby will pause and mourn
before this very *sēma. Even in death he plays a role, doubling the one who stands
before the stele. By this logic, the mask becomes the *mimēsis of the stele itself. Each
exemplifies the same doubleness, the same uncanny vitality, the same combination
of *pathos and emptiness. Each is expressive and hollow at once.

The grave stele becomes, on this view, an exercise in prosopopoeia, literally “mask-
making,” the making-present of someone absent or dead through the creation of a
speaking persona. Prosopopoeia is the characteristic trope of epitaphs, especially
those that claim to speak in the voice of the deceased, and of the so-called *oggetti parlanti, “speaking objects,” which use a first-person voice to address the beholder.
The epitaphs of Kroisos and of Ampharete, quoted earlier, are good examples of this
traditional assimilation of the funerary monument to a speaker. The actor’s stele
renders visible this figure of speech.

The result is an economy of polarity and analogy. Within the frame of the relief,
there is a sharp distinction between beholder and beheld, actor and mask. In the
scene of viewing, there is a corresponding distinction between the space of the relief
and that of the beholder. The mask is radically “other” to the actor; just so, the flat
relief is spatially discontinuous with the world around it. Running counter to such
distinctions is an assimilation of beholder to work. Yet this continuity between the
relief and its surroundings is not spatial, as on the Cat stele, or the memorial of Khairidemos and Lykeas. It is mimetic and functional: a continuity of role. The drama of spectatorship within the depicted scene is the *mimēsis* of the drama that unfolds whenever a visitor pauses at the tomb. The actor is a *theatēs*, a viewer, and the mask is *theatos*, a spectacle; so the mask is like the stele itself, and the actor like the beholder. What links beholder to actor is an implicit equivalence of function.

The contrast with the Cat stele, and Khairidemos/Lykeas, is almost systematic. Iconographically, instead linking the deceased to epic, the gods, and freestanding statuary, the Actor’s stele relates him to his contemporary social context: to dramatic festivals and to the job of being an actor. Structurally, instead of connecting him to the beholder via spatial continuity, it connects him mimetically via action. It is in the drama of beholding that *ēthos* shows through, or fails to do so. We have already seen that the hollow mask raises the specter of *mere* imitation, mere seeming or *doxa*: its emotion is nothing but surface. So is the stele itself a *mere* *mimēsis*? Surely not: the appropriate response to this spectacle, as before tragic drama itself, is some version of mourning, *Kartharsis*, pity, and fear are useful terms, but there is no need to invoke the Aristotelian vocabulary in all its specificity. Presumably, the stele is not a *mere* mask, not a mask in the pejorative sense of a *mere* superficial appearance. But if not, why not? At once suffused with sorrow and utterly fictive, the mask presents unavoidably the question of who or what will guarantee the stele’s representational gambit. What, if anything, grounds the play of appearances?

It is useful, at this point, to detour toward a somewhat later monument with a similar theme. A grave monument from Vari, dating to circa 380–370, involves a comparable play of gender and social role (figs. 139, 140).115 The *mnēma* consists of a hydria-loutrophoros and a base: the shape of the vase indicates that it stood over the grave of a woman. On the vessel is a scene of *dexiosis*, or hand clasping: a woman, presumably the deceased, and a bearded male, flanked by two additional women in attitudes of mourning. Most likely the dead woman is bidding farewell to her father, with her mother and sister nearby. The identical *dexiosis* appears again on the front panel of the base. Each of the flanking sides of the base depicts a single figure: a man in a himation on the left and a man holding a female tragic mask on the right. Base and vase thus make a matched pair, articulated according to gender: on the one, a *dexiosis* framed by men; on the other, a *dexiosis* framed by women.

The actor wears feminine attire and false breasts, along with a skull cap (presumably to keep the mask from riding too high on his head). On a monument organized around protocols of gender—a monument completely unambiguous about the gender of the deceased—this figure is at least a little bit ambiguous. He resembles a woman, and in fact most modern commentators take him for one (which is impossible, since women did not act onstage in Greece). Yet this ambiguity is by no means permanent. On the contrary: the gender of this figure is incontrovertibly masculine, because only men were actors in Greece (to see this figure as an actor is to see it as masculine).116 Hence the actor does not undo the polarity of gender that organizes this monument: he reinforces it. His

---

gender is clear even in the face of Dionysian ambivalence and transvestitism. *Nomos*, custom, contains any subversive potential to this image. In the context of Athenian social norms, even a man in woman’s clothes, a man with breasts, remains a man when he holds the mask of Dionysos. The Vari base presents gender as a social role and, in so doing, makes it only more real.

Something similar is on offer with the Actor’s stele. Itself a mask of sorts, the stele is the very figure of surface-effect, hollowness passed off as expression, at once compelling and insubstantial. Crucially, it presents the ethical as social. It is social in two ways. First, *ēthos* occurs in and through an economy of gazes: the triad of mask, actor, and audience. Kouroi stand alone; Khairedemos is a kouros *manqué*; but the actor is part of a community of function that includes the beholder. We do the recognizing, even though there is no spatial continuity between ourselves and the actor as on the Cat stele. Second, it employs the iconography of public festival: tragic drama is, at Athens, a civic project. The Cat stele related the space of the relief to that of the beholder; but it did not characterize either space in civic terms. The
Actor’s stele, by contrast, asserts an absolute distinction between the space of the relief and that of the beholder, theatrical display and audience, even as it articulates that relation in and through the iconography of state festival.

By staging the ethical as no more and no less than a role, and by presenting that role as public and communal, the Actor’s stele makes beholding a social, even civic function. We are asked to recognize the deceased as distinct from his mask. The ethics of beholding, which structures Alkamenes’ Prokne and Itys, structures this stele as well. But if the Prokne and Itys thematized the social fabric as that which is always vulnerable to cutting, here the coincidence of ἐθος and πόλις has no particular narrative. On offer is not a story but a direct confrontation with the performance of a public role.

These theatrical reliefs are thematically and formally close to the mirror stelai yet retain a rather old-fashioned commitment to the distinction between imagined and real, actor and role. It may be significant, in this regard, that the spectacle of a woman with her mirror seems to allude to private life, that of actors and acting to public. Tragic performances were great civic spectacles: as the crowd assembled in the Theater of Dionysos at the foot of the Akropolis, divided up according to tribe, Athens was on display to itself. Money for such performances came from wealthy citizens, who were strongly encouraged by the state to bear the enormous cost of mounting a production. The audience of a drama is the citizenry; the actor is displaying his art for their benefit. And that eminently public metaphor structures this gravestone. Here the old metaphors are recast into the vocabulary of civic spectacle and community.

The Vari monument is an example of a trend that begins at the end of the fifth century: the production of scenes that allude, not to statuary but ceramic vessels, the cheap grave-goods of the democracy. Already the “Aphrodite” stele incorporated such a vessel in the form of the loutrophoros on which the woman leans (fig. 122). Inverting the hierarchy, sculptors at the end of the fifth century begin making reliefs that show nothing but clay vessels. Human figures appear as if painted onto the depicted pot. The stele of Panaitios of Hamaxanteia shows five such vessels: two lekythoi and a loutrophoros down below, and two alabastra hanging with a ribbon up above (fig. 141). Iconographically, we are squarely within the world of the upper class. The loutrophoros at center shows Panaitios making dexiosis with an older man, presumably his father. The youth is a hippēus or “knight,” his horse marking him as a member of the wealth elite. At lower left, a lekythos or oil flask shows a naked boy rolling hoop, a reminder of youthful play and pederasty both. In their clay form and with decoration by local vase-painters, such vessels were the politically correct form of grave-good under the radical democracy. Here they have been elevated into an ostentatious memorial. Just as Panaitios exemplifies democratic philia by clasping hands while yet looking splendid with his fancy horse, so he is commemorated with a deluxe version of humble clay pots.

The spatial organization is correspondingly complex. Standing on their little shelf, hanging from their hooks, the five vessels represent an assemblage of gifts placed on the top step of a tomb. Like the “statuesque” gravestones, this one translates three-dimensional markers into relief format. But that is not where the real spatial bravura takes place. The pots, after all, stand in a simple flat frieze. The real action is on the lekythos at lower left, where the running boy and the rolling hoop provide some of the most extravagant examples of foreshortening of the whole fifth
century. His body twists 180° from top to bottom, and his left leg passes behind the foreshortened hoop to give a sense of dramatic volume. Thus the Panaitios stele has its cake and eats it, too. It translates both a three-dimensional pot and a two-dimensional drawing on the pot into the hybrid medium of relief. In so doing, it gives us dramatic spatial recession while carefully containing that space within the fiction of a two-dimensional painted scene. The result is almost the reverse of the Cat stele. Where the latter made the space of relief porous to our own, Panaitios’s stele creates a world of its own.

These “closed” or “contemplative” gravestones seem to make a counter-tradition to those stelet that seek to absorb freestanding statuary into the medium of relief. Are they, simply, “democratic” responses to “elitist” works like the stele of Khairedemos and Lykeas? Probably not. The opposition is suspiciously facile, and the fact is that we do not have enough evidence to say one way or the other. After all, any stele in the late fifth century marks a departure from the restraint of previous generations: any stele is ostentatious and self-aggrandizing. It may be better, therefore, to see shades of meaning, relatively more and relatively less strident assertions of independence from democratic ideology. Between resistance and revolution, abandoning
Still it is worth noting that, after the end of the Peloponnesian War and the fall of the Athenian Empire, the Athenian grave relief underwent a pronounced change. For one thing, it became more popular: many people set up stelai, not just a small elite. In a fourth-century context, it no longer makes sense to see grave stelai in terms of “the abandonment of restraint,” and dissent from popular rule. After 404, restraint is long gone: the war is over; everyone does it. Along with the circumstances, the format changes. The early Contemplative gravestones evolve into increasingly crowded and formulaic scenes of *dexiosis*, which quickly lose their flatness and adopt the spatial virtuosity of the stelai. The fourth century witnesses masses of gravestones in which depicted space is evoked with singular virtuosity, even as two or more figures face one another à la the Contemplative reliefs (fig. 142). What ultimately wins out in Athens is, characteristically, a compromise.

Recapitulation

Herodotos’s crystal pillars presented a chain of indices, each diaphanous to the next. Works like the Motya Charioteer or the Riace bronzes had offered versions of this chain. Each offered a progression from inner essence to outer form, be it by way of drapery, skin, or depicted space. Some Classical gravestones—particularly the earliest ones—work to similar effect. They use a variety of ways to overcome the strict planarity of the Archaic stele. Many early stelai revive an outmoded practice and thereby dissent from the ordinary practice of Athenian democracy. Working within the established parameters of democratic rhetoric—that is, respecting the de facto prohibition on freestanding tomb sculpture—they nonetheless seek to reconcile the relief format with what can only be called the phenomenology of freestanding statuary. The result is “the conquest of space,” which may be understood as a practical, material, and distinctly nontheoretical version of the “intellectual critiques” of Athenian democracy that Socrates, Thucydides, Aristophanes, and others were undertaking at the same time.

This is not to say that style is or was crudely propagandistic. Again, it is not a matter of interpretation or gnosis. Rather, Athenian sculptors should be seen as responding to a demand—in this case, a demand that funerary relief attain to the condition of sculpture in the round—and that demand was and is the very stuff of power. Thus “the conquest of space” becomes a political event. So, of course, does resistance to that conquest.

In Classical Athens, style and politics are not just inseparable but, to a point, identical. Just as there were political stakes to seeing a kouros or a man as “foursquare” (*tetrágōnos*), or to seeing an *éthos* in Alkamenes’ Prokne and Itys, so the articulation of space in Classical tombstones carried a political charge. As a practical matter, the difference between freestanding and relief tomb sculpture comes down to the representation of space, that is, to style. A statue, like Aristodikos’s monument by the roadside at Anavysos, stands *within* space—establishes spatial relationships with ambient or stationary beholders by marking territory, being bright and wonderful,
containing conspicuous voids and hollows—but it does not depict space. Relief, on the other hand, does just that. It congeals this environment into the background of the stone slab itself. This materialized space, space petrified, acquires a special political affect in wartime Athens. Gravestones of the late fifth century make space political by representing it and, in so doing, rendering it conspicuous as a medium of sociability. They thematize the backplate, thematize the slab, make the slab a source of visual interest as something either to be acknowledged or overcome; and they do so within an implicit narrative of interaction between living beholders and depicted actors. The web of assignment relations that a kouros brings to light is figured in Classical grave reliefs in the way that the figures stand out before, or cleave to, the slab, the way they shimmer between the solid stone behind, and the airy world in front. Depicted space becomes the very medium of a model sociability, a way concretely to think or to see social relations.
CODA: THE BENEFITS OF HINDSIGHT

Looking back down the Anavysos road, having stood and mourned for Kroisos, Aristodikos and the rest, the monuments now receding, it is possible to discern a chain of homologies linking the reading of Herakleitos or Simonides, the beholding of bright statues, and the stylistics of archaeology and art history. Each is a matter of redeeming ellipses, stitching syntax out of concatenations of words—of conjuring presence out of absence in a moment of vision by the roadside—of finding meaning in a jumble of scarp-faces and lumps of stone, printed pages and piles of dirt. These are no idle exercises. On the contrary, structures of beholding constitute real historical and political situations. I have tried to provide a new account of Classical sculpture—also, as promised, an accounting for it and to it. But the key terms of this account—wonder, surface-effect, the recognition of ēthos, and the articulation of space—are not merely formal. At stake in such terms, such beholdings are ideologies of gender, modes of subjection, relations of power. It is in such everyday encounters that the abstract vocabulary of academic theory becomes concrete theōria.

This last term we are now in a position to define as a grammar of use that describes (hence determines) what counts as image and beholder in the first place. This grammar is by definition shared, public, retrievable. Conversely, the occlusion of Classical or pre-Platonic, beholding is a crucial moment in the detachment of both art and theōria from the quotidian, hence from politics understood in other than abstract terms. The “great light” shining at and for the Athenians, the flashing thunderbolt in the hand of Zeus, the shimmering drapery of Aphrodite, the gleaming web of Penelope, the voice of the shuttle, Prokne’s threads, the Cat stele’s invisible dove and the mirror of Pausimakhe—all are replaced with Hegel’s “lightning bolt of individuality,” Blitz der Individualität, and with Darstellung und Enthüllen, “presentation and unveiling.” Yet there is no need to look to the world of miracles and Spirits for such a blinding flash. The Blitz is there already, internal to our encounter with Greek art, like a synapse overfiring in a seizure.
## ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>BAPD</strong></td>
<td>Beazley Archive Pottery Database (<a href="http://www.beazley.ox.ac.uk">http://www.beazley.ox.ac.uk</a>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CAT</strong></td>
<td>Christoph W. Clairmont, <em>Classical Attic Tombstones</em> (Kilchberg, 1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IG</strong></td>
<td><em>Inscriptiones Graecae</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LIMC</strong></td>
<td><em>Lexicon iconographicum mythologiae classicae</em> (Zurich and Munich, 1981–1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MNRSc</strong></td>
<td><em>Museo Nazionale Romano: le sculture</em> (Rome, 1979–)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RE</strong></td>
<td>A. F. Pauly and G. Wissowa, <em>Real-Encyclopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft</em> (Stuttgart, 1893–)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SEG</strong></td>
<td><em>Supplementum epigraphicum graecum</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SIG&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</strong></td>
<td>W. Dittenberger, <em>Sylloge inscriptionum graecarum</em> (Leipzig, 1915–1924)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NOTES

Introduction
1. Alice Donohue has recently devoted a superb study to this topic: Donohue 2005.
2. One might, a bit reductively, describe these alternatives as Aristotelian versus Platonic modes of imitation. For the conceptual gymnastics required to distinguish these two modes of mimēsis, see Panofsky 1968.
5. For the term “brief,” see Baxandall 1983.
7. I have generally avoided statues known exclusively through Roman versions. Although some Roman versions do appear at important junctures, they are all connected to Greek originals with reasonable certainty. The Tyran-nicides and the Hera Borghese, for instance, are known through Roman casts taken from the original Greek bronzes: we know that these works were copied, and we now have good reason to believe that the extant copies versions are reasonably accurate (Landwehr 1985; Schuchhardt and Landwehr 1986; Hallett 1995). This decision was heuristic: it ensures accuracy and usefully curtails the number of possible examples, while anticipating some predictable objections.
8. On the illusion of a “total account” see the superb discussion in Ginzburg 1993: 27 and passim; also Ginzburg 2005.
9. Statistical methods have been invaluable for showing long-term trends in mortuary customs, dedicatory practices, the distribution of ceramics, and so on (e.g., Morris 1992 and Morris 2000). But attempts to apply the method to iconographic themes (e.g., Osborne 2004a) come at a cost. First, they are reductive, typically tracking just one variable out of the numerous mutually-ramifying features that make up a work of art. Second, given that only a tiny fraction of ancient pottery and sculpture survives, the samples available to such analyses are almost always inadequate, and the standard errors are merest conjecture. As a result, the statistical confidence levels are either very low or (what amounts to the same thing) unknown. An approach that seeks statistical patterns for their own sake while ignoring the intractable problem of the data set risks becoming a new kind of formalism, a pursuit of numerical patterns for their own sake.
10. Auerbach 1953: 547.
13. Whitley 2001: xxiii. As Jonathan Hall has observed, the phrase adapts the slogan of Willey and Phillips, “American archaeology is anthropology or it is nothing” (Willey and Phillips 1958: 2).
15. Rotroff 2006: 139. The topic is Hellenistic pottery, but the point generalizes.
16. See, most recently, Manning et al. 2006.
17. For example, the Pylos Regional Archaeological Project: http://classics.uc.edu/PRAP/.
20. Jenkins 1936: 59, emphasis added. Note that Jenkins here acknowledges one theoretical premise (cultural uniformity) without explicitly acknowledging another (teleological development).
21. In a recent overview, for example, Claude Rolley identifies the “triangular” phase as the earliest on the basis of analogies between stone sculptures and two other classes of artifact: Subgeometric bronze figures, and bronze cauldron-handle attachments in the form of Sirens. But the siren-handle that he identifies as the earliest in Greece (Delphi 1248; Rolley 1969 no. 369), hence the anchor of his chronology, comes from Delphi, a site massively disturbed after the fire of 548 BCE, hence unreliable as a source of early seventh-century stratigraphy. Of the Subgeometric bronzes the crucial example is the Mantiklos Apollo in Boston, which was purchased on the market and has no stratigraphic context at all. As for the late, “ovoid” phase of the Dedalic style, Rolley dates it by the similarity between a fragmentary statue from Eleutherna on Crete and the so-called Kleobis and Biton from Delphi. Again, the latter were not found in their original context, while the former is dated on the basis of an analogy with the plastic heads on Corinthian vessels (Adams 1978: 37 and n. 184). Thus, as D. A. Amyx remarks, “[T]he system of absolute dating … down to the early sixth century B.C., depends almost exclusively on the dates assigned to Protocorinthian and Corinthian fine ware pottery” (Amyx 1998: 398).
25. For a forthright but ultimately problematic effort to work through some of the problems of style, see Croissant 1983.
26. See Whitley 1997, to the effect that J. D. Beazley held an implicit theory about attribution; denning that Beazley held an implicit theory, see Oakley 1998.
28. For an example of racialized vocabulary, see, inter alia,
Langlotz 1927. On the archaeology of ethnic identity, the most pertinent discussion is Morgan 2001, in which the role of style in archaeological method is juxtaposed with the function of styles in ancient societies.

30. SEG 9.3.
32. On the concept of an archaeological culture, see the illuminating discussion in Papadopoulos 2005, with further references.
33. Indeed, if we take style in archaeology to mean, at a minimum, the characteristic trace of an intentionality, then style is what archaeologists use to recognize artifacts as such. When excavators distinguish potsherds from pebbles, retaining the former and shoveling away the latter, they do so because the one is styled and the other is not. The distinction is self-evident but not, for that reason, irrelevant. On this view, the concept of style is what separates archaeology from geology. But I do not insist on this point.
35. For a succinct critique of the charge of formalism in art criticism, see Pippin 2002: 3–4 n. 2.
36. For related arguments, please see Neer 2005 and Neer 2007a.
39. A key work being the superb Elsner 1995, Elsner 2006, another excellent treatment and very pertinent to the present study, came out after this book was largely complete, but much of what follows can be understood as the fruit of an ongoing conversation with my delightful friend and colleague.
40. This line of thinking has recently blossomed thanks to Gell 1998.
42. I am emboldened, in this paragraph, by Mitchell 2002.
43. For related arguments, please see Neer 2005 and Neer 2007a.
44. “The magnificent art of Greece remains without a corresponding [sc., Greek] cognitive-conceptual meditation on it, such meditation not having to be identical with aesthetics. The lack of such a simultaneous reflection or meditation on great art does not imply that Greek art was only ‘lived,’ that the Greeks wallowed in a murky brew of ‘experiences’ braced by neither concepts nor knowledge. It was their good fortune that the Greeks had no ‘lived experiences’.” Heidegger 1979: 80. If the Greeks were not subjective experiences either.
46. Day 1989 and Day 1994 and, on the literary side, Rutherford 1998, are exemplary in this regard.
50. Vernant 1983: 305–20; Vernant 1990: 17–82; Vernant 1991: 141–92. For pertinent discussion see Elsner 1996. More recently, Steiner 2001: 3–78 and passim, follows Vernant’s arguments. Although they are known chiefly from literary accounts, such argoi lithoi, “unworked stones,” have been found in a late seventh-century context near the temple of Apollo at Metaponto in southern Italy, and in a sixth-century context at Paestum. On this material see Doepner 2002; also Adamesteanu 1970 (Metaponto); Greco et al. 2001: 39 (Paestum).
51. Greek applies this last term chiefly to tomb sculpture, but Vernant argued that the formulaic nature of early Greek statuary made it misleading to make fine distinctions on the basis of nomenclature. In this regard he has been seconded in Sourvinou-Inwood 1995.
52. For “elsewhere,” see the “ithyphallic” hymn to Demetrios as transmitted in Athenaeus, Deipnosophistai 253D (discussed in greater detail below).
57. Distinguishing between the two versions of Vernant’s thesis can be tricky and in this section I have had to schematize them somewhat; not, I hope, unfairly. In the space of two pages, for instance, Vernant can affirm an “advent of figuration” in eighth-century Greece; deny that any of the Archaic words for “divine idol” has “any relation whatsoever to the idea of resemblance or imitation, of figural representation in the strict sense”; and assert that “the category of figural representation emerges in its specific features” only circa 400. It seems, in other words, that there is “figuration” from the eighth century, but no “figural representation in the strict sense” until the fourth. Here “figural representation in the strict sense” corresponds to a theory of “resemblance or imitation,” that is, to Platonism. But this definition seems either to obscure or to beg all the key questions. (All quotations, Vernant 1991: 151–52).
60. To be sure, dissimulation is always a possibility. When Polonius agrees with Hamlet that a cloud is “very like a whale” (Hamlet III.ii) it is not certain that he actually sees it so. He is a courtier, after all. But it is clear that he possesses the relevant concept.
62. It is not an uninteresting fact for cultural history that the Bronze Age Greeks should have paired word and image in this way; but the pairing must be distinguished rigorously from identification.
63. I have not, in this study, found an opportune moment to address the propositions and arguments of Gell 1998. Insofar as Gell is offering a semiotics of what he calls “agency,” then the arguments mounted here about the limits of Vernant’s historical semiotics might be brought to bear on Gell’s as well. The crucial role of the “representation of ‘what is seen’” anticipates semiology no less than philology.
64. Cf. Wittgenstein 1993: 133.
66. Compare the following newspaper account of the discovery of the Sacred Gate kouroi: “Suddenly the experienced excavation worker Tassos Boudroukas struck something that he immediately recognized as sculpted marble. It came from the left shoulder of an Archaic kouroi, lying on its stomach, as a rapid cleaning quickly showed.” “Jahrhundertfund im Kerameikos,” Athenen Zeitung, May 2002, trans. author. The original text may be found at http://www.griechische-botschaft.de/weeknews/2002/mai/220502.htm (last accessed September 2008).
68. Foucault, quoted (and translated) in Davidson 2001: 185.

Chapter One
2. Hair: Brinkmann 2003 no. 170. The red may have been the ground for another color, perhaps brown.
3. IG I2 1244: Ἄριστος.
5. But see Ridgway 1990; Ridgway 1993: 68.
9. On kouroi and Apollo, see Stewart 1986 (the phrase “man for all seasons” is his); contra, Ridgway 1993: 66–75.
10. For a diametrically opposite conclusion, see Keesling 2003, on which see p. 179 and n. 47.
20. For another possible base to the Munich kouroi, see Jeffrey 1962: 145.
27. This last point is made in Richter 1961 no. 37, and is stated most forcefully in Eliot 1967.
28. Though it is often said to be from Anavysos itself. For the findspot, see Mastrokostas 1974: 215–19. It was found by the roadside in the vicinity of Barbaliaki, on the route from Laurion to Keratea via Kamarisa and Plaka. Athens, National Museum 4472; Richter 1961 no. 59; Kaltsas 2002a: 64 no. 87; Brinkmann 2003 no. 171.
29. On early Naxian sculpture, see Kokkorou-Alewras 1995. For Sounion’s proximity to the Cyclades, see the opening paragraph of Pausanias (Pausanias 1.1). On Attic landholding patterns, see Osborne 1985: 47–63. On this region, see Lohmann 1993.
31. It is very likely that the Kroisos buried at Phoinikia was the guest-friend to the Alkmeonidai, so it is natural to suppose that an Athenian named Kroisos would have...
belonged to that clan. Moreover, the Alkmeneidai are known to have led the "Coastal" faction in sixth-century Athens, and Laureotic Olympos is a plausible candidate for their home territory. See Eliot 1967; Anderson 2000.

33. For the location of Phrearrhoi, see most recently Simms 1998, with earlier bibliography.


35. On the herms, see Shapiro 1989: 125–32, with references to earlier discussions.

36. See Manville 1990 for an overview. On tyrants as demarcators of space, see Steiner 1994: chap. 4.


42. On polarity and analogy in Herakleitos, see Lloyd 1966: 94–102.

43. Herakleitos fr. 10 DK. Trans. K. Freeman, modified.

44. Herakleitos fr. 67 DK. The remainder of the fragment reads, “He changes himself just as [fire?] when mixed with spices is named according to the scent of each of them.”

45. Herakleitos frs. 62 DK.

46. See Heidegger 1968: 182–93. “We call the word order of the saying paratactic in the widest sense simply because we do not know what else to do. For the saying speaks where there are no words, in the field between the words” (186). Compare the related discussions in Merleau-Ponty 1993: 80–81; Derrida 1982: 175–205.


49. Aristotle, Rhetoric 1411b10. The phrase appears amidst a series of such passages, which the philosopher cites to illustrate his taxonomy of metaphor.


51. Hesiod, Theogony 35.


54. The point has been made countless times. See, for example, Richter 1970: 11, 39–41.

55. Published in Tuchelt 1970. See also Himmelmann 1986.


57. The basic account of Samian korai is to be found in Freyer-Schauenburg 1974, with Kron 1986; Kyrieleis 1995; and Karakosi 2003: 13–34. On the affinities with wood, see Ridgway 1993: 134, 163 n. 4.28. Parian korai are similar in this regard. See Zapheiropoulou 1986. On the new kore from Samos, see Kyrieleis 1995. For ivory forebears of this type, see Carter 1985: 225–47.

58. In much the same way, the sphyrelaton (“hammer-wrought thing”) technique involves hammering sheets of bronze over a wooden core. The result is, in effect, a wooden idol made of bronze. On sphyrelaton, see Romano 2000, with earlier bibliography. For a denial of the role of wood in sphyrelaton, see Haynes 1992: 11–23.


60. On Didyma, see Tuchelt 1970. The position of the figures on the Ephesian columns is debated.

61. Similar figures from Naxos are slightly less treelike (the hem of the garment, for instance, does not flare), perhaps suggesting that the Naxians adapted the Samian type and, in so doing, discarded some of its arboreal associations. There is a handy discussion of Naxian versus Samian korai in Croissant 2002.


63. On the Piraeus bronzes, see the recent overview in Palagia 1997; Moullou 2003. For a recent discussion of small bronze kouroi, see Stibbe 2000: 23–24. On “the irrelevance of the medium” to nonmarble kouroi, see Mattusch 1996: 8–9. On a wooden kouroi from Massalia, see Hermay 1997.

64. After all, the Greek word for “raw material” is hulé, literally, “felled trunks.” On the canonical quality of stone in kouroi production, see Mack 1996: 25.


68. Diodoros 4.76. On Daidalos, see Frontisi-Ducroux 2002.


70. For teaching me about the importance of voids in Archaic statuary, I am indebted to Andrew Stewart. For the connection between glyptic extraction and making-present, I


73. On Foce del Sele, see the recent overview in Greco 2001.

74. See the fine remarks in Hurwit 1985: 293.

75. See the recent overview in Greco 2001.


77. Mack 1996: 140. For related arguments in the matter of bronze working, see Mattusch 1996. For an overview of seriality in early Greek sculpture, see Strocka 1979; Ridgway 2004: 381–409.


82. Mack 1996: 46–47.

83. The distinction between clusters of kouroi and singletons is discussed at Mack 1996: 165–68; here I simply adopt his account to the example of the Anavysos road.


86. In total, parts of four statues with dedications by Kheramyes have come to light. See Kyrieleis 1995.

87. Although there may have been some differentiation by word for “statue”—as dynamic and mobile. It seems that this question is one on which reasonable people can disagree—a point that, in itself, seems important. Indeterminacy seems to be part of the type’s appeal.


89. On the mobility and stasis of statues in Greek literature, there is a remarkable similarity between the replica—see Duplouy 2006.

90. On the Sounion kouroi, see Floren 1987: 252–53, with further references.


94. For example, Ducat 1976: 245; Hurwit 1985: 22; Stewart 1986; Mack 1996.


96. On the attractiveness of texts, see Svenbro 1993: 187–216. This fact may explain the otherwise puzzling assertion, in Osborn 1988, that kouroi meet the gaze of the beholder. Contra Osborne, see Stewart 1997: 244. Osborne modifies his position in Osborne 2005.

97. Aristotle, Poetics 1458a26–27. In this passage the Furies are speaking of law courts, where the terror of punishment is a good thing.

98. Cf. Paul de Man’s characterization of Wordsworth’s Essay upon Epitaphs: “It is a system of mediations that converts the radical distance of an either/or opposition in a process allowing movement from one extreme to the other by a series of transformations that leave the negativity of the initial relationship (or lack of relationship) intact. One moves, without compromise, from death or life to death and life.” De Man 1984: 74.

99. See the fine remarks in Hurwit 1985: 293.

100. For Plato’s discussion of a related experience—seeing a couch from varied angles and extrapolating the true form—see Republic 598a.

101. Illustrated here is a figure from Chios, dating to the third century BCE: Boston 10.70 (Comstock and Vermeule 1976 no. 56).

102. For Plato’s discussion of a related experience—seeing a couch from varied angles and extrapolating the true form—see Republic 598a.

103. At times the texts are incised on the body itself: see Freyer-Schauenburg 1974: 71–72 and nn. 30–35.


105. On the attractiveness of texts, see Svenbro 1993: 187–216. This fact may explain the otherwise puzzling assertion, in Osborn 1988, that kouroi meet the gaze of the beholder. Contra Osborne, see Stewart 1997: 244. Osborne modifies his position in Osborne 2005.

106. For example, Ducat 1976: 245; Hurwit 1985: 22; Stewart 1986; Mack 1996.


112. Sophokles, Oidipous Tyrannos 13.

113. Euripides, Phoinissai 49, 806, 1504.


115. Aristole, Poetics 1458a26–27.

117. \textit{IG} I’ 1204; Hansen 1983: 20 no. 28. “Pondering other things in your mind” is literally “posing other things in thoughts.” ἄνθρωποι ἴστειχες ὡς "ὄδοιν ὤφθαιν ὡς μενονοὶ ὥς στεθα καὶ οἴκτιρον σῆμα Φρασικλείας ὥς ἱδον.


120. Homer, \textit{Iliad} 22.24–30. The similarity with the thunderbolt emerges in the use of the formula arizéloi de loi augai to describe the sign/Dog Star, used of the sign/ thunderbolt at 13.244.


122. As Heidegger puts it, “The more solitarily the work … stands on its own and the more cleanly it \textit{seems} to cut all ties to human beings, the more simply does the thrust come into the open that such a work is, and the more essentially is the extraordinary thrust to the surface and the long-familiar thrust down.” Heidegger 1971: 66, emphasis added.

123. The basic study is Day 1989. For a recent overview, see Bruss 2005: 38–57.


125. “Is this it perhaps”—asks Wittgenstein of the artwork in 1961: 83e. 


132. For the myth—cited by Vermeule—see Hyginus, \textit{Fabulae} 114; Ovid, \textit{Heroides} 13.149–58.

133. Euripides, \textit{Alkestis} 348–54.


135. For the myth—cited by Vermeule—see Hyginus, \textit{Fabulae} 114; Ovid, \textit{Heroides} 13.149–58.


137. See Bonfante 1989; Osborne 1997; Osborne 1999.


139. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins B 5 (BAPD 201626). By the Kiss Painter.

140. Cf. Brooks 1993: 102, on pornography and photographic freezing. Taken for granted here is “scopophilia,” the “visual pleasure in looking” that was the starting point of certain theorizations of the cinema in the 1970s; also, on scopophilia, 70s. See Freud 1953–74, 7: 191–94.


142. Agrigento, Museo Cívico; Richter 1960: 145.

143. Consequently, there is no experience that corresponds to mistaking an image of something for the thing itself—even a tromp d’oeil like Parrhasios’s curtain. If you are fooled, then by definition you do not see the image as an image. You see it as the real thing, just as Zeuxis had the experience of looking at a curtain. Tromp d’oeil is therefore a misnomer—the tense is wrong. The experience is not of \textit{being fooled} but of \textit{ceasing to be fooled} or of \textit{refusing to be fooled} or, at most, of \textit{playing along}. Hence the experience is usually not subsersive or unsettling, as many recent critics seem to wish, but comforting and normalizing; that may be why tromp d’oeil is generally used as a pleasing gimmick, a party trick, hocus-pocus.


145. The enactment of Plato’s philosophical theo\textit{r}ia, the enactment of Plato’s philosophical ambition in the dialogue.
160. On *Phaedrus* and Nietzsche’s critique thereof, see Heidegger 1979, especially 188–210.

161. *Himeros and pathos: Phaedrus* 251c–e.

162. That is why Plato had to posit a prior beholding of the Ideas, of which the perception of statues would be a mere imitation; memory ensures the recognition of the Beautiful as it shines “most radiantly” through the world.

163. Fundamental studies and collections of sources (mostly epic) are Mette 1961 and Prier 1989. See also Jouanna 1992 (Hippocratic corpus); Hunzinger 1994 (Homer and Hesiod); Pugliara 2002: 8–12, 62–66 (especially for later material); Hunzinger 2005. For a brief and somewhat dismissive account, see Pollitt 1974: 189–91. Another brief treatment is Philipp 1968: 8–9, 10, 29. More recently, see Saintillan 1996 and Vernant 1996, both of which mention *thauma* while focusing on the related notion of *kharis*, “grace.” Steiner 2001 barely mentions the word.


177. The example appears in Plato, *Theaitetos* 152b.


179. The imitation of sounds is also wonderful, as when the Titans mimic the cries of animals, or the Delian maidens mimic the tongues of men in bewitching fashion. Titans: Hesiod, *Theogony* 834. Delian maidens: [Homer] *Hymn to Apollo* 3.156–64.


181. [Hesiod], *Shield of Herakles* 139–45. Trans. H. G. Evelyn-White (modified).


183. Simonides fr. 47b PMG.

184. The word *thauma* appears three other times in the *Shield of Herakles*. Lines 318–20 emphasize that the wonder of handiwork affects even the gods: “The great strong shield was a wonder to see for itself—even for Zeus the loud-thunderer, by whose will Hephaistos made it and fitted it with his hands.” The silver bag in which the figure of Perseus holds the Gorgon’s head is also a *thauma idesthai* (1.224). Perseus himself is less immediately striking, but no less wonderful: “There, too, was the son of rich-haired Danaë, the horseman Perseus: his feet did not touch the shield and yet were not far from it—a great wonder to ponder [thauma mega phrassathai], since he was not supported anywhere; for so did the famous Lame One fashion him of gold with his hands” (11. 216–20). This last passage contains the element of paradox that typifies artistic *thaumata*: the figure is part of the shield and at the same time floats free, just as Odysseus’s brooch and Akhilleus’s shield present figures that seem real even though made of gold. Once again, the doubleness of images is wondrous. As so often in Greek thought, seeing and thinking are inextricable: what dazzles the eye will dazzle the mind as well.

185. [Homer], *Hymn to Hermes* 4.270; [Homer], *Hymn to Aphrodite* 5.202–6. Trans. H. G. Evelyn-White. With regard to Ganymede, it is noteworthy that the poet does not use the middle-voiced *idesthai* of the epic formula but the active *idein*. Ganymede is not a “wonder to see for himself,” but a simple “wonder to behold.” If this departure from established formula mitigates the radical alterity of the wonder, that may be because Ganymede is himself an object wholly possessed by Zeus, his lover.

186. [Homer], *Hymn to Aphrodite* 5.81–90. Trans. H. Evelyn-White (modified). I follow here the ordering of the lines and the emendations in Evelyn-White’s Loeb text, which take account of the fact that the third-person singular verb “shimmered,” *elampeto*, should take as subject the singular noun “robe,” *peplos*.

187. [Homer], *Hymn to Aphrodite* 5.180–84.


192. On these Dedalic statues, see Frontisi-Ducroux 2002; Pugliara 2002. More generally, see the classic discussion in Gross 1992.
193. Cf. LSJ, s.v. “omma.”
199. Similar language appears at Pindar, Python 10.46–50. The immediate context is the story of Perseus: “He slew the Gorgon, and, bearing her head adorned with locks of serpents, came to the islanders, bringing them stony death. But to me no wonder [thauma] ever seems unbelievable in itself if the gods bring it about.” Although Pindar’s reference to disbelief parallels that of Bacchylides, in this case the identity of the wonder is uncertain. It seems at first glance to be, self-evidently, the killing of Medousa. But the précis of Perseus’s deeds occupies no more than three lines, which follow immediately upon a fourteen-line evocation of the Hyperboreans, the “Dwellers beyond the North Wind.” Pindar says that a “wonderful road,” thaumastos hodos, leads some people, and not others, to their land, where they host Apollo and the Muses, feast endlessly, make music, and entertain visitors with their braying donkeys (11. 30–43). In this context it is by no means clear whether Pindar’s wonder refers to Perseus, the Hyperboreans, or both. Indeed, this uncertainty seems very much to the point. For the noisy hospitality of the Hyperboreans contrasts to “stony death” on Seriphos much as, in Bacchylides, the roaring sea, ululating maids, and singing boys contrast to dumbfounded Minos. In each case, a thauma occupies the middle point between sound and stupor, between an ideal reception of the divine and a mute aversion to it.
201. As Andrea Nightingale aptly remarks of this passage, “simultaneous experience of strangeness and kinship produces a unique kind of wonder.” Nightingale 2004: 257.
203. Empedokles fr. 35.34 DK.
204. Theognis 373.
205. Xenophon, Symposium 7.2.
207. [Plato], Epinomis 985a–b.
208. [Plato], Epinomis 990d.
210. But Parmenides is an aporetic dialogue, and the clean distinction that it makes between these two domains is not perhaps tenable. Philosophy begins in wonder, and wonder begins in the ordinary experience of “multifariously entangled confusion” in the visible world.
212. See, again, Nightingale 2004.

Chapter Two
1. A detailed historical treatment of the phenomenon, arguing for its origins in Cycladic workshops, is Knigge 1965.
2. Loewy 1891; Loewy 1900 (translated as Loewy 1907).
4. Carpenter 1959 [1921]: 76.
5. Himmelmann 1998: 156–86. See also, for an interesting if highly speculative treatment, Fehr 1979. More recently, several of the papers in Bol 2003 have addressed similar issues, in particular Rolley 2003.
9. On this relief, see below, chapter 5.
More technical studies may be found in Demeyer 1987; Fant 1988; Waelkens and Herz 1988; True and Podany 1990; Ward-Perkins 1992; Maniatis, Herz, and Basiakos 1995; Schwoerer 1999.

11. Recent work has shown that Greek temple architecture relies less upon wooden prototypes than previously thought: it is a style developed in, and suited for, stone. See Barletta 2001.


13. Stokes is eloquent on this score: see Stokes 1934: 52–58, 111–12.


16. On Roman colored marble, see, inter alia, Vermeule 2003: 235–50, with further references to the extensive bibliography; de Nuccio and Ungaro 2002. The Ptolemaic rulers recognized the cultural values of different stones, importing Aegean marble for Hellenized portraits, and using traditional Egyptian stones for pharaonic styles.

17. See Shoe 1949 for dark stones in Greek architecture.


19. Stewart 1990a: 36. Stumbling upon this passage again after many years was a happy accident. It is not the first time that what I had taken to be my own idea turned out, with digging, to derive from this masterful book by my teacher. It is a pleasure to acknowledge the debt.


21. Athens, NM 3476. Tin foil: Brinkmann 2003 no. 164. The foil was first pointed out to me by Andrew Stewart, in Athens, in 1996. Argupheos: see, for instance, Hesiod, Theogony 574.

22. Brinkmann and Wünsche 2004b.


24. On the early Hellenistic “Alexander” sarcophagus, for instance, the figures were painted but the background was left white, as on some contemporary murals.


26. “Sehr fraglich”: Reuterwärd 1960: 41. Brinkmann 2003 no. 105 seems to suggest that the coloring is no longer visible.


29. Brinkmann and Wünsche 2004b: 124, citing Pliny. See the next note.


31. Not all statues were actually painted. The sculptures from an Archaic favissa at Cyrene (a sphinx, a kouros, and two koirai) bear no traces of paint, although they were buried only a generation or so after they were made; other statues from Cyrene have retained their paint unusually well, which makes the absence of paint from these favissa statues especially surprising. Interestingly, the sculptors do seem to have anticipated that their chiselwork would be supplemented by paint. But in this case the work seems never to have been carried out. See Pedley 1971 (who concludes, implausibly to my mind, that all the paint weathered away during the short time that the statues stood above ground).

32. Hesiod, Theogony 699; Homer, Iliad 3.397.


34. Hayes 1992: 88. The relative cheapness of leaded bronze derives from two facts. One, less tin is needed, and tin was costly. Two, leaded bronze can be cast in thinner sections than unleaded, so sculptors could use less metal overall.

35. On bronze casting, see Mattusch 1988; Haynes 1992; Mattusch 1996.


37. On the Tyrannicides, real and depicted, the best general treatment is Taylor 1991. The key ancient sources are Thucydides 1.20, 6.54–59; [Aristotle], Athenaiōn Politeia 18–19.1. On their sculptural commemoration, the literature is large, but see especially Brunnsäker 1971; Fehr 1984; Stewart 1997: 70–75; Stansbury-O’Donnell 1999: 75–77.

suggested that they might derive from the earlier monument. The implication is that Antenor’s group was essentially identical to its replacement, but in an earlier style. It is not certain, however, whether the archaisms reflect Antenor’s original or the whims of Roman copyists; nor can the head of one figure tell us much about the group as a whole. A related argument to the effect that the first Tyrannicides could not have been kouroi, because kouroi in Attica are exclusively funerary and therefore inappropriate to placement in the Agora, ignores the fact that kouroi have been found in the Agora and on the Akropolis. The notion that Attic kouroi are exclusively funerary seems to go back to Ridgway 1993: 66–68 (first published 1975). Her argument that Akropolis 665 and 692 are not kouroi because they are “uncanonical” does not convince: her criteria for defining a canonical kouroi seem overly restrictive and would, if applied evenly, exclude works like the Aristodikos (which she elsewhere describes as a kouroi). By the same token the Sounion kouroi are not a “single exception” to the rule that Attic kouroi are nonvotive: there are about fourteen of them. For the Agora fragments—which may or may not belong with the Dipylon head—see Richter 1970: 47 no. 7. On Kritios and Nesiotes see, most recently, Keesling 2000, who shows that a base on the Akropolis positioned the figure and the dedicatory inscription in such a way as to encourage viewers to walk all the way around the monument.

40. As noted in Stewart 1997: 245. For the effect, compare Palatine Anthology 16.124, an anonymous epigram (probably Hellenistic) on a statue of Herakles: “Tremble not, traveler, at this, that I have unsheathed my bow and newly-sharpened arrows and laid them at my feet, nor that I bear a club in my hand and wear round my shoulders the skin of a tawny lion. It is not my task to hurt all men, but only evil-doers, and I also can deliver the good from sorrow.” Trans. W. R. Patton.
41. Stewart 1997: 245. Cf. Rolley 1994: 329. It was for many years traditional to regard the Kritian boy as the first properly Classical work of sculpture (figs. 31–32). Yet it has recently been shown that the statue probably post-dates the Agora group: see Hurwit 1989.
42. See in particular Fehr 1984; Stewart 1997: 70–75. Cf. Thucydides 2.43.1.
43. See above, chapter 1, pp. 51–52.
44. Thucydides 2.43.
47. Simonides, SEG 10: 320; Page 1981: 186–89; Hansen 1983: 430. The Agora base is Athens, Agora inv. I 3872. For the connection between the base and the established Simonidean text, see Page, loc. cit., with further references. As Page notes, the link is “not certain, but the probability is high.” The stone preserves part of the fourth line and the word “Harmodios” at the end of the second. For discussion of the poem, with a reading different from the one presented here, see Carson 1999: 91–92. [ἐνέβαλεν τ’ Ἀθηναίοις φόος γένεθ’ Ἑλίκ’ Ἀριστο/γείτον ἡπάραχον κτείνε καὶ]
49. Anakreon fr. 380 PMG.
51. Pindar, Isthmian 2.12. Compare too the enigmatic final line of Minnemors fr. 14 IEG.
52. Homer, Iliad 22.131–37.
56. That this feature is absent from two dimensional versions of the scene, like the Elgin throne in Malibu, probably has to do with the fact that painting and relief requires offsetting the two figures to make sure that both are visible.
57. On the Selinuntine sculptures, see, inter alia, Holloway 1984; Marconi 1995; Marconi 1997.
60. But compare a small terracotta in Syracuse with a mounted Gorgon, dating to roughly the same period: see Langlotz 1965 no. 12.
61. On the Corfu pediments, see pp. 84–85.
63. Pliny, Natural History 35.65, 35.103 (see also Pollitt 1974: 125–38 for additional ancient sources); Richter 1974: 24.
64. For the concept of drift, see Kubler 1962: 75–77.
70. For issues of this sort, Ridgway 1971 remains essential.
73. Homer, Iliad 13.242–45.
75. For the Near Eastern “smiting” type, see Seeden 1980.
76. That the profile is not the only significant viewpoint does not imply that a trident hiding the face in a profile view would have been any less egregious, as is implied by Rolley 1994: 333–34 in arguing that the statue depicts Poseidon.
78. “Lancelotti” version: Rome, Palazzo Massimo 126571 (AMNRSc 1.1: 184–86 no. 120). Castel Porziano version:


80. Formalism, in this neo-Kantian variant, entails the twin imperatives of purposiveness without purpose in art, and disinterest in aesthetic judgment. The former leads to a celebration of abstraction, if not in artworks themselves then in critical discussion of them: hence all the talk of planes and profiles, and the corresponding neglect of iconography and narrative. Disinterest entails that the relationship between critic and work be uncontaminated either by psychology or phenomenology. Nothing so interesting as shock, awe, or desire should intrude upon the critic’s judgment. The statue may be overwhelming, vivid, and vital, but the critic, as a matter of principle, concerns himself only with intelligibility and persuasiveness. Kant’s own view was more complex, since he insists that aesthetic disinterest is “a mere ideal norm,” unattainable in practice: Kant 1892: §22.

81. The view has its origins in distortions introduced by Roman copyists when adapting the type for placement in niches. But Roman taste alone does not explain the preference for the single profile view in modern reproductions of the statue.

82. A back three-quarters view is equally complex. Here everything breaks up into a series of wedges; the arc of the arms becomes a low triangle with its apex at the face, staring back at us quite unrealistically.


86. On the Corfu pediments, see Rodenwalt 1939; Benson 1967.


88. On western Greek pediments with Gorgoneia, see Danner 2000.


92. [Hesiod], Shield of Herakles 140–45. Trans. H. G. Evelyn-White (modified).

93. Lucian, Eikones 1.

94. Similar effects appear elsewhere in Archaic Greek art, as in the metopes from the Heraion at Foc’ del Sele near Paestum, or in Athenian vase-painting. On framing devices in Greek art, see Hurwit 1977; Hurwit 1992.

95. See, for example, Snodgrass 1982.

96. On the Pyrgi pediment, see the papers in Colonna et al. 2000.

97. The main exception to this rule is the east façade of the temple of Apollo at Delphi, where kouroi and korai flank the god’s chariot at center. But this pediment was a private offering: erected by the great Athenian clan of the Alkmeonidai during their exile under the tyrant Hippias, it employs the characteristic sculptural types of private votive statuary. The west pediment of the same building, paid for by a consortium of city-states, is far more conventional in its contrast between a central, frontal chariot and a violent melee to either side. On this aspect of the Alkmeonid temple, please see Neer 2007c.

98. It is perhaps significant, in this regard, that an Athenian red-figure krater of the mid-fifth century employs a similar format for the birth of Pandora. A frontal, epiphanic Pandora stands at center, with Hephaistos and a goddess flanking her in a flaring arrangement; additional figures in profile line up to either side. For this painter, the way to depict the quintessential thauoma idesthai of Greek literature is to adopt a pedimental composition. Vase: London E467 (ARV² 601.23; Paralipomena 395; Beazley Addenda 266). The composition is related to, but probably anticipates, that of the base of Pheidias’ great statue of Athena Parthenos, dedicated in 437.


101. Or rather, all-but-beyond it. Pliny, for instance, famously says that the fourth-century artist Apelles “painted things that cannot be painted [pinxit et quae pingi non possunt]: thunder, lightning, and thunderbolts.” Pliny, Natural History 35.96.

102. Attic red-figured hydria by the Pronomos Painter, Pella 80.154 (RAPD 17333).

103. It is intriguing, in this light, that the center of the east frieze of the Parthenon should depict the presentation of a new peplos to Athena, recalling Iliad 6.269–303, in which the Trojans present Athena a peplos “that shone like a star.” The theme of light runs through the building.


105. On these figures, see Lapatin 2001 with earlier bibliography, to which add Nick 2002. For the Pergamon Parthenos, see Kunze 1992 no. 74.

106. For example, Dio Chrysostom, Oration 12.25–26; Eustathius, Commentarii ad Homerī Iliadem 1.528; Macrobius, Saturnalia 5.13; Philostratus, Life of Apollonius 4.7; Plutarch, Aemilius Paulus 28.2; Strabo 8.3.30; Valerius Maximus, Memorabilia 8.14.6.
Chapter Three

3. See above, chapter 1, p. 32.
7. Compare also the brief discussion of inhérence— with reference to Deleuze and le pli, not Rilke—in Didi-Hubermann 2002: 40.
17. On the Ethiopians and their relation to the gods, see Vernant 1989.
20. For the history of the veil as a metaphor in metaphysics, see Hadot 2004.
22. Da der Dichtung zauberische Hülle
Sich noch lieblich um die Wahrheit wand,—
Alles wies den eingeweihten Blicken,
Alles eines Gottes Spur.
23. Phrased in this way, the difference may sound like that between Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions of mimésis. The difference is that, for Schiller, this magic cloak no longer exists in modernity; rather, it is the defining attribute of a Classical Greece to which modernity is necessarily belated.
27. [Homer], Hymn to Aphrodite 5.81–90. Trans. H. G. Evelyn-White (modified). I follow here the ordering of the lines and the emendations in Evelyn-White’s Loeb text, themselves derived from Wakefield, which allow the singular verb “shimmered,” elampeto, to agree with the singular subject noun “robe,” peplos.
33. On such fabrics, see Wagner-Hasel 2002.
34. Homer, Odyssey 19.232–35. I translate theaomai here following the definition in LSJ: “to gaze at, mostly with a sense of wonder.” As Prier (1987: 82) puts it, the verb “betokens wonder and astonishment for oneself.”
35. Homer, Odyssey 19.250.
36. Hesiod, Theogony 574–75.
39. The contrast of the two faces is noted in Payne and Mackworth-Young 1950: 3; Stewart 1990a: 120. One might compare this arresting double frontality with the stare of the sphinx on works like the Brother-and-Sister stele (fig. 12). Just as the stele contrasts the repulsive gaze to the inviting text on its base, so here four staring eyes at the top of the group make a counterpoint to the dedicatory inscription at the base. In between the two is Rhonbos's body and its emblematic X.


41. Brinkmann 2003 no. 65 makes no mention of any patterns on the Calf Bearer's garment. The calf itself was originally painted blue.


44. Aristophanes, Frogs 411.

45. Plato, Charmides 155d.


47. I cannot follow Keesling 2003 in seeing the Acropolis korai as representations of Athena. Deities in Greek art are identified by their attributes, and the korai do not have the attributes of Athena: helmet, aegis, and spear. That they hold objects that could potentially be attributes of deities, or even objects that are held by Athena in some representations, does not make them goddesses or Athenas. That one statue sometimes called a kore (Acropolis 661) wears a helmet and is therefore Athena does not mean that all korai are Athena. Just the reverse: we recognize the statue as Athena because she bears the attributes of Athena (cf. Richter 1968: 83 no. 131), and the presence of those attributes only underscores the statue's difference from ordinary korai. At issue is a basic point of iconographic method. I have discussed these issues in greater detail with reference to caryatids in Neer 2001 and Neer 2007c. For an important account of korai as offering bearers, see Osborne 1994. For a recent overview, see Schneider and Höcker 2001: 72–88.

48. Brinkmann 2003 no. 46.


52. On pomegranates, see Muthmann 1982: 66–67. The korai do not mean that all korai are Athena: helmet, aegis, and spear. That they hold objects that could potentially be attributes of deities, or even objects that are held by Athena in some representations, does not make them goddesses or Athenas. That one statue sometimes called a kore (Acropolis 661) wears a helmet and is therefore Athena does not mean that all korai are Athena. Just the reverse: we recognize the statue as Athena because she bears the attributes of Athena (cf. Richter 1968: 83 no. 131), and the presence of those attributes only underscores the statue's difference from ordinary korai. At issue is a basic point of iconographic method. I have discussed these issues in greater detail with reference to caryatids in Neer 2001 and Neer 2007c. For an important account of korai as offering bearers, see Osborne 1994. For a recent overview, see Schneider and Höcker 2001: 72–88.


57. Brinkmann opts tentatively for Athena, noting that the ependytes appears on an Attic bronze statuette of Athena of the mid-sixth century. The parallel is real yet may not support the argument. We do not identify the bronze statuette as Athena on the basis of the ependytes, but on the basis of other attributes: a scaly aegis, a helmet, and an upraised spear. It is these attributes that typically define the Athena type; there is no evidence that the Peplos kore possessed any of them. See Brinkmann and Wünsche 2004b: 74. Also Ridgway 2004.

58. Athens, NM 1.


60. On the Brauroneion, see Edmundson 1968; Rhodes and Dobkins 1979; Despinis 1997; also Hurwit 1999: 197–98.


63. A figure from Eleusis, Athens National Museum 5 (Kaltsas 2002a: 42–43 no. 26), wears a similar but not identical garment.

64. Ridgway 2004: 130.


67. Harrison 1991 is exemplary in this regard and contains references to earlier studies. The term "language of dress" comes from Bonfante 1978.


70. On the Parthenos base, see most recently Hurwit 1999: 235–45; Palagia 2000; Robertson 2004.


72. On Argeia Hera and nuptial cult, see Kauffmann-Samaras 1990. The statue held a pomegranate: Pausianias 2.17.4.


74. The definitive publication of the pinakes is Grillo et al. 2000–2003. See also Prückner 1968. On their connection around the throne, see Ashmole 1922.


76. Often paired with the Ludovisi "throne" is an object of similar dimensions and (allegedly) findspot, the so-called Boston throne. With iconography drawing on well-known
works from the High Classical to the Hellenistic periods—that is, the hanging Marsyas, or the Eros from a column drum of the later Artemision at Ephesus—the piece is either a nineteenth-century fake or a Roman-era pastiche (probably the former). In any event, the Boston “throne” postdates the Ludovisi by hundreds or even thousands of years, and has no direct pertinence to the present discussion. For the theory that the Boston “throne” is a Roman copy of a Greek original—special pleading, in my opinion—see Gullini 1982.

77. On the identification of the figures, see the recent overview in Redfield 2003: 332–45. For the narrative, see the sixth Homeric Hymn, to Aphrodite; the quotation is from line 6.

78. [Homer] Hymn to Aphrodite 6.18. See also Cypria fr. 5: “Her body was dressed in garments that the Graces and Ἕραι had made for her and steeped in all the spring flowers that the seasons bring forth, in crocus and hyacinth, and springing violet, and the rose’s fair, sweet, nectarine bloom, and the ambrosial buds of narcissus.” Trans. M. L. West.

79. On scenes of this sort, see Bérard 1974; Simon 1989; d’Henry 1999. Pausanias saw a sculptural group of this sort on the Akropolis of Athens.

80. Compare Euphronios’s psykter, St. Petersburg, Hermitage 644 (BAPD 200078). For nudity in Archaic terracottas, see Ammerman 1991.


82. Although Redfield 2003 disputes this line of argument.


84. For example, pinakes of types 5 and 6, on which see Grillo et al. 2000–3.


86. On chiton versus peplos, see Schmaltz 1998.


88. Traditional photographs of the throne, straight shots from left, right, and center, obscure a way in which the sculptor playfully emphasizes this point: the nude hetaira crosses her legs, and from an oblique angle one can see her and the Dorian Ἁρα διαίρεται simultaneously; the muffled matron opposite has her legs in strict profile.


90. Derveni Papyrus col. 21 Janko.

91. On the type, see Pasquier 2004.

92. Rome, Palatine 51 (MNRSc 1.1: 222–23 no. 139). See Delivorrias 1993; Delivorrias 1995. On the Baiae casts, see Landwehr 1985: 90–92. Delivorrias himself believes the original to have been a work of Polycleitos, the Aphrodite of Amyklai erected by the Spartans following their victory over Athens in 404 BCE.


95. Euripides, Ion 887–90.


97. The question of which figure is Demeter and which Persephone is not definitively settled but, as Ridgway observes, is relatively unimportant (Ridgway 1981: 138). More recently, see Harrison 2000 (the boy identified as Eumolpos). For the identification as Ploutos, with a review of earlier interpretations, see Clinton and Palagia 2003.


100. Carpenter 1960: 139.


102. Brinkmann and Wünsche 2004b.


106. See, for example, Homer, Iliad 8.399, 8.409.


108. The word is known chiefly from Hesiod and Apollonios Rhodios (e.g., 2.299). The latter is consciously imitating the former, again in connection with Iris and the Harpies. Ancient lexicographers (and LSJ) define metakronion as “high up in the air,” which certainly makes sense of the passages in question, but only by doing violence to the word’s etymology and its poetic context. The issue in each case is not altitude but velocity. Although Evelyn-White’s translation as “quick as time” is much closer to the mark. I have modified to “quicker than time” to retain the sense of paradox.

109. Hesiod, Theogony 380. In the Homeric Hymn to Ares, by contrast, she is “warlike,” and daughter of Ares himself.

110. Bacchylides 11.1–9; cf. 6.10, 10.15.

111. Bacchylides 12.5; Herodotos 8.77.1; Euripides, Phoinissai 1764.

112. Paros A 245; Zaphiropoulou 2000: 13 and n. 21, with earlier bibliography.

113. Athens, Agora S 312. See Shear 1935. The akroterion has often been assigned to the Stoa of Zeus, even though Pausanias says explicitly that the Stoa’s akroteria were of terracotta (Pausanias 1.3.1). The figure was found near the Stoa of Zeus, built into the wall of a late Roman kiln; the findspot is no indication of original location. It might be associated with the Temple of Athena Pallenis that was moved into the Agora in Roman times (see Korres 1992–1998). On akroteria, see Danner 1989. It is a pleasure here to recognize a superb seminar report on these akroteria by Nicola Cronin.

114. Athens, Agora S 1539 + Athens, NM 1732.

115. Olympia 46–8. See especially Hölshcher 1974a; Harrison...
1. Bersani and Dutoit 2004: 70.
3. See Ashmole and Yalouris 1967: 29: “His torso is fully modelled as if he were naked, but the folds of drapery round the hips show that in fact he was wearing a thin garment, perhaps as a shield against the heat, so thin that it was carved only at its lower edge, the rest being simply a coat of paint.” For analogous effects in other works, see Brinkmann and Wünsche 2004b: 141–49.
4. The bibliography on the Motya youth is large. For a recent overview, see Denti 1997, with earlier references, to which add Steiner 2001: 230–32.
5. Steiner draws a provocative analogy between these fingers and the way Ovid’s Pygmalion presses his thumb into the flesh of Galatea: Steiner 2001: 231, with Ovid, Metamorphoses 10.285–86.
6. From Rhaidestos: Thessaloniki, NM 930; Despinis, Tivéries, and Voutras 1997: 18–19 no. 5. Compare also a terracotta akroterion (?) from Paestum, dating to the later sixth century: Holloway 1975 figs. 17–18. For the Ionian “draped kouroi” type and its impact on the West, see Barletta 1987. For a recent find from Kalymnos, with dedication to Apollo, see Blackman 2001–2002: 100. The tradition is apparent in a late fifth-century figure in Rome: a naked warrior whose chlamys, slung over the shoulder, employs transparent drapery (Dörig 1993). The Ionian tradition carries on in frieze 1 of the early fourth-century Nereid monument from Xanthos (Childs and Demargne 1989; Ridgway 1997: 79–88).
7. Here it is worth remembering that the characters of the Greco-Phoenician alphabet were themselves originally pictograms. For instance, the letter Α, alpha or aleph, originally written Ϛ, depicted an ox (two horns over a triangular face), which is the meaning of aleph in Semitic tongues.
8. Boston 03.997.
11. The inscription may have been added later: see Duplouy 2006: 258–59.
16. On the approved male physique, see Dover 1989: 70.
17. A point noted in Dover 1989.
18. Bibliography on the Riace bronzes is vast. Important collections are Triches 1984; Melucco Vaccaro et al. 2003. See also Deubner 1988. (Those who believe that the Riace bronzes were cast from live models suggest that the genitals were not included in the mold-making process, being too tender for such treatment!)
20. Konstam and Hoffmann 2002; Konstam and Hoffmann 2004. Compare Cohen 1991. Ancient sources do record casting of this sort but only in the Hellenistic period (Lysistratos, brother of Lysippos), and even then the testimony is dubious.
25. To avoid this bind it is necessary to set some limits to idealism as an art-historical category. To be heuristic, accounts of idealism must allow for departures from “precise, objective, and even scientific realism” that would not be idealistic (or rational, or what have you). Such departures, moreover, should not be monstrosities that would never be candidates for idealism (for realism). It is only insofar as the muscles of a statue correspond to muscles in a real human that we may call them idealized. Many men have soft and flabby stomachs, without the splendidly delineated abdominals of, say, Warrior A from Riace (plate 8). But it would miss the point to call the statue unrealistic or distorted on this ground, because each of the depicted muscles does have a counterpart, however undeveloped, on a real man. This correspondence is a necessary condition for idealism; idealization must have an object, there must be something to idealize. It follows that, if a statue is a candidate for idealism, and if its depicted anatomy does not correspond to anything in ordinary human anatomy, then that statue it is neither idealized nor realistic. Giving a human statue eight abdominal muscles, twisting its arms impossibly (even painfully), or extending its arms to simian length is not idealization. It is either distorted or...
flat-out unrealistic. On the other hand, conforming the sculpted body to Greek ideals of manly beauty—making the nose impossibly straight, the muscles impossibly clear-cut and well-developed—could be idealization. In short, for present purposes idealization is the imagined realization of a potential for perfectibility; anything else is either distorted or unrealistic.

27. Childs 1988: 13. For another version of this view, see Hallett 1986.
32. Amphora, related to Exekias, once London Market (BAPD 12898).
33. Paris, Louvre F8bis (BAPD 7479). See also Mykonos 7, attributed to the Flying-Angel and Triptolemos Painters (BAPD 203815).
40. Foucault 2001: 12, emphasis added.
41. A position echoed in Aristotle, Politics 1340a35. On Xenophon’s use of diaphainō, see Halliwell 2002: 123.
42. Kleiton is sometimes taken as a stand-in for Polykleitos: Kaiser 1990.
43. For analogies in Aristotle see Halliwell 2002: 123 n. 16, 124 n. 19.
44. Empedokles fr. 126 DK. Trans. K. Freeman. Compare Sophokles, Antigone 705, which can be translated as, “Do not wear just one ἑθος, mē nun hen ἑθος mounon ev sautōi phorei.
45. Plato, Symposium 216d.
48. New York, Metropolitan Museum 29.54.
49. Pliny, Natural History 35.58. Trans. Rackham (slightly modified).
52. On expressive projection and lure, see Wollheim 1987: chap. 3; Wollheim 1993: 144–58. There is a suggestive parallel with Riegl’s account of the pitched roofs of Greek temples, which he sees as suggestive of interior space: “[B]y exposing the interior to the outside, the roof stimulates fantasy.” Rieg 1904: 424.
53. For a wide-ranging discussion of hetairai and textiles, see Dalby 2002. On this passage in particular, compare the use of periballō at Plato, Symposium 216d.
54. Compare Kant and Schiller from the beginning of this chapter: the terms are very similar.
55. For antecedents in vase-painting, please see Neer 2002: chap. 3.
57. Plato, Symposium 217a. A little later (219b–c), Alkibiades will use thaumastos to describe Socrates sleeping beside him beneath their two cloaks. Thus muffled beneath a sort of nuptial blanket manqué, Socrates is carnally present to his smitten pupil but psychologically absent, asleep. He thereby elicits thauma, for this conjoining of absence and presence only makes the philosopher all the more compelling morally: he sleeps his way through an invitation to sex, and this refusal only binds the young man to him all the more. Once again, the relation of cloth to body figures the relation of soul to vision.
64. See LSJ, s.v. “nemesis.”
65. leukoisin pharessi kalupsamene khroa kalon: Hesiod, Works and Days 198.
67. For useful discussions, see Cairns 1996; Cairns 2002.
69. “When manifested in the eyes ἀίδως indicates that the gaze is averted downwards.” Cairns 1993: 312.
70. Paraphrasing Stewart 1997: 80–81. The Amelung goddess type, if it does in fact depend on a fifth-century goddess, is another instance of this thematic, this time in a feminine figure.
72. Recent studies of the “Mourning Penelope” include Gauer 1990; Stähler 1990; Buitron-Oliver and Cohen 1995: 43–48; Parisi Presicce 1996. For an overview, see Ridgway 1970:

74. There is much speculation about the origins of the type and the larger group, if any, to which it may have belonged. Fortunately, such matters are not directly pertinent to the present discussion. For an overview, see Hausmann, *LIMC* 7.290–95, s.v. “Penelope.” For speculations that the type may have originated in wall painting, see Gauer 1990: 49–50.


76. See Parisi Presicce 1996: 388 fig. 9; and Paris, Louvre MNB 906.


79. New York, Metropolitan 48.11.4; CAT 2.277.


84. Papadopoulos-Belmeidi 1994b. See also Helleman 1995.

85. No longer, in fact, in the Terme, but the Palazzo Massimo. For a recent overview of scholarly debate on this figure and others associated with it, see Hartswick 2004: 93–104.

86. Homer, *Iliad* 24.617: *entha lithos per eousa theōn ek kēdea pessē*.


89. Pausanias 1.24.3.

90. Boardman 1985: 175.

91. Philokles was the nephew of Aeschylus and a playwright in his own right: *TrGF* F 1. Sophokles: *TrGF* F IV 581–95b.


93. Sophokles, *Tereus* *TrGF* F IV F 595.

94. In what follows I favor the arguments presented in Adam 1966 over those of Knell 1978. In brief, Knell puts the knife in the right hand, not the left. This reconstruction does have the advantage of making Prokne right-handed. But it leaves unexplained the action of the left hand. Iconographic parallels suggest that the upraised hand should hold the knife. From the Roman period come related images of the daughters of Pelias preparing to disembowel their father and Medea preparing to murder her sons (the former on a so-called Three Figure relief (fig. 113), the latter on a Pompeian fresco). The Peliades relief, in particular, is often understood to depend upon a fifth-century Attic original. The theme of killing family members is a constant in these scenes. On this relief, see Meyer 1980; with Schmidt 1984. On the pose, see Settis 1984: 207–8.

95. On nudity as vulnerability, see Stewart 1997.

96. On the pedimental figures, see Palagia 1993: 22–23 (identifying L as Artemis, but without accounting for the intimacy of the pose). Compare as well the early fourth-century gravestone of Philotera in Thebes (Archaeological Museum of Thebes inv. 131), and the woman with a boy on her lap from the frieze of the Erechtheion.

97. On Aphrodite’s exposed shoulder, here and elsewhere, see Delivorrias 1995.

98. Pausanias 1.24.3.

99. As Claude Rolley puts it, “Here there is an effect entirely new to large-scale sculpture, a direct reflection of the most intense moments of tragedy.” Rolley 1999: 147. Trans. author.


101. Cf. Tölle-Kastenbein 1986. In fourth-century Athens, a variant of the pose characteristically signifies grief. See, for instance, Athens NM 709 (Kaltsas 2002a: 207 no. 420); Athens NM 4496 (Kaltsas 2002a: 203 no. 406); Athens NM 3890 (Kaltsas 2002a: 324 no. 680). On peplophoroi as mythic (as opposed to realistic), see Lee 2003; Lee 2004.


103. Rome, Musei Vaticani, Museo Gregoriano Profano 9983. This and other “Three Figure Reliefs” are sometimes associated with Alkamenes: see Fuchs 1969: 519; Harrison 1977: 149.


106. For the pose of the daughter of Pelias as one of thoughtfulness, see Meyer 1980: 133–39.


111. Usually dated to circa 410–400 BCE. Athens, Kerameikos P695 / I221; CAT 1.660. For similar effects, see Athens, Kerameikos P169, CAT 2.727; Paris, Louvre Ma 2872, CAT 2.810. The receiving blanket functions similarly on neo-Attic reliefs showing the birth of Erikhthonios, often associated with the base of the cult statues in the Hephaisteion: Kosmopoulou 2002: 242–44.


116. On seeing-as as a mode of ethics, see Cavell 1979.


119. Just to give one signal example, Panofsky's landmark *Perspektive als symbolische Form* of 1927, which trades on a distinction between retinal and mental images of space, is behelden to Hildebrand in fundamental ways. Translation: Panofsky 1991.


121. This ethics of beholding might serve as a counterbalance to the "ethics of form" that Halliwell detects in Plato: *Cloud* 202–23; *Laws* 655c–660c (sections 264–70). See, for example, Osborne 1988. For a view of this opposition that is to my mind overly reductive, see Sourvinou-Inwood 1995: 252–53; Mack 1996: 6–11.

122. The ideological distinction between kouroi and stelai is argued most thoroughly in D'Onofrio 1983; D'Onofrio 1998. For a contrary position, part of a broad effort to depoliticize the entire apparatus of funerary display in the tradition of *Geistgeschichte*, see Sourvinou-Inwood 1995: 264–70.


26. Phokylides frs. 3 and 4 IEG.


30. Cicero, De legibus 2.64–65. On the usefulness of this passage (or lack thereof), see Morris 1994: 89 n. 43.


36. IG 1330; Hansen 1983: 54 no. 93.

37. But see F. Giudice 2000; E. Giudice 2002. The former argues, implausibly to my mind, that the dēmosion sēma was decorated with statues. The latter adds the same evidence to argue, on the contrary, that only private tombs were decorated with statues. The latter is marginally more compelling, but the evidence derives solely from vase-paintings. This method raises two problems. First, the key work, a white-ground lekythos by the Thanatos Painter (Boston 01.8080; BAPD 216394), is routinely said to depict a tomb with freestanding statues. But the edifice in question does not look much like the tombs on other Athenian pots (if anything, it is more like an altar); its identity is by no means certain. Second, even if a Classical painter were to depict freestanding tomb sculpture, that would not necessarily imply that real Classical tombs bore sculpture. The tomb could be make-believe, could be mythic, could be non-Athenian, could be Archaic. The realist fallacy has been criticized most extensively in Pinney 2002. On images of statues in vase-painting, see De Cesare 1997.

38. This is the traditional position. Stears 2000b: 39–41 seeks to raise the date as high as c. 450. The argument is implausible, depending on a presumed date of ca. 445–35 for completion of work on the Parthenon frieze, after which the sculptors were free to work on stelai. The frieze, however, has been shown to be an afterthought, added to the building well after construction was underway (Korres 1988); completion in the 440s is unlikely. Stears eventually pegs the reappearance as early as c. 450 (pp. 49, 51), in order to associate it with the Periklean Citizenship Law of 451/50. This high date seems impossible on stylistic grounds, implying that the stele of Eupheros (fig. 121) and works like it must predate the Parthenon metopes—quite apart from the frieze—by as much as a decade. For a related argument, see Osborne 2004b.


42. On funerary statuary and the lack thereof in the fifth century, see, inter alia, Kurtz and Boardman 1971: 132–36; Ridgway 1981: 117–19. A possible exception would be the memorial of Kritias, leader of the Thirty Tyrants, which depicted a personification of Oligarchy setting fire to Democracy (Kritias A 13 Diels-Kranz). It is unclear, however, whether this scene was depicted in relief or freestanding sculpture. The democrats who overthrew Kritias erected a relief at Thebes, carved by Alkamenes: Pausanias 9.11.6.

43. Stele of Eupheros: Athens, Kerameikos P 1169; Clairmont 1993 no. 1.081.

44. On grave stelai that cite freestanding statuary, see Himmelmam 2000. Unsurprisingly, the phenomenon is especially common in Attic votive reliefs; see, for instance, Baunmer 1997. More generally, on citation in Classical art, see Strocka 1979; Frontisi-Ducroux 2004.

45. Athens, NM 2004; IG I 1317; Clairmont 1993 no. 1.100; Kaltsas 2002a: 152 no. 298. From Chasani, near the old Athens airport.

46. Berlin F 2394; ARV² 400.1 (1651, 1706); Para 370; Beazley Addenda² 230.


49. Athens, National Museum 3891 (CAT 1.182; Kaltsas 2002 no. 301).
51. Not everyone accepts the connection between the stele and monumental prototypes or the connection between the Roman versions and a Classical original. But even Brunilde Ridgway, generally a stern skeptic in such matters, seems to do so: see Ridgway 1997: 181. On the type, see Delivorrias 1968.
54. Pausanias 4.27.
55. Not everyone accepts the connection between the stele and monumental prototypes or the connection between the Roman versions and a Classical original. But even Brunilde Ridgway, generally a stern skeptic in such matters, seems to do so: see Ridgway 1997: 181. On the type, see Delivorrias 1968.
56. Royal, generally a stern skeptic in such matters, seems to do so: see Ridgway 1997: 181. On the type, see Delivorrias 1968.
57. The gears clash at only one point: his hips twist uncomfortably to remain parallel to the relief plane while his shoulders recede into the background.
58. Pausanias 10.25.11.
59. Pausanias 4.27.
60. IG I² 1190 line 42, a casualty list from the naval battle at Kynossema in the Hellespont in summer 411. Lykeas was trierarch. For the battle, Thucydides 8.104–6. For the identification, first made by P. Wolters, see Clairmont 1983: 314–15 n. 70. For the name, Osborne 1996 s.v. “Lykeas”; for its rarity, Davies 1970: 344. Clairmont, loc. cit., goes on to suggest that the Khairedemos on the Piraeus stele is named in a casualty list of 409, IG I² 1191 line 250. This name, however, is not so uncommon, and the problem of homonyms is correspondingly more acute. Andokides denounced a Khairedemos during the Hermokopidai crisis in 413, but the latter was still alive when Andokides delivered *On the Mysteries* in 400.
61. Revolution of the Four Hundred: Thucydides 8.48–98. On the coup, see Ostwald 1986: 344–411; Ostwald 1999. That the Battle of Kynossema occurred while the oligarchs were still in power is stated explicitly at Thucydides 8.104–6. For the identification, first made by P. Wolters, see Clairmont 1983: 314–15 n. 70. For the name, Osborne 1996 s.v. “Lykeas”; for its rarity, Davies 1970: 344. Clairmont, loc. cit., goes on to suggest that the Khairedemos on the Piraeus stele is named in a casualty list of 409, IG I² 1191 line 250. This name, however, is not so uncommon, and the problem of homonyms is correspondingly more acute. Andokides denounced a Khairedemos during the Hermokopidai crisis in 413, but the latter was still alive when Andokides delivered *On the Mysteries* in 400.
62. The gears clash at only one point: his hips twist uncomfortably to remain parallel to the relief plane while his shoulders recede into the background.
63. Pausanias 4.27.
64. Pausanias 4.27.
65. Pausanias 4.27.
66. On Boeotian stelai, see, most recently, Daumas 2001. For the island relief, Amorgos K.9, see Heinmeyer 2002: 120. For the public grave relief, Athens NM M 4551, see Parlama and Stampolidis 2000: 396–99 cat. no. 452. See also Athens NM 3730 (CAT 127); Athens, Epigraphical Museum 9305 (CAT 1.194), also the somewhat later stele of Sosias and Kephisodoros (Berlin 1708; CAT 3.192). A bronze *piloi* is part of an Athenian trophy on a sculpted base of ca. 430–20 in the Akropolis Museum (inv. 3173; Kosmopoulos 2002: 175–76 and fig. 27). On *piloi* of felt and bronze, see Sekunda 1994: 176–77 and n. 193–94.
68. Pausanias 10.25.11.
69. Pausanias 10.25.11.
70. Pausanias 10.25.11.
71. Pausanias 10.25.11.
72. Pausanias 10.25.11.
75. In this light it is worth noting that Lykeas, on his stele, wears a beard in the Spartan fashion, without a moustache.
76. Leader 1997: 693; Younger 2002: 183–85. I was unable to consult Bectarte 2006 while writing this section; the article provides a useful catalog of funerary reliefs with specular themes, although I cannot subscribe to the thesis that the mirrors represent “the movement of the psyche during death” (179). On mirrors in Greece, with particular reference to pictorial representations, see Vernant and Frontisi-Ducroux 1997.
77. Leader 1997: 693; Younger 2002: 183–85. I was unable to consult Bectarte 2006 while writing this section; the article provides a useful catalog of funerary reliefs with specular themes, although I cannot subscribe to the thesis that the mirrors represent “the movement of the psyche during death” (179). On mirrors in Greece, with particular reference to pictorial representations, see Vernant and Frontisi-Ducroux 1997.
78. Leader 1997: 693; Younger 2002: 183–85. I was unable to consult Bectarte 2006 while writing this section; the article provides a useful catalog of funerary reliefs with specular themes, although I cannot subscribe to the thesis that the mirrors represent “the movement of the psyche during death” (179). On mirrors in Greece, with particular reference to pictorial representations, see Vernant and Frontisi-Ducroux 1997.
Osborne 1996, Stears 2000b) fail to take into account the fact that the earliest Classical Athenian gravestones date to the very late 430s.

79. On the Pasticcio, see Zagdoun 1980. For the profile mirror, compare also a lekythos by the Tithonas Painter, Boston 00.340 (BAPD 203180). For frontal mirrors on Locrian pinakes, see Types 6/3–6/8, 7/2 (?); for a profile mirror, see Type 6/9. On these types, see Grillo et al. 2000–2003 no. 4: 662–723, 751–63.

80. On the play of gazes, or Augenspiel, in reliefs, see CAT 1: 122–29. For mirrors as an engagement with beholders, see Leader 1997: 693; Younger 2002: 183–85.


82. Plato, Republic 596c–e.


84. Athens, National Museum 715, from Aegina. Cf. Conze 1890–1922 no. 1032; Clairmont 1993 no. 1.550, with earlier bibliography. More recently, Rolley 1999: 166; Kaltsas 2002a: 148 no. 287. For the reflexive structure compare also the late fourth century stele of Agnostrate. The deceased stands looking at a large funerary lekythos, on which she herself again appears: her name is actually inscribed twice, once on the epistyle and once on the lekythos. Athens, National Museum 1865; Kaltsas 2002a: 206 no. 417.

85. On the turning posts and mortuary commemoration, see McGowan 1995.

86. Robertson 1975: 367–68 questions the standard identification of the boy as a slave, noting his long hair. Robertson also suggests that the boy is sitting on the steps of a tomb and that he is in fact the deceased: both possibilities seem unlikely. For the possible athletic equipment, first suggested by Semi Karouzou, see Clairmont 1993: 397. He probably resembled a figure of the sort one finds on Classical banquetting reliefs, such as an example in the Palazzo Altemps in Rome (Rome, Palazzo Altemps 381001; De Angelis d'Ossat 2002: 142).

87. Robertson 1975: 367–68 questions the standard identification of the boy as a slave, noting his long hair. Robertson also suggests that the boy is sitting on the steps of a tomb and that he is in fact the deceased: both possibilities seem unlikely. For the possible athletic equipment, first suggested by Semi Karouzou, see Clairmont 1993: 397. He probably resembled a figure of the sort one finds on Classical banquetting reliefs, such as an example in the Palazzo Altemps in Rome (Rome, Palazzo Altemps 381001; De Angelis d'Ossat 2002: 142).

88. Robertson 1975: 367–68 questions the standard identification of the boy as a slave, noting his long hair. Robertson also suggests that the boy is sitting on the steps of a tomb and that he is in fact the deceased: both possibilities seem unlikely. For the possible athletic equipment, first suggested by Semi Karouzou, see Clairmont 1993: 397. He probably resembled a figure of the sort one finds on Classical banquetting reliefs, such as an example in the Palazzo Altemps in Rome (Rome, Palazzo Altemps 381001; De Angelis d'Ossat 2002: 142).


90. For other instances of the dove motif on Athenian gravestones, cf. Clairmont 1993 nos. 0.530, 0.690, 0.691, 0.693–96, 1.080, 1.082, 1.154, 1.721.

91. Rome, Conservatori 987.


93. On such birds, see Robertson 1975: 368–69.


95. It also migrates to Boeotia, for example, Athens, National Museum 818, a relief of the late fifth century showing a seated woman with a bird, from Thespiai.

96. Clairmont 1993: 398. Sheila Adam, in her invaluable discussion of the stele’s technical aspects, has suggested that there was, originally, a little dove attached to the youth’s hand by some means; but the idea is implausible and unsupported by evidence (Adam 1966: 111). An opposing tradition takes the gesture to be one of greeting or farewell: see Rolley 1999: 161, with earlier references. As the ephiepe turns away from the beholder, it is unclear to whom this gesture could possibly be addressed.


98. On sphinxes atop gravestones, see Sourvinou-Inwood 1995: 270–73. For a related image of a rabbit or hare atop a pillar, see Athens, NM 794, CAT 1.200. The rabbit is perhaps a love-gift, as on the stele of Telesias (Athens, NM 898; CAT 1.810).

99. The kouros-like autonomy of the deceased on the Cat stele has been recognized by Himmelmann: “Between the figures on the Aeginetan stele, death has most certainly opened up a rift. The combined absence of gaze and expression, the evident separation in the pair, cannot mean anything else. The autonomy [für-sich-sein] of the deceased, declared here with utter clarity, connects this stele in its conception not with contemporary lekythoi but with the illisos stele of a hundred years later.” Himmelmann 1956: 15. Trans. author.

100. Aeschylus, Agamemnon 394.


106. Sosinos: Paris, Louvre MA769 (CAT 1.202). Xanthippos: London 1805.7–3.183 (CAT 1.650). Affinities with these stele lead Slater to argue, plausibly, that the stele represents an actor, not a mere choreutēs. There were no professional chorus-dancers in Classical Greece.

107. All the more startling, therefore, to find that Jiri Frel attributes the two gravestones to a single hand.

108. On masks and theatricality in Greece, the bibliography

114. See the classic account in Svenbro 1993.
116. For the correct identification, see Scholl 1995: 231–33.
117. See, for example, Goldhill 1992; Goldhill 1994; Goldhill 1997.
118. On the *khoregia*, see Wilson 2000, with further references.
120. Athens, National Museum 884; CAT 2.710; Kaltzas 2002a: 170 no. 335, with earlier bibliography. The right side is restored; the presence of the second alabastron is not certain.
122. Nielsen et al. 1989; Scholl 1996; Bergemann 1997; Leader 1997; Oliver 2000b; Stears 2000a. Some scholars (e.g., Nielsen et al.) reason that if sculpted monuments were not necessarily elitist in the fourth century, then there is no reason to suppose that they were elitist in the fifth. But this view neglects the point, argued in Morris 1992 and elsewhere, that elitist mortuary practices tend to be appropriated by lower classes, with elites adapting in turn by finding new modes of self-presentation.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Reliefs from the Athenian Agora.” In Hoffmann and Leszina-Haft, 2001: 115–24.


GENERAL INDEX

Numbers in italics refer to illustrations.

Admetos, 50, 53, 60–61, 67
Aeschylus, 44, 97, 178, 204; on the wonderful in sculpture, 103
agalma ("delightful thing, votive gift, statue"), 2, 33, 56, 65, 117, 162, 164
Agorakritos of Paros, 237n88
aidos ("seemly modesty"), 153, 162–64, 171
Akhilleus, 44, 46–47, 59, 63, 82, 97, 178
Alkaios, 76
Alkamenes of Athens, 5, 169–78, 180–81, 192, 211, 213, 110, 111
Alkestis, 50, 60–61, 67, 191
Alkmeneids, 28, 93, 96, 54
amazement (thamboos), 59–60, 63, 97, 98
Ampharete, monument of, 176–77, 180, 208, 117
Anakreon, 81
Anakreons (Attica), 21–30, 37, 39, 41–44, 46, 49, 58, 78, 145, 146, 176, 186, 213, 215, 219n28, 221n83
Anchises, 53, 60, 112
aniconism, 14, 58, 66, 87, 110; argoi lithoi ("unworked stones"), 218n50
Aphrodite, 5, 53, 58, 60, 67, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78, 108, 109, 112–114, 119, 121, 123, 124, 125–31, 133, 139, 140, 144, 156, 167, 172, 192, 211, 215, 233n172, 185–87, 228n27, 228n32, 229n73, 230n77–78, 230n99–94, 233n97, pl. 3
argoi lithoi ("unworked stones"). See aniconism
Ariston of Paros, 48, 53
Aristogeiton. See Tyrant-Slayers
Aristophanes, 109, 117, 141, 171, 174, 204, 213, 234n109, 236n62
Aristotle, 40, 45, 85, 159, 178; metaphors of weaving, 174; on pathos, 159–60; on pity and fear, 178; on seeing statues ("the inanimate becomes animate"), 32, 105, 108; on wonder, 5, 66, 105–6, 224n215. See also pareontas apeinai ("present while absent")
astonishment (ekplēxis), 56, 57, 60, 222n156
Athena, 9, 56, 58, 60, 82, 93, 94, 96–102, 114, 119, 124, 138, 208, 227n89, 227n98, 227n103, 229n47 229n57, 237n97
Auerbach, Erich, 3
Bacchylides of Keos, 62–63, 88, 90–91, 137, 224n199
Baxandall, Michael, 47, 217n05
beautiful death (katos thanatos), 30, 50, 220n37
Beazley, J. D., 9, 194, 217n26
Bersani, Leo, and Ulysses Dutoit, 142
Blitz der Individualität. See Hegel, G. W. F
blockiness, foursquareness, quadrifacesity, 33–40, 49, 51, 73, 106, 145, 148, 213, 220n66
boundary-markers, 28–30, 220n34
Brilliance, personified (Elektra), 137
Brinkmann, Vincenz, 66, 75–76, 119, 225n25–30, 229n41, 229n57
bronze, as medium, 35, 74, 76–77, 81–83, 85–88, 89, 109, 136–37, 146, 190, 198
Carpenter, Rhys, 13, 43, 72, 89–90, 102, 134, 146–47, 151, 184–86, 220n66
Carson, Anne, 32, 50, 162–63, 220–217n0, 226n47
carving, as attitude and as technique, 33–38, 73, 145–46
Cavell, Stanley: on criticism, 288n37; on myths of the inner, 112; on "possibilities" of phenomena, 218n45; on seeing-as and ethics, 234n116
ceramics
character (éthos), 4, 5, 6, 71, 105–10, 155–81, 209–11, 213, 215, 232n38, 232n45. See also ethics
chronology (absolute and relative), 7–9, 217n21
chryselephantine, 74, 76, 99–102, 105, 124
Cicero, M. Tullius, 101, 187
connoisseurship, 7–10, 11
contraposto, 72–73, 88, 102, 105
copies and variants, Roman, 37, 38, 45, 60, 73, 75, 78, 81, 83, 89, 97, 104, 113, 123, 129, 131, 164, 192
copula and para taxis, 10, 31–32, 40. See Carson, Anne; Heidegger, Martin; synapse, synaptic criteria, agreement in, 10–11, 13, 14, 18, 179. See also Cavell, Stanley; image, criteria of; Wittgenstein, Ludwig
cunning intelligence (mētis), 57, 162, 168, 223n167
Daidalos, 36, 61, 109, 220n68
Day, Joseph, 44, 231n9
Dedalic style, 8, 217n21, 223n192
Delphi, 54, 58, 69, 93, 96, 98, 121, 196, 200, 217n21, 227n89, 237n89; Siphnian Treasury, 25, 41, 93, 159; temple of Apollo ("Alkmeneid temple"), 54, 93, 96, 227n89, 227n97
general index

260

style, role of in archaeology and art history, 1–19

Summers, David, 185–86

surface-effect, chap. 3 passim, 109, 111–14, 117, 121, 124, 128, 134–35, 141, 161, 184, 185; defined, 5, 105–8; drapery and, chap. 3 passim; emblems of, 192 (jug), 210 (mask); ēthos and, 155–81; narrative and, 5–6, 164–68, 169–72; skin and, 147–55. See also Rilke, Rainer Maria

survey archaeology, and connoisseurship, 7

Svenbro, Jesper, 44, 54, 126

technology, sculptural, 36, 77; bronze working, 77, 81; marble working, 146; wood working, 14, 34–36. See also carving, as attitude and as technique; sphyrelaton (technique)
teeth, gritted, 157–59

territory, statues as possible markers of, 30, 48, 213. See also place, space and
tetragōnon (“foursquare”), 36, 40, 49, 73, 145, 148, 213, 220n67. See also blockiness, foursquareness, quadri faciality

thambos. See amazement (thambos)

thaua. See wonder (thaua)

thaua idesthai (“a wonder to behold for itself and oneself”), 4, 58–68, 84, 94, 97, 102, 105, 113, 126, 128, 139, 192, 223n170, 223n184–85, 227n98. See also wonder (thaua)
thеatеr. See masks and theatrical iconography

Theodotē, 160–64, 180, 208

Theognis of Megara, 63

theōria (“beholding”), 13, 85, 178, 215; appropriated by philosophy, 65–66, 222n159. See also Plato

Theseus, 62, 82, 91, 94, 236n68

Tharon, monument of, 46

Thucydides of Athens, 8, 9, 78, 196, 213

thunderbolts, 59, 76, 87–92, 96, 98

trunkiness, 34–38, 40, 106. See also blockiness, foursquareness, quadri faciality
twofoldness, 4, 46, 59, 61, 65–69, 71, 83–84, 113, 164, 224n226. See also poikilia (“complex adornment”); Wollheim, Richard, on “lure”

Tyrannicides. See Tyrant-Slayers

Tyrant-Slayers, 4, 38, 39, 78–85, 86, 87, 89, 96, 102, 105, 128, 136, 138, 139, 141, 194, 217n77, 223n137–38

Ventriss, Michael, 17–18

Vernant, Jean-Pierre, 3, 5, 13–19, 30, 42, 58, 59, 84, 93, 114, 218n51, 218n57, 219n63, 221n92

viewing experience. See experience, viewing

visual culture, 11–12, 18

weaving, metaphors of, 58, 114, 168, 174, 234n109, 234n126

Whitley, James, 6

Winckelmann, J. J., 2, 152

Winter, Irene, 74

Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 222n127, 234n112; critique of semiotic and neuroscientific accounts of seeing, 16–18; on dolls and stones, 179; on the inner, 106, 112, 179; on the “possibilities” in phenomena, 218n45; on seeing pictorial representations, 16–18; on “the weave of our life,” 179

Wölflin, Heinrich, 13, 84

Wollheim, Richard, on “lure,” 159–60, 162. See also twofoldness

wonder (thauma), 4–5, 36, 57–69, 71, 74, 82–85, 86, 88, 89, 91, 98, 102–3, 105, 114, 137, 152; appropriated by philosophy, 63–66; decay of concept in late Classical and after, 68; grammar of, 66–68, 223n185; light and, 59–60, chap. 2 passim, 74, 82, 83, 102, 113, 137; personified, 137; sudden appearance and, 61–62, chap. 2 passim, 82, 85, 138; twofoldness and, 57–62, 78–81. See also thauma idesthai (“a wonder to behold for itself and oneself”)

Xenophon, 14, 63–65, 155–62, 163, 172, 176, 178, 180, 198

xoanon (“carved thing”). See aniconism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Work</th>
<th>Page Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kleoboulos (?)</td>
<td><em>Nemean Odes</em> 5:42–139–40</td>
<td>PMG: 48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simonides</td>
<td><em>Olympian Odes</em> 1.1–2: 99</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kritias</td>
<td><em>Pythian Odes</em> 4:238: 60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucian</td>
<td>8:95–97: 88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eikones</td>
<td>10:46–50: 224n199</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gallus</td>
<td>Plato</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Charides</em> 154b–c: 164</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Cratylus</em> 240a–b: 50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Laws</em> 644d–e: 234n125</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Parmenides</em> 129d–130a: 64, 224n210</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Phaedo</em> 117c: 163</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Phaedra</em> 250a–251d: 55–57, 222n159</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Philebus</em> 36e: 63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Republic</em> 359d–e: 109</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>568d: 113</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>596c–e: 198</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>598a: 221n100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pausanias</td>
<td><em>Statesman</em> 282c: 174</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>279b–283b: 234n109</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>305–306a: 234n109</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>309c: 174</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phokylides</td>
<td><em>Apologie</em> 3: 219n29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Antigone</em> 705: 232</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Oidipous Tyrannos</em> 13: 45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strabo</td>
<td>6:3.3: 196</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8:3.4: 102</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.1.16: 101</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xenophon</td>
<td><em>Memorialia</em> 3:10: 155–57, 161</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3:11: 160–62, 163, 188, 178, 180</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Simposium</em> 7.2: 63, 198</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>